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Introduction
On March 1, 1917, Gustav Stresemann addressed the German Reichstag. Commenting on recent international developments, the rising star of the National Liberal Party had much to ponder. After the German Re-
ich had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare just one month earlier, U. S. 
President Woodrow Wilson had cut off diplomatic relations. After thirty-one 
 months of neutrality, it no longer seemed likely that the United States would 
refrain from joining the war coalition against Germany. Not yet forty years 
old, Stresemann, Germany’s future foreign minister and Nobel peace laureate, 
applied his oratory skill to explaining the deterioration of German-American 
relations in the preceding years. Trying to comprehend why the U. S. stance on 
Germany had shifted from neutral to somewhat belligerent, Stresemann fo-
cused not on the Reich’s violation of Belgian neutrality in August 1914, not on 
its infamous sinking of the ocean liner Lusitania in May 1915, not on its acts of 
sabotage on American soil during 1915 and 1916, and not even on the resump-
tion of unrestricted submarine warfare (which he had supported); instead he 
told his audience: “with regard to German-American relations, we now have 
to pay the price for the distorted image of Germany that was able to develop 
abroad because we have not even tried to properly influence international 
public opinion.”1 At the heart of America’s growing enmity, Stresemann held, 
lay not Germany’s wartime decisions but a fundamental misunderstanding of 
Germany and the German people. Ultimately, a “distorted image” of the Reich 
as an aggressive, militaristic, and autocratic nation was to blame for the trans-
1 See Gustav Stresemann in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Mar. 1, 1917, 2470 A.
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atlantic discord.2 As the two countries edged toward war, Stresemann regarded 
Germany’s international isolation and even U. S. belligerence as the product of 
failures in German public relations.
Given Stresemann’s strong support for the resumed submarine warfare 
just a few months earlier, it would be easy to dismiss his focus on such an im-
ponderable factor as Germany’s “distorted image” as a convenient excuse for 
a policy gone wrong. But Stresemann was far from alone in this assessment. 
The left-liberal opponents of submarine warfare, too, widely attributed Amer-
ican belligerence to the Imperial government’s long-standing neglect of public 
diplomacy. While Allied propaganda had successfully turned Germans into 
“Huns,” German leaders had apparently not mustered any determined or ef-
fective countermeasures.3 On the contrary: for decades already, they claimed, 
the German government had failed to pursue a modern communications strat-
egy as it lacked both the necessary expertise and interest. With its foreign ser-
vice steeped in aristocratic privilege and the Reichstag relegated to the fringes 
of foreign policy-making, the Kaiserreich had never perceived international 
opinion as a “power factor” at all. A few days after the Reichstag debate, news 
broke of the intercepted Zimmermann Telegram, wherein German Undersec-
retary of State Arthur Zimmermann had promised parts of the United States 
to Mexico in exchange for its military support in case of war. For many crit-
ics, this seemed to be merely the most recent in a long string of diplomatic 
blunders, and yet another indication of the disregard for foreign psychology in 
German statecraft.
For Germany’s future leaders, including Stresemann, the importance of 
public relations and the need for systematic public diplomacy was among the 
central lessons of the Great War. From 1917 onward, they set out “to make up,” 
as Stresemann put it, “for what we have long neglected.”4 Spurred on by the re-
alities of defeat in late 1918 and the loss of hard power options in 1919, a debate 
emerged in the postwar years about the significance of public opinion in in-
ternational relations, along with a commitment to reshaping Germany’s image 
in the world. Whatever their previous positions, many Germans realized the 
international impact of public sentiment as a result of World War I. Hence-
forth, foreign policy could no longer be conducted as it had been before. As 
Stresemann had already concluded in March 1917: “We just have to get used to 
the fact that today throughout the world we live in a democratic age, in which 
these public attitudes have such great importance, are so powerful a factor, that 
we have no option but to counter Britain’s enormous efforts in this field with 
2 Gustav Stresemann in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Mar. 29, 1917, 2850 
D–2851 A.
3 For more details on this discussion, see Chapter 2.
4 Stresemann in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Mar. 1, 1917, 2470 A.
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something similar of our own.”5 And nowhere would this be more apparent 
than in the United States, where Germany had suffered its most spectacular 
wartime failure and where it had its greatest postwar ambitions.
This study is about Weimar Germany’s American project. It traces the Wei-
mar Republic’s efforts to make public diplomacy an essential part of its foreign 
policy toward the United States. At the same time, it follows the initiative of 
a group of educated bourgeois German publicists, educators, and parliamen-
tarians to rebuild trust and sympathy within America after the devastations 
of the war. In the 1920s, official and private groups were united in their desire 
to overcome German isolation and secure the support of the United States, in 
the hope that it could help bring about a revision of the Versailles peace treaty. 
Realizing that this would first require a solution to Germany’s postwar “image 
problem,” this group of peaceful revisionists established a new way of think-
ing about foreign relations that differed notably from the nineteenth century 
and became commonplace thereafter; the cultural institutions and transatlan-
tic outreach programs they created continue to define Germany’s foreign rep-
resentations even now, a century later.
*
World War I famously ended on November 11, 1918, when the German delega-
tion signed the armistice in a railroad car in the forest of Compiègne.6 In the 
preceding weeks, the German military effort had collapsed, German monar-
chies had broken down, and, only two days prior, the German Republic had 
been established. Few could have foreseen these developments just weeks 
earlier. In the early summer, German victory had still seemed possible, even 
probable, to many contemporaries. Only in late September had the German 
Supreme Army Command admitted that defeat was imminent and asked the 
civilian leadership to call immediately for a ceasefire. The parliamentarization 
of the German monarchy, long demanded by reformers, was now deemed ex-
pedient. On October 3, 1918, the liberal Max von Baden formed a new reform 
government, which included members of the Social Democratic Party for the 
first time. The following day, the von Baden government called on U. S. Presi-
dent Wilson to negotiate an armistice based on his fourteen points in order to 
avoid the Allies’ more punitive peace terms. When the harsh armistice terms 
dashed German hopes, the German Navy Command decided on a last “battle 
of honor” in late October, sparking first local mutiny, then a national revolu-
5 Ibid.
6 I refer here narrowly to the military confrontation of World War I. I am aware of recent litera-
ture on the continuation of violence in Europe and elsewhere, even as the war had officially come 
to a close; see, e. g., Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End 
(New York, 2016).
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tion, after four years of deprivation, death, and now unexpected defeat. On 
 November 9, Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann announced the abdication 
of the Kaiser, proclaimed the German Republic, and appointed a new leftwing 
provisional government. Two days later in Compiègne, the representatives of 
the new republic assumed responsibility for ending a war whose origins and 
direction they had influenced only marginally. As the Kaiser and his generals 
fled the country, the republic was left to deal with the consequences of defeat.
The gravity of these consequences only dawned slowly on many Germans 
during the long armistice period. Those who had held on to illusions of a le-
nient “Wilson Peace” were shocked by the actual peace terms, which had to 
be signed, with only minor modifications, on June 28, 1919. While none of the 
victors were satisfied with the treaty, the Germans experienced it as a devastat-
ing injustice and calculated humiliation. The treaty had placed responsibility 
for the war squarely on Germany’s shoulders, sharply reduced its army and 
navy, and dissolved its air force entirely; sizeable German lands and all colo-
nies had been lost, the Rhineland and the Saar area were to be occupied, and 
reparations – in an amount yet to be determined – would have to be paid. In 
a consensus rare during the Weimar period, opposition to the Versailles “dic-
tate” was nearly unanimous at the time. Even as the treaty was ratified in the 
Reichstag, public discussion focused on how to revise its economic, military, 
and territorial terms. From then on, revision became the leitmotif of German 
foreign policy.7
It was clear that the United States would have to play a crucial role in We-
imar’s revisionist project. It had emerged from World War I not only as the 
leading economic power and main creditor nation – France alone owed it 
more than $3 billion – but with substantially increased international visibil-
ity and moral capital. While German strategists had previously dismissed the 
very notion of U. S. military power, one million fresh American troops had in-
deed helped to secure an Allied victory in the summer of 1918 just as President 
Wilson’s vision of a liberal world order had resonated powerfully around the 
world.8 As the United States entered the 1920s unburdened by staggering debt 
and national trauma, the global distribution of power shifted dramatically in 
its favor. Compared to postwar Europe, engulfed in economic chaos and civil 
strife, America seemed (at least to European observers) more united, prosper-
ous, and confident than ever.
The new political and economic weight of the United States in the world 
placed it at the heart of German foreign policy ambitions. On October 4, 1918, 
the newly established German government had approached not the Allies but 
7 On the pathological forms of the “Weimar Revision Syndrome,” see Michael Salewski, “Das 
Weimarer Revisionssyndrom,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B2/80 (Jan. 1980): 14–25.
8 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-
colonial Nationalism (New York, 2007).
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President Wilson about armistice negotiations, and, despite the lack of Amer-
ican encouragement, unrealistic German hopes of American goodwill flour-
ished.9 It was in deference to perceived American wishes that further constitu-
tional reforms were initiated in October, and the abdication of the Kaiser, even 
the declaration of the republic, were widely perceived as accommodating the 
United States. After the armistice, the German government and civil groups 
tried to keep up direct lines of communication with the United States. It was 
on this country that they settled their hopes for a just peace and economic 
reconstruction since it seemed more benevolent and had fewer apparent di-
rect interests than the other Allies.10 Even after the profound disappointment 
over Versailles (and President Wilson’s alleged “betrayal”), German democratic 
leaders clung to their “basically pro-American orientation.”11 The most press-
ing issue – in particular, the settlement of the reparations question – depended 
in part on the United States. As the main creditor to the Allies it was the only 
nation in a financial and economic position to broker a reasonable settlement, 
to ward off the large Allied demands, and to finance Germany’s economic re-
covery. Consequently, German hopes were set overwhelmingly on Amerika.12 
Convincing an increasingly isolationist, still hostile American public to get in-
volved on Germany’s behalf became one of the republic’s central foreign policy 
concerns of the 1920s.
This study details how Germans addressed this concern, that is, how they 
tried to reach out to a country that seemed to hold a solution to the Weimar 
Republic’s many troubles and what strategies they employed to win over the 
American public, which they widely perceived as hindering U. S. support and 
involvement. Throughout the 1920s, German state and nonstate groups created 
organizations and programs designed to loosen the Allied grip on America 
and to rebuild German prestige and transatlantic influence. For more than a 
decade, they fought an uphill battle to overturn Germany’s “distorted image,” 
which they felt had contributed to their defeat.
9 As the Reich finance minister explained to the cabinet on April 26, 1919: “Wilson’s 14 points 
are a shield against the demands of our victorious enemies.” Akten der Reichskanzlei. Weimar 
Republik (AdRk) – Das Kabinett Scheidemann/Bd. 1/Dokumente 54 b Ausführungen des Re-
ichsfinanzministers vor dem Reichskabinett über die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit des Reiches, 
Apr. 26, 1919, 233.
10 ADAP Serie A, I, Document 36, “Aufzeichnung des Leiters der vorbereitenden Maßnahmen 
für die Friedensverhandlungen Graf von Bernstorff,” Nov. 24, 1918, 55.
11 Klaus Schwabe, “The United States and the Weimar Republic: A ‘Special Relationship’ That 
Failed,” in America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History, ed. Frank 
Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, 2:18–29 (Philadelphia, 1985), 24; on the German discussion 
about Wilson, see Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich. Ideologie, Propaganda und Volks-
meinung 1933–1945 (Stuttgart, 1997), 34–46.
12 Manfred Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Weltwirtschaftli-
che Verflechtung und Revisionspolitik (Baden-Baden, 1990), 17; Peter Berg, Deutschland und 
Amerika 1918–1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der 20er Jahre (Lübeck, 1963), 71.
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*
This story is not widely known. While German-American relations in the 
1920s are generally well researched, scholars have focused primarily on eco-
nomic and financial relations in the context of the reparations tangle. They 
have underlined how central the United States was to Germany’s foreign pol-
icymakers and have detailed their efforts to convince a reluctant America to 
become involved in revising the reparations question and the peace treaty at 
large.13 To this end, Germany appealed strategically to the U. S. interest in a 
stable and prosperous Europe as a market for Americans goods and a bulwark 
against Bolshevism. Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann was determined to 
use Germany’s remaining economic weight to return it to great power status; 
he systematically – and ultimately successfully – pursued an America-focused 
strategy that underlined the need for U. S. involvement in an economically 
interdependent world.14 U. S. informal participation in the 1924 Dawes repa-
rations settlement and the subsequent inflow of American capital facilitated 
Weimar’s “relative stabilization” and its reintegration into the family of nations 
in the mid-1920s. Throughout the 1920s, German-American relations were 
underpinned by a mutuality of interests and methods: the German policy of 
recapturing Germany’s international position by way of economic recovery 
matched the American inclination to conduct world affairs through (informal) 
economic diplomacy; Germans’ desire for a peaceful revision of the Versailles 
treaty dovetailed with American support for peaceful change in Europe.
This mutuality of interest and America’s substantial ($3 billion) investments 
in the Weimar Republic are generally credited with underwriting a remarkable 
transatlantic rapprochement. While German-American relations had reached 
a historic low point in 1919, the former enemies proclaimed an extraordinary 
“friendship” just ten years later. By 1929, German and American diplomats, ed-
ucators, and businessmen alike agreed that Germany and the United States had 
reconciled and that, in fact, German-American relations had “never been bet-
ter.”15 As a number of studies have shown, this rapprochement also went hand 
in hand with Americans’ more sympathetic perception of Germany.16 A decade 
after the war, Germany’s negative image had been largely reversed, and there 
13 See Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–32 (Düssel-
dorf, 1970); Michael Wala, Weimar und Amerika. Botschafter Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron 
und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von 1927 bis 1933 (Stuttgart, 2001); Klaus Schwabe, 
Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche Friedensstrategie zwis-
chen Ideologie und Machtpolitik, 1918/1919 (Düsseldorf, 1971).
14 Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, passim.
15 Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten seit 
dem Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1934), 25.
16 Carmen Müller, Weimar im Blick der USA. Amerikanische Auslandskorrespondenten und 
öffentliche Meinung zwischen Perzeption und Realität (Münster, 1997), 253, 276–326; Klaus Fer-
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was even a tendency to see the increasingly stable and prosperous Weimar Re-
public as an “American prodigy” or a “junior partner” in Europe.17
This historiography, however, with its heavy focus on economics, leaves 
many questions unanswered. While we know that both public relations and 
the United States acquired a new significance for German foreign policy after 
World War I, few efforts have been made to analyze the two together. Indeed, 
research on Weimar public diplomacy, especially its cultural variant, has paid 
relatively little attention to the United States. This is true for comprehensive 
studies on the subject,18 for many older studies on single institutions,19 and 
for more recent bilateral explorations alike. While we have detailed studies 
on German public diplomacy during that period toward Spain, Turkey, Latin 
America, and the Netherlands, we have none on the United States, which was 
vital in many respects.20 At the same time, there are in-depth studies on this 
aspect of German-American relations for the Wilhelmine era,21 the Nazi peri-
dinand Schoenthal, “American Attitudes toward Germany, 1918–1932” (PhD diss., Ohio State 
University, 1959), 182–203.
17 John G. Siemann, “The American Response to Weimar: Public Perception and Foreign Policy 
Development in the Decade of the 1920s” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1986), 63.
18 Frank Trommler, Kulturmacht ohne Kompass. Deutsche auswärtige Kulturbeziehungen im 
20. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 2013); Kurt Düwell, Deutschlands auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1918–1932 
(Cologne, 1976).
19 Ernst Ritter, Das Deutsche Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart 1917–1945. Ein Beispiel deutscher 
Volkstumsarbeit zwischen den Weltkriegen (Wiesbaden, 1971); Volkhard Laitenberger, Akademis-
cher Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst 
(DAAD) 1923–1945 (Göttingen, 1977); Hans Adolf Jacobsen, “Auswärtige Kulturpolitik als geis-
tige Waffe. Karl Haushofer und die Deutsche Akademie [1923–1937],” in Deutsche auswärtige 
Kulturpolitik seit 1871, ed. Kurt Düwell and Werner Link, 218–256 (Cologne, 1981); Kurt Posse-
kel, “Studien zur Politik des Vereins für das Deutschtum im Ausland [VDA] in der Weimarer 
Republik” (PhD diss., Universität Rostock, 1967); Gerhard Weidenfeller, VDA. Verein für das 
Deutschtum im Ausland. Allgemeiner deutscher Schulverein [1881–1918]. Ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Kaiserreich (Frankfurt am Main, 
1976); for a more recent study, see Eckard Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-In-
stitut. Sprach- und auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1923–1960 (Munich, 2005); Holger Impekoven, Die 
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung und das Ausländerstudium in Deutschland 1925–1945 (Bonn, 
2013); Daniela Siebe, Germania Docet. Ausländische Studenten, auswärtige Kulturpolitik und 
deutsche Universitäten. 1870–1933 (Husum, 2009).
20 Stefan Rinke, Der letzte freie Kontinent. Deutsche Lateinamerikapolitik im Zeichen transna-
tionaler Beziehungen, 1918–1933 (Stuttgart, 1996); Ernst Pöppinghaus, Moralische Eroberungen. 
Kultur und Politik in den deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen der Jahre 1919–1933 (Frankfurt, 1998); 
Friedrich Dahlhaus, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen auswärtiger Kultur- und Pressepolitik dargestellt 
am Beispiel der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen 1914–1928 (Frankfurt am Main, 1990); Nicole 
Eversdijk, Kultur als politisches Werbemittel. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen kultur- und pressepoli-
tischen Arbeit in den Niederlanden während des Ersten Weltkrieges (Münster, 2010).
21 Bernhard vom Brocke, “Der Deutsch-Amerikanische Professorenaustausch. Preußische Wis-
senschaftspolitik, internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfänge einer deutschen 
auswärtigen Kulturpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch 31, no. 2 
(1981): 128–182; Franziska von Ungern-Sternberg, Kulturpolitik zwischen den Kontinenten. 
Deutschland und Amerika. Das Germanische Museum in Cambridge, Mass. (Cologne, 1994); 
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od,22 and the Bundesrepublik23 but none for the Weimar years. To be sure, 
we know that the Weimar governments made many efforts to communicate 
more effectively with the American public. Foreign Minister Stresemann val-
ued public relations highly as part of his revisionist politics.24 The German 
Foreign Ministry systematically cultivated American news correspondents in 
Berlin,25 subsidized the agitation against German “war guilt,” and aided non-
state and semiofficial bodies like the Berlin-based Vereinigung Carl Schurz in 
their transatlantic endeavors.26 Moreover, Michael Wala has skillfully, if briefly, 
sketched Weimar’s attempts to draw on the emotional attachments of Ger-
man Americans as well as the networks and prestige of German universities to 
re-establish Germany’s standing across the Atlantic.27 But even though scholars 
have begun to investigate certain aspects of Weimar’s public diplomacy toward 
the United States, there is no comprehensive study on this topic. Indeed, schol-
arship on this subject remains, as Wala himself concluded, “rather disappoint-
ing.”28 In short, public diplomacy remains underexplored as a factor in Weimar 
Germany’s Amerikapolitik.
The present study broadens, complements, and challenges our understand-
ing of transatlantic relations in a number of ways. At its narrowest, it deep-
ens our understanding of German public diplomacy and counterbalances the 
Martin Wroblewski, Moralische Eroberungen als Instrumente der Diplomatie. Die Informations- 
und Pressepolitik des Auswärtigen Amts 1902–1914 (Göttingen, 2016); World War I is well re-
searched; for a recent study, see Chad Fulwider, German Propaganda and U. S. Neutrality in 
World War I (Columbia, MO, 2016).
22 Klaus Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten 1933–1941 (Heidelberg, 
1971); Arthur L. Smith, The Deutschtum of Nazi Germany and the United States (The Hague, 
1965); Gregory Kupsky, “‘The True Spirit of the German People’: German Americans and Na-
tional Socialism, 1919–1955” (PhD., Ohio State University, 2010); Cornelia Wilhelm, Bewegung 
oder Verein. Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA (Stuttgart, 1998).
23 Most recently, see Brian Etheridge, Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Mem-
ory (Lexington, KY, 2016).
24 Hans Jürgen Müller, Auswärtige Pressepolitik und Propaganda zwischen Ruhrkampf und Lo-
carno, 1923–1925. Eine Untersuchung über die Rolle der Öffentlichkeit in der Außenpolitik Strese-
manns (Frankfurt, 1991).
25 Müller, Weimar im Blick der USA, esp. 276–326.
26 Christian Freitag, “Die Entwicklung der Amerikastudien in Berlin bis 1945 unter Berück-
sichtigung der Amerikaarbeit staatlicher und privater Organisationen” (PhD diss., Freie Univer-
sität Berlin, 1977); Rennie Brantz, “German-American Friendship: The Carl Schurz Vereini-
gung, 1926–1942,” International History Review 11, no. 2 (1989): 229–251.
27 Michael Wala, “‘Gegen eine Vereinzelung Deutschlands’: Deutsche Kulturpolitik und akade-
mischer Austausch mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in 
Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für 
Detlev Junker, ed. Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert, 303–315 (Stuttgart, 2004); Michael Wala, 
“Reviving Ethnic Identity: Foreign Office, Reichswehr, and German Americans during the Wei-
mar Republic,” in German-American Immigration and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective, ed. 
Wolfgang Helbich and Walter Kamphoefner, 326–341 (Max Kade Institute for German-Ameri-
can Studies, 2004).
28 Wala, “Gegen eine Vereinzelung,” 304.
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disproportionate attention paid to sensational, but largely unrepresentative, 
propaganda campaigns such as the agitation against the so-called “black hor-
ror,” that is, the French use of North African troops in the occupied Rhineland 
and their alleged transgressions.29 While focusing on this particular campaign 
suggests that German policy was committed to abrasive propagandizing, the 
wider American case reveals an altogether different approach, one that dili-
gently avoided even the semblance of “German propaganda.” Rather than em-
bracing atrocity propaganda, Weimar strategies hinged on a less obtrusive and 
ultimately more constructive information and cultural policy geared toward 
both short-term revisionist objectives and longer-term transatlantic alliance 
building. From this perspective, public diplomacy emerges as an integral as-
pect of Weimar’s Amerikapolitik. Moreover, this study challenges the com-
monly held notion that the Weimar Republic was relatively unsuccessful in its 
publicity strategies.30 While this might have been true domestically – and there 
is growing doubt about whether it truly was31 – Weimar was neither unable nor 
unwilling to represent itself in the United States. Rather, it pursued an often 
innovative policy to normalize German-American relations and build a politi-
cally desirable transatlantic friendship.
The present study also facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the 
process of reconciliation between the United States and Germany. In fact, the 
two former enemies’ rapid postwar rapprochement still remains something of 
a puzzle. Although economic factors and growing respect for German states-
men like Stresemann are usually and rightly credited with the development of 
friendly transatlantic relations,32 numerous other factors contributed to dimin-
ishing wartime resentments, too. Indeed, while we know much about the devel-
opment of wartime animosities, that is, the process of “cultural mobilization,” 
29 This campaign, which appealed strategically to American racism, has received major atten-
tion; for a recent bibliography, see Julia Roos, “Nationalism, Racism and Propaganda in Early 
Weimar Germany: Contradictions in the Campaign against the ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’,” 
German History 30, no. 1 (2012): 45–75, 45. A work that is still seminal on this campaign is Keith 
Nelson, “Black Horror on the Rhine: Race as a Factor in Post-World War I Diplomacy,” Journal of 
Modern History 42, no. 4 (1970): 606–627.
30 See, for example, Manuela Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-Ameri-
can Relations 1955–1968 (New York, 1995), 28.
31 Corey Ross, “Mass Politics and the Techniques of Leadership: The Promise and Perils of 
Propaganda in Weimar Germany,” German History 24, no. 2 (2006): 184–211; there is increasing 
scholarship challenging this very notion, such as Nadine Rossol, Performing the Nation in Inter-
war Germany: Sports, Spectacle and Political Symbolism, 1926–1936 (London, 2010); Michael 
Meyer, Symbolarme Republik? Das politische Zeremoniell der Weimarer Republik in den Staatsbe-
suchen zwischen 1920 und 1933 (Frankfurt, 2014); see also Christian Welzbacher, Edwin Redslob. 
Biografie eines unverbesserlichen Idealisten (Berlin, 2009).
32 Müller, Weimar im Blick, 276–326; Schoenthal, “American Attitudes toward Germany,” 182–
203.
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we know comparatively little about the process of “cultural demobilization.”33 
How, precisely, were transatlantic contacts rekindled and networks rebuilt? 
What psychological hurdles had to be overcome to that end and what factors 
drove or inhibited the process? This process was neither straightforward nor 
predictable. Rather, resentments could and did flare up again relatively easily 
during the entire 1920s. Yet if we are to understand cultural demobilization, we 
need to move beyond economic explanations and into the intangible field of 
emotions and psychology.
Finally, unlike many studies that extend neither back into Wilhelmine nor 
forward into the Nazi era, this study both goes back to about the turn of the 
century and forward to the late 1930s. In doing so, it tries to trace significant 
continuities and ruptures between these periods – a question that has long pre-
occupied scholars of German foreign policy. Importantly, this longer perspec-
tive highlights a paradigm shift in the conducting of German foreign affairs. 
Public diplomacy as it developed in the 1920s was only a part of a larger process 
of adapting diplomatic practices as the world was increasingly transformed by 
the communication and transportation revolutions of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Around 1900, diplomats began to face an increasingly well connected, 
well informed, and influential global public, whose opinions and sentiments 
constituted, in Bismarck’s memorable phrase, the “imponderables” of foreign 
relations.34 The weight of these imponderables necessitated the expansion 
of foreign policy beyond “high politics” and thereby, as this study will show, 
turned more and more elements of foreign relations into subjects of foreign 
policy: Around the turn of the century hardly anyone in the Wilhelmstrasse 
thought of foreign students or tourists or news correspondents as foreign pol-
icy assets; thirty years later, few thought of them as anything else.
In the German case, I contend, this larger development cannot be under-
stood without looking at both the 1920s and the United States. While the pro-
cess began around the turn of the century and continued during the 1930s, it 
was during the 1920s that German statecraft expanded into many heretofore 
“nonpolitical” fields; diverse groups, such as tourists, students, or Germans 
abroad first became “geopoliticized”; and an official infrastructure emerged 
to manage and coordinate these new world-political “resources.”35 Germany’s 
postwar situation greatly facilitated this development. Its loss of hard-power 
33 On the concepts of cultural mobilization and demobilization, see John Horne, “Demobilizing 
the Mind: France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919–1939,” French History & Civilization 2 
(2009): 101–119.
34 “We Germans Fear God and Nothing Else in the World!”: Bismarck Addresses the Reichstag 
(February 6, 1888), German History in Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.
ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1865.
35 I borrow the term “geopoliticization” from Paul Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? Interna-
tional Students and U. S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century,” Diplomatic History 33 
(2009): 775–806, 781.
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options re-directed attention to many previously neglected soft-power assets. 
The peculiarities of the American case, however, truly pushed Berlin to adopt 
a more systematic approach to public diplomacy. Not only did the American 
public seem particularly influential and particularly ill-informed, but Ameri-
ca’s self-imposed political isolation and suspicion of foreign propaganda forced 
Germany to pursue informal, not overtly political relations. While scholars 
have long acknowledged U. S. influence on the Weimar Republic’s embrace of 
economic foreign policy, it was equally important in the cultural realm: Amer-
ica’s disdain for – and Germany’s lack of – hard power conspired to turn public 
relations and cultural affairs between the two nations into a field of “proxy di-
plomacy” in the 1920s.
Finally, this study on German public diplomacy in the interwar period 
helps to shift historical interest away from the American-sponsored programs 
and the Cold War era. In recent years, in particular, so many studies on Cold 
War public diplomacy have appeared that historians have cautioned us to “soft 
pedal our ongoing fascination with the Cold War”36 and direct more histor-
ical attention to the time “before the cultural cold wars.”37 Doing so reveals 
that many of the Cold War’s defining strategies and transatlantic networks 
had roots in the interwar period. Moreover, the study counterbalances the 
substantial scholarship on the cultural Americanization of Germany in the 
1920s. American economic expansion in Europe, as studies have shown, was 
flanked by the extension of its cultural influence. Whether wittingly (through 
American foundations or Herbert Hoover’s humanitarian relief) or unwit-
tingly (through American tourism, movies, and music), this process of cultural 
“Americanization” shaped German discourses about modernity and forged 
an image of America as efficient and progressive, which in turn facilitated the 
country’s growing economic influence.38 But, as we will see, even in the 1920s 
Americans were as much targets as they were sponsors of public diplomacy.39 
36 Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “The Anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy and Civil Society 
since 1850,” in The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and Interna-
tional History, ed. Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge, 25–56, 31–32; an effort to shift this fo-
cus is also made by the contributions in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Marc Dornfried, eds., Search-
ing for a Cultural Diplomacy (New York, 2010).
37 Katharina Rietzler, “Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philanthropy and Cultural Di-
plomacy in the Inter-war Years,” Historical Research 84, no. 223 (2011): 148–164.
38 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expan-
sion, 1890–1945 (New York, 1982); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, 
Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca, NY, 1984); scholarship on the 
Americanization of Weimar is extensive; a good starting point is Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte 
Möglichkeiten. Amerikanisierung in Deutschland und Frankreich 1900–1933 (Stuttgart, 2003).
39 There is a lack of studies on the United States as a target, not just as a sponsor of cultural di-
plomacy; see Osgood and Etheridge, eds., The United States and Public Diplomacy, 11; a pioneer-
ing work is Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Rela-
tions, 1850–1920 (Chicago, 2009).
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While the impact of “Americanization” was profound, Germany was far from 
just passive and on the “receiving end.”40 The war had effected a sea change in 
the two countries’ economic and financial relationship, yet not in their cul-
tural relations. Germany’s cultural prestige had suffered – and perhaps more 
than German contemporaries realized or liked to admit – but its feelings of 
cultural importance had survived nearly unscathed. Many Germans, indeed, 
were ready to ignore the Americanizing undertones of aid programs, U. S. 
tourism, or America’s philanthropic largesse and see them for what they also 
were: opportunities to escape postwar isolation, to mend transatlantic ties, and 
to draw the United States back into Germany’s cultural domain. If this project 
ultimately failed, it was not for lack of trying.
*
To be sure, many aspects of interwar diplomacy between Germany and the 
United States lie beyond the scope of this study. It offers no exhaustive treat-
ment of transatlantic diplomacy or even of transatlantic public diplomacy. It 
does not aim to cover all private cultural exchanges or state-sponsored propa-
ganda initiatives and casts only a cursory glance at Weimar’s official press and 
information policy. Instead, it is concerned with public relations in the basic 
sense of the word. It traces how German officials and private groups sought 
to recultivate and manage transatlantic cultural and social relations in the 
national interest, that is, how they conducted what Americans call public di-
plomacy and Germans call cultural diplomacy (or external cultural policy).41 
40 Scholars today operate with a much more interactive concept of Americanization. As Jessica 
Gienow-Hecht has pointed out, processes that have long been understood as tokens of “cultural 
imperialism” should be considered processes of potentially bi-directional “cultural transmis-
sion.” Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer and the Cold War: A 
Critical Review,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 3 (2000): 465–494, 491; as a recent historiographical 
essay put it: “Where there was Americanization, there always was Europeanization, too.” See 
Egbert Klautke, “Anti-Americanism in Twentieth-Century Europe,” Historical Journal 54, no. 4 
(2011): 1125–1139, 1137; scholars of tourism, albeit for the post-WWII period, recently pro-
vided an apt example: Neal Rosendorf, “Be El Caudillo’s Guest: The Franco Regime’s Quest for 
Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of Tourism to Spain,” Diplo-
matic History 30, no. 3 (2006): 366–406, 373.
41 For a concise presentation that addresses the different terms, see David Welch, “Cultural 
Propaganda,” in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500–Present, ed. 
Nicholas J. Cull, David Culbert, and David Welch (Santa Barbara, CA, 2003), 101: “Cultural 
Propaganda is a long-term process intended to promote a better understanding of the nation 
that is sponsoring the activity. The United States refers to it as ‘public diplomacy,’ whereas Britain 
and France prefer to call it ‘cultural diplomacy’ or ‘cultural relations.’ Such activity involves the 
dissemination of cultural products–films, magazines, radio and televisions programs, art exhibi-
tions, traveling theater groups and orchestras–as well as the promotion of language teaching and 
a wide range of ‘educational’ activities, such as student-exchange schemes. Over a period of time, 
these activities are designed to enhance the nation’s image among the populations of other coun-
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In doing so, the study focuses on three distinct “fields”: Germandom policies 
(Volkstumspolitik), that is, German relations toward German Americans; aca-
demic diplomacy, that is, the harnessing of academic relations to foreign policy 
ends; and the management of transatlantic travel, including aspects of tourism 
promotion and visitor hospitality. While these fields are treated separately only 
in the second part of the book, they underpin the analysis throughout.
There are very good reasons to focus on these three fields of transatlantic 
public diplomacy. For one, they were among the most prominent of their time, 
drawing a disproportionate share of resources, attention, and expertise. As a 
result, by the early 1930s all of them had become more or less firmly integrated 
in a state-sponsored public diplomacy apparatus. Second, from the perspective 
of historiography it is precisely because these fields were embedded in (semi)
official infrastructures that they reveal instructive continuities and ruptures 
between Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi Germany. While, for example, lec-
ture tours of individual German authors in the 1920s can tell us a great deal 
about the Weimar period, they do not lend themselves as readily to longer-
term observations as, say, the organization of academic exchanges. Third, be-
cause these different fields aimed to activate different American target groups, 
namely, Americans of German birth or descent, academic audiences, and a 
broader travel-minded public, respectively, they allow for a fairly comprehen-
sive assessment of German efforts to shape the American climate of opinion. 
Finally, there is an exceptional wealth of archival material on them. Whereas 
the files of the Foreign Ministry’s Art and Music Section were destroyed during 
World War II, files on ethnic, academic, and travel matters have largely sur-
vived. In short, a focus on these fields affords the chance to write a relatively 
comprehensive study based on archival research that elucidates major trends 
from 1900 into the 1930s.
The official publications of diplomatic sources – Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS) and Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik (ADAP) – 
are of limited use regarding cultural affairs, but the surviving archival base is 
nothing short of excellent. In Germany, the Foreign Ministry Archives offer an 
unparalleled wealth of files on a broad range of cultural activities, particularly 
for the Weimar period. Although the files of the state secretary and foreign 
minister usually yield little information on cultural policy – a clear indication 
of how far it was removed from “high politics” – the files of the Cultural Depart-
ment, the America Department, as well as parts of the Press Department cover 
this subject in great detail. Unfortunately, only small remnants of the German 
consular files for the interwar period have survived – an irretrievable loss. The 
German consulate general in New York, especially, seems to have handled a 
tries, with a view to creating goodwill and influencing the policies of the governments through 
the pressure of public opinion.”
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substantial part of German public diplomacy in the United States, which the 
embassy files (themselves decimated) cannot fully replace. The Foreign Minis-
try’s personnel files, a number of personal papers, and memoirs have thus been 
used to reconstruct some of the activities of German consulates. Diplomatic 
records are complemented and challenged by the repositories of student, pro-
fessorial, and tourist associations (Bundesarchiv), university archives (Munich, 
Marburg, Heidelberg, Berlin), company archives (Bayer and Krupp), and per-
sonal papers (Stresemann, Maltzan, Bonn, Morsbach, etc.). The roughly two 
hundred boxes of material left by the German Tourist Information Office in 
New York, 1925 – 1941 (held at the U. S. National Archives in College Park, MD) 
proved to be particularly valuable – and not just for the study of tourism.
On the American side, official diplomatic materials have been considerably 
less useful. Not until the late 1930s did the State Department show significant 
interest in cultural affairs. Nevertheless, the records of American foundations 
(especially the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), universities 
(Columbia, Princeton, Cornell), and the papers of key cultural international-
ists (like Nicholas Murray Butler) offer a veritable treasure trove of informa-
tion on U. S. informal cultural policy. Moreover, the papers of American am-
bassadors to Germany William Dodd (1933–1937) and Jacob Gould Schurman 
(1925–1929) document the intimate connection between U. S. diplomacy and 
academia at the time. The records of the German Society of Pennsylvania and 
the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation also help elucidate the key role played 
by German-American organizations in German policies. The archives of the 
Institute of International Education at the Rockefeller Archive Center have for-
tunately just been opened to researchers.
To be sure, official public diplomacy impacted only a small number of 
transatlantic encounters, and even where it did, its influence is near impossible 
to measure. The successes of other policy initiatives are visible in the durability 
of treaty provisions or the development of trade statistics, for example, yet the 
public impact of foreign study and travel is much more difficult to ascertain. 
Moreover, public diplomacy, by virtue of its very intention, is often a long-term 
project. In its cultural variant, in particular, it aims not so much to convey im-
mediate information but to project a desirable national image. Its ultimate aim, 
as one German publicist concluded in 1916, is to create among foreign elites 
an “inclination of the heart” toward Germany, that is, to engender a public 
climate in which German economic and political objectives can be more easily 
attained.42 But such an “inclination of the heart” cannot be measured and its 
political implications cannot be predicted. The pursuit of such a policy at all, 
42 Clipping: “Ein Fortschritt deutscher Kulturpolitik,” Weser Zeitung, Oct. 28, 1916, Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA) R121333.
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then, requires a leap of faith. Astonishing, above all, is that in the precarious 
1920s so many Germans were ready to take this leap.
*
This leap was certainly greatest for the German Foreign Ministry. Following 
the public relations disaster of the war, the Wilhelmstrasse was thoroughly 
reformed and two public diplomacy departments – one for cultural policy 
and one for press policy – were established. In line with the newly established 
America Department, they set out to conceptualize and coordinate the cam-
paign to rewin American hearts and minds. A number of high-ranking officials 
with a distinct interest in public diplomacy, first and foremost, Foreign Min-
ister Stresemann (1923–1929), ensured that the originally haphazard efforts to 
improve Germany’s image turned into manageable, increasingly well-designed 
programs. Often outpacing Berlin’s lead, German ambassadors and consuls in 
the United States also worked diligently to “create a general attitude of sym-
pathetic understanding” for Germany.43 From 1926 to 1929 alone, the Foreign 
Ministry’s cultural diplomacy budget rose from 4.7 to 8.3 million marks.
However, the Wilhelmstrasse (as it was itself most painfully aware) could 
pursue none of its cultural activities on its own. Its constitutional competence, 
funds, staffing, and expertise were all severely limited. As a consequence, it 
depended on the cooperation of other ministries, especially the Prussian 
Ministry of Culture, university administrations, and a mushrooming ar-
ray of organizations, institutes, and makeshift propaganda bureaus. Some of 
these were longstanding mass membership organizations like the Association 
for Germandom Abroad (Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, est. 1881), 
while others like the German Tourism Promotion Bureau (Reichszentrale für 
deutsche Verkehrswerbung, est. 1920) or the Association of German Univer-
sities (Verband deutscher Hochschulen, est. 1920) were of more recent origin. 
Following agendas of their own, they were at times indifferent, at times hostile, 
to reconciliation with the West, and the Foreign Ministry spent considerable 
time cajoling or restraining them to suit its foreign policy needs. With time, the 
Foreign Ministry thus created a number of ostensibly private but financially 
dependent organizations (like the German Academic Exchange Service, est. 
1923/25) to manage new policy fields while hiding state involvement.
To this end, it relied on a group of what I call “peaceful revisionists,” who 
operated outside – albeit usually in close touch with – the German foreign 
policy establishment.44 These men (and a very few women) provided funds, 
43 Consulate General, San Francisco [Wiehl] to AA, Dec. 6, 1927, “Französische Kulturpropa-
ganda in San Francisco,” PA R 61130.
44 Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 565, 572.
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sat on committees, directed semiofficial organizations or assumed quasi-dip-
lomatic functions at international conferences or roundtable discussions. This 
illustrious group included financier Max Warburg, industrialists Carl Duisberg 
and Robert Bosch, parliamentarians like Anton Erkelenz, publicists like Ernst 
Jäckh, and educators like Albrecht Penck, Moritz Julius Bonn, Alfred Weber, 
Reinhold Schairer, and Adolf Morsbach, as well as (former) diplomats like 
Walter Simons or Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff. As heterogeneous as this 
group appears at first, these men shared an educated bourgeois background, 
a comparatively positive attitude toward the republic (they were often, like 
Stresemann himself, “republicans by reason”), a staunch commitment to re-
visionism, and a common agenda: to win American sympathy and support. 
In concert with the Foreign Ministry, they would turn public diplomacy into a 
key instrument of peaceful revision.
*
In telling this story, this book is divided into three parts, which correspond 
to the larger political and economic periodizations of the Weimar Republic. 
Though alternative chronologies were considered, in the end the economic and 
political caesurae of the years 1923/24 and 1929/1930 proved too momentous to 
ignore.
The first part focuses on the tumultuous years from 1918 to 1924. Chap-
ter 1 begins on the heels of German defeat. It points to the depth of German 
moral isolation and the nature of America’s anti-German sentiments, analyzing 
their implications for Germany’s revisionist politics. As will be shown, Ger-
many recognized that the hostile and isolationist American public was a major 
stumbling block to American support and began to realize that revision would 
require improvement in America’s sentiments toward Germany. The strate-
gies they decided on, however, were heavily informed by earlier experiences. 
Chapter 2 thus returns to the prewar period and retraces earlier German steps 
to win American public opinion. Germany had already pursued a substantial 
goodwill campaign among Americans since 1902. This section on pre-1917 de-
velopments is intended to offer an English-language overview of the extensive 
German-language scholarship on this subject. At the same time, it demon-
strates that the sensational failure of this German campaign, as reflected in the 
U. S. entry into the war in 1917, profoundly affected postwar initiatives. Without 
an understanding of their prewar and wartime experiences, the decisions of 
Weimar-era public diplomats are incomprehensible. Only substantial postwar 
reforms placed the Foreign Ministry (theoretically at least) in a position to 
conduct more effective public diplomacy. However, German efforts, as Chapter 
3 demonstrates, met with limited success until 1923/24. German inflation and 
lingering wartime resentment did not create the financial or psychological ba-
31Introduction
sis for successful public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the obstacles and frustrations 
of the early 1920s, often ignored by historians, reinforced the government’s 
commitment to public diplomacy and profoundly informed later strategies.
The second part details the true “founders’ period” of German public di-
plomacy from 1924 to 1929. It turns from larger developments to three case 
studies. Chapter 4 focuses on German Americans. Given the extensive atten-
tion that both pre-1918 and post-1933 “Germandom policies” have received, 
the chapter details continuities and ruptures after 1918. It shows that the 1920s 
led to a major departure in this field. Weimar public diplomats came to assess 
Americans of German birth and descent more realistically and to take a more 
cautious approach toward them, which played a significant role in facilitating 
the transatlantic rapprochement of the 1920s. Chapter 5 focuses on aspects of 
academic diplomacy; it shows that the Foreign Ministry tried ever more sys-
tematically to harness the prestige and networks of German universities for use 
in its agenda of peaceful revisionism. However, this effort was often compli-
cated by Germany’s conservative academic establishment. The chapter traces 
the development of substantial academic diplomacy programs and details the 
process of cultural demobilization among at least parts of the academic com-
munities on both sides of the Atlantic. Chapter 6 looks at the “discovery” of the 
American tourist for German commercial and political ambitions. Assessing 
efforts to promote German tourism and tracing American travel patterns, it 
tries to gauge the influence of tourist perceptions on larger American debates 
about Germany. Collectively, the three chapters underline the broadening 
scope of German outreach from German Americans to a more elite traveling 
and travel-minded public. A brief summary of findings after Chapter 6 shows 
that (i) transatlantic contacts were largely restored during that period, and (ii) 
public diplomacy was established as a distinct component of Germany’s Amer-
ikapolitik.
Finally, the third part (1930–1937) explores how public diplomacy fared 
during the economic depression, rising nationalist agitation, and the demise 
of the republic. Chapter 7 details the increasing challenges but also the unique 
opportunities that Weimar’s public diplomacy faced in the context of economic 
distress and political illiberalism in the early 1930s. Chapter 8, then, details the 
transition and, in many cases, the absorption of Weimar structures into the 
Nazi propaganda and cultural policy apparatus. Despite significant and delib-
erate structural continuities, the Nazis ultimately did not continue Weimar’s 
Amerikapolitik. Instead, they used the existing infrastructure to pursue a more 
forceful expansionist policy in southeastern Europe and Latin America.
In all, this study’s findings go beyond German cultural diplomacy and the 
United States from 1918 to 1933. They not only broaden our understanding of 
German foreign policy and German-American relations but also offer insights 
into the nature of transatlantic relations at a crucial moment in the twentieth 
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century. By tracing the Weimar Republic’s intense efforts to develop a polit-
ically desirable transatlantic partnership with the United States, and by ac-
knowledging its competition with France and other European countries while 
doing so, this book underlines the significant role that an allegedly isolationist 
United States played, and was accorded, in interwar Europe. Ultimately, it is to 
be hoped that this German-American case study may inspire further research 
into how the Old World sought to come to terms with U. S. ascendency after the 
turn of the century.
Part I 
Breaking the Cultural Blockade, 1919–1924

Backdrop: The Cultural Blockade
Usually, historians pay too little attention to how German defeat and the peace 
settlement isolated Germany not only politically and economically, but also 
culturally. But just as Allied statesmen, clerks, and advisors met to determine 
the contours of the peace treaty, so did Allied scholars, journalists, students, 
sport functionaries and humanitarians descend on Paris to remake a broader 
cultural postwar order without – and sometimes against – Germany: In the 
world of science, Article 282 of the Versailles Treaty voided nearly all scien-
tific conventions, while the newly established International Research Council 
excluded Germany from membership and barred the German language and 
German scientists from international conferences and collaborations in the 
postwar years.1 On the student level, a newly founded Confédération Inter-
nationale des Étudiants re-organized international student relations without 
German participation.2 In the field of communications, the cartel agreements 
between global news agencies were nullified and the largest German news 
agency (Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau) was shut out of the world market.3 In 
the sphere of sports, Germany would not be invited to participate in Olympic 
games until 1928. Even in the humanitarian realm, the Allies sought to replace 
the neutralist International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva with a 
freshly formed (Allied) League of Red Cross Societies in order to exclude Ger-
many from international cooperation. In myriad ways, a host of new organi-
zations and agreements perpetuated the inter-Allied accord and cemented the 
Great War’s recalibration of cultural affairs away from Germany.4 Their former 
enemies, Germans felt, were enacting a “cultural blockade” (geistige Kontinen-
talsperre) against them, hoping to deprive their nation of the remnants of its 
international standing and influence.5
1 Manfred Abelein, Die Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Ihre verfassungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung und ihre verfassungsrechtlichen Probleme (Cologne, 
1968), 24.
2 Walter Zimmermann, “Deutsche Studentenschaft und Ausland,” Der Auslanddeutsche 5, no. 2 
(1922): 34.
3 Heidi Evans, “’The Path to Freedom’? Transocean and German Wireless Telegraphy, 1914–
1922,” Historical Social Research 35 (2010): 209–33, 210.
4 Tomás Irish, “From International to Interallied: Transatlantic University Relations in the Era 
of the First World War, 1905–1920,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, no. 4 (2015): 311–325.
5 This term is used by a number of observers; see Prof. Dr. Gast, “Die Auslandsbeziehungen der 
deutschen Hochschulen,” Mitteilungen des Verbandes der deutschen Hochschulen, 2. Sonderheft 
17–24, 18; Friedrich Beck, “Ausländerstudium im Ausland und in Deutschland,” Süddeutsche 
Monatshefte 28, no. 4, (1931): 250; Georg Schreiber, “Die Kulturpolitik des Völkerbunds,” in 
Zehn Jahre Versailles, ed. Heinrich Schnee and Hans Draeger, 2:245–62, (Berlin, 1929), 246.
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This “cultural blockade” was never as systematically organized nor as 
Machiavellian in design as German observers liked to imagine.6 In part, it was 
a matter of timing: the upsurge of international institution-building after the 
war simply happened when Germany was absent, thus perpetuating the status 
quo of inter-Allied cooperation as it existed in mid-1919. In many cases, these 
new organizations expressed less a desire to exclude Germany than a lack of 
desire to include it. At the heart of these developments lay a pronounced moral 
outrage over the complicity of German scholars, journalists, and even human-
itarians in the alleged and real crimes of the German war effort. Acknowledg-
ing the role of German science in the gas and propaganda war, U. S. President 
Woodrow Wilson characterized it as “science without conscience.”7 The notion 
that Germany had to undergo a sort of probationary period before it could 
be readmitted into the fold of “civilized nations” pervaded not just (some of) 
the founders of the League of Nations but humanitarian and academic circles. 
Summing up a widespread feeling in March 1919, the American magazine Lit-
erary Digest remarked that “Hans must go to the bottom of his class.”8
And still, the cultural blockade was not less powerful for being more of an 
informal consensus than a formal agreement. Contemporaries recognized that 
such efforts were part of a power play intended to break German influence in 
prestigious fields of international relations,9 fueled as much, German observers 
suspected, by lingering wartime resentments as by a desire to deprive Germany 
of prestige in the world. With the war largely regarded as a cultural struggle, it 
seemed only logical that in the field of culture, as in politics or trade, Germany 
6 On German suspicions, see Karl Kerkhof, “Die internationalen naturwissenschaftlichen Or-
ganisationen vor und nach dem Weltkriege,” Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft. Kunst 
und Technik 15, no. 3 (Jan. 1921): 225–42; “Aufzeichnung über den Stand der internationalen 
wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen,” June 16, 1924, PA R64980.
7 For Wilson’s address at the Sorbonne on Dec. 21, 1918, see Brigitte Schröder-Gudehus, “Chal-
lenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Organizations after the First World War,” Science 
Studies 3, no. 2 (1973): 93–118, 100. For Americans, German arguments in favor of unrestricted 
submarine warfare played a special role. As George Ellery Hale, a scientist and science organizer 
on the National Research Council, wrote in a memorandum on the reorganization of interna-
tional science on September 18, 1917: “The part German men of science have played in the initi-
ation of gas attacks, and the demand upon their government last autumn for the resumption of 
unrestricted submarine warfare, must militate against the early establishment of cordial personal 
relations with men in other countries whose relatives and friends have been the victims of these 
methods or of others still more barbarous”; qtd. in Roy MacLeod, “Wissenschaftlicher Interna-
tionalismus in der Krise. Die Akademien der Alliierten und ihre Reaktion auf den Ersten Welt-
krieg,” in Die Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 1914–1945, ed. Wolfram Fischer, 
317–49 (Berlin, 2000), 338.
8 “German Academic Prestige Lost,” The Literary Digest, Mar. 15, 1919.
9 French scholars, in particular, saw Wissenschaft as a means of German domination and con-
tended that, on account of the predominance of the German language in science, “German pro-
fessors [had before the war] set up a kind of scientific Empire which covered all of northern, 
central, and eastern Europe and exerted considerable influence on the science of Russia, the 
United States, and Japan.” Qtd. in Schröder-Gudehus, “Challenge to Transnational,” 99.
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would no longer occupy its prewar position. The French, in particular, seemed 
determined to use the postwar situation to arrest Germany’s cultural imperial-
ist ambition and assert French civilization in its place.10 The French-dominated 
International Research Council was “quite openly part of the general postwar 
policy, whose spearhead was the Treaty of Versailles, of isolating the Central 
Powers, of demanding from them expressions of penitence, and of ensuring 
that Germany in particular never regained her old dominance in military af-
fairs, industry, trade or science.”11 Accordingly, if Germany were going to re-
gain its great power status and its standing in the world, it would have to alter 
not only the treaty’s territorial, economic, and political provisions; it would 
also have to overturn the recalibration of the cultural world.
10 As Charles Cestre, Professor of American Literature and Civilization at the University of 
Paris, noted, educational facilities with regard to the United States “would serve powerfully to 
cement bonds of sympathy and friendship between the two republics; it would enhance the intel-
lectual reputation of our country and the prestige of our higher education in a country that the 
war has seized from the German hold”; qtd. in Whitney Walton, “Internationalism and the Jun-
ior Year Abroad: American Students in France in the 1920s and 1930s,” Diplomatic History 29, 
no. 2 (2005): 255–78, 260.
11 A. G. Cock, “Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Coun-
cil, 1919–1926,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 37, no. 2 (1983): 249–88, 249.

Chapter 1  
Isolation, Revision, and Amerika, 1919–1921
The proud nation which sought to dominate the world is reduced to a country without 
army or navy, with an enormous burden of debt, and without influence or prestige 
in international politics.1
With these astute words, the Literary Digest characterized the Ger-man situation in May 1919. Just days earlier, the terms of the Ver-sailles peace accord made clear that Germany, in defeat, would 
have to bear heavy territorial losses, military disarmament. and the burden of 
reparations. But the American magazine recognized that, in addition to eco-
nomic and political isolation Germany had an ominous lack of “prestige in 
international politics,” an absence that weighed perhaps as heavily on Germany 
as the more tangible provisions of the peace treaty. As Germany would soon 
come to realize, the ramifications of its defeat extended beyond the economic 
or military fields to include the moral and cultural realms. Conversely, for it to 
regain great power status, it would not only need to overturn the written terms 
of the peace treaty but also to recapture its prestige and moral standing in the 
world. Not least, it needed to achieve this in the one country that German dip-
lomats, businessmen, and publicists soon identified as a key partner in revising 
the Versailles treaty: the United States.
Postwar Germany, Moral Isolation and the Revision of Versailles
To note that Germany had an “image problem” in 1918/19 would be a gross 
understatement. German defeat was not limited to the military battlefield but 
extended to world opinion. The exigencies of a total war had necessitated the 
1 “Terms That Take All the Fight Out of Germany,” Literary Digest, May 17, 1919.
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cultural mobilization of civilian populations on all sides of the conflict, lead-
ing to an unprecedented demonization of the enemy. Although at least some 
Allies had initially been inclined to distinguish between what they deemed to 
be the detestable German leadership and a hapless public, between conniving 
elites and innocent people, these distinctions had long since given way to a 
near wholesale condemnation of the German nation.2 The German breach of 
Belgian neutrality in August 1914 and the German army’s ruthless behavior in 
invading that country (which Allied propaganda called the “rape of Belgium”) 
had turned public opinion against Germany, even in neutral nations. By the 
war’s end, a once-admired nation of “thinkers and poets” had been recast in 
the public imagination as an aggressive, militarist power out to rape, pillage, 
and mutilate.
The long armistice period, from November 1918 to June 1919, did little to 
normalize relations. The democratic sea change that had taken place in Ger-
many just days before the armistice never profoundly altered public sentiment 
or official policies. On the contrary, the armistice period revealed the full ex-
tent of anti-German feeling. The general election campaigns in the United 
Kingdom in December 1918 were famously built around the slogans that read 
“Hang the Kaiser” and “Make Germany Pay,” and through the spring of 1919 
the Allies maintained the blockade of Germany to force it to accept the peace 
terms.3 German claims of widespread civilian suffering at first elicited limited 
compassion or were dismissed as “German propaganda.” For example, Amer-
ica’s chief propagandist George Creel, in responding to suggestions that the 
former enemy needed to be fed to avert social unrest, pointed out what he saw 
as German hypocrisy on November 16, 1918: “Even the women of Germany … 
who never lifted their voice in protest when the babies of Belgium were slaugh-
2 By the time of the armistice, the distinction once drawn between the German ruling class and 
the common people had collapsed in American news reporting. As the North American Review 
asserted in February 1918: “You can no more separate the German government from the Ger-
man people than you can separate the bite of the mad dog from his blood. The wickedness and 
infamy of the German people is in their blood; it is the corruption and poison of their blood that 
have made the German people […] a nation of savages […] We must kill to save,” North Ameri-
can Review (February 1918), qtd. In Cynthia Wachtell, “Representations of German Soldier in 
American World War I Literature” in “Huns” vs. “Corned Beef ”: Representations of the Other in 
American and German Literature and Film on World War I, ed. Schneider and Wagener, 59–83 
(Osnabrück, 2007), 61; The New York Sun found that “the Germans are not human beings in the 
common acceptation of the term,” qtd. in Frederick Franklin Schrader, 1683–1920 (New York, 
1920), 28; for a few more sophisticated analyses in the Saturday Evening Post, see Michaela Hoe-
nicke-Moore, Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933–45 (New York, 2010), 
37.
3 In January 1919, an American newspaper reminded its readers that though Germany’s war-
time careers as an “armed enemy of civilization” had come to a halt, “she can no more be trusted 
than a torpid serpent warmed into renewed vitality at a friendly hearth.” “The War Not Yet Over,” 
Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 24, 1919, 16; Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied 
Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919 (Athens, OH, 1985), 101.
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tered at the breasts of their mothers … are now flashing their cry to America 
for sympathy and for help, while the male propagandists are holding out their 
hands dripping with blood and begging for mercy … the damnable cant of 
Germany is trying to poison the mind of the world at this late date.”4
Indeed, the distrust and disdain toward Germany on the Allied home 
fronts proved to be so strong that they complicated the peace-making process 
in Paris. With his constituents in a punitive mood at home, even U. S. President 
Woodrow Wilson almost immediately shrank back from his commitment to 
“open covenants, openly arrived at” and returned to closed sessions just days 
into the peace negotiations.5 The Paris conference itself was replete with small 
humiliations and symbolic indictments of Germany.6 German delegates left 
ample record of the hostility they encountered. They went for weeks without 
being invited to the conference table, isolated from the other delegates in un-
heated, freezing cold accommodations. This situation prompted Ernst von 
Simson, the director of the Foreign Ministry’s legal department, to speak of an 
“ice wall between us and the former enemies.”7
The peace terms and the accompanying correspondence embodied this 
sense of moral tribulation. According to the Allied and Associated Govern-
ments’ cover letter of June 16, the harsh peace terms expressed the “judgment 
passed upon the war by practically the whole of civilized mankind.” Germany 
was accused of having planned and started the conflict in pursuit of its expan-
sionist aims and was held directly responsible for the war’s millions of dead 
and maimed. Moreover, the communication once more elaborated on Germa-
ny’s ruthless conduct of war, including the illegal invasion and occupation of 
neutral Belgium, the pioneering use of poison gas, civilian bombings, subma-
rine warfare, and the maltreatment of prisoners of war. Furthermore, the cover 
letter made it clear that such behavior placed Germany – a nation that had cho-
sen “to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war” – outside of the pale of the 
family of “civilized” nations.8 While such moralistic language was largely ab-
sent from the treaty itself, articles 227 to 230 still demanded the extradition and 
trial of the emperor and other war criminals to conform to the requirements 
of “international morality.” Article 231 asked Germany to assume responsibil-
ity for the damages caused to the Allies in a “war imposed upon them by the 
4 See Creel in the New York Times, Nov. 17, 1918, qtd. in Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Rev-
olutionary Germany and Peacemaking (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985), 143.
5 William R. Keylor, “Versailles and International Diplomacy,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A Re-
assessment after 75 Years, ed. Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser, 469–505 (New York, 1998), 481 ff..
6 See Gerd Krumeich, “Versailles 1919. Der Krieg in den Köpfen,” in Versailles 1919. Ziele – 
Wirkung – Wahrnehmung, ed. Gerd Krumeich, 53–64 (Essen, 2001).
7 See Dieter Neizert, “‘Das Amt’ zwischen Versailles und Rapallo. Die Rückschau des Staatsse-
kretärs Ernst von Simson,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 60, no. 3 (2012): 443–490, 455.
8 Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on 
the Conditions of Peace, June 16, 1919, FRUS, Paris Peace Conference (PPC) 6, 928.
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aggression of Germany and her allies.” Whereas this much-debated “war guilt” 
clause served in a strictly legal sense only to justify reparations payments, Ger-
mans interpreted it as a concerted humiliation.9 When the Versailles treaty was 
signed on June 28, 1919, and ratified a few weeks later, this ended the legal state 
of war, but the “cultural demobilization”, i. e., the waning of war mentalities, 
had hardly begun.10
Fig . 1: J . N . Darling, “Outcasts,” editorial cartoon, October 1918  
© “Ding” Darling Wildlife Society
9 Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage. Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage 
in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1983), 17.
10 On the concepts of “cultural mobilization” and “cultural demobilization,” see Horne, “Demo-
bilizing the Mind”; contemporaries tended to speak of “moral demobilization.” See, for example, 
Gustav Stresemann, “Rede vor der ausländischen Presse vom 30. Dezember 1924,” in Reden der 
Kanzler- und Außenministerzeit (1923–1929), by Gustav Stresemann, ed. Wolfgang Elz, 516–533.
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Revision as leitmotif
Germany’s international ostracism would soon prove to be a significant polit-
ical problem. It was in this hostile climate, and from this circumscribed, iso-
lated position, that Germany had to begin its efforts to revise the provisions of 
the peace treaty. While none of the victors was truly satisfied with the treaty, 
Germans saw it as a devastating injustice and a calculated humiliation heaped 
upon an exhausted people. The treaty placed the odium of responsibility for 
the war on German shoulders, heavily reduced its army and navy and entirely 
dissolved its air force, took sizeable German lands and all colonies away from 
it, saw the Rhineland and the Saar area occupied, and stipulated that Germany 
would have to pay reparations of a yet to be determined amount. In a rare 
Weimar consensus, opposition to the Versailles dictate was nearly ubiquitous 
at the time. German professors, publicists, and politicians of nearly all political 
persuasions described the peace as a major injustice, even as “Carthaginian” in 
nature.11 An internal memorandum by the German peace delegation astutely 
summarized German sentiment, characterizing the peace terms as “insuffer-
able,” “unfulfillable,” “dishonest,” and “dishonorable.”12 Although the Weimar 
National Assembly ratified the treaty (under the threat of Allied military oc-
cupation and continuing blockade), German debates began to focus on how 
to revise its terms even before the ink had dried.13 Revision would become the 
leitmotif of foreign policy in the Weimar period.
Despite some discussion about the respective priority of overturning the 
treaty’s economic, military, and territorial provisions, economic questions soon 
emerged as the most pressing concern. Settling the amount of German repa-
rations payments to the Allies, in particular – which had remained unresolved 
due to inter-Allied disputes at Paris – would pre-occupy the great powers dur-
ing the 1920s.14 Between 1921 and 1924 alone, more than two dozen interna-
tional conferences sought to determine the final amount and payment meth-
ods. The centrality of the reparations question to European politics derived 
from a number of factors: For one, the fight over who would have to shoulder 
the immense financial burdens of the war was crucial because it would greatly 
11 Michael Grüttner, “Nachkriegszeit,” in Geschichte der Universität unter den Linden,Vol. 2, Die 
Berliner Universität zwischen den Weltkriegen, ed. Grüttner et al., 5–65 (Berlin, 2012), 28.
12 Denkschrift der deutschen Friedensdelegierten zu den Friedensforderungen der Entente, 
June 17 1919, Akten der Reichskanzlei (AdRk), Weimarer Republik/Das Kabinett Scheidemann/
Vol. 1/No. 113, 469–475.
13 German leadership had definitely been aware that the peace treaty would not resemble Wil-
son’s 14 Points since March 21, 1919; for the detailed instructions on how the peace negotiations 
were to be approached, see Kabinettssitzung, Mar. 21, 1919, AdRk, Das Kabinett Scheidemann. 
Vol. 1/No. 19, 74–83.
14 Walter Zechlin, Pressechef bei Ebert, Hindenburg und Kopf. Erlebnisse eines Pressechefs und 
Diplomaten (Hanover, 1956), 39.
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affect the redistribution of power in postwar Europe. For France, in particular, 
with its destroyed departments, staggering war debt (it owed 3 billion dollars to 
the United States alone), clouded demographic prospects, and fears of German 
revanchism, the question of reparations amounted to the question of its future 
standing in Europe.15 Only large reparation payments, by economically weak-
ening Germany and strengthening France, could ensure France’s security and 
truly reinforce the reality of German defeat and French victory. Conversely, for 
Germany, a viable reparations settlement was of eminent political importance 
because it would determine the pace of its economic recovery and therewith – 
many German decisionmakers believed – its return to great power status.16 If 
Germany succeeded in minimizing its reparations burden, it could attract the 
necessary capital from abroad to rebuild its dominant economic position on 
the continent. For this reason, a favorable settlement of the reparations ques-
tion was both a financial prerequisite and a potential precedent for the revi-
sion of other peace terms. As a consequence, reparations became one of the 
determining foreign policy questions of the decade and, in many respects, the 
linchpin of Germany’s revisionist politics.
Treaty Revision and the United States
These questions kept the United States – the world’s main creditor nation – at 
the heart of German attention. Indeed, since October 1918 the United States had 
stood at the center of German foreign relations. When the collapse of the Ger-
man military was imminent, Germany’s newly established democratic govern-
ment under Chancellor Max von Baden had approached U. S. President Wilson 
on October 4, 1918, about armistice negotiations on the basis of his Fourteen 
Points. There were both ideological and strategic reasons for this “turn” to the 
United States. At least partly, it was due to the enormous psychological impact 
that Wilson’s vision of a new world order had on war-weary publics around the 
world.17 German liberals close to the von Baden government like Max War-
burg, Walter Simons, and Moritz Julius Bonn embraced Wilson’s vision as a 
15 Even the German finance minister, if only internally, admitted that the “French economic 
position, if that is even possible, is even a lot sadder than ours. The French have about 180 billion 
debt, much of it abroad, their industrial territories are destroyed, their industry is to a large part 
a luxury industry, that can find no markets in an impoverished world (and) they have only 40 
million people.” Ausführungen des Reichsfinanzministers vor dem Reichskabinett über die 
 finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit des Reichs, Apr. 26, 1919, AdRk, Das Kabinett Scheidemann/
Vol. 1/No. 54, 233.
16 Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten, 17.
17 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment.
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solution to Europe’s long-standing problems.18 But the appeal to the American 
president was also a strategic decision. The war had not only left the United 
States with greatly enhanced international prestige and economic strength, but 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points (at least in the way that Germans liked to understand 
them) simply promised the most lenient possible peace to Germany. It was 
partly in deference to perceived American wishes that Germany further re-
formed its constitution in October 1918; the abdication of the Kaiser, even the 
declaration of the German Republic on November 9, 1918, were widely per-
ceived as concessions to American democratic ideals.19
After the armistice, Germany tried hard to keep up direct lines of commu-
nication with a powerful Amerika. It was to the American president and the 
American public that German foreign secretary Wilhelm Solf and civil society 
groups first turned to relax the armistice terms on November 12. Throughout 
the long armistice period, the German government invoked Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points on every occasion both to calm revolutionary unrest at home and to 
avert the more punitive intentions of the Allied governments abroad.20 In a 
memorandum on the United States in late November 1918, Johann Heinrich 
von Bernstorff, the former German ambassador to Washington (1908–1917), 
who was now in charge of preparing what Germans believed would be peace 
negotiations, held that “because the United States has decided the war, its po-
sition and especially that of President Wilson has become decisive for the fu-
ture.” Consequently, “the entire world will become economically and finan-
cially dependent on the United States. […]We will thus have to lean on the 
United States politically during the peace negotiations and arrange the later 
reconstruction of Germany with its help.”21 While this process would not be 
as straightforward as Bernstorff might have hoped at the time, these thoughts 
already reflected the main approach that German governments would take to-
ward the United States in the 1920s, aspiring to recover Germany’s place in the 
world with American support.
Germans’ prevalent hope in the United States was not lost on Americans. 
Summing up his impressions after a two-week special mission to Germany 
18 Horst Gründer, Walter Simons als Staatsmann, Jurist und Kirchenpolitiker (Neustadt an der 
Aisch, 1975), 69.
19 Klaus Schwabe, “America’s Contribution to the Stabilization of the Early Weimar Republic,” 
in Germany and America: Essays on Problems of International Relations and Immigration, ed. 
Hans Trefousse, 21–28 (New York, 1980), 26.
20 As the Reich finance minister explained to the cabinet on April 26, 1919: “Wilson’s 14 points 
are a shield against the demands of our victorious enemies.” Ausführungen des Reichsfinanz-
ministers vor dem Reichskabinett über die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit des Reichs, Apr. 26, 
1919, AdRk, Das Kabinett Scheidemann/Vol. 1/No. 54, 233.
21 “Aufzeichnung des Leiters der vorbereitenden Massnahmen für die Friedensverhandlungen 
Graf von Bernstorff,” Nov. 24, 1918, ADAP Series A, Vol. 1, No. 36, 55.
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in December 1918 and January 1919, Ellis Loring Dresel, the future American 
chargé d’affaires in Berlin, reported back:
The most conspicuous feature of all conversations, which I had with all classes was that 
somewhat over-friendly disposition toward America and Americans. This is undoubt-
edly partly due to self-interest, but is also largely owing to the former close ties with 
America, to social, economic and financial intercourse which existed before the war and 
to the large population of German extraction in the United States: also to an appreciation 
of the fact that America has no selfish ends to serve and to the hope that she may be in-
duced to plead the German cause with her allies. The result is that there is a strong wish 
to take up relations again with the United States at the same point where they were before 
the war, and the hope is cherished that the events of the war will be overlooked and con-
doned and that by the help of America, Germany will be enabled to rehabilitate herself. It 
is perhaps needless to add that I was careful to give no encouragement to this desire for a 
policy of forgiving and forgetting.22
Just as Dresel was personally careful not to encourage German hopes, few 
American actions could justify German belief in the nation’s particular good-
will during the armistice period. In reality, the Wilson administration had 
never made republican government in Germany a prerequisite for peace ne-
gotiations, and the events of the German Revolution elicited apprehension 
rather than enthusiasm in Washington. If Germany’s independent socialists 
smacked dangerously of Bolshevism, the moderate Social Democrats, who had 
supported the German war effort in 1914, seemed hardly less militarist than 
the old regime. President Wilson, indeed, remained suspicious of the republi-
can and democratic credentials of the new German government and regarded 
the young republic in many respects as the moral equivalent of the bygone 
empire.23 Had Germans believed that democratic reforms would entitle them 
to a lenient “Wilson Peace” based on the Fourteen Points, not even Wilson 
himself – quite apart from the other heads of Allied governments – was willing 
to modify his earlier judgments. As a consequence, American support for the 
new German government was tacit at best. American food sales to Germany, 
the most profound measure of American support to the fledgling republic, 
were intended to ward off Bolshevist infiltration, not to actively support Ger-
man democracy.24 Official U. S. representatives closest to the German situation 
22 The Chief of the Special Mission in Germany (Dresel) to the Secretary of the Commission to 
Negotiate Peace (Grew) FRUS PPC Vol. 2, 138.
23 In Klaus Schwabe’s words, “Wilson was inclined […] to see the German Republic, morally 
and in terms of international law, as the equivalent of Wilhelm II’s monarchy”; Schwabe, qtd. in 
Daniel Larsen, “Abandoning Democracy: Woodrow Wilson and Promoting German Democ-
racy, 1918–1919,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 3 (2013): 476–508, 504.
24 On this issue, see Larsen, “Abandoning Democracy.”
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urged Americans to engage on behalf of a Germany that “will do anything the 
president wants at present,” but these admonitions fell largely on deaf ears.25 
“The Weimar Republic,” Klaus Schwabe concluded, “was to America an un-
wanted or, at best, a half-wanted child.”26 Even without American encourage-
ment, however, Germany’s unrealistic hopes in a benevolent “Wilson peace” 
continued to flourish during the armistice.
The reality of the Versailles peace terms came as a shock.27 The grave gen-
eral disappointment was coupled with particular indignation at President Wil-
son. Previously hailed as a savior-like figure, even German liberals now spoke 
with bitterness of the American president’s “betrayal” at the Paris Peace Con-
ference. Though they conceded that Wilson was an honest idealist and had 
ameliorated some of the harsher Allied demands, this hardly moderated their 
disappointment. “In light of the devastating peace terms,” wrote the centrist 
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, “no rape and no dishonoring that our enemies 
have devised against us has been so disappointing to the German people as the 
realization that Wilson has betrayed us.”28 On the political right, which had 
never really trusted Wilson in the first place, he swiftly became a near Machia-
vellian character and was given a distinct role in the “stab in the back”-legend. 
Clever Wilsonian peace propaganda, right-wing groups now claimed, had (de-
liberately) tricked a militarily undefeated Germany into laying down its arms 
in the expectation of a just peace – with the gravest consequences.29 This dis-
appointment turned Wilson into a rallying point of right-wing anti-American-
ism.30 At the same time, it also affected the stability of the Weimar Republic by 
undermining the credibility of its liberal, pro-American leaders and recasting 
it as an American, essentially un-German, creation.31
Still, Germans’ broader hope in the United States outlived this disillusion-
ment with Wilson. Despite the harsh peace, Germany’s governments, and a 
25 This is a statement by a neutral diplomat quoted in Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, Nov. 
21, 1918, FRUS PPC Vol. 2, 96; Larsen, “Abandoning Democracy,” 482.
26 Klaus Schwabe, “The United States and the Weimar Republic,” 20.
27 On the reaction to the peace terms and Wilson in Germany’s public discussion, see Berg, 
Deutschland und Amerika, 24–33.
28 Deutsche Allg. Zeitung, No. 232, May 14, 1919, quoted in Berg, Deutschland und Amerika, 
24–25.
29 To a conservative historian like Eduard Meyer, Germany – weakened by the “hunger block-
ade” and socialist agitation – had foolishly trusted in Wilson’s fourteen points only to be bitterly 
disappointed; see Eduard Meyer, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Geschichte, Kultur, Verfas-
sung und Politik (Frankfurt a. M., 1920), 283; the former ambassador Bernstorff called this popu-
lar version of events an utter “historical misrepresentation” (glatte Geschichtsfälschung); see Jo-
hann Heinrich von Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe (Hamburg, 2010) (orig. Zurich, 1936), 99.
30 “For Germany,” wrote Meyer in August 1919, “Wilson will always remain the type of the 
sententious, canting hypocrite, in whose persona is concentrated everything that is antipodal 
and repugnant to the German character (deutsches Wesen).” Meyer, Die Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika, 288.
31 Schwabe, “America’s Contribution to the Stabilization of the Early Weimar Republic,” 26.
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significant part of the German public, clung to their “basically pro-American 
orientation.”32 They remained convinced, as the leader of the German People’s 
Party (DVP) and future foreign minister Gustav Stresemann put it, that “the 
determination of Europe’s future depends in the last analysis on the United 
States.”33 This applied especially to reparations, the one issue fast becoming the 
key focus of German foreign policy. In this, the United States, as the economic 
“world victor,” attained a new importance for Germany. Since it was seen as 
the only nation in the financial position to exert the necessary pressure for a 
sober settlement of the reparations question and to finance Europe’s economic 
stabilization, the involvement of the Allies’ creditor seemed indispensable to 
German recovery.34 Notions of America’s fabulous wealth and a strong sense 
of entitlement after the frustrated promises of the armistice only intensified 
this transatlantic focus. German hopes for economic recovery rested to a large 
degree in Amerika.
Fig . 2: Hans-Maria Lindloff, “German 
Hope in America: The German 
Michel Dreams of the Fair Towers 
of Gold,” Literary Digest, Jan . 5, 1924
32 Schwabe, “The United States and the Weimar Republic,” 24.
33 Andreas Dorpalen, “American Isolationism and German Foreign Policy During the Weimar 
Era,” in Deutschland und die USA, 1918–1933, ed. Georg Eckert, 44–52 (Braunschweig, 1968), 44.
34 Peter Berg has shown that between 1919 and 1924 the subject of the need for and prospects 
of American economic aid to Germany preoccupied the German public like no other; Berg, 
Deutschland und Amerika 1918–1929, 71.
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As the 1920s would reveal, German hopes in the United States were more than 
just wishful thinking in the long run. There were good reasons to suggest the 
United States as a likely partner for the revision of the treaty. Of all the main 
former enemies, the United States alone had no serious political or commercial 
grievances against Germany. Germany’s defeat had removed its threat to Amer-
ican interests in Latin America, and the United States, in turn, entertained nei-
ther territorial interests in Europe nor held major claims on Germany.35 Indeed, 
by virtue of wartime constellations, Germany alone was not heavily indebted to 
the United States, sparing it the tensions of a debtor-creditor relationship that 
would soon develop between France and the United States – another factor 
that worked in Germany’s favor. When the U. S. Senate rejected the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Republican presidential candidate Warren G. Harding won 
a landslide victory in late 1920, these events also seemed to signal a rift in the 
victors’ alliance; the United States took no major part in the enforcement of 
the peace treaty.36 On the issue of disarmament, moreover, the one political 
project the United States remained committed to during the 1920s, a disarmed 
Germany (for reasons of its own) emerged as a natural partner. And though 
U. S. administrations were at first skeptical about the authenticity of Germany’s 
democratic conversion, its new form of government could theoretically count 
on American sympathy and could challenge the favored position long enjoyed 
by the French “sister republic” in the long run. In hindsight, there was no doubt 
that time would work for Germany.
Even if these constellations only successively became clear to contempo-
raries, there was from 1919 onward a near unfaltering belief that American 
economic self-interests would ultimately lead it to support Germany. German 
economists, journalists, and diplomats did not tire of pointing to considera-
ble U. S. interest in a stable and prosperous Germany both as a market for its 
goods and, no less important, a bulwark against Bolshevism. With a destitute 
and unproductive Germany at its center, Europe was unlikely to recover, and 
would thus work against American political and economic interests. It was on 
this notion of an economically interdependent world – a world whose prosper-
ity hinged on Europe’s largest economy – that a growing number of German 
foreign policymakers, including later foreign ministers Walther Rathenau and 
Gustav Stresemann, based their firm belief in American support.37 Trusting 
American administrations to think more in terms of business than of national 
35 One exception may be the protracted negotiations over German property and war claims; see 
Burkhard Jähnicke, Washington und Berlin zwischen den Kriegen. Die Mixed Claims Commission 
in den transatlantischen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden, 2003).
36 The United States did, of course, participate in the occupation of the Rhineland; see Henry T. 
Allen, Mein Rheinlandtagebuch (Berlin, 1923).
37 See Stresemann in the Frankfurter Zeitung, Apr. 10, 1921 in Berg, Weimar und Amerika, 63; 
and also Berg, Gustav Stresemann, 103.
Isolation, Revision, and Amerika, 1919–192150
emotions, it did not seem absurd for them to hope that the United States would 
be a partner in the revision of the treaty.
The Problem of American Public Opinion
These German expectations would soon establish U. S. opinion as a primary 
foreign policy problem. Indeed, the hope in American involvement clashed 
with the realities of American withdrawal from Europe. While German for-
eign policymakers rightly believed that the United States would eventually 
get involved, owing to its strong interest in a stable and prosperous Europe, 
they overestimated “the pace of the politicization of economic factors.”38 In 
the immediate postwar years, U. S. administrations showed little inclination to 
get involved in Europe. Ratification of the Versailles treaty was defeated in the 
U. S. Senate in March 1920, thus voiding all American obligations agreed on in 
Paris. Even though Germany welcomed this rejection of the peace treaty and 
inter-Allied cooperation, its leaders also worried that the United States was re-
treating from European problems. Despite the widespread belief in Germany 
that America would ultimately get involved, the question of how to secure this 
involvement proved complicated.
American public opinion was first identified as a major stumbling block to 
American involvement within this context. Germans assumed that America’s 
powerful but ill-informed public was primarily to blame for this astounding 
and (to their minds) incomprehensible retreat from international influence, 
Although neither German diplomats nor German scholars at the time ever ar-
rived at a sophisticated understanding of just how American public opinion 
affected American foreign policymaking, they generally believed it to be more 
influential than anywhere else.39 As the former German ambassador to Wash-
ington, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, acknowledged in a 1920 publication, 
no mayors, congressmen, nor even the President of the United States could 
defy public opinion. Before long, they would invariably adjust their policies to 
suit the sentiment of the American people.40 Although Bernstorff recognized 
that American leaders could and would also actively influence public opinion, 
the conviction in the policy-shaping power of public sentiment ran high after 
the propaganda battles of the preceding years.41 Consequently, the U. S. gov-
38 Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 53.
39 In his wartime memoirs, Ambassador Bernstorff admitted how hard it was “to grasp the ac-
tual extent of the power of public opinion in the Union.” Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, 
28.
40 Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, 30.
41 Jeffrey Verhey, “Some Lessons of the War: The Discourse on the Propaganda and Public 
Opinion in Germany in the 1920s,” in War, Violence and the Modern Condition, ed. Bernd Hüp-
pauf, 99–118 (Berlin, 1997).
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ernment would only have a mandate for action in Europe if American public 
opinion changed, paving the way for loans, political support, and a positive 
response to Germany’s revisionist demands. Whether, when, and how the U. S. 
administration would decide to act in Europe, Germans believed, depended 
largely on how the American public thought and felt about Germany.
With U. S. involvement hinging on American public opinion, the pros-
pects by 1920 were not encouraging at all. For one, anti-German sentiment was 
still widespread and particularly strong in the influential Northeast. Patriotic 
groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution or the veterans’ organi-
zation American Legion at first held fast to wartime positions. Among pro-Al-
lied periodicals like the Independent, the Outlook, or the Saturday Evening Post, 
Germany’s primary responsibility for the war went nearly unquestioned.42 
Through the early 1920s, upper-class, Northeastern organizations like heiress 
Anne Morgan’s Committee for Devastated France sought to maintain cordial 
relations with France, backed French reparations demands against Germany, 
and lashed out against any pro-German stirrings. Indeed, some of the attacks 
on German-friendlier groups were so vile that one liberal American journalist 
was left to wonder “why […] the worst, the meanest, the most revengeful, the 
most German public opinion in the world is the American?”43
But increasing disinterest in European problems was almost as discon-
certing as anti-German sentiment after 1920. Many Americans had never had 
much interest in European affairs and regarded America’s role in World War I 
not as an opportunity for world leadership but an aberration in the nation’s his-
tory.44 Around 1920, according to Robert Young, no more than five percent of 
Americans kept abreast of foreign affairs, and while there were some regional 
variations – interest tended to be highest on the East Coast – most Ameri-
cans either did not care about European troubles, and/or objected to America 
becoming formally involved in European affairs on principle. When the U. S. 
Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles (and the League of Nations) in March 
1920, it marked one expression of the U. S. swinging back into isolationism, 
despite all the other factors involved.45 The Republican administrations of the 
1920s, for their part, fully heeded this public sentiment. Both President Hard-
ing, elected in November 1920 promising a “return to normalcy,” and his suc-
42 Müller, Weimar im Blick, 47.
43 John A. Thompson, Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World 
War (Cambridge, 1987), 246.
44 An early study that is still relevant on American isolationism is Selig Adler, The Isolationist 
Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York, 1966).
45 I am aware of the intense debate surrounding this term but will continue to employ it because 
it captures how Germans thought of U. S. policy. For a recent critique of the concept, see Brooke 
L. Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American
Political Culture, 1919–1941,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (April 2014): 345–376.
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cessors retreated from America’s formal involvement and “entangling alliances” 
in Europe, joining neither the League of Nations nor the World Court.
To be sure, American attitudes toward Germany notably diversified once 
the peace treaty had been signed. Apart from the majority isolationist group 
and a pro-Allies, anti-German patriotic group, there were three groups with 
a basically more positive attitude toward Germany by mid-1920.46 First and 
foremost, there were the millions of Americans of German birth and descent 
who had been persecuted during the war. The leaders of this ethnic group grew 
more vocal again once the peace had been signed. From the beginning, much 
of the German-language press espoused a decidedly pro-German position, ad-
vocating American action on behalf of Germany to redress what they, too, con-
sidered Wilson’s broken promises and revise the Versailles treaty.47 Wartime 
propagandists like Harvard professor Edmund von Mach and publicist George 
Sylvester Viereck also took up their pro-German work again, rallying against 
German war guilt and the French use of North African troops in the occupied 
Rhineland. German-American leaders saw this fight against the peace treaty 
as a way to revive the group’s ethnic identity and forge a more unified and 
politically conscious German-America.48 The average German American, to 
be sure, had little appetite for militancy or public controversy. Though many 
harbored concern and sympathy for the German situation, they expressed it,if 
at all, through transatlantic charity or quiet action at the ballot box.
A second, much smaller, but also more influential group was comprised of 
left-leaning liberals in the United States who advocated American responsibil-
ity in Europe but rejected the peace treaty as the basis of the postwar order.49 
During the war, many of them, like Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the Na-
tion, had fully subscribed to Wilson’s vision of offering a reformed, democratic 
Germany a “peace without victory.” Following the abdication of the Kaiser, they 
had adopted a conciliatory and supportive stance toward the German republic 
and came to reject the peace treaty – “the madness at Versailles” as the Nation 
termed it – as the very “antipode” of the “democratic peace” they had envi-
sioned. Though most supported American ratification of the peace treaty for 
lack of alternatives, they imagined the League of Nations as an instrument to 
46 I follow the findings of Klaus Schoenthal, who groups American opinion in early 1920 along 
a spectrum of five positions; Schoenthal, “American Attitudes toward Germany,” 63–65.
47 Barbara Wiedemann-Citera, Die Auswirkungen des Ersten Weltkrieges auf die Deutsch-Amer-
ikaner im Spiegel der New Yorker Staatszeitung, der New Yorker Volkszeitung und der New York 
Times 1914–1926 (Frankfurt, 1993), 179; see the editorial line in Viereck’s American Monthly, 
1919–1920.
48 They were convinced that “if it had been the intention of the conquerors utterly to destroy 
Germany, they hardly could have made a more thorough job of it.” Richard Bartholdt, From 
Steerage to Congress (Philadelphia, 1930), 409.
49 Thompson, Reformers and War, 242.
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correct its more onerous terms.50 Already shortly after the war, liberal opinion 
journals like Herbert Croly’s New Republic or Villard’s Nation offered generally 
favorable coverage of the new Germany: they championed relief of German 
distress, challenged the notion of exclusive German war guilt, and advocated 
that the United States play an active role in securing the revision of the peace 
treaty.51
Most important, however, were the attitudes of a third group that called 
upon America to take some responsibility for the reconstruction and welfare of 
Europe but within the Versailles order. This group was comprised of a diverse 
and influential lot of businessmen, bankers, educators, and politicians of both 
major parties, including Republican leaders like Secretary of State Charles Ev-
ans Hughes or Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, and was represented 
by such sophisticated press organs as the New York Times and the Chicago Daily 
News. By upbringing and ideological outlook, this group leaned toward the Al-
lies, but only as long as they accorded with their overarching desire for a stable, 
liberal, and capitalist world order. Consequently, they were clearly interested in 
German economic recovery to bolster the democratic republic and to provide 
a market for U. S. goods but understood their German policy always as part of 
a larger European policy.52 Over time, they would come to adopt a policy of 
“peaceful change” in Europe, advocating a gradual and consensual revision of 
the peace terms to economically, and, by extension, politically, stabilize Ger-
many. Still, by 1920, those in public positions, especially, were “resolved not to 
get ahead of an isolationist [and divided] electorate.”53
For a Germany anxious for American support, this widespread public dis-
trust, dislike, and disinterest seemed like a major stumbling block. By 1920, 
it could count on sympathetic consideration of its problems only among the 
largely marginalized group of German Americans and a small number of 
left-leaning American Progressives, who, moreover, found themselves attacked 
by patriotic groups riding high on the nativist wave of the postwar years.54 
Even those in favor of, and in a position to effect, American involvement were 
not willing to ignore the generally isolationist climate at home.
50 For a grouping of the American press according to these categories, see Müller, Weimar im 
Blick, 47–49.
51 As early as April 1919, the New Republic held that none of the major powers had been inno-
cent in 1914; for an early summary, see Lewis Gannett, “They All Lied,” Nation, Oct. 11, 1922; see 
also Selig Adler, “The War-Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918–1928,” Journal 
of Modern History 23 (March 1951): 1–28.
52 See Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 57; Alanson B. Houghton, first as ambassador 
in Berlin and then in London, was a major proponent of that strategy; see Jeffrey Matthews, 
Alanson B. Houghton: Ambassador of the New Era (Lanham, MD, 2004).
53 Robert J. Young, Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940 (New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2004), xix.
54 A liberal supporter of Germany was maligned “as pro-German, or as a bolshevist, or an agi-
tator.” Thompson, Reformers and War, 259.
Isolation, Revision, and Amerika, 1919–192154
It was only during the spring of 1921 that the problem of U. S. opinion, as 
well as the extent of America’s withdrawal from Europe, first became really 
visible to the German government. At that point, both the reparations struggle 
and American interest in Europe had reached a low point. In January of that 
year, the Allies had finally fixed the total reparations sum to be paid by Ger-
many at 226 billion gold marks, shortly thereafter occupying the Rhine ports 
of Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Düsseldorf to compel German acceptance. In this 
situation, Germans looked to the incoming U. S. administration under Pres-
ident Harding for support; they hoped Harding would steer a more active, 
business-oriented course in European reconstruction.55 In a desperate public 
plea in April 1921, the German government appealed to the U. S. to mediate in 
the reparations tangle, promising to subject itself unconditionally to American 
suggestions. Across the Atlantic, however, Germany’s unprecedented step in-
spired only a non-committal answer, forcing Germany to accept what became 
known as the London schedule of reparations, which fixed German payments 
at 132 billion gold marks, payable over 42 years. Though there were many good 
reasons for the U. S. administration to keep out of the European imbroglio, 
the German Foreign Ministry attributed America’s caution also to public sen-
timent. Americans, it realized, neither trusted Germany nor considered it wor-
thy of U. S. support in a situation it had brought upon itself. State secretary 
Adolf Boyé characteristically attributed U. S. reluctance to get involved to the 
continued “influence of the war propaganda of our enemies.”56 By early 1921, 
Germany’s moral isolation had become a serious political problem.
Accordingly, German image-building in the United States seemed ab-
solutely imperative. If American action in Europe depended on U. S. public 
opinion, then more serious efforts would have to be undertaken to persuade 
a reluctant American public that Germany deserved American support in re-
vising the peace treaty. From this perspective, a primary objective of German 
foreign policy had to be widening the circle of those with favorable attitudes 
toward Germany. As things stood, Germany had to rewin transatlantic trust, 
rebuild appreciation, and recapture lost prestige.57 When, a few months after 
the Spring 1921 debacle, Reich President Friedrich Ebert appointed business-
man Otto Wiedfeldt as the first postwar German ambassador to Washington, 
55 For the many different hopes placed in President Harding, see Berg, Deutschland und Amer-
ika, 59.
56 Der Staatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt Boyé an den Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie 
und den Deutschen Handelstag, Apr. 18, 1921, ADAP Serie A Vol. 4, No. 247, 509–510; on the 
importance of public opinion with regard to reparations in the spring of 1921, see also Bern-
storff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 200–201.
57 The former German ambassador to the United States Bernstorff published his wartime mem-
oirs, Deutschland und Amerika. Erinnerungen aus dem fünfjährigen Kriege, in December of 1919 
as a way to learn from the sins of omission during the war; Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 
92.
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he expressed Wiedfeldt’s two-fold mission in no uncertain terms: to improve 
American public opinion toward Germany and to get the United States to par-
take in German reconstruction.58 In the minds of many, as we have seen, the 
two questions were intimately connected.
Henceforth, then, the main question confronting German policymakers 
was how to win the American public over to intervening on Germany’s be-
half. What measures and methods would Germany have to adopt? Who should 
organize and oversee them? What sort of German “image” or message about 
Germany was it to convey? Which American audiences should it address, and, 
perhaps more importantly, which ones could it even hope to reach? To un-
derstand the answers German officials arrived at, however, we need to review 
Germany’s efforts at public diplomacy as they had developed in a transatlantic 
context since the turn of the century.
58 Wiedfeldt to Ebert, Apr. 20, 1924, in Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter der Weimarer 




Culture, Propaganda, and Transatlantic Relations, 
1902–1921
All states are today pursuing an extensive general propaganda abroad, a kind of expansion 
of ideas or attitudes not for the distinct, clearly demarcated ends of a single undertaking, but 
in order to create a favorable climate for all present and future undertakings, whether they 
be  political, economic or cultural; to surround themselves with an atmosphere of power, of 
 economic and financial prowess, of cultural standing, in short, with prestige. 
(J . J . Ruedorffer [Kurt Riezler], Grundzüge der Weltpolitik, 1914, 243)
In trying to win over a disinterested, even hostile American public, the We-imar Republic often felt that it was facing an entirely novel situation. Seen from the perspective of the 1920s, Imperial Germany often appeared to be 
a happy place of unchallenged German prestige, worldwide influence, and con-
siderable cultural sway. Unburdened by the deadweight of recent enmity and 
unfettered by financial troubles, the Kaiserreich seemed never to have needed 
to advertise itself abroad in the first place. It had attracted international stu-
dents and tourists, respect and esteem – all seemingly without effort. This nos-
talgic assessment was as alluring as it was wrong.1
Quite the contrary, when Germans began to debate how to improve Amer-
ican sentiment in the early 1920s, they had already been courting Americans 
for nearly two decades. After 1900, Germany had tacitly begun to build a cul-
tural pillar of foreign policy alongside economic and political ones, and it was 
in the United States that it first developed key elements of a soft power ap-
proach, a subtler promotion of Germany. By 1914, it had already built a sub-
stantial transatlantic infrastructure to promote itself in the United States, and 
during the war, it had waged a major, if ultimately ineffective, campaign for the 
hearts and minds of what it regarded as the most important neutral power.2 The 
present chapter traces the origins of this campaign, its fate during World War 
I, and its implications for Germany’s postwar public diplomacy. It will intro-
1 Gärtner, Botschafterin des Guten Willens, 19–20.
2 Abschrift zu UIK 3368 1 Amerika-Institut [R. W. Drechsler] to Minister der geistlichen und 
Unterrichts-Angelegenheiten, Nov. 20, 1914, PA R 64997.
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duce key groups of actors, such as Germany’s “peaceful imperialists,” German 
Americans and American cultural internationalists, who would continue to 
play a critical role in the 1920s. Moreover, it examines some of the underlying 
conceptions that made the United States such a prominent target for German 
public diplomacy and analyzes why the positive effects of German prewar and 
wartime efforts were so limited. All in all, I argue that it was precisely because 
the German campaign ended in such resounding failure with the U. S. entry 
in the war in April 1917 that it came to define the approaches of the 1920s: the 
lessons of the war established German public diplomacy as a legitimate policy 
field just as they demarcated the pace, shape, and nature of German initiatives 
during the 1920s. Therefore, understanding Weimar’s decisions requires first 
and foremost some insight into Wilhelmine ambitions, conceptions, and dis-
appointments.
Prince Heinrich’s Visit and the Origins of German Public Diplomacy in the 
United States
For all public purposes, Wilhelmine Germany’s campaign for American hearts 
and minds began on February 25, 1902, the day Prince Heinrich of Prussia ar-
rived in the United States as an envoy of goodwill for his older brother, the 
German emperor, Wilhelm II. For Heinrich, a navy admiral and passionate 
traveler, this was far from his first semi-diplomatic assignment. In the preced-
ing years, this likeable and modest member of the Hohenzollern dynasty had 
repeatedly accepted semiofficial missions to smooth over the international un-
ease his brother’s imprudent remarks tended to produce. But with regard to 
German-American relations, the prince’s visit constituted an unprecedented 
event. No German royal had ever traveled to the republican United States on 
an official mission, and Heinrich was but the fourth high-ranking European 
aristocrat ever to do so. His visit thus set off a flurry of etiquette problems and, 
much to the chagrin of many a staunch American republican, a wave of public 
excitement.
From the time Heinrich’s visit was announced in mid-January 1902 to his 
arrival in New York six weeks later, all major American newspapers reported 
on the Prussian prince’s preparations almost daily and cities vied to be included 
in the continental tour that was to follow his East Coast visit. Symbolic gestures 
of German courtesy and monarchical interest caught the attention of Ameri-
can journalists. It was reported, for example, that Wilhelm II had hand-picked 
about one thousand of his choicest pieces of silverware, valued at over five 
million dollars, to entertain American guests on board the royal yacht Hohen-
zollern in New York harbor; the news that Prince Heinrich had systematically 
read up on the United States and that visiting the New World had been a boy-
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hood dream of his were equally suited to generating enthusiasm.3 Despite some 
reservations about celebrating European royalty, the American press published 
favorable portraits of the “democratic” nature of “Wilhelm’s friendly envoy” 
and found “these courtesies exchanged between a republic and a monarchy 
[…] interesting and useful. They tend to banish distrust and to create a better 
feeling.”4 By the time Prince Heinrich set foot in the United States, his visit had 
already evolved into a media spectacle of remarkable proportions.5
Once Heinrich was in the United States, media interest and public enthu-
siasm soared as an impressive range of special courtesies were showered upon 
him. President Theodore Roosevelt declared Heinrich a guest of the nation and 
honored him with a large state dinner at the White House. The U. S. House 
of Representatives welcomed the Prussian prince with a two-minute ovation; 
Harvard University bestowed an honorary doctorate upon him. Heinrich then 
went on a whirlwind tour through thirteen American states, always paying his 
respects to the shrines of American history, including Civil War battlefields 
and Mount Vernon. Wherever he went, crowds lined the railroad tracks to 
catch a glimpse of the Imperial train (where one carriage was reserved for the 
accompanying press correspondents), and the crème-de-la-crème of the Amer-
ican business, education and political worlds entertained him at splendid ban-
quets. On several of these occasions, cable messages between Wilhelm II and 
the Americans in attendance were exchanged, creating the impression of two 
modern nations bridging the Atlantic divide in a world shrunk by the recent 
revolutions in communication and transportation.6 In short, Heinrich’s tour 
became precisely what his brother had intended it to be: a display of German 
respect for American traditions, a reminder of German influence on American 
culture, and a celebration of German-American “friendship.”7 American jour-
nalists characterized it as a German “master stroke of diplomacy,” marking “a 
new epoch of cultural relations between the so greatly befriended countries.”8
Indeed, the prince’s visit was but the beginning of a much broader German 
attempt to enhance its reputation and influence in the United States, which 
3 “Prince Henry Is Studying,” Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1902, 1.
4 “Emperor and President,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan. 14, 1902, 12; a similar take can be found 
in “Affair of the State,” Boston Daily Globe, Jan. 12, 1902, 2; one measure of this popular enthusi-
asm is the considerable amount of memorabilia produced to commemorate Heinrich’s visit and 
the careful efforts German Americans, especially, took to collect and archive everything having 
to do with it; see Prince Heinrich Scrapbooks, German-American Collection Manuscripts 
(Non-Catalogued) 15, Horner Memorial Library.
5 “Germany Won Over,” Washington Post, Feb. 26 1902, 1.
6 See, for example, Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of 
the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ, 2014), 37–39, 711–724.
7 As Wilhelm II explained in a letter to President Roosevelt, his brother’s visit was to “express to 
you once more my sincere feelings and friendship for the United States.” “Emperor and Presi-
dent,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan. 14, 1902, 12.
8 “Prince Henry Is Welcomed by Roosevelt,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 25, 1902.
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it pursued not through traditional channels of diplomacy, but through public 
and cultural relations. Contemporaries rightly identified a Wilhelmine policy 
of “gifts and gestures” in the decades before the war.9 During his visit to Har-
vard University, for example, Heinrich announced his brother’s financial sup-
port for a “Germanic Museum” to be opened on the campus of America’s oldest 
and most prestigious university.10 Over the next several years, Wilhelm II also 
gifted statues of famous Germans (such as Frederick the Great), bestowed dec-
orations and medals on prominent Americans, and regularly sent congratula-
tory telegrams to ethnic German organizations. Meanwhile, the Prussian Min-
istry of Culture initiated professorial exchanges with Harvard University and 
Columbia University and in 1910 opened an Amerika-Institut in Berlin.11 (Ger-
man-)American philanthropists, businessmen, and scholars mirrored German 
enthusiasm for transatlantic cultural exchange and established the Germanistic 
Society of America (est. 1904), a number of visiting professorships, as well as 
a Deutsches Haus at Columbia University (est. 1911) to familiarize a broader 
American public with German cultural achievements.12 In short, the decade 
after Prince Heinrich’s visit witnessed a host of private and official initiatives, 
9 Emil Witte, Aus einer deutschen Botschaft. Zehn Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diplomatie 
(Leipzig, 1907), 238.
10 These cultural initiatives, in particular, the professorial exchange and the Germanic Museum, 
have been detailed in a number of studies; see Reiner Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika. Die 
USA in der Politik der Reichsleitung (Cologne, 1986), 255–290; Bernhard vom Brocke, “Interna-
tionale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfänge einer deutschen Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik: 
Der Professorenaustausch mit Nordamerika,” in Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftspolitik 
im Industriezeitalter. Das ‘System Althoff ’ in historischer Perspektive, ed. Bernhard vom Brocke, 
185–242 (Hildesheim, 1991); Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung der 
Kultur: der deutsch-amerikanische Professorenaustausch 1904–1914,” in Zwei Wege in die Mod-
erne: Aspekte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1900–1918, ed. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase 
and Jürgen Heideking, 45–88 (Trier, 1997); Charlotte Lerg, “Uses and Abuses of the First Ger-
man-American Professorial Exchange 1905–1914,” in German-American Educational History: 
Topics, Trends, Fields of Research, ed. Anne Overbeck and Jürgen Overhoff, 63–80 (Bad 
Heilbrunn, 2017); for an in-depth study of the Germanic Museum, see Ungern-Sternberg, 
Deutschland und Amerika (Cologne, 1994); on the diplomatic importance and dynamics of 
American-German university relations more generally, see Charlotte Lerg, Universitätsdiplo-
matie. Wissenschaft und Prestige in den transatlantischen Beziehungen, 1890–1920 (Göttingen, 
2019).
11 The quasi-diplomatic objective of the Columbia-Berlin exchange was apparent from its 
name: In Berlin, the American exchange professor held the “Theodore Roosevelt Professorship,” 
the German exchange professor in New York City, the “Kaiser-Wilhelm-Professorship.” It was 
Columbia President Butler who insisted that the Columbia-Berlin exchange was not an aca-
demic but a national affair; Butler to Schmidt, Oct. 6, 1910, and Dec. 28, 1910, NL Schmidt-Ott 
418 Butler, New York, Korrespondenz 1909–15, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbe-
sitz (GSPK); The Amerika-Institut, too, was founded with (German-)American support. Its 
founding director, Harvard professor Hugo Münsterberg, conceptualized it as “a clearing house 
for all the cultural relations between Germany and the United States”; see Margaret Münster-
berg, Hugo Münsterberg, His Life and Work (New York, 1922), 188; Amerika-Institut-Rundbrief, 
Dec. 7 1910, PA R 64997.
12 Germanistic Society, Activities of the Germanistic Society of the United States, 1904–1910.
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establishing a transatlantic infrastructure of academic exchanges, museums, 
institutes, and societies to showcase German cultural grandeur, cultivate 
American elite and ethnic sympathies for Germany, and engender closer trans-
atlantic cooperation between the two nations. Looking back in 1914, the Ger-
man ambassador to Washington, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff (1908–1917) 
identified Heinrich’s trip as the beginning of a German “Amerikapolitik.”13
Before we turn to the distinct motivations behind this Amerikapolitik, we 
should pause to appreciate just how novel these measures were in terms of 
international relations. At the time, quasi-diplomatic endeavors like the Ger-
manic museum, the professorial exchange, the Deutsches Haus at Columbia 
University, and the Amerika-Institut in Berlin were among the first of their 
kind. As scholars have pointed out, they count among the very first acts of 
German cultural diplomacy.14 To be sure, cultural and especially academic re-
lations had long been a significant factor in transatlantic affairs. Ever since the 
1820s, German universities had attracted a large number of American students 
in search of the specialized scientific training not yet available back home.15 
Collectively, about 10,000 German-trained Americans shaped the American 
university landscape as well as a generally positive image of Germany in the 
United States.16 Academic relations, alongside German immigration to the 
United States and American high regard for German music, wove an intricate 
web of personal and emotional connections at a time when German-American 
official relations were otherwise characterized by benign disinterest.17
But these cultural networks were not the product of a coherent policy, let 
alone a state-directed one. Throughout the nineteenth century, the German 
state had made no attempt, for example, to send symphony orchestras abroad 
or even to influence individual musicians, professors, or emigrants (many of 
whom did consider themselves informal ambassadors) venturing overseas. 
With few exceptions, German officials did not regard such matters as falling 
within the purview of foreign policy; there were no official bodies, funds, con-
13 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
14 Prince Heinrich’s visit and the subsequent cultural campaign have been identified as mile-
stones in the development of German public diplomacy; see vom Brocke, “Der Deutsch-Ameri-
kanische Professorenaustausch,” 128; Ungern-Sternberg, Deutschland und Amerika, 131.
15 For decades to come, German-American relations would benefit from the language skills and 
sympathy of these students; for example, well into the 1920s, most American ambassadors to 
Germany had received at least part of their education in Germany.
16 Between 1870 and 1890, Americans constituted the single largest group of foreigners en-
rolled at German universities; see Siebe, Germania Docet, 109; on German educational influ-
ences more generally, see Henry Geitz, Jürgen Heideking, and Jurgen Herbst, eds., German Influ-
ences on Education in the United States to 1917 (New York, 1995).
17 Even decades later, many an American professor would think back fondly to his German 
student days and acknowledge the “complete intellectual rebirth” he had experienced there; see 
Louis Viereck, Die Vereinigung alter deutscher Studenten in Amerika (New York, 1902), 31.
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certed plans, or even significant interest in them.18 For most of the nineteenth 
century, there was no German cultural diplomacy in the sense of a strategic use 
of cultural relations for national ambitions.
Importantly, this revealed a general characteristic of German foreign policy 
at the time: a disregard for public relations. Even by the turn of the century, 
institutions to interpret or advertise Germany to the world were few and far 
between. While there had been a press office at the Foreign Ministry to commu-
nicate government policies to the domestic and international press since 1871, 
the high-handed manner in which Bismarck liked to conduct his foreign affairs 
had long stifled its development.19 Even after 1900, its staffing remained dis-
mal (Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow only half-jokingly referred to its staff as 
his “three and a half men”) and its competencies disputed by career diplomats. 
Their aristocratic background and exclusive understanding of foreign policy as 
arcane high politics led them to hold publicity in correspondingly low regard.20 
In terms of methods and infrastructures, too, the press office lagged far behind 
the mass agitation and sophisticated publicity already adopted by the Imperial 
Naval Office or larger German companies.21 Not until 1900 did Germany even 
lay its own telegraph cable across the Atlantic.22 Wilhelmine Germany’s conduct 
of foreign policy, in short, had failed in many respects to keep pace both with 
the massive changes in information, communication, and transportation tech-
nology of the preceding decades as well as with its own soaring global ambitions.
So what transformed this apparent disregard for foreign opinion around 
the turn of the century? What led Wilhelmine Germany to embrace new forms 
of public and especially cultural diplomacy at the time? And why was it that 
many of these new measures were first developed in the United States?
The answer lies in a combination of Germany’s immediate political con-
cerns and longer-term assumptions about the United States. First and fore-
most, the decision to appeal more systematically to an American public was 
18 See Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy, 11.
19 Nathan Orgill, “‘Three and a Half Men’: The Buelow-Hammann System of Public Relations 
before the First World War” (PhD Diss. Duke University, 2009), 9–23.
20 The press bureau was frequently bypassed by career diplomats, who refused to share insights 
into actual policymaking with “outsiders” like Otto Hammann, the bureau’s long-time director 
(1894–1916), and communicated directly with the foreign press whenever it seemed opportune; 
the bureau, for example, only found out about the Kaiser’s interview with the Daily Telegraph 
when it had already become a major scandal; on the press bureau, see Zechlin, Pressechef bei 
Ebert, Hindenburg und Kopf, 18.
21 See Wilhelm Deist, Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda. Das Nachrichtenbureau des Re-
ichsmarineamtes, 1897–1914 (Stuttgart, 1976); for a detailed account of commercial public rela-
tions, see Michael Kunczik, Geschichte der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in Deutschland (Cologne, 1997), 
188–242.
22 Rainer Pommerin, “Seekabel und Nachrichtenbüros. Determinanten des Deutschlandbilds 
im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1871–1914,” Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte 73, no. 4 (1986): 520–531.
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a product of rising anti-German sentiment at a time of heightened imperial 
rivalries. Indeed, on the eve of Heinrich’s visit, German-American relations 
had taken a decided turn for the worse. For much of the nineteenth century, 
relations had been quite good. Especially when compared to American antag-
onisms with France or Britain, there were few economic disputes between the 
United States and what became the German Empire, let alone territorial ones. 
Quite the contrary: the large number of Americans who studied at German 
universities had returned with respect for German thought and organization, 
and despite the failed revolutions of 1848, there was a widespread sense that 
Germany, of all European countries, had the greatest potential for democratic 
reform and stable government.23 The good qualities of German immigrants 
and their service to the Union during the Civil War seemed only to validate 
this impression. Tending to see unity as a trailblazer for liberty, the American 
press thus favorably received the unification of Germany in 1871. In terms of 
foreign policy, too, Bismarck accommodated American wishes, especially with 
regard to Latin America, and there was little to cloud transatlantic relations. 
For the better part of the century, German-American relations were cordial, 
which, as Alfred Vagts pointed out long ago, was basically “a diplomatic euphe-
mism for the lack of competition between the two countries.”24
It was this element of competition that slowly transformed American senti-
ment toward Germany in the two decades before World War I. As the two na-
tions rose to industrial pre-eminence and broadened their international reach, 
protective trade policies began to sow the first seeds of discord in their rela-
tionship after the 1880s. Germany’s imperialist ambition, however, was what 
truly alienated the American public. After 1897, Wilhelm II and his foreign 
secretary (after 1900, Chancellor) Bernhard von Bülow embarked on a Welt-
politik that aimed to carve out a worldwide sphere of influence for the German 
Empire concurrent with its economic power. Accompanied by rash actions and 
imprudent remarks, this policy increased tensions around the world, includ-
ing with the United States.25 The Venezuelan Crisis of 1902/03, in particular, 
intensified longer-standing U. S. apprehensions about Germany’s imperialist 
ambitions in Latin America and its apparent disregard for the Monroe Doc-
trine.26 In the years that followed, Germany’s shortsighted obstruction of an 
arbitration agreement with the United States ignited further qualms about its 
intentions.27 Americans began to perceive Germany as an increasingly milita-
23 Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, NY, 1984), 
19–23.
24 Quoted in Freitag, Die Entwicklung der Amerikastudien, 20.
25 For some of these issues, see Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika, 90–91.
26 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, Lateinamerika als Konfliktherd der deutsch-amerikanischen Bezie-
hungen, 1890–1903, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1986), passim.
27 Negotiations on an arbitration treaty began in 1904 and dragged on to 1909. For the discus-
sions on the German side, see Reinhard Doerries, Washington, Berlin 1908/1917. Die Tätigkeit 
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ristic and autocratic state – an image heightened by pan-German agitation and 
U. S. reliance on British news cables at a time of rising Anglo-German con-
flict.28 Already around 1900, America’s benevolent disinterest had given way 
to suspicion about the German Empire’s true motives. While there were no 
protracted grievances between the two nations, the U. S. public increasingly 
came to perceive Germany as an expansionist, perhaps even bellicose, power 
unwilling to accept American zones of influence.29
This development alone might not have particularly worried Berlin. After 
all, America was a recent and distant great power that enjoyed nothing akin 
to the prestige and influence it would have after World War I. What made the 
deterioration of German-American relations important were rising European 
tensions as well as the concurrent and seemingly successful efforts of Germany’s 
key rivals, France and Britain, to improve their relations with the United States. 
British influence, in particular, seemed to be on the rise. In the decade after 
the Spanish-American War, America’s traditional Anglophobia gave way to a 
“hands across the Atlantic” ideology that played out culturally, economically, 
and, albeit tacitly, politically. After the 1890s, Great Britain publicly accepted 
the Monroe Doctrine and agreed to submit any future transatlantic grievances 
to international arbitration. In 1898, it was the only European country not to 
protest America’s war against Spain, and the United States alone, returning 
the favor, did not officially condemn British actions during the Boer War. This 
“great rapprochement” was assisted by the influence of British news, with Lon-
don serving as the hub for American international newsgathering, as well as 
contemporary racial assumptions about an “Anglo-Saxon destiny to dominate 
and uplift the globe.”30 Elite initiatives like the Rhodes Scholarships or the Pil-
des Botschafters Johann Heinrich Graf von Bernstorff in Washington vor dem Eintritt der Verein-
igten Staaten von Amerika in den Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf, 1975), 38–47; see also Bernstorff, 
Deutschland und Amerika, 15; Reiner Pommerin has interpreted Wilhelmine foreign policy 
much more positively than Doerries. He notes that initially Germany was quite willing to sign an 
arbitation treaty and that the Foreign Ministry, in particular, was eager to harmonize relations 
with the United States wherever possible; see Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika, e. g., 10, 376; 
however, scholars usually agree that Germany was not able to establish fruitful relations with the 
U. S. press and that it often thought all too little about the “optics” of its actions. 
28 For the negative German press coverage of the Spanish-American War, see Emil Witte, Aus 
einer deutschen Botschaft. Zehn Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diplomatie (Leipzig, 1907), 21.
29 Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika, 113–130; Doerries, Washington–Berlin, 38–47; as 
Nancy Mitchell has shown, this was at least partly due to the interests of the U. S. Navy, which 
quite systematically promoted the idea of a “German peril” in Latin America; see Nancy Mitch-
ell, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 
NC, 1999).
30 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914 (New 
York, 1968); John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion’s Tail: Anglophobia in the United States, 1921–48 
(London, 1999), 3.
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grims Society (est. 1902) helped promote a nascent “special relationship.”31 At 
the same time, France, too, stepped up its courtship of the United States.32 Its 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 had triggered a renaissance of its 
mission civilisatrice, which gave rise to a growing network of private groups 
promoting its culture and language abroad. By 1900, the most important of 
these, the Alliance Française (est. 1883) already had some 150 local committees 
across the United States, just as France became a magnet for American tourists 
and students venturing to the Old World.33 Driven by a strong sense of cultural 
pre-eminence, French elites skillfully capitalized on American feelings of cul-
tural inferiority to sell social distinction and savoir vivre in the form of French 
wine, fashion, education, vacation, and art.34 They never left any doubt that 
their attempts to draw America into their cultural domain ultimately served 
political, anti-German objectives.35
In light of rising German-American tensions, these subtle and effective 
British and French efforts to pull America onto their side were clearly disquiet-
ing for Berlin. They gave political weight to longer-standing trepidations about 
Germany’s declining influence in the United States.36 German-born professors 
at American universities, especially, like Germanist Kuno Francke and psy-
chologist Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University, had long sought to alert 
German ministries to German culture’s waning attractiveness to Americans 
and the threat this posed to German standing.37 According to a memorandum, 
which Münsterberg submitted to the Prussian Ministry of Culture in 1908, 
French and British actions had already reversed earlier trends whereby the 
most promising American students “had received their seminal impressions 
in Germany and returned [to the United States] as missionaries of German 
scholarship.” If this decline were not addressed, he predicted, American ac-
ademia would be replete with “enemies of German science” in merely a few 
31 Important, too, was the ambassadorship of Oxford scholar and liberal politician James Bryce 
(1907–1913). His The American Commonwealth (1888) was frequently hailed as the English 
equivalent of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835, 1840).
32 Young, Marketing Marianne, 10.
33 Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy, 23.
34 On French efforts, see Young, Marketing Marianne, esp. Chapter 1.
35 As Le Temps asserted in 1908, “clearly, French culture is entangled in a combat with German 
culture.” Cited in Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy, 22.
36 For this argument, see Fiebig-von Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur,” 49.
37 Ungern-Sternberg, Deutschland und Amerika, 62; Vom Brocke, “Professorenaustausch,” 137; 
Hugo Münsterberg, “Die deutsche Kultur und das Ausland,” Internationale Wochenschrift für 
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 4 (1910): 1471–78; at the University of Heidelberg, for example, 
the percentage of Americans among international students fell from 22 percent (1870–90) to 12 
percent (1890–1914); see Siebe, Germania Docet, 267; by 1908 U. S. Ambassador to Germany 
David J. Hill (a former president of Rochester University) voiced his concern that Germany no 
longer attracted the very best American students. Auswärtiges Amt, Abschrift IIIc 16521, Aug. 
17, 1908, PA R 64997.
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years’ time.38 Given the broader political issues of the time, such professorial 
concerns drew the attention of the Prussian Ministry of Culture and Wilhelm 
II, leading ultimately to the founding of the Germanic Museum, the professo-
rial exchange, and the Amerika-Institut. It was the disconcerting coincidence 
of Germany’s decline in cultural standing in the United States at a time of rising 
transatlantic tensions that first prompted official attention to cultural diplo-
macy, a field that had hitherto been far outside state interest.
And still, we should note that in adopting a more determined policy to 
strengthen its cultural and intellectual influence, Germany hardly centered its 
interest on the United States because of the New World nation itself. Instead, 
cordial relations with the United States were meant to counterbalance British 
hostility and allow Berlin to pursue its policy of a “freie Hand,” or free hand, 
unhampered by the fear of an Anglo-American agreement.39 Since Germany 
was not willing, or able, to address the real grievances that underlay transat-
lantic tensions – by accepting the Monroe Doctrine or signing an arbitration 
treaty – a public relations campaign appeared to be the most readily available 
and least costly means to salvage the deteriorating relationship with the United 
States. After 1902, in short, the purpose of public diplomacy was to neutralize 
transatlantic tensions at minimum cost.
Fig . 3: The Anglo-German competition for U . S . sympathies was not lost on U . S . observers, 
”The Latest Suitor,” Puck, Feb . 19, 1902
38 Auswärtiges Amt, Abschrift IIIc 16744, Aug. 20, 1908; and Hugo Münsterberg, “Das Ameri-
kanische Institut,” Aug. 12, 1908, PA R64997.
39 See Fiebig-von Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur,” 60.
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German Peaceful Imperialism and the United States
Although the American campaign, as we shall see, was unique in some re-
spects, it also anticipated and reflected a broader German reorientation toward 
new modes of conducting foreign policy. Major impulses to this end came 
not at first from within the German government but from liberal members of 
Germany’s Bildungsbürgertum and export industries. This well-educated and 
often widely traveled middle and upper middle class of professors, teachers, 
publicists, lawyers, pastors, bankers, and merchants championed commercial 
and cultural outreach as a subtler form of German influence in the world. Es-
pecially the Bildungsbürgertum, a group shaped by the privilege of university 
education and missionary notions of Bildung and Kultur, saw the expansion 
of ideas and cultural practices as an important and hitherto neglected tool for 
Germany’s ambitions in the accelerating imperialist race in China, the Otto-
man Empire, and parts of Latin America. Based on the French example of a 
pénétration pacifique, these “peaceful imperialists” were convinced that the 
German language, music, technology, medicine, and education could build 
trust and sympathy in faraway regions and pave the way for commercial ex-
pansion and political influence. They imagined that instilling foreign people 
with respect for the unique grandeur of German Kultur and a sounder under-
standing of the German character would provide a competitive advantage over 
rival powers in the future.40 These ideas gained momentum after the Moroccan 
Crises of 1905 and 1911, in particular. As these two crises revealed the sharp 
limits of Germany’s power politics and the extent of its international isolation, 
economic and cultural expansion appeared to be a soft(er)-power alternative to 
its hard-power pursuit of Weltpolitik.
While this group of peaceful imperialists pursued their agenda primar-
ily through a host of private international clubs (Auslandsvereine), they also 
increasingly demanded a state-supported drive for global sympathies and 
commercial influence.41 In the liberal press and the Reichstag, they called for 
state-funded cultural and information policies, globally minded university ed-
ucation, and, ultimately, a democratization of the German Foreign Service to 
bring in more practically educated and widely traveled men who cared about 
matters of international trade and public opinion.42 Reichstag appropriations 
for public diplomacy rose steeply from 1905 to 1914, and book-length exposi-
40 On this group, see Jürgen Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten. Deutsche Auslandsvereine 
und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1906–1918 (Frankfurt a. M., 1994); Rüdiger vom Bruch, Weltpolitik 
als Kulturmission. Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbürgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend 
des Ersten Weltkrieges (Paderborn, 1982); more recently, see Stefan Manz, Constructing a Ger-
man Diaspora: the “Greater German Empire”, 1871–1914 (London, 2014).
41 Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 15.
42 See Gustav Stresemann in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Vol. 236, 238. Sitzung, 
7907D.
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tions of peaceful imperialism like Paul Rohrbach’s Der deutsche Gedanke in 
der Welt (German Thought in the World, 1912) became bestsellers.43 A bet-
ter-funded, coordinated, and conceptualized policy of economic and cultural 
expansion, a policy of “moral conquests” as Rohrbach called it, was intended to 
advance Germany’s worldwide expansion without further isolating it.44
As the American example illustrates, such peaceful imperialist ideas also 
resonated with German officials. Although the Prussian Ministry of Cul-
ture was the driving force in the American campaign until at least 1914, the 
Wilhelmstrasse was decidedly more active than was long believed.45 Under 
Bülow’s chancellorship, a “school desk” was founded at the German Foreign 
Ministry in 1906 to support German schools and language education abroad; 
his successor Bethmann-Hollweg and his associates also took an interest in 
these matters. A few months before the war, Kurt Riezler, one of Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg’s close confidants, and a member of the Foreign Ministry’s 
press office, pondered the nature of modern diplomacy in his Grundzüge der 
Weltpolitik (Fundamentals of World Politics).46 The modern age, Riezler (writ-
ing under the pseudonym of J. J. Ruedoerffer) acknowledged, had introduced 
two new factors in foreign affairs: the global influence and dependencies of 
economics, and the power of public opinion. To increase diplomatic influence 
in any given country, it no longer sufficed to cultivate kings and dukes, min-
isters and mistresses; instead, one had to export ideas and establish prestige 
among a larger, diverse group of opinion-shapers to “create a favorable climate 
43 State funds for German schools abroad rose from 400,000 marks in 1900 to 1 million marks 
in 1912; allocations for information policy rose from 500,000 in 1905 to 1 million marks in 1910 
and to 1.3 million marks in 1911; see Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten, 109; on the success 
of Rohrbach’s book, see Comment Kloosterhuis in Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871, 
ed. Kurt Düwell and Werner Link (Cologne, 1981), 60.
44 What united many of them was a sense of cultural mission, rooted in two different intellec-
tual currents. On the one hand, the educated classes were gripped by cultural pessimism in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century, fearing a cultural decay amidst a world apparently fo-
cused on purely civilizatory and materialist progress. On the other, and more visible after the 
turn of the century, a “new idealism” took root, which recognized German culture, technology, 
and science as among the greatest in the world and demanded for it to be shared more widely. 
From their perspective, the world was a field of cultural competition against both stale material-
ism – not least associated with the United States – and other national cultures, like the British 
and French, which seemed to have gained a foothold around the world.
45 Under Friedrich Althoff, the headstrong and broad-visioned director of the universities de-
partment, the Prussian Ministry of Culture steered a particularly active course. Following a dec-
ade of domestic higher education reform (admired and despised as the “system Althoff ”), Al-
thoff turned his attention to further the world renown of German scholarship as a key field of 
international competition. On Althoff, see vom Brocke, “Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehun-
gen,” 185–242; the Foreign Ministry’s concern for and involvement in a concerted global infor-
mation and press policy before 1914 is shown in Wroblewski, Moralische Eroberungen.
46 On Riezler, see Karl Dietrich Erdmann, ed., Kurt Riezler – Tagebücher – Aufsätze – Doku-
mente (Göttingen, 1972).
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for all present and future undertakings.”47 Extrapolating from these thoughts, 
Bethmann-Hollweg declared in December 1913 that a concerted economic 
and cultural expansion would form an integral part of Germany’s Weltpoli-
tik.48 Though his official statement declared that such an expansion was best 
left to private initiative, there was already substantial state involvement behind 
the scenes, especially in China and the Ottoman Empire.49 In this sense, the 
German response to deteriorating relations with the United States was but an 
early expression of a broader German turn to “soft power” in the decade before 
World War I.
American Idiosyncrasies : Cultural Assumptions, German Americans and 
Cultural Internationalism
Still, the American case showed a number of instructive differences, which 
reveal central German assumptions about the United States. Obviously, the 
United States had little in common with other objects of Germany’s budding 
cultural imperialism, that is, the crumbling Ottoman Empire, Latin America, 
and China. Unlike these countries, America prompted Germany’s interest be-
cause of its strength rather than its weakness. So why did Germany choose to 
employ a cultural strategy toward the United States that it otherwise reserved 
for “backward” places of colonial interest? It is notable, indeed, that Germany 
did not launch a cultural offensive involving a comparable level of state spon-
sorship, innovation, and public interest toward any other Western power. The 
Prussian Ministry of Culture, for example, seems to have professed little in-
terest in establishing an exchange professorship with France, despite the fact 
that Franco-German relations certainly needed improving. And although Im-
perial Germany faced hostility and distrust in many places around the world, 
the establishment of institutes, museums, and exchange professorships – the 
uniquely cultural thrust of the campaign – remained nearly singular to the 
American case. To understand why Imperial Germany would utilize such a 
groundbreaking approach toward the United States, in particular, we have to 
consider three distinct factors: cultural assumptions, German Americans, and 
U. S. cultural internationalism. Because these remained important during the 
1920s and 1930s, we will look at these factors in some detail.
*
47 Ruedorffer, Grundzüge der Weltpolitik, 242.
48 See Kloosterhuis, “Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und ihre Trägergruppen vor dem 
1. Weltkrieg,” in Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871, ed. Düwell and Link, 11.
49 Vom Bruch, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission, 101.
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For one, the choice of a cultural strategy had everything to do with basic per-
ceptions and assumptions Germans had about the United States. First, Ameri-
ca’s politically isolationist attitude toward Europe suggested a nonpolitical field 
of action. Ever fearful of entangling alliances, America required a different 
approach than most European countries.50 As German ambassador Theodor 
von Holleben (1897–1903) had already noted in 1899, cultural relations “are al-
most the only means remaining to us on this side of the pond to gradually 
bridge (our) differences.”51 This was only reinforced by the German belief in 
the extraordinary influence of public opinion on U. S. foreign policymaking. 
Though its precise impact remained difficult to gauge, few German observers 
doubted that public opinion – partly because of America’s democratic politics, 
partly because of its highly developed mass journalism – was more powerful 
in the United States than in other Western nations.52 As German ambassador 
Hermann Speck von Sternburg (1903–1908) concluded in 1904, “it is no exag-
geration to contend that it is more important here to win the press for German 
interests than the State Department.”53 America’s unique tradition of isolation-
ism and the special influence attributed to its public opinion thus were weighty 
factors in pushing Berlin to consider alternate strategies to resuscitate Ameri-
can trust and sympathy.
Equally decisive, however, was the peculiar European perception of the 
United States as a country devoid of (high) culture or, at best, having only a 
“culture in the making.” Only a few hundred years old and long preoccupied 
with settling a vast continent, the United States appeared to be a land of stunted 
aesthetic tastes, where crass materialism had pushed aside concern for the finer 
things in life.54 Germans ignored most evidence to the contrary and largely 
regarded America as a European cultural colony. Ambassador Bernstorff 
50 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
51 Quoted in Ungern-Sternberg, Deutschland und Amerika, 140.
52 James Bryce began his chapter on public opinion (tellingly titled “How Public Opinion Rules 
in America”) with the observation that “public opinion stands out in the United States as the 
great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it.” James Bryce, The American 
Commonwealth (Philadelphia, 1906 [orig. 1888]), 258; on the rising influence of public opinion 
in the late nineteenth century more generally, see Friedrich Kießling, “(Welt-)Öffentlichkeit,” in 
Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte, ed. Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth, 85–105 (Munich, 
2012), 89–91.
53 Quoted in Stefan Rinke, Zwischen Weltpolitik und Monroe Doktrin: Botschafter Speck von 
Sternburg und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, 1898–1908 (Stuttgart, 1992), 178; this 
was also repeatedly underlined by Americans. During a press dinner given in Prince Heinrich’s 
honor, President Roosevelt found it “eminently fitting that such a dinner should be given in our 
country, in which the press has attained a power greater than that which it holds in any other 
land,” Horner Memorial Library, German-American Collection Manuscripts (Non-Catalogued) 
15 Prince Henry Scrapbook # 1, Theodore Roosevelt to New Yorker Staatszeitung, Sep. 15, 1902.
54 See Alexander Schmidt, Reisen in die Moderne. Der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürger-
tums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich (Berlin, 1997), esp. chapter 3.
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concluded as much shortly before the war: “today an American culture does 
not yet exist. After a short acquaintance with any American, it is soon clear 
whether his culture is of English, German or French origin.”55 Perhaps more 
than any other factor, this nearly ubiquitous cultural conceit explains why 
European powers would choose to employ a policy of “peaceful penetration” 
– one usually reserved for semi-colonial spheres of interest – toward a lead-
ing industrial nation. This odd constellation of economic power and cultural
backwardness made the United States such an attractive target for Germany’s
cultural outreach. Molding the cultural affinities of a nascent American civ-
ilization seemed to offer Germany one way to forge beneficial economic and
political relations with the emerging world power in the West.
While these assumptions underpinned European endeavors in general, the 
way Germany’s cultural campaign was conceived and implemented had much 
to do with German Americans in particular. As the European competition 
for American hearts and minds accelerated in the decade before the war, the 
nine million first- and second-generation German Americans and the nearly 
25 million Americans of German ancestry appeared to be a unique asset to 
Germany’s economic, cultural, and even political cause in the New World. As 
representatives of the German character and as active promoters of German 
positions, German Americans seemed well suited to improving the German 
image and transatlantic relations. To this end, however, Germany would have 
to engage in more strenuous efforts to keep their sense of ethnic identity alive 
in the face of the forces of Americanization. This thought gained wider cur-
rency as a burgeoning group of German associations, church organizations 
and state ministries committed themselves to keeping in contact with “Ger-
mans abroad” after the 1890s.56 Historical notions of the German Kulturnation, 
a deterritorialized German nation defined by cultural and linguistic rather 
than geographical boundaries, helped to construe Germany’s global diaspora 
as a “Greater Germany,” a worldwide sphere of potential German cultural and 
economic influence.57 In the imagination of large organizations like the Associ-
ation for Germandom Abroad (Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland) or the 
Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband), the millions of Germans abroad 
began to look like a “multitude of Reich-oriented little Germanys.”58 German 
émigrés, the “national deserters” of Bismarck’s day, were now recast as an un-
tapped national resource for Germany’s global ambitions.
55 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
56 On the largest such organization, see Weidenfeller, VDA; and Manz, Constructing a German 
Diaspora.
57 See Stefan Manz, “Diaspora and Weltpolitik in Wilhelmine Germany,” in Germans as Minor-
ities during the First World War, ed. Panikos Panayi, 27–46 (London, 2014), 27.
58 See Manz, “Diaspora and Weltpolitik,” 27.
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German Americans, to be sure, had long been unlikely objects for such 
ethnic politics. Their notorious factionalism, lack of effective ethnic leader-
ship, and overwhelmingly lower-class background had facilitated their rapid 
assimilation and kept them from gaining cultural or political influence com-
mensurate to their numbers. Viewed from a “Germandom” perspective, the 
United States had always appeared to be only a “mass grave of Germandom.”59 
Around the turn of the century, however, several developments suggested 
that a sort of ethnic reawakening was taking place. From the 1890s onwards, 
a plethora of organizations had been established or revived to uphold and 
memorialize German cultural heritage in the United States. On the local, re-
gional, and, finally, on the national level, German gymnastic, singing, and vet-
erans groups peaked in membership; ethnic festivities, like the annual Ger-
man Day celebrations (held since 1883), drew record numbers of visitors.60 In 
1901, German-American leaders founded the first national organization, the 
National German-American Alliance, to maintain German language educa-
tion in American schools, highlight German contributions to American soci-
ety, fight Prohibition and, not least, advance amiable transatlantic relations.61 
Many German Americans followed their old fatherland’s rise to world power 
with pride, and it was in part their enthusiastic welcome of Prince Heinrich in 
1902 that suggested to Berlin that they could be a means of German influence. 
For the first time, there seemed to be a chance of saving them from traceless 
“Americanization” and harnessing their ethnic loyalties for the interests of the 
fatherland.
The mobilization of German Americans, then, was a distinct part of Ger-
many’s cultural campaign. In the decade before the war, German-American 
veterans and social clubs received countless greetings, gifts, and decorations 
from the other side of the Atlantic. German navy cruisers were dispatched to 
visit American ports, and German-American societies were invited to visit 
Germany.62 Germany’s university-oriented campaign, too, was designed to 
link German Americans to the intellectual life of the fatherland and awaken 
59 The fate of ethnic Germans in the United States was often seen as an ominous sign of the 
impending cultural preponderance of Anglo-American values in the world; see Michael Er-
marth, “Hyphenation and Hyper-Americanization: Germans of the Wilhemine Reich View Ger-
man-Americans, 1890–1914,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 2 (2002): 33–58, 36.
60 Heike Bungert, “Demonstrating the Values of ‘Gemüthlichkeit’ and ‘Cultur’: The Festivals of 
German Americans in Milwaukee, 1870–1910,” in Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American 
Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Geneviève Fabre, Jürgen 
Heideking, and Kai Dreisbach, 175–193 (New York, 2001), 176.
61 Charles T. Johnson, Culture at Twilight: The National German-American Alliance, 1901–1918 
(New York, 1999), 11.
62 The various measures are outlined in Emil Witte, Aus einer deutschen Botschaft, 281 ff.; on the 
special importance of ethnic festivities and veteran groups, see Heike Bungert, “Migration und 
Internationale Beziehungen im Kaiserreich: Wilhelm II., das Auswärtige Amt und ihr Interesse 
an den Deutschamerikanern,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 63, no. 5 (2015): 413–434; 
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pride in German achievements. In 1905, for example, the Prussian Ministry of 
Culture sent Eugen Kühnemann, a professor of German literature at the Uni-
versity of Posen (and later Breslau), on an American lecture tour to sound out 
the chances for an ethnic revival.63 A cultural missionary of the highest persua-
sion, Kühnemann conceived of his tour as part of a larger effort to “assert and 
establish a world empire of German culture” and sought to convince his eth-
nic audience that cultural attachment to Germany and political loyalty to the 
United States were not incompatible.64 “The stronger German,” he explained to 
the German Societies of New York in 1906, “is the better American.”65 Appar-
ently Kühnemann hit just the right note. In the following years, he returned to 
the United States three times: as a Harvard exchange professor in 1908, as a vis-
iting professor at the University of Wisconsin’s newly established Carl Schurz 
Professorship in 1912–13, and as an itinerant propagandist from 1914 to 1917. 
He summed up the new German policy as follows: “the old fatherland had just 
lost the men around [Carl] Schurz. The new one recognizes its duties as center 
of the ‘Greater Germany,’ which encompasses all Germans around the world; 
[these are] duties of a spiritual nature toward [its] children abroad, which in no 
way encroach on the national territories of foreign peoples.”66
Despite this allegedly solely “spiritual nature,” Germandom policies pur-
sued clear economic, even political, motives. The sheer number of German 
Americans in the United States invited Berlin to dream of political influence. 
Either directly through a “German vote” or indirectly through their mere 
presence as a large, ethnically conscious pressure group, they hoped that Ger-
man Americans would induce the American press and politicians to adopt a 
more German-friendly position. Could German Americans not draw America 
closer toward Germany – or at least away from Great Britain? Realizing that 
ethnic mobilization could never take the form of open political agitation with-
out antagonizing U. S. opinion, German representatives in the United States 
advocated a broadly cultural course, although clearly to political ends.67 Am-
bassador Bernstorff argued “that the political weapon that we have in German 
Americans should be kept clean and sharp as long as it is still available to us. 
“Stimmen zur Deutschlandfahrt des Lehrerbundes und zu seiner Tagung in Berlin,” Monatshefte 
für deutsche Sprache und Pädagogik 13, no. 10 (Dec. 1912): 350–367.
63 Eugen Kühnemann, “Von der Tätigkeit des ersten Karl-Schurz-Professors an der Staatsuni-
versität von Wisconsin,” in Vom Weltreich des deutschen Geistes. Reden und Aufsätze, ed. Kühne-
mann, 268–319 (Munich, 1914), 268.
64 Kühnemann, Vom Weltreich des deutschen Geistes, vii.
65 Kühnemann, “Deutsch-Amerika und Deutschland,” in Vom Weltreich des deutschen Geistes, 
ed. Kühnemann, 221–226, 221.
66 Kühnemann, “Deutsch-Amerika und Deutschland,” Vom Weltreich des deutschen Geistes, ed. 
Kühnemann, 221–226, 226.
67 On the difference between the Kaiser and diplomats regarding this question, see Fiebig-von 
Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur,” 68; Doerries, Washington-Berlin, 34.
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If we act accordingly, the memory of German descent will for all times remain 
effective for us in the United States.”68 Only too slowly did it dawn on Germa-
ny’s peaceful imperialists that political and cultural mobilization could not be 
so neatly separated in a nativist era.
German Americans, to be sure, were not just passive objects of Germany’s 
ambitions. They were partners. While a majority of German Americans pro-
fessed little interest in their heritage beyond its sociable aspects, a small group 
of educated and affluent professors (like Francke and Münsterberg), business-
men and financiers (like Adolphus Busch, Jacob Schiff, and the Warburg fam-
ily), and ethnic leaders (like the Ridder family, publishers of the New Yorker 
Staats-Zeitung) provided significant initiative and funds to promote German 
culture among Americans.69 Indeed, long before the Germanic Museum, the 
professorial exchange, or the Amerika-Institut ever became German projects, 
they were German-American projects; and even thereafter they often contin-
ued to rely on ethnic initiative and generosity.70 In this way, German-Ameri-
can involvement always defined the shape, pace, and reach of German public 
diplomacy in the United States.
Still, the mutuality of interests between Germans and German Americans 
should not be overstated. At first glance, their motives were closely connected. 
Both groups sought to raise the prestige of German culture among their ethnic 
kin and “Anglo-Americans.”71 But German Americans’ ultimate objectives dif-
fered notably. By underlining their superior cultural background, they primar-
ily hoped to stem the rising tide of Anglo-American nativism, which sought to 
impose Anglo-conformist norms – most notably Prohibition – on more recent 
immigrant groups.72 Even though their actions dovetailed with German agen-
68 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
69 Most German-American organizations were made up of “stomach Germans,” that is, German 
lower-middle classes in urban settings whose “devotion to German culture […] did not tran-
scend an appreciation for traditional food and drink.” Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 44. There was a 
considerably smaller group of “soul Germans” who regarded German culture as superior and 
saw their “mission […] to promote and defend German culture in the American setting, and to 
graft its ideals, if possible, onto American practicality and inventiveness to produce the finest 
civilization in the history of mankind.” See Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 28.
70 See, for example, the funding structure of the Amerika-Institut in vom Brocke, “Der 
Deutsch-Amerikanische Professorenaustausch,” 155.
71 For one example, see Julius Goebel, Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nord-Amerika (Munich, 1904), 38; Johnson, Culture at Twilight. For many an ethnic newspaper, 
association, restaurant, and church advocating Kultur and maintaining ethnic identity was also a 
way to stay in business. Many of the men most prominently involved in ethnic organizations ran 
ethnic businesses, and their livelihood depended on the survival of an ethnically conscious clien-
tele. The president of the German Society of Pennsylvania, for example, ran a German restau-
rant, and the Ridder family, owners of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, was active in many Ger-
man-American endeavors; for this point, see Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 46.
72 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 67.
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das, ethnic spokesmen usually felt no strong allegiance to Imperial Germany. 
The National German-American Alliance, for example, admitted only Amer-
ican citizens as members and insisted that it was not a German but an Ameri-
can organization.73 If German Americans welcomed and supported Germany’s 
cultural campaign, it was ultimately not so much to promote the positions of 
the Reich as to advance their own place in America’s ethnic pecking order. In 
the last analysis, their concerns were of an American nature, not of a German 
one. This distinction, unfortunately, tended to be lost on German and Ameri-
can observers alike.
Finally, if German Americans – as both targets and partners – played a key 
role in the development of German cultural diplomacy in the United States, so 
too did a distinct group of educated and international-minded “Anglo-Amer-
icans.” University presidents like Charles W. Eliot of Harvard and Nicholas 
Murray Butler of Columbia gladly institutionalized professorial exchanges, in-
vited German writers and scholars to their universities, and opened German 
houses and museums on campus. Without them (as without German Ameri-
cans) Germany’s cultural campaign could never have materialized. Respect for 
German learning and thought certainly figured prominently in their decisions. 
Many in this group had at one point studied in Germany and viewed German 
higher education as one model for their own ambitious university-building 
projects.74 But their cooperation with Germany expressed not just a desire for 
academic advancement, let alone a notion of continued American discipleship, 
but for their own international visibility and prestige in the “golden age” of 
scientific internationalism.75 Interest in Germany was driven not least by stiff 
competition among America’s leading universities, which used their connec-
tions to old and world-renowned centers of learning to raise their scientific 
profiles and, by extension, enrollment and endowment figures.76 A streak of 
peace-building idealism also pervaded these initiatives because international 
education was often cast as a perfect means for bringing the world closer to-
gether.77
73 Johnson, Culture at Twilight, 9.
74 To Harvard president, Charles W. Eliot, for example, who had spent decades of his life re-
forming Harvard along the lines of a German research university, “German is the language of 
scholarship and education and no student may be entitled to these, without a thorough know-
ledge of the German language.” Quoted in Ungern-Sternberg, Deutschland und Amerika, 26.
75 Elisabeth Crawford, Nationalism and Internationalism in Science, 1880–1939: Four Studies of 
the Nobel Population (New York, 1992), 61.
76 Columbia University and Harvard University, especially, competed actively for German aca-
demic contacts, using them to build their own prestige and visibility; see Lerg, “Uses and Abuses,” 
72–73; on the case of the Berlin-based Amerika-Institut, see PA Botschaft Washington, Nr. 465 
Amerika-Institut in Berlin, 1910–1914.
77 In 1912 President Butler laid out his ideas of an “International Mind […] which, given the 
adoption of a universal set of values, would function as an international superego. To a large 
 degree, moral transformation would be achieved through transnational contacts, with cultural 
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But while U. S. cultural internationalism aided the implementation of Ger-
man cultural programs, such internationalist strategies on the part of Amer-
icans did not apply to Germany alone. German aspirations for cultural pre-
ponderance were thwarted by American universities, which welcomed French 
houses, associations, and exchange professors with equal ease and enthusi-
asm.78 If anything, Americans conceived of their cultural internationalism in 
distinctly American terms. For all their regard for European culture, men like 
Eliot or Butler were confident enough in the merits of American education to 
consider academic programs meaningful transatlantic encounters rather than 
one-way streets of European influence. For them, the idea of an intellectual 
exchange – often arrogantly dismissed on the German side as mere goodwill 
rhetoric – was quite real. They saw the American educational system as on 
par with or even surpassing the European system in the near future, and the 
American nation as possessing many of its own valuable ideas and principles 
to impart to the Old World. If academic exchanges seemed to Europeans an 
avenue to reach the American public, they could also heighten the prestige and 
influence of the United States across the Atlantic. In short, although Germans 
imagined these exchanges as a way to curry American favor, their American 
interlocutors were ready to export their own progressive ideology to a Europe 
that seemed mired in endless imperialist squabbles and fruitless arms races. 
While Germans still believed they were primarily extending their influence in 
the United States, Americans were already pushing to extend their own across 
the Atlantic. In the short run, however, this made them not less but more com-
mitted partners of German cultural diplomacy.
*
By 1914, Germany could look back on a decade of concerted cultural campaign-
ing in the United States. More than thirty exchange professors had crossed the 
Atlantic, and a transatlantic infrastructure of institutions, organizations, and 
committees had come into existence. Though German Americans and German 
“peaceful imperialists” initially spurred these actions, the degree of German 
state involvement, particularly of the Prussian Ministry of Culture, was already 
substantial. Even before World War I, German state actors increasingly rec-
ognized German cultural networks abroad as assets in international relations, 
especially in the United States. America’s tradition of isolationism, the influ-
ence ascribed to its public opinion, German cultural conceits, and the availa-
bility of strategic American partners all strengthened this perception. For these 
relations serving as the vehicle of reeducation.” Ninkovich, Diplomacy of Ideas: U. S. Foreign Pol-
icy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950 (New York, 1981), 11.
78 In the years after 1905 Columbia University, just as it had done with Germany, initiated pro-
fessorial exchanges with France, the Netherlands, Japan, and Austria.
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reasons, Germany first practiced seminal forms of cultural diplomacy in the 
United States, thereby laying the groundwork for its modern public diplomacy 
more generally.
Nevertheless, contemporaries were not certain whether Germany’s cultural 
strategy was successful, and historians have not been, either. Not surprisingly, 
in light of World War I, they doubted whether this strategy engendered a bet-
ter understanding between the two nations. Some even posited that academic 
programs like the professorial exchanges exacerbated, rather than amelio-
rated, American apprehensions about Germany.79 If this is true, personal de-
ficiencies were, not least, to blame. Frequently selected from a small pool of 
English-speaking candidates, German exchange professors at times proved to 
be ill-suited to a task that demanded not (just) scholarly brilliance but tact, 
people skills, and a willingness to immerse oneself in another culture.80 Their 
chauvinistic, even bellicose, assumptions about Germany’s role in the world 
and their thinly veiled disdain for American culture and democracy provided 
ready confirmation of American accusations of German militarism.81 Seen as 
official spokespeople of the German nation, exchange professors often left a 
rather negative impression.
Nor did all of America’s professorial envoys to Germany return as deter-
mined advocates of German-American friendship. Their contact with German 
nationalism and cultural conceit was just as likely to deepen their transatlantic 
distrust and alert Americans to different notions of state power, military ne-
cessity, and international law.82 It is thus not entirely surprising that several of 
America’s exchange professors would later become harsh critics of German war 
policy.83 Nor did American scholars necessarily help to forge a more realistic 
image of the United States in Berlin. Some of them were so eager to please their 
German audience that they simply misrepresented prevalent American sen-
79 See Fiebig-von Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur,” 87.
80 On this point, as well as on the perception of German professors more generally, see the re-
port of the economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter, who served as the first Austrian exchange pro-
fessor in 1913. Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Bericht über die Mission als Austauschprofessor an der 
Columbia-Universität in New York, 1913–14, ed. Ulrich Hedtke, www.schumpeter.info2012, 14; 
on the arrogance of his German colleagues, 34.
81 By defending the purifying and heroic aspects of warfare against American pacifism, the 
well-known Berlin historian Eduard Meyer, for example, provided only ready proof for Ameri-
can accusations of German militarism; see Fiebig-von Hase, “Die politische Funktionalisierung 
der Kultur,” 73.
82 Ibid., 87.
83 Paul Shorey of the University of Chicago, exchange professor in Berlin in 1913/14, felt so ar-
rogantly treated by Berlin classical philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff that they no 
longer got along; see Bernhard vom Brocke, “‘Wissenschaft und Militarismus’. Der Aufruf der 93 
‘An die Kulturwelt!’ und der Zusammenbruch der internationalen Gelehrtenrepublik im Ersten 
Weltkrieg,” in Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren, ed. William M. Calder III, Hellmut Flashar, and The-
odor Linken, 649–719 (Darmstadt, 1985), 679.
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timents. For example, in a lecture titled “The Germanization of South Amer-
ica,” Professor John Burgess of Columbia University encouraged Germany to 
become more active in Latin America – a suggestion that ran directly counter 
to American official and public opinion.84 In the extensive press reports about 
the professorial exchanges, such dissonances and mishaps often received the 
greatest coverage.85
Germany’s obvious interest in German Americans, too, increasingly roused 
suspicion. The openness with which exchange professors like Eugen Kühne-
mann proselytized among them gave credence to suspicions of a pan-German 
conspiracy in which German Americans were supposedly to be used as impe-
rial agents on American soil.86 Above all, it made this ethnic group look closer 
to the Imperial government than it actually was. Just when Germans were try-
ing to argue for the compatibility of cultural attachment to Germany and po-
litical loyalty to the United States, rising nativism made Americans less likely 
to accept any such distinction, especially where a foreign government was in-
volved.87 If anything, German efforts helped convince Americans that German 
culture was a dangerous element of ethnic separatism. Thus, even before the 
war, Germandom policies had begun to cast doubt on German intentions and 
German-American loyalties alike.
Nor could frequent public expressions of amiability suppress elements of 
rivalry that came into play, especially in transatlantic academic relations. To 
many Americans, professorial exchanges with the foremost European uni-
versities were a sign that America was leaving behind its dependence on Eu-
ropean culture. Proud of their own increasingly well-equipped, well-staffed, 
and well-endowed research universities, American scholars saw themselves as 
representatives of an emerging academic world power; Germans, on the other 
hand, held on to notions of American discipleship, interpreting professorial 
exchanges as a favor granted for purely political reasons.88 At times, these dif-
ferent interpretations became starkly obvious. When exchange professor Ar-
thur Hadley, the president of Yale University, praised American scholarship in 
his final lecture at Berlin, the dean of Berlin University, Adolf Wagner, replied: 
“Yesterday it was said: Bononia [Bologna] docet; today: Germania docet. It 
84 “Professor Burgess Gave an Un-American View,” New York Times, Oct. 31, 1906; on German 
Americans and German consular officials warning about the inaccuracy of Burgess’s representa-
tions, see Clipping: “Dichtung und Wahrheit,” Chicagoer Abendpost, Oct. 30, 1906, Kaiserlich 
Deutsche Botschaft in Washington, No. 461, Akten betr. Professoren und Lehrer-Austausch, 
Vol. 2, 1906–1909.
85 For example: Clipping: “Exchange of Professors,” NY Evening Post, Mar. 24, 1911, PA Kaiser-
lich Deutsche Botschaft in Washington, No. 462.
86 A particularly prominent example can be found in Johnson, Culture at Twilight, 24.
87 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 77.
88 See vom Brocke, “Der Deutsch-Amerikanische Professorenaustausch,” 140–141.
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may be that tomorrow it will say: America docet. In any case, we have reason to 
use our best endeavors to keep that from happening.”89
This is not to say that these professorial exchanges contained no attempts 
at transatlantic understanding, that no friendships developed in them, or that 
no national positions were clarified.90 Still, many of the exchange’s underlying 
assumptions were flawed, and their ultimate impact was limited. German pro-
fessors could comment favorably on the industrial strides America made and 
even find words of praise for its university system while dismissing American 
culture as nonexistent. They could spend an entire year in the United States, 
enjoy American hospitality, and still regard democracy as an inferior form of 
government. By the same token, American professors could enjoy the attention 
showered upon them in Berlin while still disagreeing with the political and 
ideological tenets of Wilhelmine Germany. They could respect, even admire, 
German scholarship without coming to like the German state, or even German 
scholars. Cultural familiarity and political distrust were by no means incom-
patible.
Rising German Criticism
While these dissonances were not as apparent then as they are in hindsight, 
criticism of Germany’s public diplomacy grew significantly in the last few 
years before the war. The Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, in particular, made 
German isolation very apparent, just as German rivals beame more success-
ful in their American courtship.91 Under these circumstances, liberal, bour-
geois groups in Germany amplified their earlier demands for a cultural and 
economic reorientation of foreign policy. Even though the German Foreign 
Ministry was far more active than was (for obvious reasons) publicly known, 
89 Schmidt-Ott, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes, 111; on the competition between German and Ameri-
can universities since the turn of the century, see Emily J. Levine, “Baltimore Teaches, Göttingen 
Learns: Cooperation, Competition, and the Research University,” American Historical Review 
(June 2016): 780–823.
90 Willi Paul Adams traced the positive influence of the exchanges on the development of 
American studies in Germany; see Willi Paul Adams, “Die Geschichte Nordamerikas und Ber-
liner Historiker,” Working Paper No. 15/1988 (John F. Kennedy-Institut, Freie Universität Ber-
lin), esp. 11–21.
91 In 1909 a group of prominent Americans and Frenchmen founded the Paris-based Comité 
France-Amerique and the New-York based France-America Society to “make France known and 
loved in America, and America in France.” In 1913 a Maison Francaise was established at Co-
lumbia University. For the history of the Maison Française, see http://www.maisonfrancaise.org/
centennial/the-france-america-society (last accessed July 24, 2020). In 1913 France even sur-
passed Germany in international student enrollment; see Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten, 
129; more generally on French academic efforts, see Young, Marketing Marianne, 17.
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these critics had a point.92 Whereas the Quai d’Orsay had opened a cultural 
diplomacy department in 1909, Germany remained without any such office to 
even begin to coordinate and formulate cultural programs in accordance with 
foreign policy objectives, let alone to implement them. After a decade of ef-
forts, Germany seemed to have moved no closer to establishing cultural diplo-
macy as a legitimate policy field with ample funds, expertise, and reliable com-
mitment. The ballooning number of “international clubs” committed to these 
questions – no less than fifty were created between 1912 and 1914 – seemed 
to carry on without state support;93 and although German diplomats were ex-
pected to cultivate international opinion by then, the level of official instruc-
tion remained low, the machinery to influence foreign publics rudimentary, 
and even the overall place of shaping opinion in German foreign policy disput-
ed.94 Many older (and high-ranking) diplomats, moreover, still regarded public 
diplomacy as an undignified form of self-advertisement foreign to the German 
character and inimical to their ideal of diplomatic negotiations undisturbed by 
the meddlesome public.95 Even the Foreign Ministry’s press office seemed to 
lack the qualities any office hoping to shape opinions abroad needed: an un-
derstanding of foreign psychology and a feeling for the mass public.96 By 1914, 
German foreign policy still failed to take the imponderables of foreign affairs 
sufficiently into account.
At that point, developments in the United States, too, appeared to be stag-
nant. In a long report to the German chancellor in January 1914, Ambassador 
Bernstorff reflected on the last decade of German foreign policy with regard 
to the United States. To Bernstorff, Prince Heinrich’s visit had marked the be-
92 This impression was actually intended by the German Foreign Ministry, which carefully ob-
scured its (in Turkey and China quite substantial) involvement. By 1914, Kloosterhuis notes, the 
German Foreign Ministry had established itself as the primary state actor in this field of Weltpo-
litik; Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten, 246.
93 See Kloosterhuis, “Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und ihre Trägergruppen vor dem 1. 
Weltkrieg,” in Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871, ed. Düwell and Link, 7–36.
94 Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe (Hamburg, 2010 [orig. Zurich, 
1936]), 77.
95 A 1912 initiative by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to enlarge the press bureau had 
foundered on inter-ministerial resistance; see Walter Vogel, “Die Organisation der amtlichen 
Presse und Propagandapolitik des Deutschen Reiches von den Anfängen unter Bismarck bis 
zum Beginn des Jahres 1933,” Zeitungswissenschaft 16 (Aug./Sep. 1941): 81. In fact, the diplo-
matic preference for arcane negotiations only increased as public and published opinion turned 
out to be ever more influential but also ever more volatile and emotional after the turn of the 
century; on this paradoxial development, see Friedrich Kießling, “Das Paradox der Geheim-
diplomatie. Offizielle Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit vor 1914,” in Außenpolitik im Medienzeit-
alter. Vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Frank Bösch and Peter Hoeres, 73–94 
(Göttingen, 2013).
96 Peter Jungblut, “Unter vier Reichskanzlern. Otto Hammann und die Pressepolitik der 
deutschen Reichsleitung 1890 bis 1916,” in Propaganda. Meinungskampf, Verführung und poli-
tische Sinnstiftung 1789–1989, ed. Ute Daniel and Wolfram Siemann, 101–116 (Frankfurt, 1994), 
114.
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ginning of a German “Amerikapolitik,” that is, a policy that aimed to establish 
American markets for German goods, maintain the ethnic identity of German 
Americans, and maximize Germany’s intellectual influence on an emerging 
great power. “In this last task,” Bernstorff added, “lies one of the most impor-
tant global historical duties of the German people.”97 After five years in Wash-
ington, however, Bernstorff was forced to admit that German policy seemed 
“least successful” in precisely this cultural field. The pre-eminence of the Eng-
lish language and literature and America’s predilection for French fashion, life-
styles, and art called for a more systematic cultural diplomacy from Germany.
Though the immediate occasion of Bernstorff ’s report was the German 
government’s decision not to participate in the international exposition in 
San Francisco in 1915, his frustration revealed longer-standing grievances that 
cut to the heart of Germany’s Amerikapolitik in the decade before the war.98 
Indeed, Bernstorff regarded the San Francisco decision as symptomatic of 
German foreign policy – it was conducted by a group of men who knew and 
cared little about the United States and who systematically underestimated the 
impact of public opinion on transatlantic affairs.99 He explained in a private 
letter: “Therein lies the saddest aspect of the affair that it has shown how little 
‘Weltpolitik’ we actually pursue. America, so near to us today, is already ‘terra 
incognita’ for our official circles, the United States, the greatest world power of 
tomorrow, a quantité négligeable.100 Bernstorff, as well as a growing number of 
private associations and officials, believed that greater attention to the impon-
derables of international relations was urgently needed. He summed up this 
decade-long discussion with a nod to the superiority of German culture: “Our 
cultural endeavors are not meant as a favor to Americans, but are to secure 
German culture its rightful place; a rightful place which – as the first culture 
of the world – it absolutely has a claim to. This, too, is a piece of Weltpolitik.”101
97 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
98 Though Bernstorff had been repeatedly assured of German participation while in Berlin and 
despite the fact that the U. S. government considered the world’s fair in honor of the Panama 
Canal a prestige project, the German government had not only decided against participating but 
(in order to explain its decision) had also downplayed the world’s fair’s importance. This led to 
very unfavorable reporting in the American press. Ambassador Bernstorff considered the entire 
episode highly symptomatic of the way in which Berlin conducted its American affairs. In con-
trast, the Prussian Ministry of Culture and academic circles had championed German participa-
tion and a large German “educational and scientific exhibition” to halt the apparent decline of 
Germany’s academic and scientific position in the United States; see Eckhardt Fuchs, “Das 
Deutsche Reich auf den Weltausstellungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Comparativ 5/6 (1999): 
61–88, 86.
99 Bernstorff to Bussche-Haddehausen, Jan. 2, 1914, in Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 88.
100 Bernstorff to Dr. Heckscher, Dec. 30, 1913, in Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 90–91.
101 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
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Bernstorff ’s report, however, came too late to address the deficiencies of 
German foreign policy. Indeed, although there had been notable efforts to har-
monize German-American relations, Germany had done too little outside of 
“gestures and gifts” to quiet American distrust.102 While Berlin was careful to 
avoid the impression of German meddling in Latin America, it still refused 
to sign an arbitration treaty after 1908 or to officially recognize the Monroe 
Doctrine. While there were many good reasons for these actions, here, as in 
many other instances, the German government seemed oblivious to how such 
actions appeared to Americans and the American press. For example, mere 
months before the July crisis, even as a banquet was being held in honor of an 
American exchange professor and to celebrate transatlantic friendship in Ber-
lin, a German shipping line was ignoring the American arms embargo of Mex-
ico and delivering weapons to the Huerta government.103 In light of these and 
similar actions, German expressions of amiability had the look of mere lip ser-
vice to Americans. Here, then, lay the crux of the problem in German-Ameri-
can relations before the war: As long as Germany failed to act according to its 
pronouncements of goodwill, no German public diplomacy, however skillful, 
could have improved transatlantic relations.
Kultur, War and Propaganda, 1914–1917
The advent of war in 1914 uniquely accelerated and amplified the promises and 
problems of Germany’s public diplomacy. For one, it increased attention to 
American public opinion and raised the funds and expertise devoted to ad-
vertising German positions abroad. The war professionalized and institution-
alized public diplomacy, turning a field that had lingered on the margins of 
international relations into a legitimate, even pivotal, policy field. At the same 
time, it created and emphasized the suspicions, resentments, and psychological 
hurdles that would circumscribe Germany’s Amerikapolitik in the 1920s.
*
Within months of the beginning of the conflict, World War I had transformed 
the significance accorded to American opinion. The warring parties faced each 
102 See Reinhard Doerries, “Transatlantic Intelligence in Krieg und Frieden,” in Deutschland 
und die USA in der internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Manfred Berg and Philipp 
Gassert, 279–302 (Stuttgart, 2004), 283; Rainer Pommerin, too, while taking a more benevolent 
perspective on German efforts, notes that Germany proved unable to communicate its policy 
credibly to the American press; see Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika, 380.
103 Reinhard Doerries, “Imperial Berlin and Washington: New Light on Germany’s Foreign 
Policy and America’s Entry into World War I,” Central European History 11, no. 1 (March 1978): 
23–49, 26.
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other not only in the trenches of the Western front but also on the battlefield of 
international opinion. Consequently, this “war of words” was bitterly fought for 
the (moral) allegiance of the neutral world, with the United States being by far 
the most important theater. Indeed, World War I elevated the United States to 
a position of importance it had never previously enjoyed. As the largest indus-
trial non-belligerent nation, America had the potential to help determine the 
outcome of the war based on its attitude toward the conflict. It was unclear how 
Americans would understand their neutrality, whether their banks would lend 
money and how much, whether their industry and agriculture would supply 
warring parties and the government would accept the inconveniences of the 
war. These decisions depended not least on how the American people inter-
preted the cause and conduct of the different warring parties, as well as on how 
they assessed the compatibility of these parties with American interests and the 
likelihood of their victory. The ensuing battle for American sentiments, fought 
especially between Britain and Germany, was characterized as “the most deci-
sive battle of World War I.”104 Nowhere else were the stakes so high, the compe-
tition so fierce, and, ultimately, Germany’s defeat so resounding.
*
The war obliterated America’s indifference to international affairs. The out-
break of hostilities at the height of the 1914 travel season surprised tens of thou-
sands of Americans on the continent and left them scrambling to return home 
as borders were closed, trains requisitioned, and bank accounts frozen.105 For 
these elite Americans, including university presidents, congressmen, bankers, 
and industrialists, these first few days provided seminal impressions of the Eu-
ropean conflict.106 Across the Atlantic, the first response to the war was not, 
as interwar memoirs would have it, shock or revulsion, but excitement and 
expectation.107 In major American cities, thousands of European reservists 
reported for duty at consulates, and ethnic groups staged large parades and 
demonstrations in support of their homelands. The largest mass gathering in 
response to the outbreak of the war was held not in Berlin, Paris, or London, 
but in New York City. The American press reported on frontline movements 
several times a day, and it was not long before Americans began to see the war 
104 Chad Fulwider, “The Kaiser’s Most Loyal,” 85.
105 See the experiences of Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, 247–64.
106 The effect that these experiences had, especially in light of the fact that most American tour-
ists vacationed among the Allies and not the Central Powers, deserves more scholarly attention; 
for some of these impressions, see Christopher Endy, “Travel and Power: Americans in Europe, 
1890–1917,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 4 (1998): 565–594, 590–592.
107 Phillips Payson O’Brien, “The American Press, Public, and the Reaction to the Outbreak of 
the First World War,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 3 (2013): 446–475, 474.
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as an economic opportunity. By the first weeks of August, the New World al-
ready seemed transformed by the conflict of the Old World.
Few Americans saw this more clearly than U. S. President Woodrow Wil-
son. Realizing that open partisanship could easily corrode the multiethnic fab-
ric of American society (and preclude the U. S. peace mediation he desired), 
he implored his fellow Americans to remain neutral, stating on August 18 that
every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, 
which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit 
of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and 
society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and 
magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their 
opinions upon the street. […] The United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in 
name, during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought, as 
well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction 
that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.108
Such sentiment was as noble as it was vain. While the United States officially 
tried to walk the difficult line of impartiality, many Americans developed clear 
sympathies during the period of neutrality, most of which did not rest with 
the Central Powers.109 The breach of Belgian neutrality in violation of inter-
national law, rumors of German atrocities, and the destruction of cultural 
artifacts like the Louvain library alienated many Americans early on.110 Al-
though large swaths of American society remained indecisive about the war 
and others—primarily German Americans, Irish Americans and Jewish Amer-
icans—tended to oppose the Allied cause, the Anglo-American establishment 
largely sided with France and Great Britain. Upon his return from Germany 
in late August 1914, Ambassador von Bernstorff found the East Coast’s “up-
per 400” had all drifted into the Allied camp.111 Outside the traditionally Ger-
man-friendly Midwest, the American press, too, shared a pro-Allied bias, and 
even at American universities only a handful of German-born or anti-British 
scholars rose to defend Germany.112 Many others, like former Harvard presi-
108 Woodrow Wilson, Message to Congress, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. No. 566 3–4; Aug. 
19, 1914, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Declaration_of_Neutrality
109 Clara Eve Schieber, “The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany, 1870–
1914,” The Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (1921): 50–74, 70.
110 The German occupation of Belgium has been called the “defining act of the war”; John 
Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, 2001), 251.
111 Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 75.
112 Fulwider, German Propaganda and U. S. Neutrality, 18.
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dent Charles William Eliot, almost immediately became vocal critics of Ger-
man “autocracy” and “militarism.”113
European propaganda was at least partly to blame for this state of affairs. In 
the summer of 1914, the Anglo-German competition for America’s favor gave 
way to a vigorous propaganda battle for “the most important neutral.” The Brit-
ish, in particular, took early steps, hoping to draw the United States onto the 
Allied side, first in moral and economic terms, and later in military terms. Just 
hours after Britain declared war, a British cruiser cut Germany’s transatlantic 
telegraph cables, turning Britain’s already considerably transatlantic commu-
nications advantage into a virtual monopoly for a time.114 Britain’s “very first 
act of war” was soon followed by more comprehensive measures to influence 
American perceptions of the European conflict.115 By mid-August, all outgoing 
cables, including American ones, were subject to British censorship, and by 
early September Wellington House, a government-sponsored propaganda hub 
of journalists, Oxbridge scholars, and famous writers, set out to create a power-
ful image of the German enemy. It asserted a fundamental difference between 
Germany and the Western powers, with the highly publicized “Rape of Bel-
gium,” in particular, effectively demonizing a militarist and autocratic Prussia. 
These propagandists argued that Prussia had forced the war upon its own peo-
ple and the entire world.116 The skillful use of sensational details, the cultural 
authority of its authors, and the discreetness of its operations – which passed 
invisibly through news channels or personal networks – guaranteed British 
propaganda the widest circulation and credibility in the United States.117 Most 
Americans, indeed, remained unaware of its very existence until after the war.
While such British propaganda went largely unnoticed in the United 
States, it received all the more attention and determined countermeasures in 
113 See, e. g., Charles Eliot, “Imperialistic and Democratic Ideals of National Greatness – A 
Contrast,” New York Times, Sep. 22, 1914, 10. Eliot, in fact, came out so strongly and publicly 
against Germany that Hugo Münsterberg saw him as the leader of the anti-German party in the 
United States; Hugo Münsterberg, The War and America (New York, 1914), 35.
114 A substantial amount of the material reprinted in American newspapers was tinged in Brit-
ish favor; Michael Kunczik, “British and German Propaganda in the United States from 1914–
1917,” in Propaganda in the 20th Century: Contributions to Its History, ed. Jürgen Wilke, 25–51 
(New York, 1998), 27.
115 Fulwider, German Propaganda and U. S. Neutrality, 50.
116 The Berlin theologian Adolf von Harnack referred to the “international lying press” as the 
“fourth great power […] which pours lies all over the world against our straight-laced army and 
slanders all that is German.” Quoted in Christian Nottmeier, Adolf von Harnack und die deutsche 
Politik 1890–1930. Eine biographische Studie zum Verhältnis von Protestantismus, Wissenschaft 
und Politik (Tübingen, 2004), 390.
117 When the British propaganda apparatus was re-organized in 1917, even an otherwise criti-
cal report found that the “American campaign could not have been handled more successfully 
and with more tact and better results than it has been.” See Robert Donald, “Report on Propa-
ganda Arrangements,” Jan. 9, 1917, 10; quoted in M. L. Sanders, “Wellington House and British 
Propaganda during the First World War,” The Historical Journal 18, no. 1 (1975): 119–146, 123.
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Germany. Following prewar precedents, it was the group of “peaceful impe-
rialists” rather than the German government that first rose to the task. By the 
second week of the war, many of them had become convinced that the distor-
tions of the media-savvy British enemy were to blame for anti-German sen-
timents and that the American public, in particular, had been left in the dark 
about the “true” state of affairs, at least as many Germans saw it: that, encircled 
by malevolent powers, a peace-loving Germany had invaded a not truly neu-
tral Belgium as a pre-emptive act of self-defense; that its army was charging 
heroically toward victory; and that the German people were enthusiastically 
united behind the war effort. If only this “truth” could be made known, they 
believed, Americans would have a German-friendlier assessment of affairs.118 
Long aware of German deficiencies in this field, the publicists Paul Rohrbach 
and Ernst Jäckh, in league with the Imperial Naval Office, improvised a small 
propaganda bureau. On August 11, it published the war’s first propaganda bro-
chure, tellingly titled The Truth about Germany: Facts about the War, which 
it distributed to American tourists returning home. In the following weeks, 
a combination of patriotic self-mobilization and the (mistaken) notion of an 
ignorant but benevolent America unleashed a flood of similar German pam-
phlets, letters, and public manifestos across the Atlantic.119 The historian Karl 
Lamprecht recalled the situation pretty accurately when he stated that the aver-
age German professor (including himself, one might add) “obtained the largest 
possible goose quill, and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they 
did not realize what splendid fellows the Germans were.”120 For the first weeks 
of the war, the self-mobilization of the German Bildungsbürgertum filled the 
gap left by a largely unprepared state propaganda apparatus.
Only in late September did the Foreign Ministry begin to take greater ini-
tiative in this field. At that point, the unregulated growth of makeshift propa-
ganda offices as well as Germany’s military misfortune at the Marne called for 
a more coordinated effort to explain the German war effort. The result was a 
transition from private to state-sponsored undertakings. On October 5, 1914, 
118 Ernst Jäckh, Paul Rohrbach, et al., Truth about Germany: Facts about the War (New York, 
1914), 43.
119 The literature on this subject is extensive. For a good introduction, see the essays in Wolf-
gang Mommsen, Kultur und Krieg: Die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Er-
sten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1996); still seminal is Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Manda-
rins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933 (Middletown, CT, 1990 [reprint]). For 
special appeals to the United States, see, for example, “Scientists Plead Germany’s Cause: Profes-
sors Ask Universities of America to Stand by Kaiser,” New York Tribune, Sep. 25, 1914, 3; Georg 
Kerschensteiner, “Offener Brief an meine amerikanischen Freunde,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte 
(Oct. 1914): 120–221; Otto Hintze, “Unser Militarismus. Ein Wort an Amerika,” Internationale 
Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 9, no. 4 (Nov. 1914): 209–220, 215; for a con-
temporary selection, see Hermann Kellermann, Der Krieg der Geister 1914 (Weimar, 1915).
120 Lamprecht cited in Harold Laswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York, 
1938), 24.
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the Foreign Ministry incorporated Rohrbach’s and Jäckh’s bureau into a new 
Central Office for Foreign Services (Deutsche Zentralstelle für Auslandsdi-
enst), which was to oversee all non-press-related propaganda directed at neu-
tral countries.121 Staffed with bourgeois publicists and overseen by the Foreign 
Ministry, it pursued a prolific publishing strategy: between October 1914 and 
March 1918, the Central Office commissioned and distributed no less than 574 
different publications, ranging from official German white books to novels and 
war pictorials.122 Even in 1917, when the British blockade had tightened con-
siderably, it was still sending around 7,400 parcels a day to individuals, public 
libraries, clubs, and universities around the world.123
In the United States, the Central Office for Foreign Services worked closely 
with the German Information Office in New York City, an institution that the 
German embassy had set up in early September to be able to conduct Ger-
man propaganda without implicating German envoys.124 Headed by Bernhard 
Dernburg, former state secretary of the Imperial Colonial Office, it was staffed 
with a more or less random group of German diplomatic personnel stranded 
in the United States and sympathetic (German-)American journalists. Receiv-
ing its instructions, material, and funds from the Wilhelmstrasse, it aimed to 
improve U. S. public sentiment toward Germany and to effect a harder Ameri-
can stance towards British blockade policies and munitions sales.125 The num-
ber of people involved in the German Information Office remained small, 
just as its understanding of mass psychology remained rudimentary and the 
transatlantic information flow patchy. Yet its establishment constituted a new 
level of governmental involvement in transatlantic propaganda.126 Within a few 
121 On this office, see Jürgen Wilke, “German Foreign Propaganda in the United States during 
World War I: The Central Office for Foreign Services,” in Propaganda in the 20th Century, ed. 
Jürgen Wilke, 7–23.
122 Kunczik, Geschichte der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, 146.
123 Jürgen Wilke, “Deutsche Auslandspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die Zentralstelle für 
Auslandsdienst,” in Pressepolitik und Propaganda: historische Studien vom Vormärz bis zum 
Kalten Krieg, ed. Jürgen Wilke (Cologne, 1997), 79–125, 93.
124 Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, 33; an in-depth portrait of this group and their activ-
ities can be found in Johannes Reiling, Deutschland: Safe for Democracy? Deutsch-amerikanische 
Beziehungen aus dem Tätigkeitsbereich Heinrich F. Alberts, kaiserlicher Staatsekretär der Reich-
skanzlei, der Weimarer Republik, Reichsminister, Betreuer der Ford-Gesellschaften im Herrschafts-
gebiet des Dritten Reiches 1914 bis 1945 (Stuttgart, 1997), esp. 166–195.
125 Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, 39; Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propa-
ganda. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. 
Sixty-Fifth Congress Second and Third Session Pursuant to S.Res. 307 (Washington, 1919), 1392.
126 On the office’s many problems, see Reinhold Doerries, “Promoting Kaiser and Reich: Impe-
rial German Propaganda in the United States during World War I,” in Confrontation and Cooper-
ation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900–1924, ed. Hans-Jürgen 
Schröder, 135–166 (Providence, RI, 1993); for a contemporary perspective, see Horst Falcke, Vor 
dem Eintritt Amerikas in den Weltkrieg (Dresden, 1928), 251.
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months of the war, public diplomacy had become recognized as a significant 
policy field, especially in the “most important neutral country.”127
*
Although Germany’s wartime propaganda campaign had many new elements, 
it also drew heavily on prewar connections.128 In particular, it sought to activate 
transatlantic elite and ethnic networks through public appeals, lecture tours, 
and direct mail campaigns. With Germany’s transatlantic telegraph cables cut, 
personal access to potentially sympathetic “multiplier” groups seemed to be its 
most promising alternative. Consequently, peacetime initiatives and networks 
were quickly expanded, centralized and – as far as possible – harnessed to Ger-
many’s wartime agenda.129 The Amerika-Institut, for example, essentially be-
came part of the Foreign Ministry’s newly established news department, func-
tioning as a “news center for America.”130 Just two weeks into the war, Friedrich 
Schmidt-Ott, the Prussian official in charge of the professorial exchange, was 
recalled from military service to instead take his place on the emerging prop-
aganda front. Drawing on his contacts across the Atlantic, he now explained 
Germany’s position to all professors and university presidents affiliated with 
the exchange program and encouraged former German exchange professors 
to follow suit.131 Scholars already present in the United States, like the econo-
mist Moritz Julius Bonn, were asked to promote German points of view, while 
others, like Eugen Kühnemann, were once more dispatched specifically for this 
purpose.132 Given their degree of patriotic elation and the widespread inter-
127 Abschrift zu UIK 3368 1 Amerika–Institut [R. W. Drechsler] to Minister der geistlichen und 
Unterrichts-Angelegenheiten, Nov. 20, 1914, PA R 64997; Eugen Kühnemann identified the 
United States as the propaganda war’s main battlefield; Eugen Kühnemann, Mit unbefangener 
Stirn (Heilbronn, 1937), 238.
128 The New York Office published a daily German news service, covertly purchased and subsi-
dized American periodicals, and used new technologies such as wireless telegraphy and film, al-
beit not always successfully, to overcome the constraints imposed by the British communications 
blockade. On the use of wireless telegraphy, see Evans, “The Path to Freedom”; in the spring of 
1915 Berlin also established the American Correspondence Film Company to supply U. S. movie 
theaters with German war films and news reels; Reiling, Deutschland: Safe for Democracy?, 171.
129 Peter Grupp, “Vorraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda in den 
neutralen Staaten während des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Der erste Weltkrieg, Wirkung, Wahrneh-
mung und Analyse, ed.Wolfgang Michalka, 799–825 (Munich, 1994), 802.
130 Its job was to supply American news correspondents with information, provide regular 
analysis of American published opinion to German diplomats, and oversee the production of the 
Continental Times, an English-language paper distributed in Europe and the United States. The 
Continental Times was almost entirely funded by the German Foreign Ministry, which used the 
Amerika-Institut as a “cover address”; details in PA R 122219. For a very negative assessment of 
the Continental Times, see James Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York, 1917), 228.
131 Schmidt-Ott, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes, 113–114.
132 Moritz Julius Bonn, So macht man Geschichte (Munich, 1953); Abschrift Kühnemann 
(1914), NL Schmidt-Ott 411, GSPK.
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pretation of the war as a “great war of ideas,” it took minimal state prodding to 
enlist scholars’ moral and cultural authority for a state-sponsored propaganda 
campaign:133 they gladly edited war documents, authored popular pamphlets, 
issued public manifestos, went on lecture tours, and even initiated personal 
correspondence.134 In the single most (in-)famous of these efforts, ninety-three 
luminaries of German scholarship, literature, and art issued a public manifesto 
titled “To The Civilized World” on October 4, which refuted Allied accusa-
tions of German “war guilt” and civilian atrocities and – responding to Allied 
claims that German military and political leaders had forced the war upon the 
German people – aligned German culture with Germany’s “so-called milita-
rism.”135 Invoking German cultural achievements, the ninety-three asked the 
world to “trust in us” that “we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized 
nation, to which the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant, is just as 
sacred as its own hearths and homes.” And although the Foreign Ministry dis-
tributed the appeal around the world, its effect was hoped to  be strongest once 
again in the United States.
*
The first few months of the war, then, witnessed a thorough politicization of 
the cultural sphere. German intellectuals were placed – or, more accurately, 
placed themselves – in the service of the nation’s cause. This process, it should 
be noted, was neither uniquely German nor especially difficult: on the con-
trary, intellectuals easily reconciled their previous work for transatlantic un-
derstanding with that of wartime propaganda.136 In fact, they often saw it as 
133 Eugen Kühnemann, Deutschland und Amerika. Briefe an einen deutsch-amerikanischen Fre-
und (Munich, 1917), 13. Both the Manifesto of the 93 and the later Declaration of German Pro-
fessors were, if not initiated, at least strongly encouraged by state officials; see Jürgen von Un-
gern-Sternberg, “Wie gibt man dem Sinnlosen einen Sinn? Zum Gebrauch der Begriffe ‘deutsche 
Kultur’und ‘Militarismus’ im Herbst 1914,” in Kultur und Krieg, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 77–
96, 90.
134 The historian Hermann Oncken explained to the Foreign Ministry that there was “no intel-
lectual activity important to the war I would have refused to take on.” Studt, “Geistiger Luftku-
rort,” 381.
135 An English translation is “To the Civilized World: By Professors of Germany,” North Ameri-
can Review 210, no. 765 (1919): 284–287. On the manifesto, see Wolfgang von, and Jürgen von 
Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf “An die Kulturwelt!”: Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der 
Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1996); and Bernhard vom Brocke, “‘Wissen-
schaft und Militarismus.’”
136 French cultural institutes followed the same approach. See “Wissenschaft und Schule im 
Dienste der französischen Propaganda,” Deutsche Arbeit 23, no. 11 (Aug. 1924): 283–288; on ac-
ademic mobilization in other countries, see Tomás Irish, The University at War, 1914–25: Britain, 
France and the United States (London, 2015); Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva: World War I 
and The Uses of Higher Learning in America (Baton Rouge, 1975).
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the logical continuation and “crowning act” of such efforts.137 The exigencies of 
the war first blurred, then collapsed, the already porous line between cultural 
diplomacy and propaganda. Since the cultivation of U. S. relations had always 
served political ends, this collapse seemed neither remarkable nor disconcert-
ing to contemporaries. The war simply revealed the functional character that 
Germany’s cultural campaign had possessed all along. The prewar policy of 
“gifts and gestures” was now expected to pay dividends.
From German Culture to Kultur: Professorial Propaganda and Its 
Disappointments
These expectations were to be disappointed. German propaganda never im-
proved anti-German sentiment in the United States. While it did make the Ger-
man viewpoint more widely known, it failed to resonate with a larger Ameri-
can public, including many of those more familiar with Germany.138 This had a 
lot to do with the quality of German propaganda. Whereas the British worked 
quietly and unobtrusively, German propaganda tended to be visible and brash, 
an impression only intensified by language barriers and German-American ag-
itation.139 But it also reflected different German and American attitudes toward 
state authority and military intervention.140 Moreover, deep-seated cultural, 
political, and familial affinities for the Entente as well as U. S. disapproval of the 
invasion of neutral Belgium – not to mention German atrocities – limited the 
potential success of German propaganda from the beginning.141 While German 
Americans, in particular, supported Germany’s cause, American elites proved 
largely unreceptive to German arguments.
137 Kühnemann. to Schmidt, Sep. 2, 1914, NL Schmidt-Ott 411, GSPK. Abschrift zu UIK 3368 
1 Amerika-Institut to Minister der geistlichen und Unterrichts-Angelegenheiten, Nov. 20, 1914, 
PA R 64997.
138 Charles A. Elwood, “Germany and American Opinion,” The Sociological Review 8 (1915): 
106–111.
139 The German Information Bureau in New York, for example, consisted of a more or less ran-
domly assembled group of amateurs who lacked the necessary experience and language skills for 
the difficult task ahead. See Reinhard Doerries, “Imperial Berlin and Washington: New Light on 
Germany’s Foreign Policy and America’s Entry into World War I,” Central European History 11, 
no. 1 (March 1978): 23–49, 28–33.
140 Fulwider has pointed to the “very real ‘cultural divide’ between German and Anglo-Ameri-
can perceptions of authority and opinion”; see Fulwider, German Propaganda and U. S. Neutral-
ity in World War I, 52.
141 There is, in fact, evidence that Americans, well-versed in sensational press coverage, were 
skeptical about Belgian atrocity stories; but this never changed their disdain for Germany’s will-
ful violation of Belgian neutrality. As one well-known American journalist summed up: “We 
need not look for individual atrocities. Belgium herself is the capsheaf atrocity of this war.” Irvin 
Cobb cited in Michael S. Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road 
to the Great War, 1914–1917,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 801–812, 803.
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But German outreach was not simply ineffective; it was counterproductive. 
This can be seen with regard to the two groups singled out by German prop-
agandists: academic and ethnic circles. With regard to American professors, 
indeed, their drift into the Allied camp was only accelerated by the pronounce-
ments of German scholars.142 Despite their critical stance toward the German 
government and military, few would have initially held Germany’s respected 
culture responsible for its transgressions of civilized behavior. Like their Brit-
ish colleagues, many Americans originally adhered to a theory of “two Ger-
manies,” distinguishing the German people from the Prussian government 
and Germany’s culture from its allegedly autocratic and militaristic political 
system. According to this widespread notion, there was one Germany of un-
abashed navy enthusiasm, of the Kaiser’s boastful remarks, of stunted parlia-
mentarization, of clicking heels and shiny helmets; and then there was another 
Germany of Goethe, Kant, and Beethoven, of pleasant university life, critical 
inquiry, admirable social reform, and a docile, peaceful people. Prussia’s mil-
itary and political leaders, many believed at first, had simply forced the war 
upon that “other Germany.”143
Within a few months, however, German intellectuals’ open alignment 
with the war effort had collapsed this distinction. For one, their professorial 
proclamations damaged them morally. By defending Germany’s cause and its 
military conduct, these academics linked German culture to a military system 
that had invaded and occupied a defenseless neutral country, terrorized its 
 civilian population, and drawn Europe into a terrible war. This explicit connec-
tion of Germany’s admired cultural achievements to its despised “militarism” 
was deeply disturbing to many American scholars, who were used to scholars 
taking a more reserved position toward state power. Failing to understand that 
German academics aligned themselves with a “so-called German militarism” 
not because they were especially bellicose but because they felt it was their duty 
to testify to the German people’s support of the war effort, Americans inter-
preted this as a “melancholy demonstration of the obscuration of […] great 
intelligences under the spell of militarism!”144
Consequently, German culture was increasingly implicated in America’s 
general rejection of the German war effort. American scholars were ever more 
inclined to believe French claims that German culture and militarism were not 
only compatible but intrinsically connected, and that German Kultur was actu-
142 Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 70.
143 The New York Evening Post exemplified this thought in an editorial, stating that the defeat of 
German militarism would lead to a liberation of Germany’s cultural sphere; see Kellermann, Der 
Krieg der Geister 1914, 22–23.
144 Frank Jewett Mather, “Eucken and Haeckel: Sad to See Them Sink to the Level of Chauvin-
ists,” New York Times, Sep. 12, 1914, 8; on the motives of German scholars, see Ungern-Sternberg 
and Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf “An die Kulturwelt!,” 65.
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ally embedded in an inherently aggressive and expansionist German mentality 
and, as such, constituted a serious threat to world peace.145 German thought 
from an older and nobler era (represented by Goethe and Kant, for example), 
they argued, had since been replaced by a newer, militaristic philosophy in-
fluenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, Heinrich von Treitschke, and Friedrich von 
Bernhardi, who had all preached that “might is right” and led Germany away 
from Western traditions. Within this perspective, the mutilation of Belgian 
women and children, as well as the destruction of cultural artifacts, libraries, 
and churches, had not taken place despite German culture but because of it.146 
In short, while German scholars had wanted to use their moral capital to ele-
vate the German military effort, their unconditional alignment with the mili-
tary’s conduct, in fact, dragged German culture down.
These propagandist efforts also damaged German scholars academically. 
As ethically disturbing as the substance of their claims might have seemed 
to Americans, German scholars aroused the most indignation because of 
the uncritical spirit with which they repeated their government’s pronounce-
ments. Known the world over for their attention to detail and their tiresome 
erudition – in short, known to base the smallest insight on a mountain of ev-
idence – German scholars were now asking the outside world to “believe,” to 
“have faith,” to “trust” in their statements simply because they stood in the 
intellectual tradition of Kant, Beethoven, and Goethe. To many American 
scholars, the manifestos, with their strong claims, apodictic rhetoric, and lack 
of evidence, violated the principles of sound scholarship and detached crit-
ical inquiry for which German scholarship had long been revered.147 Worse 
still, many Americans saw this propaganda as dismissing their own intellectual 
capacities. German scholars’ claim that they ought to be believed because of 
their proven contributions to science and culture, not because they were mak-
ing a persuasive, evidence-based argument, seemed to impose a standard on 
Americans that Germans would never have accepted for themselves.148 Perhaps 
German appeals would not have provoked such opposition had Americans 
145 On French scholars, see Martha Hanna, The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and 
Writers during the Great War (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 75; Robert Norton, “Wilamowitz at War,” 
International Journal of the Classical Tradition 15, no. 1 (2008): 74–97, 90; Gerd Krumeich, 
“ Ernest Lavisse und die Kritik an der deutschen ‘Kultur’, 1914–1918,” in Kultur und Krieg, ed. 
Mommsen, 143–54, 153.
146 George Trumbull Ladd in the Times, Nov. 21, 1914, reprinted in Sixty American Opinions on 
the War, ed. Samuel Harden Church, 100–103 (London, 1915), 103.
147 John Grier Hibben to New York Times, Nov. 24, 1914, reprinted in Sixty American Opinions, 
ed. Church, 87–88.
148 “German Professors Insult American Intelligence Says Albion W. Small,” Chicago Daily Trib-
une, Jan. 10, 1915; for very similar perspectives, see Edgar Ewing Brandon, “German Propa-
ganda Answered: Dean Edgar Brandon of Miami University Resents Its Slight Upon American 
Intelligence,” New York Times, Jan. 13, 1915, 8; and Peabody to Schmidt, Oct. 20, 1914, NL 
Schmidt-Ott 420, GSPK.
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not long sensed German condescension in their transatlantic dealings. But as 
things stood, they appeared to be yet another instance of German arrogance 
and further antagonized American scholars.149
While we ought to be careful not to mistake German propaganda as the 
source of anti-German sentiment – the roots of this alienation go much fur-
ther back150 – the onslaught of German letters and manifestos hastened the 
process of intellectual disassociation from German scholarship among Amer-
ican academics.151 The Manifesto of the 93, in particular, became so famous 
because it offered Americans an opportunity to air longer-standing grievances 
about German feelings of superiority and, no less important, provided them 
with a psychologically important excuse for their position toward a country to 
which they were bound by so many personal and professional ties.152 A survey 
of American scholars taken in early 1915 shows how pervasive this intellectual 
disassociation was: only about 6-percent of American scholars were sympa-
thetic to the German cause, and on the Eastern seaboard, where acquaintance 
with Germany tended to be greatest, only 3.4-percent were.153 While a small 
number of American scholars kept up correspondence with their German 
peers after 1914, American academia had largely begun to drift into the Allied 
camp.154
These developments occasioned a major disruption in transatlantic aca-
demic relations, which would have wide-ranging implications for the 1920s. 
To German scholars, American reactions came as a shock. Because they had 
hoped for at least “honest neutrality” once Americans were informed of the 
“truth about the war,” the hostile responses were frustrating,155 especially in 
light of the strenuous efforts they had made in previous years. Indeed, in light 
of their own “devoted and selfless” cultivation of American goodwill, as Eduard 
Meyer called it, and persistent notions of a transatlantic teacher-student rela-
tionship, German professors deemed the rejection of their arguments nothing 
149 Elwood, “Germany and American Opinion,” 107.
150 These developments are summed up in Jörg Nagler, “From Culture to Kultur: Changing 
American Perceptions of Imperial Germany, 1870–1914,” in Transatlantic Images and Percep-
tions: Germany and America since 1776, ed. David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, 
131–154 (New York, 1997).
151 Reinhard Doerries has noted that “the manifesto […] merely contributed to the growing 
cultural estrangement of the Germans from the rest of Europe and North America.” Doerries, 
Promoting Kaiser and Reich, 143.
152 Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 46.
153 Falcke, Vor dem Eintritt Amerikas in den Weltkrieg, 251–252.
154 Tomás Irish, “From International to Interallied: Transatlantic University Relations in the Era 
of the First World War, 1905–1920,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, no. 4 (Nov. 2015): 311–
325.
155 Meyer, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 259.
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short of ingratitude, even an insult.156 The dividends of German cultural invest-
ments in the United States seemed utterly disappointing.
The lessons Germans drew from this experience were often radical: they 
would have to cease all efforts to win the American public immediately and 
never take them up again. Had German observers hitherto believed that Amer-
ican antipathy stemmed merely from misinformation created by English prop-
aganda – in other words, that Americans were only to blame for their gulli-
bility – they now attributed American hostility to the cultural predominance 
of Anglo-Americans and a fundamental and irreconcilable dissimilarity of 
the German and American character.157 Germany’s prestige, a vocal group of 
professors argued, had only suffered from its courtship of the United States, 
which had proved fruitless as demonstrated by the wartime animosity at Co-
lumbia and Harvard.158 Under these circumstances, the professorial exchanges, 
which had been temporarily halted at the outbreak of the war, finally collapsed. 
Though U. S. universities expressed their desire to continue them through-
out 1915, the Prussian Ministry of Culture now wished to sever relations with 
such ungrateful institutions to preserve German dignity.159 More conciliatory 
positions, such as those of church historian Adolf von Harnack or economist 
Moritz Julius Bonn, were marginalized in a climate in which the predominant 
view was that the German universities should be closed to foreigners altogeth-
er.160 By January 1915, the prevailing opinion among German scholars was that 
“whoever is with us should have loyalty for loyalty and, as far as we are con-
cerned, all the rest can go to hell.”161
At this point, both sides felt that the decade-long experiment in cultural 
exchange had failed. In Germany, scholars’ feelings of indignation and resent-
156 Eduard Meyer, Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung, Feb. 18, 1915, reprinted in Eduard Meyer, Nor-
damerika und Deutschland, 9–10 (Berlin, 1915); Ludwig Fulda, Amerika und Deutschland 
während des Weltkrieges (Leipzig, 1916), 19–20.
157 In terms of lifestyle, norms, and language, the United States had remained a “British cultural 
colony,” and political and institutional sympathy for England and cultural predilections for 
French art, design, and fashion were blamed for America’s siding with the Allies; see Fulda, 
Amerika und Deutschland, 22; a similar perspective is Hermann Oncken, “Deutschland, England 
und Amerika. Historisch-politische Betrachtungen über den Kampf in der öffentlichen Mein-
ung,” Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft. Kunst und Technik 9, no. 7 (Feb. 1915): 537–
562, 541.
158 See “Selbstachtung vor den Neutralen!,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Dec. 1914): 415.
159 Schmidt-Ott to Wilhelm II, Nov. 8, 1914, I HA Rep 89 13367 Förderung der geistigen Bezie-
hungen zu Amerika, Vol. 3, 1914–1916, GSPK; Schmidt-Ott to Dobschütz, June 17, 1915, NL 
Schmidt-Ott 420, GSPK.
160 On these moderate voices, see Nottmeier, Adolf von Harnack und die deutsche Politik, 399; 
Schmidt(-Ott) to Bonn, Aug. 11, 1915, NL Schmidt-Ott 420, GSPK; on the increasingly radical 
solution, see Clipping: Prof. Dr. Conrad Bornhak, “Das Ausländertum an den deutschen Hoch-
schulen,“ Der Tag, June 15, 1915, I HA Rep 89 13367 Förderung der geistigen Beziehungen zu 
Amerika, Vol. 3, 1914–1916, GS PK.
161 See “Selbstachtung vor den Neutralen!,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Dec. 1914): 415.
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ment would interfere with resuming relations after the war. More fatal in the 
short run, their public rejection left them with the impression that America 
was not a truly neutral power.162 Before long, even former exchange professors, 
who should have been better at gauging America’s industrial strength, sec-
onded military voices that belittled American military potential and advocated 
unrestricted submarine warfare at the risk of drawing America into the war.163 
In the United States, German intellectuals’ public alliance with a military ef-
fort responsible for many alleged and real war crimes helped discredit Ger-
man culture even among Americans who had long held it in high esteem. Just 
months into the war, many long-standing transatlantic ties had been severed 
and great emotional and psychological obstacles had been raised to renewing 
them. When on May 7, 1915, a German submarine sank the British passenger 
liner Lusitania with about 1,200 civilians, including 120 Americans, on board, 
American cartoonists pictured drowning women and children torpedoed by 
German “Kultur.” Within less than a year of the war’s outbreak, respected Ger-
man culture had become “Kultur” – and, as such, part of the “German prob-
lem.”
Fig . 4: “As the World Sees It,” 
Literary Digest, May 22, 1915
162 Stresemann’s take on this is in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Apr. 6, 1916, 
868 A.
163 Klaus Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral. Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die poli-
tischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1969), 121–123; Reiling, Deutschland: 
Safe for Democracy?, 74.
Culture, Propaganda, and Transatlantic Relations, 1902–1921 96
German Americans in the Middle
However, it was with regard to German Americans that German propaganda 
would prove most detrimental. Once their broader U. S. appeal had failed, 
German propagandists redoubled their efforts with German Americans. The 
war had initially inspired a resurgence of ethnic feeling among this group.164 
In larger American cities, they staged parades, waved German flags, and held 
demonstrations in support of the fatherland. As early as August 3, the National 
German-American Alliance had established a “literary defense” campaign 
to oppose the “lies” spread about Germany, and shortly thereafter the young 
German-American poet George Sylvester Viereck began publishing the Eng-
lish-language weekly The Fatherland to champion the German cause.165 While 
we should not confuse the militant positions of ethnic leaders with those of the 
“average” German American, even many who had shown little regard for eth-
nic activities, let alone Germany’s political leadership, felt compelled to defend 
their old fatherland against the charges of barbarism leveled against it and, 
indirectly, against themselves.166 The circulation of German-language newspa-
pers rose impressively as German Americans sought news less tainted by what 
they considered a pro-Allied bias, and The Fatherland (aided by German sub-
sidies) soon reached a circulation of 100,000.167 Ethnic leaders, for their part, 
embraced the fight for “fair play” and an arms embargo as a chance to “revital-
ize a disintegrating ethnic community.”168
German propagandists were delighted to encourage these developments. 
From August 1914 onwards, a substantial part of German propaganda targeted 
German Americans.169 After the sinking of the Lusitania, especially, Germany’s 
shrinking access to mainstream American society reoriented its efforts toward 
164 Don Heinrich Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community: The Cincinnati Germans, 
1918 through 1932” (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 1983), 120.
165 The proclamation of the National German-American Alliance can be found in Karl Jünger, 
Deutsch-Amerika Mobil (Leipzig, 1915), 67.
166 There is still considerable uncertainty about the position of the majority of German Ameri-
cans. Luebke has surmised that “it is even possible that a majority of persons of German stock in 
the United States in 1914 were either indifferent to the war in Europe or actually hostile to the 
German government in its goals”; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 88. Henry J. Schmidt has noted that 
“after 1914, the German-American community was split essentially into four camps: the 
pro-Germans, the pro-Americans, the neutralists (out of religious conviction or the desire for 
anonymity) and the socialists, who opposed the war from the start as a manifestation of capital-
istic imperialism.” Henry J. Schmidt, “The Rhetoric of Survival: The Germanist in America from 
1900 to 1925,” in America and the Germans, ed. Trommler and McVeigh, 2:204–216, 209.
167 Wüstenbecker, Deutsch-Amerikaner im Ersten Weltkrieg, 55.
168 Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 96.
169 As early as September 1914, Hermann Oncken was put to the task of writing a greeting to 
German Americans to be published as the sixth volume in a series of propaganda brochures ed-
ited by Ernst Jäckh: Hermann Oncken, Deutschlands Weltkrieg und die Deutschamerikaner: Ein 
Gruß des Vaterlandes über den Ozean (Stuttgart, 1914).
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pro-German, or at least anti-Allied, ethnic groups, including those of German, 
Irish, and Jewish descent.170 The exigencies of the war only deepened earlier 
misconceptions about German Americans. German propagandists systemati-
cally overestimated the unity, influence, and commitment of “Germans” in the 
United States.171 In some German minds, the war had transformed a highly 
diverse ethnic group into a “powerful entity” and a “force to be reckoned with” 
that could be used to keep the United States neutral. In one reckless moment, 
Eugen Kühnemann confided to Friedrich Schmidt-Ott that “Americans will 
have to learn to fear German Americans.”172 In reality, of course, the initial eth-
nic unity had already fractured into a multitude of different opinions, and after 
the sinking of the Lusitania many German Americans fell silent, no longer de-
fending their old fatherland.173 Above all, most German Americans had neither 
the authority nor the visibility to effectively champion Germany’s position. The 
German-language press found few readers among “Anglo-Americans,” and 
English-language periodicals like The Fatherland were so militantly partisan 
that they began to discredit rather than advertise German positions.
More fatefully still, many German propagandists continued to harbor an 
astonishing lack of regard for the sensitivities of a multiethnic society. In their 
thinly veiled political hopes in German Americans, their repeated intimations 
that German Americans might physically oppose American belligerence,174 
and their contention that Americans “would have to learn to fear German 
Americans,” they ignored – despite numerous warnings on both the German 
and American sides175 – how detrimental such insinuations of ethnic disloyalty 
could be. As they had before 1914, they also failed to understand that cultural 
and political loyalties could not be neatly separated in an increasingly nativist 
America. As Ambassador Bernstorff summed up, looking back in 1920, “al-
ready before the war we lacked a true understanding of the awkward position 
170 Reiling, Safe for Democracy?, 177; Falcke, Vor dem Eintritt Amerikas, 19.
171 As scholars have shown, “the German perception of a large body of well-organized Germans 
in America who could rise up in support of the goals of the Fatherland and maintain American 
neutrality was a creation of German officials’ imaginations. In reality, Germans in America were 
fragmented along multiple lines, such as community size, region, religion, politics, class, time of 
immigration, generation and family connection.” Fulwider, “The Kaiser’s Most Loyal,” 151; for 
contemporary examples, see Oncken, Deutschlands Weltkrieg und die Deutschamerikaner, 12; 
Jünger, Deutsch-Amerika Mobil, 4.
172 Kühnemann to Schmidt(-Ott), Feb. 6 1915, NL Schmidt-Ott 411, GSPK.
173 Frank Trommler, “The Lusitania Effect: America’s Mobilization against Germany in World 
War I,” German Studies Review 32, no. 2 (2009): 241–266, 247.
174 Jünger, Deutsch-Amerika Mobil, 141–155.
175 Under State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann had felt it wise to suggest to Ambassador 
Gerard that the 500,000 German reservists in the United States might rise up in the event of an 
American declaration of war. The American ambassador (allegedly) responded that in that case, 
there would surely be 500,001 lampposts in the United States; see Gerard, My Four Years in Ger-
many, 173–174.
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of Americans of German descent. This was all the more the case during the 
war. At all times the question of ‘German Americans’ was not handled tact-
fully. In particular, expectations in them were too high.”176 Throughout the war, 
many Germans cultivated a way of thinking about German Americans that 
was bound to raise unrealistic expectations – and American suspicion.
*
This German disregard for ethnic sensibilities unleashed a profound backlash 
against German influence. The sinking of the Lusitania added momentum to 
the U. S. preparedness campaign, which called for vigilance against the “Ger-
man menace” at home and abroad.177 None other than former president The-
odore Roosevelt, with an honorary doctorate from the University of Berlin, 
at one point told an audience that “Germany has habitually and as a mat-
ter of policy practiced the torture of men, the rape of women and the kill-
ing of children.”178 A sensational exposé of Germany’s covert activities in the 
New York World in the summer of 1915 only deepened American resentment. 
Though many of the activities it disclosed – such as the purchase of Ameri-
can newspapers – were not technically illegal, Americans did not regard them 
as legitimate for a friendly foreign power.179 Against the backdrop of German 
submarine warfare and acts of sabotage and terrorism on American soil (at 
Black Tom Terminal in New York in July 1916 and a New Jersey factory in Jan-
uary 1917), anti-German hysteria soared.180 In the process, Germany’s clumsy 
opinion-shaping attempts came to be seen as a vast German plot and German 
Americans as imperial agents on American soil.181 In the escalating rhetoric of 
the 1916 presidential election, the “hyphen” in the identity of this group had 
already become tantamount to treason.
Though neither German hopes nor American fears about German-Amer-
ican disloyalty were justified, America’s entry into the war on April 6, 1917, un-
leashed a crusade against “German Kultur” at home and abroad. While Pres-
176 Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, 20.
177 According to Trommler, the sinking of the Lusitania set off three broader developments: 1) 
it led Americans to see Germany as a military threat; 2) it sparked an increasingly hysterical, vi-
olent reaction against German Americans; and 3) it was an important marker of American mo-
bilization for national unity; Trommler, “The Lusitania Effect,” 241–242.
178 Steward Halsey Ross, Propaganda for War: How the United States Was Conditioned to Fight 
the Great War of 1914–1918 (Jefferson, 1996), 177.
179 Fulwider, German Propaganda and U. S. Neutrality, 124.
180 Doerries, Berlin–Washington, 62.
181 British propaganda, for its part, fueled American hysteria with sensational publications like 
Frederic William Wile’s “The German-American Plot,” which depicted German propaganda as a 
vast, formidably organized conspiracy determined to use “hyphenated Americans” for its sinister 
plans; see Frederic William Wile, The German-American Plot: The Record of a Great Failure (Lon-
don, 1915).
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ident Wilson had initially declared that he had “no quarrel with the German 
people,” the tidy distinction between the government and the public, between 
politics and culture, soon collapsed. German Americans bore the brunt of 
American indignation.182 As the suspicion, distrust, and hostility that had be-
gun to emerge in August 1914 came to the fore, German ethnic organizations 
and individuals that did not disavow their transatlantic connections quickly 
found themselves subject to boycotts, denunciations, and even violent attacks. 
Federal legislation censored or shut down the German-language press, and in-
dividual states forbade the teaching and even the public use of the German 
language. Most German ethnic clubs suspended their activity for the duration 
of the war, and often for good. Individually, German Americans sought to shed 
their cultural markers: they stopped using the German language, abandoned 
their associational life, and changed their names. While the war only acceler-
ated an already far-advanced process of assimilation, the experience was trau-
matic, nonetheless.
But World War I also systematically rid the United States of nonethnic 
expressions of German Kultur. Universities purged their departments of al-
leged pro-Germans, public libraries removed the works of Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Gerhart Hauptmann, and Friedrich Schiller, and concert halls no 
longer played German music.183 The Deutsches Haus at Columbia was fittingly 
re-dedicated as Columbia House, a center for Americanization. Americans 
seemed to be following the rule that “we disapprove of the Kaiser and his pro-
jects. Therefore we punish him by snubbing Beethoven […]”; and although 
some recognized the absurdity of this position, the “eradication of German 
culture” in the United States could not be stopped.184 Indeed, this backlash was 
more severe in the U. S. than in other countries on account of the distinct men-
ace German culture was believed to pose to America as a multiethnic society, 
the demands of mobilizing that reluctant society for war, and the widespread 
perception that the war constituted a moment of emancipation from German 
traditions.185 On this basis, George Creel’s Committee for Public Information – 
staffed with alumni of German universities – successfully recast Kultur as the 
182 For German-American postwar frustrations about this development, see New Yorker 
Staats-Zeitung, Oct. 11, 1920, cited in Wiedemann-Citera, Die Auswirkungen des Ersten Welt-
kriegs auf die Deutsch-Amerikaner im Spiegel der New Yorker Staatszeitung, der New Yorker 
Volkszeitung und der New York Times 1914–1926 (Frankfurt, 1993), 243.
183 For a detailed summary of these measures, see Wüstenbecker, Deutsch-Amerikaner im Er-
sten Weltkrieg, 245–304.
184 Quoted in Trommler, “The Lusitania Effect,” 251; for a dramatic account of these develop-
ments, see Erik Kirschbaum, Burning Beethoven: The Eradication of German Culture in the 
United States during World War I (New York, 2015).
185 See also Frank Trommler, “Inventing the Enemy: German-American Cultural Relations, 
1900–1917,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 99–126; comparative 
studies are still lacking; one recent exception is Panayi, ed., Germans as Minorities during the 
First World War.
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very antithesis of the American war effort.186 In the end, it was neither Ger-
many nor the United Kingdom but rather the United States that proved to be 
the true master of World War I propaganda.
*
With the American entry into the war, Wilhelmine Amerikapolitik had ended 
in resounding failure. The campaign for American hearts and minds, which 
had begun fifteen years earlier, had not only failed to meet its objectives; it 
had clearly aggravated the situation. The alignment of cultural and military 
power and the attention paid to German Americans had amplified apprehen-
sions about a German menace at home and abroad, ultimately unleashing a 
massive backlash against German Kultur, ethnic or otherwise. On both sides 
of the Atlantic, the period of U. S. neutrality left behind a trail of disappoint-
ments and injured feelings that would complicate cultural demobilizations in 
the 1920s. Above all, for perceptive observers, it demonstrated the futility of 
a German policy that was built on “gifts and gestures” but was unwilling to 
truly accommodate U. S. interests. All pronouncements of transatlantic respect 
aside, America remained little understood and esteemed in Berlin. Nowhere 
was this more apparent than in the decision to resume unrestricted submarine 
warfare (albeit against the massive opposition of the chancellor and German 
diplomats), as well as in the infamous Zimmermann Telegram shortly thereaf-
ter.187 As one American had already observed on the occasion of Prince Hein-
rich’s visit fifteen years earlier, gestures of goodwill had a limited political effect 
because, in the end, “wars are not made or unmade by such things as personal 
visits.”188 As the Germans began to realize in 1917, it was not only German pub-
lic diplomacy that needed reforming, but its foreign policy in general.
186 For the propaganda contribution of (German-educated) American academics, see George T. 
Blakey, Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (Lexington, 
1970); in the war’s single most widely circulated propaganda pamphlet, “How the War Came to 
America,” printed in a circulation of six million copies and eight languages, America’s entry into 
the war was attributed to Germany’s indefensible behavior, which had “with a fanatical faith in 
the destiny of German kultur as the system that must rule the world […] through years of boast-
ing, double dealing, and deceit tended toward aggression upon the rights of others,” 15; on that 
particular publication, see George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York, 1920), 455.
187 There were, of course, also many voices that clearly saw the consequences of unrestricted 
submarine warfare. For a precise prediction of its consequences, see “Aufzeichnung Kurt Riezlers 
zur Frage des U-Bootkrieges,” in Kurt Riezler, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 488–491.
188 “War Is Coming,” Boston Daily Globe, Jan. 18, 1902, 6.
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From the history of our neighbors we can learn how well the art of disguising real po-
litical motivations beneath a cloak of smart words and beautiful appearances has been 
learned on the banks of the Seine, the Thames, even the Neva. As a wise Greek man once 
observed, people are moved less by the things themselves than by their opinions about 
these things. And often it is not truth that rules the world, but the appearance of truth. 
The Realpolitiker in particular knows of the great importance of emotions in international 
affairs, knows what great weight the imponderables have, which, as Count Bismarck re-
marked on February 6, 1888, weigh heavier, much heavier, than material things.189
 (Bernhard von Bülow, Deutsche Politik, 1916)
Germany’s botched propaganda campaign prompted a renewed public de-
bate about the country’s international representation. Beginning in late 1916 
and lasting through the early 1920s, a series of internal memoranda and public 
pamphlets alike set out to reconfigure the place of public diplomacy in German 
foreign affairs in the face, first, of wartime failures, and then of defeat and of a 
humiliating peace. During the course of the debate, criticism of German prop-
aganda operations converged with a more fundamental critique of how Ger-
man foreign policy was conducted. The result was the most profound reform of 
the German Foreign Service in the twentieth century and a clear commitment 
to a concerted and state-directed public diplomacy even beyond the end of the 
war.
*
The debate on German public relations, which had gained momentum in the 
prewar years, resurfaced in 1916 when the endless Verdun campaign eroded 
patriotic self-censorship and raised broader questions about the German war 
effort.190 Trying to understand why Germany had lost the battle for interna-
tional opinion, liberal publicists and politicians initially focused on prewar sins 
of omission. Most of these critics believed that Allied propaganda successes 
after 1914 were fostered by longer-standing German deficiencies.191 Whereas 
England and France had long prepared the ground with press and cultural pol-
icies, the German government, a German newspaper argued in late 1916, had 
189 Bernhard von Bülow, Deutsche Politik (Berlin, 1916), 346.
190 On the development of German public opinion toward the war effort, see Wolfgang 
Mommsen, “Die Regierung Bethmann Hollweg und die öffentliche Meinung, 1914–1917,” 
 Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 17, no. 2 (Apr. 1969): 117–159.
191 “Auslandspresse und Auslandskorrespondenten,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Nov. 1915): 
268–70; Rohrbach, Memorandum to Foreign Ministry, June 1915, reprinted in Rohrbach, Woher 
es kam, 18–31.
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failed to advertise German traits and positions to the world and to cultivate 
that “predisposition of the heart” among foreign peoples that could translate 
into “commercial trust” and “diplomatic sympathies” in times of need. “The 
war,” it concluded, had shown “that it was but a step from ignorance to mis-
trust, from mistrust to hostility.”192 In a similar vein, National Liberal Party 
politician Gustav Stresemann would attribute the breakdown of diplomatic 
relations with the United States to this kind of public relations failure a few 
months later.193 After 1916, German isolation and even American belligerence 
were increasingly blamed on what Germany had failed to do in the field of 
public relations.
Importantly, those most intimately acquainted with German propaganda 
efforts doubted that the war had changed this state of affairs. While it was 
true that official and unofficial propaganda operations had grown by leaps 
and bounds, it was a different question altogether whether this had improved 
its quality. As early as March 1915, publicist Paul Rohrbach, a member of the 
Central Office for Foreign Services, had submitted a memorandum to the For-
eign Ministry that characterized German efforts as “perfect disorganization.” 
If someone had intended “to organize Germany’s entire international opin-
ion-shaping efforts […] as inappropriately and as ineffectively as possible,” 
Rohrbach concluded, he could hardly have done a better job.194 This situation 
only deteriorated as the war progressed. Private enterprise, interministerial turf 
battles, and rising tensions between the military and civilian leadership led to a 
duplication, even a contradiction, of efforts. By late 1916, Chancellor von Beth-
mann-Hollweg realized that the Foreign Ministry’s approach to propaganda 
had to be reformed. Though crumbling domestic morale provided the initial 
impetus for reform, the deficiencies of Germany’s international propaganda 
figured prominently in the ensuing reorganization process. In a detailed mem-
orandum of December 1916, Erhard Deutelmoser, the director of the Foreign 
Ministry’s news department, underlined the need to centralize all propaganda 
in the hands of the Foreign Ministry and called for a more comprehensive 
approach to German image-building.195 In line with public criticism, Deutel-
moser also identified “the diligent cultivation of international cultural relations 
[as] the most influential diplomatic groundwork” for the enemies’ wartime 
propaganda successes and, accordingly, as Germany’s particular weakness.196
192 Clipping: “Ein Fortschritt deutscher Kulturpolitik,” Weser Zeitung, Oct. 28, 1916, PA R 
121333.
193 Gustav Stresemann, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Bd. 309, 85. Sitz. 2470B.
194 Rohrbach, Woher es kam, 17–18; scholars have agreed with this impression; see Grupp, 
“Vorraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda,” 803.
195 Deutelmoser, “Über Nachrichten- u. Pressedienst des Auswärtigen Amtes,” Dec. 3, 1916, 
partly reprinted in Vogel, “Die Organisation der amtlichen Presse und Propagandapolitik,” 88–
91.
196 Grupp, “Vorraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda,” 808.
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Based on Deutelmoser’s suggestions, Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmer-
mann initiated a twofold reorganization process in early 1917. First, he intro-
duced a division for cultural propaganda at the Central Office for Foreign 
Services to cultivate German cultural relations with otherwise propagan-
da-weary neutral audiences. Secondly, he centralized most of German public 
diplomacy – including the Central Office for Foreign Services – in the For-
eign Ministry’s news department, where newly opened geographical desks 
were to bring the processes of policymaking and policy communication into 
closer alignment.197 Unlike in other countries, the German Foreign Ministry 
thus defended its claim to leadership in this emerging policy field.198 While 
its control was by no means exclusive, it had concentrated a significant deal 
of authority and resources in its hands by 1918:199 it was in charge of most in-
ternational propaganda, including press matters, news agencies, telegraph and 
wireless communication, the distribution of film, pictorial, and print material, 
as well as economic and cultural propaganda. From around 1900 to 1918, the 
news department increased its staff from about four to more than 400, clearly 
indicating the growing recognition that public opinion constituted a key factor 
in modern foreign relations.200
While these steps expressed new attention to the “imponderables of for-
eign relations,” they did not placate more determined critics. Long-standing 
associates of official propaganda like Paul Rohrbach and Ernst Jäckh felt that 
such reforms failed to address its most fundamental problem, namely, that 
Germany simply engaged in the wrong kind of propaganda. By 1917, Germany’s 
leadership had still not developed a compelling vision of its cause that would 
have allowed it to capture the hearts and minds of the neutrals. Whereas Brit-
ish propagandists had managed to turn the fate of “poor little Belgium” into an 
international cause célèbre, German officials had never understood foreign psy-
chology or the power of ideas and emotions. As Rohrbach and Jäckh charged, 
they made arguments about encirclement and military necessity that had little 
emotional or moral sway over neutrals and failed to exploit prime “opportu-
nities” to this end, like German civilian suffering under the British “hunger 
197 It became the section on book, brochure, and cultural propaganda; see “Vorläufige Geschäft-
sordnung,” BArch R 901/71001.
198 In Great Britain, the Ministry of Information was established in February 1918, and in the 
United States the Committee on Public Information was established in 1917; by contrast, Ger-
man propaganda efforts were never united under one roof.
199 Ute Daniel, “Die Politik der Propaganda. Zur Praxis gouvernmentaler Selbstrepräsentation 
vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik,” in Propaganda, ed. Ute Daniel and Wolfram Siemann, 
44–82, 55.
200 These figures can be found in Hans Jürgen Müller, Auswärtige Pressepolitik und Propaganda 
zwischen Ruhrkampf und Locarno, 1923–1925. Eine Untersuchung über die Rolle der Öffentlichkeit 
in der Außenpolitik Stresemanns (Frankfurt, 1991), 32.
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blockade.”201 Even as the impact of international opinion was duly recognized, 
Berlin seemed no closer to influencing it. Indeed, by tightening ministerial 
oversight, the reforms seemed only to aggravate earlier deficiencies by placing 
this line of work in the hands of men who lacked a feeling for mass psychol-
ogy – and refused to listen to those who did have one.202 In the Foreign Min-
istry, experienced publicists like Rohrbach and Jäckh found themselves rele-
gated to writing press digests. Their advice, like warning about the devastating 
impact that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would have on 
American opinion, seemingly went unheard and unheeded by policymakers. 
For many involved, the ministerial reorganization of 1917 did not even begin to 
solve the true problem of German public relations. Consequently, both Jäckh 
and Rohrbach used the occasion to resign from the German propaganda effort.
By mid-1917, then, the debate over Germany’s botched propaganda cam-
paign was turning increasingly into a more profound critique of German for-
eign policymaking; it converged with debates on the democratization of Ger-
man politics. Diplomatic blunders like the Zimmermann Telegram or the Lux-
burg Affair of a similar nature (which almost brought neutral Argentina into 
the war) in 1917 once again illustrated not just the deficiencies of “propaganda” 
in a narrow sense but also German leaders’ ineptitude at gauging the inter-
national public repercussions of their actions. In the summer of 1917, when 
Germans’ high hopes in unrestricted submarine warfare proved unfounded, 
liberal publicists, scholars, businessmen, and politicians began to call for more 
fundamental reforms. Faced with the disastrous results of a policy decision 
many of them had advised against, they demanded an overhaul of the insti-
tutions, individuals, and mentalities shaping German foreign policy. If Ger-
man foreign policy seemed at times to go dangerously amiss, they argued, then 
German diplomats’ traditional education and aristocratic background was, not 
least, to blame. As the free conservative Dr. Rewoldt concluded in the Prussian 
parliament: “the present war has shown appallingly just how grossly mistaken 
especially our leading circles have been about the assumptions and character 
of foreign peoples, namely England and America, so that we have exposed 
ourselves to very considerable and often far-reaching disappointment.”203 The 
more America threw around its economic and military weight – that is, the 
201 See Matthias Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1920), 8; and Bernstorff, My Three 
Years in America, 45–46.
202 Rohrbach to Ballin, Mar. 1915, cited in Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten, 439n6; on 
these frustrations, see also Gärtner, Botschafterin des Guten Willens, 39–40; Moritz Julius Bonn, 
who was recruited into the press department for some time after his return from the United 
States, spent “the most useless months of my life” there; Bonn, So macht man Geschichte, 170.
203 See Dr. Rewoldt in “Die Auslandsstudien im preussischen Landtag,” Internationale Monatss-
chrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 11, no. 7 (Apr. 1917): 769–820, 816–817; in a similar 
vein, Rohrbach later concluded that “of all our underestimations of our enemies, the underesti-
mation of the Americans has been the most fateful. […] That we did not realize how much of 
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more flawed initial assumptions about American weakness turned out to be – 
the more these voices gained currency.
By the last year of the war, this mounting criticism could no longer be ig-
nored.204 In part to placate the growing number of critics, the Foreign Minis-
try’s new state secretary Richard von Kühlmann solicited the suggestions of 
the Hanseatic shipping and export industry concerning the reorganization of 
the German foreign service. The “Hamburg Memorandum” of April 1918 bun-
dled long-standing criticism and demands: that German diplomacy neglected 
“world economic policy”; that its organizational and conceptual principles 
were outmoded; and that an almost exclusive regard for “high politics” barred 
individuals with economic acumen from the ranks of the diplomatic corps and 
precipitated a dangerous disregard for the power of public sentiment. As the 
memorandum made clear, reform was urgently needed and would have to give 
greater weight to commercial relations, practical training of diplomats, and the 
reorganization of the Foreign Ministry along geographical lines; in short, the 
reforms had to adapt the foreign service to the needs of a globally operating 
nation in an age of worldwide trade and communications.
To this end, the Hanseatic elites, in the Hamburg Memorandum, also 
called for public diplomacy conducted by the government in order to offset the 
impact of Allied atrocity propaganda on Germany’s commercial and political 
prospects. More widely traveled and globally invested than any other German 
group, they were painfully aware of this negative effect. Alongside other meas-
ures, a concerted “cultural propaganda,” they argued, was needed to salvage 
Germany’s international reputation and help recapture lost goodwill and mar-
kets. “The Foreign Ministry,” the Hamburg Memorandum argued,
has to act on the assumption that it must not work on the governments of other countries 
alone, but on the sentiment of the peoples themselves. First and foremost, our govern-
ment has to attach great importance to a German cultural propaganda […] Only by fa-
miliarizing foreign countries with our culture time and again will we eliminate the delu-
sion created by atrocity propaganda that to be German and to be barbarian is essentially 
the same.205
enemy strength relied on them fighting with the power of ideas, has cost us the victory.” Rohr-
bach, Woher es kam, 10.
204 In the Reichstag the national liberals under Stresemann passed a resolution in June 1918 
that a commission be appointed including diplomats, military representatives, and politicians, as 
well as representatives of the export industry, to ponder the reform of the Foreign Ministry; see 
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags Bd. 324, Antrag Nr. 1669; and Stresemann’s explana-
tion in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Bd. 180. Sitzung, June 25, 1918, 5657–5659.
205 Quoted in Düwell, Deutschlands auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 77; on the reorganization process, 
see also Kurt Doß, Das Auswärtige Amt im Übergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik. 
Die Schülersche Reform. (Düsseldorf, 1977).
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In May 1918, one month after the memorandum had been submitted, von 
Kühlmann tasked the director of the Foreign Ministry’s personnel department, 
Edmund Schüler, with restructuring the German Foreign Service.206 Strongly 
supported by the Reichstag, the Hanseatic suggestions became the blueprint 
for the most profound reform of the German Foreign Service in the twentieth 
century.
*
That the reform actually took place, however, was due, above all, to German 
defeat. Just as German victory would have likely undermined the reform impe-
tus, the situation after November 1918 made it even more urgent.207 The estab-
lishment of the Weimar Republic, the parliamentarization of foreign policy, the 
preparations for the peace negotiations, and President Wilson’s call for what 
amounted to a “new diplomacy” all necessitated the reform of one of Germa-
ny’s most conservative ministries. By late 1918, even the staunchest advocates 
of what was soon called “old diplomacy” recognized the imperative of at least a 
semblance of reform – if only to defend the traditional prerogatives of the Wil-
helmstrasse. While this explains why these reforms took place, the exact shape 
they took and the significance they accorded to public diplomacy derived from 
how Germans came to understand the role of propaganda in their defeat and 
recovery.
The already substantial focus on the topic of propaganda during the war 
paled in comparison to the phenomenal influence ascribed to it thereafter. 
German defeat changed the entire premise of the debate. Within months of 
the armistice, a vast outpouring of scientific and popular treatises, articles, and 
memoirs by German journalists, professors, as well as military and civilian 
leaders, interpreted the propaganda from all sides in light of the war’s outcome, 
only to declare it a major factor in Germany’s defeat. Trying to explain why 
world opinion had been set against Germany during the war, they all con-
curred that the British had set up a giant propaganda machine within weeks 
of August 1914 and henceforth convinced a gullible world of both German war 
guilt and its atrocious warfare.208 It was foreign propaganda that had turned the 
Germans, a people once admired for their cultural and scientific achievements, 
into the “Huns.” As one observer concluded as late as 1929, “the main weapon 
206 See Sylvia Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften. Die Karriere des Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff 
(1884–1952) (Stuttgart, 2006), 56.
207 This is suggested by a comparison with the British Foreign Office; here, too, criticism had 
been mounting during the war years, but with British victory no truly substantial reforms were 
initiated; see Zara Steiner and M. L. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office Reforms, 1919–21,” The His-
torical Journal 17, no. 1 (1974): 131–156.
208 Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1932), passim.
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with which our enemies defeated us […] is and was the lie. The lie about our 
‘barbarism’, which was used to drive nearly the entire world in war against us 
[…].”209
But it was not just the “entire world.” German Conservatives in particular 
believed that Allied propaganda had also eroded the German home front’s will 
to keep on fighting. This version of history, first popularized by former mili-
tary leader Erich Ludendorff, construed the successes of enemy propaganda 
as the root of German defeat. His 1919 memoirs acknowledged the novel na-
ture of the conflict as a “people’s war” (Volkskrieg) where civilian and military 
involvement were never clearly demarcated. More than ever before, military 
success had depended on home-front morale, which the enemies, in turn, tried 
to “corrode and numb.”210 According to Ludendorff, it was only on this psy-
chological battlefield that the Allies had been victorious. After years of war-
fare, he claimed, the Allies had abandoned their hope of defeating Germany 
by military might and shifted to psychological warfare as the “primary means” 
of defeating Germany.211 In the last years of the war, the effects of the Allied 
blockade and cleverly orchestrated enemy propaganda had begun to under-
mine Germany’s “mental fitness to fight” and its belief in final victory.212 Even-
tually, external propaganda and socialist agitation from within had broken 
German spirits and roused the masses to revolution, making it impossible to 
continue the fighting on the Western front.213 Allied victory, in short, had not 
been a military but a propagandist one.214 Ludendorff ’s “propaganda legend,” as 
the historian Wolfgang Schieder has observed, thus became an integral part of 
the “stab-in-the-back” myth.215
Of course, the debate was not without criticism of Germany’s own pre-
war and wartime propaganda policies. Throughout the 1920s, a cacophony of 
voices once again lamented Imperial Germany’s initial failure to recognize how 
essential propaganda abroad was, as well as its inability to later employ it rig-
orously enough, hence preparing the ground for Allied propaganda success-
es.216 Seeing propaganda as “unsophisticated” and “un-German’,” the imperial 
209 Hermann Leitz, Schlachtfelder im Westen, 1929, 55, cited in Susanne Brandt, “Versailles auf 
den ehemaligen Schlachtfeldern im Westen,” in Versailles 1919, ed. Gerd Krumreich, 323–332, 
328.
210 Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnungen, 1; English edition: My War Memoirs 1914–1918 (Lon-
don, 1919), 2 vols., American edition: Ludendorff ’s Own Story (New York, 1920), 2 vols.
211 Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 291.
212 Ibid., 285; on his assessment of enemy and German propaganda, see 285–303.
213 Ibid., 303.
214 Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Die Propaganda als politisches Instrument (Berlin, 1921), 3.
215 Wolfgang Schieder and Christoph Dipper, “Propaganda,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 
Vol. 5, Pro–Soz, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 69–112 (Stuttgart, 
1984).
216 Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 300; Adolf Morsbach, “Die Deutsche Auslands-Kul-
turpolitik vor dem Kriege,” Hochschule und Ausland 10, no. 6 (June 1932): 3; Paul Rühlmann, 
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government, it was argued, had by and large stuck to the “truth” and never 
developed the type of striking emotive images that its less scrupulous enemies 
had skillfully used to sell the story of German atrocities to the world. While 
such lamentations rehashed long-standing criticism, German defeat cast these 
sins of omission in a much more dramatic light: German propaganda, virtually 
everyone agreed, had not just been a failure; it had been a key factor in Germa-
ny’s defeat. Put differently, Germany had not just lost the propaganda war; its 
deficient propaganda had lost the war.
While such criticism of German propaganda was not unsubstantiated, 
such oft-repeated and exaggerated claims about its insufficient, ineffective, and 
haphazard nature – and the supreme efficacy of Allied propaganda – had a 
decidedly functional character.217 Military and civic leaders as different as Er-
ich Ludendorff and Matthias Erzberger utilized their respective “propaganda 
myths” to exculpate and exonerate themselves. Moreover, the alleged lack of 
(the right sort of) German propaganda became an argument for securing fi-
nancial and administrative support for a fledgling policy field. Not surprisingly, 
those with the strongest personal or professional interest in the expansion of 
public diplomacy argued most adamantly about its earlier deficiencies.218 Fi-
nally, the “propaganda myth” defended against the idea that Germany’s actual 
deeds – not their representation – were responsible for international opinion. 
It was much easier to claim that too little had been done too late than to won-
der whether more done earlier might have yielded the same result, or to ad-
mit that even more effective German propaganda could not have changed the 
impression that Germany’s treatment of Belgian civilians or the Lusitania had 
left. These “functions” of the German debate, to be sure, hardly undermined its 
influence. Quite the contrary, it was precisely because these claims served such 
salient psychological and political needs that they enjoyed the widest currency.
In itself, the German preoccupation with propaganda was hardly unique. 
In the aftermath of the war, the subject was critically debated and scientifically 
explored around the world, engendering a “propaganda boom” in the inter-
war period.219 The psychology of the masses, the techniques of how to manip-
Kulturpropaganda. Grundsätzliche Darlegungen und Auslandsbeobachtungen (Charlottenburg, 
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ulate them, and the role of propaganda in the outcome of the Great War all 
came under scrutiny once the extent of wartime opinion-shaping attempts be-
came known.220 But while all concurred that propaganda was a highly effective 
weapon in shaping public attitudes, the national debates differed significantly 
in the lessons they drew from this insight. In Britain and the United States, the 
two countries deemed most successful in their wartime efforts, the very term 
“propaganda” fell into disrepute, its practice was disavowed, and wartime insti-
tutions were quickly dismantled.221 However, Germany took a different path. Its 
wartime experiences led policymakers to overestimate the extent to which the 
masses could be manipulated and made them determined to use this hard-won 
lesson to Germany’s advantage in the future.222 Liberals and conservatives alike 
advocated the brazen use of propaganda for the German cause and lobbied for 
German opinion-shaping efforts to be expanded, centralized, and institution-
alized to meet the challenges ahead. As the guns fell silent, publicist Paul Rühl-
mann (a former member of the Central Office for Foreign Services) argued: 
“the battle for the minds will be continued all the more actively, especially for 
the masses, for the opinions and sentiments of wider parts of the public.”223
*
The reality of the peace treaty only intensified this trend. Given worldwide 
anti-German sentiment, German observers soon realized that the Treaty of 
Versailles could not be revised without first revising negative opinions about 
Germany. Germany’s recovery and return to great power status required more 
effective communication of its positions as well as a concerted effort to over-
turn wartime judgments and tap buried sympathies. Germany would have to 
persuade the international public of the untenable nature of Versailles while 
keeping the reproaches of German war guilt, the impact of territorial losses and 
occupation, the dire fate of German minorities, and the crippling economic 
effects of Allied reparations demands before the eyes of the world. Future for-
eign minister Gustav Stresemann gave voice to a broad public consensus when 
he demanded in 1920 “that the revision of the Versailles peace [be] made the 
220 Stern-Rubarth, Die Propaganda als politisches Instrument; Wilhelm Bauer, Der Krieg und die 
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221 For British developments, see Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 79.
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Opinion in Germany in the 1920s,” in War, Violence and the Modern Condition, ed. Bernd Hüp-
pauf, 99–118 (Berlin, 1997), 107; Corey Ross, “Mass Politics and the Techniques of Leadership: 
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center of a government propaganda, which hammers the injustice perpetrated 
on Germany home into the awareness of our people, into the awareness of the 
entire world.”224 On a more positive note, Germany would have to rebuild trust 
and prestige abroad in order to exercise the little political and economic capi-
tal it still possessed. Isolated and ostracized, grappling with unexpected defeat 
and the consequences of the Versailles peace, Germans saw public diplomacy 
as a necessary tool even – in fact especially – in peacetime. If Germany was to 
rid itself of the dirt piled upon it by Allied propaganda, if it was to escape its 
isolation and push through its revisionist demands against competing Allied 
interests, it would have to learn to master the weapons of its enemies.
As the peace treaty went into effect, the constraints Germans encountered 
in most other fields of foreign policy reinforced this conviction. Though Ver-
sailles was nowhere near as devastating in the long run as German contempo-
raries liked to imagine, the Weimar Republic was forced to pursue its revision-
ist foreign policy from a tightly circumscribed position.225 Its military, political, 
and even (for the moment) its economic might had all been dismantled after 
the war, and the threat of Allied sanctions further limited its options in the 
postwar years.226 General-turned-minister Wilhelm Groener summarized con-
temporary frustration when he said, “foreign policy needs power, army, navy 
and money; we no longer have any of these.”227 In this situation, Germany’s 
intangible assets emerged as an alternative means of influence. As a wide cast 
of publicists, professors, Germandom enthusiasts, and tourist boosters pointed 
out, it was in the subtle influence exerted by German science and music, in the 
attractiveness of its historical sights and universities, and in the continued at-
tachment of millions of ethnic Germans around the world that a defeated Ger-
many still held considerable global assets. Germany needed to systematically 
manage these resources and include them in its arsenal of foreign policy tools, 
they argued, to escape the object role to which it was otherwise consigned and 
reclaim a field of active foreign policy. With the country bereft of other sources 
of power and influence, men as different as the former state secretary of for-
eign affairs Gottlieb von Jagow, the theologian and church historian Adolf von 
Harnack, and the liberal publicist Edgar Stern-Rubarth saw these intangible re-
224 Quoted in Freitag, Die Entwicklung der Amerikastudien in Berlin, 80.
225 The defeat had not been total enough to force a complete reorientation of foreign policy or 
forfeit the German position. In fact, Germany in the short-term would have to approach the 
question at stake with significantly fewer power tools in hand but could, in the long-run, hope to 
recapture its great power status, especially by recovering its economic position; see Andreas Hill-
gruber, “‘Revisionismus’: Kontinuität und Wandel in der Außenpolitik der Weimarer Republik,” 
Historische Zeitschrift 237, no. 3 (Dec. 1983): 597–621, 600.
226 On this period, see Peter Grupp, Deutsche Außenpolitik im Schatten von Versailles, zur Poli-
tik des Auswärtigen Amts vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs und der Novemberrevolution bis zum 
Inkrafttreten des Versailler Vertrags, 1918–1920 (Paderborn, 1988).
227 Quoted in Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 32.
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sources as its “only remaining weapon.”228 It was ultimately postwar Germany’s 
restricted room to maneuver on the international stage that drove the German 
government to reorient itself toward alternate foreign policy tools. Collectively, 
the experiences of World War I and the realities of defeat and peace lent weight 
to the long-standing argument of Germany’s peaceful imperialists: that effec-
tive foreign policy required effective public diplomacy.
The Schüler Reforms and Public Diplomacy
Based on these considerations, a broad public diplomacy infrastructure of de-
partments, organizations, and individuals emerged in the years after Versailles. 
Since we will encounter organizations like the Association of German Univer-
sities (est. 1920), the German Tourism Promotion Bureau (est. 1920), and the 
Deutsche Akademie (est. 1923/25) in later chapters, it seems imperative first 
to take a closer look at the transformation of official structures, especially the 
Foreign Ministry, after World War I.
Going back to the “Hamburg memorandum” of Spring 1918, the Schüler 
reforms of 1919/1920 restructured the German Foreign Ministry, adapting it 
to the demands of modern diplomacy, in general, and German defeat, in par-
ticular. There were two major principles applied in pursuing this objective. The 
first was to integrate economic and political foreign policymaking along the 
lines of earlier French reforms. The formerly predominant “political depart-
ment” – which had dealt exclusively with “high politics” – was dissolved into 
six (after 1926, three) geographical departments, which handled both politi-
cal and economic matters pertaining to distinct parts of the world. According 
to this set up, Department VI, and after 1926, Department III focused on the 
United States. In the same vein, the hitherto separate consular and diplomatic 
career paths were merged to allow more practically educated men to enter the 
diplomatic corps. For the first time in a generation, too, key diplomatic posts 
(including the ambassadorships in London and Washington) were opened up 
to “outsiders,” mainly from the business world.
A second principle applied in the reform was according greater weight to 
public diplomacy. For one, the reform strengthened and professionalized the 
Foreign Ministry’s news department, which was merged with the small press 
office of the Reich Chancellery in October 1919 to form the United Press De-
partment of the German Government (Vereinigte Presseabteilung der Reichs-
regierung). While the Foreign Ministry provided its entire staff, apparatus, and 
228 Stern-Rubarth, Propaganda, 3; Gottlieb von Jagow characteristically referred to propaganda 
“as the only feasible kind of foreign policy activity”; quoted in Friedrich Dahlhaus, Möglichkeiten 
und Grenzen auswärtiger Kultur- und Pressepolitik. Dargestellt am Beispiel der deutsch-türkischen 
Beziehungen 1914–1928 (Frankfurt, 1990), 243.
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funds, its director (the Pressechef) was appointed by and directly responsible 
to the German chancellor. Because the director presented a daily digest of the 
domestic and international press to the cabinet and Reich president and, in 
concert with them, formulated the central guidelines for Germany’s informa-
tion policy, this position linked the formation and communication of foreign 
policy for the first time. Though, in theory, the Pressechef was supposed to be a 
man (politically) close to the chancellor and appointed in line with party coa-
litions, in practice Weimar’s frequent cabinet shifts soon made it expedient to 
appoint a civil servant, commonly the director of the Foreign Ministry’s news 
department, to the post.229
The press department integrated domestic and international press policy. It 
handled routine political communication, including press communiqués and 
official statements, but also pursued “propaganda” in a narrower sense, that 
is, placing articles or creating brochures to exert indirect pressure on foreign 
governments.230 To this end, it relied heavily on the quasi-official German news 
agency Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau (WTB), championed the development 
of wireless telegraphy to break into a global, as yet uncartelized market, and 
from the late 1920s made increasing use of international radio broadcasting.231 
For the most part, however, it focused on the major medium of the time, the 
press, which it supplied with mostly accurate, if generally pro-German, news. 
Specific postwar events, such as reparations conferences, the Upper Silesian 
plebiscite, and the Ruhr occupation, generated feverish activity in the press 
department. Importantly, this department, too, was organized according to the 
geographical principle. Much of the day-to-day work was handled by six newly 
created “country desks,” which were often headed by men with long experience 
in the respective regions. In cooperation with the Foreign Ministry’s new ge-
ographical departments, they worked to suppress or elicit domestic reporting, 
to encourage or deter private initiative, and to cultivate ties to foreign news 
correspondents.232 After late 1923, this work was aided by regular international 
press conferences, which aimed as much to explain German foreign policy to 
the world as they did to cultivate the sympathy and trust of the correspond-
ents.233 All in all, the reforms of 1919 addressed earlier shortcomings by linking 
the process of policy formation and policy communication and by allowing for 
a greater degree of intercultural expertise in selling policy decisions to interna-
tional audiences.
229 On the job of the “press chief,” see Walter Zechlin, Pressechef bei Ebert, Hindenburg und 
Kopf. Erlebnisse eines Pressechefs und Diplomaten (Hanover, 1956).
230 This useful distinction between “press policy” and “propaganda” is drawn by Müller, Aus-
wärtige Pressepolitik, 19–20.
231 Evans, “‘The Path to Freedom’?.”
232 Müller, Auswärtige Pressepolitik und Propaganda, 36.
233 On the importance of American news correspondents, see Müller, Weimar im Blick der 
USA, esp. 276–326.
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This part of the reform was already significant in itself, but it was comple-
mented by a true novelty: the establishment of an independent cultural de-
partment (Kulturabteilung) to “cultivate personal and scholarly relations with 
foreign countries,” especially with Germans abroad.234 This Kulturabteilung 
integrated the small and disjointed Foreign Ministry desks hitherto devoted 
to cultural matters, including the school desk (est. 1906) and the cultural prop-
aganda desk (est. 1917), into a single department. Although it was the Foreign 
Ministry’s smallest department with a staff of only forty-five (in 1930), it, too, 
answered only to the foreign minister. Charged with the systematic manage-
ment of Germany’s remaining cultural assets, it was set up into three sections 
in 1920: (i) Germans abroad, (ii) German schools abroad and (iii) international 
artistic and scholarly relations. This structure indicates the scope of its activ-
ity235 and the priority it gave to “Germans abroad.”236 In fact, maintaining rela-
tions with Germans abroad – that is, Germandom policy – was the hallmark of 
German cultural diplomacy in the interwar period. Usually conducted through 
private or semiofficial groups, it aimed to keep alive the ethnic identity of mil-
lions of “Germans abroad” by funneling economic and cultural aid to German 
minorities.237 In many respects, German schools abroad, the Kulturabteilung’s 
second section, was initially merely a subfield of Germandom policy. Since 
ethnic survival depended on language maintenance, the reconstruction of 
Germany’s severely diminished international school system attracted a great 
deal of attention and funding. During the 1920s, half of the Kulturabteilung’s 
budget was earmarked for this field.238 In contrast, the cultivation of artistic 
and scholarly relations, and nonethnic groups more broadly, initially remained 
underdeveloped.
234 See Kurt Düwell, “Die Gründung der Kulturpolitischen Abteilung im Auswärtigen Amt 
1919/20 als Neuansatz,” in Deutsche Auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871, ed. Düwell and Link, 
46–61.
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Matters regarding Germans abroad and German minorities; Protestant churches and missions 
(…); Kult W General cultural policy; scientific relations; relations to the League of Nations, insti-
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S German schools abroad (Soehring); Kult C Fine arts, applied arts, art exhibitions abroad, mu-
sic, theater, art congresses, film, sport (Sievers); Kult E emigration, inquiries about people and 
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237 Fritz von Twardowski, Anfänge deutscher Kulturpolitik zum Ausland (Bonn/Bad Godesberg, 
1970), 15.
238 Zu IIId 343 [Soehring] AA, R 64852; within ten years of the war, German schools were again 
frequented by 68,000 pupils and by 1933 the number of German schools had been almost dou-
bled (to 1,600) over prewar numbers. Entwurf zu der Rede des Herrn Reichsministers betreffend 
die Aufgaben der Abteilung VI, June 10, 1930, PA R 61125.
Culture, Propaganda, and Transatlantic Relations, 1902–1921 114
While scholars have rightly seen the founding of the cultural department 
as a reorientation of German foreign policy, they have overstated contempo-
raries’ readiness to decouple cultural policy from immediate political needs.239 
It would take years for press and cultural policy to become more clearly demar-
cated, and throughout the 1920s the Wilhelmstrasse’s two public diplomacy de-
partments worked closely together, with considerable overlap in both mission 
and personnel.240 Indeed, the Kulturabteilung was generally envisioned only as 
a longer-term and subtler complement to a news-oriented press policy. As the 
war had shown, specific German positions had only limited resonance without 
a larger sympathetic climate, that “predisposition of the heart.” As the Foreign 
Ministry’s state secretary perceptively noted in 1921, cultural relations had to be 
repaired before political relations could be improved: “As long as the boycott 
[of German science] persists, the intellectual elites of the former belligerents 
will never be able to leave the war psychosis behind; the war will be continued 
in the cultural field, and there will be no positive response to a policy of con-
ciliation.”241
*
Despite all that has been said, public diplomacy did not immediately emerge 
as a central field of foreign policy. As a relatively new field of state activity, 
cultural and even press policies were quite low down in the Wilhelmstrasse’s 
internal pecking order. For a long time, the cultural department remained a 
“stepchild” of the Foreign Service, its existence a source of bewilderment rather 
than inspiration to German diplomats.242 This was partly due to the novelty of 
the field, its distance from prestigious “high politics,” and its origins in the un-
loved Schüler reforms.243 But especially during the early 1920s, it also reflected 
the priorities of a foreign policy in dire need of immediate successes, which 
cultural diplomacy, in particular, could never deliver. This low regard was re-
flected in the Kulturabteilung’s staff profiles. Unlike other Foreign Ministry de-
partments, where up to 40 percent of staff still had an aristocratic background, 
239 Volkhard Laitenberger, “Organisations- und Strukturprobleme der Auswärtigen Kulturpoli-
tik und des akademischen Austauschs in den 20er und 30er Jahren,” in Deutsche Auswärtige 
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240 Friedrich Heilbron, for example, served as the director of the press and the cultural depart-
ment in the 1920s.
241 AA to Nadolny (Stockholm), Apr. 28, 1921, PA R 64979.
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243 Many diplomats were opposed to the reforms, especially because they were initiated from 
the outside; as Jagow complained to Bernstorff: “now they want to ‘reform’ the Foreign Service. 
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the cultural and press departments were staffed almost exclusively with “bour-
geois experts.”244 This indicated their unattractiveness to young men with the 
strongest sense of professional prestige and the personal connections to avoid 
unappealing assignments. And while the 1920s did see bourgeois experts as-
cend into the highest echelons of the diplomatic corps, they usually came from 
other departments.245 Unsurprisingly, ambitious young diplomats were reluc-
tant to serve in a department that seemed like a dead end to their careers and 
whose overall usefulness they may have doubted.
And still, no matter how poorly German diplomats regarded public diplo-
macy internally, they were determined to approach cultural and press matters 
with the same exclusivity they applied to foreign affairs more generally. By the 
end of the decade, the Foreign Ministry had won a series of interministerial turf 
wars and had slowly assumed responsibility for a field that had previously been 
the primary domain of the Prussian Ministry of Culture.246 In Foreign Min-
ister Gustav Stresemann (1923–1929), public diplomacy, including its cultural 
variant, found a strong champion. Convinced of the importance of cultural 
power for German Weltgeltung, he helped nearly triple the Kulturabteilung’s 
budget from 2,997,000 marks to 8,250,000 marks and felt it was the prerogative 
of the Foreign Ministry to “encourage the natural growth of Germany’s cultural 
influence and make it useful to foreign policy.”247 The following chapters will 
explore how this ambition was realized in the 1920s.
*
Since the turn of the century, the place of public opinion in foreign policymak-
ing had changed profoundly – and this change accelerated dramatically during 
World War I. By demonstrating the impact of international perception on for-
eign affairs, the events of that period had precipitated a reorientation toward 
public diplomacy that inspired both substantial private initiative and the over-
haul of the Foreign Service. Under the conditions of Germany’s defeat, new 
attention was put into managing public relations to substitute for traditional 
means of conducting foreign policy that were not available at the time. It was 
244 See Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 99.
245 See Peter Krüger, “Struktur, Organisation und außenpolitische Wirkungsmöglichkeiten der 
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246 On these administrative quarrels, see PA R 60795.
247 For an overview of funds, see Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 100; the 
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1924 2,997,000; 1925 3,300,000; 1926 4,700,000; 1927 6,000,000; 1928 6,000,000; 1929 8,250,000; 
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the combination of wartime failures and postwar imperatives that institution-
alized state-funded public diplomacy. For the Weimar Republic – partly out 
of conviction, partly out of necessity – “soft power” became a proxy for “hard 
power” and, as we will see, this was nowhere more true than in the United 
States.
Chapter 3  
Obstacles and New Beginnings, 1921–1924
Fig . 5: Zeppelin over New York 
City, 1928, Bundesarchiv, Georg 
Pahl, Bild 102–06709
On October 13, 1924, New Yorkers awoke to the sight of a 150-me-ter-long silver cone hovering above their city. The German zeppelin “ZR3” was circling over Manhattan, the spectacle drawing ever larger 
crowds onto the streets. A masterpiece of engineering, it was not only among 
the largest airships ever built; it was also the first to cross the Atlantic. As be-
fitted such a technological feat, its German crew was welcomed to New York 
City with a confetti parade and went on an extended tour across the United 
States. The American press, which for a decade had been reluctant to praise any 
German accomplishment, was full of stories about this transatlantic crossing’s 
daring and technical ingenuity. Like Prince Heinrich two decades earlier, air-
ship commander Hugo Eckener was enthusiastically fêted by American politi-
cal and business elites across the country – so much so that it was rumored that 
he would become Germany’s next ambassador to Washington. U.S. president 
Calvin Coolidge emphasized the event as a sign of the complete restoration of 
peaceful relations between the two countries;1 the German press hailed it as a 
day of national resurgence. The German consul general in Chicago declared it 
“an act of propaganda (for Germany) in the very best sense of the word.”2 In 
popular imagination and public rhetoric, the flight of the zeppelin marked the 
end of the postwar period in German-American relations.
1 Content of telegram to Eckener as cited in German diplomatic correspondence, German Em-
bassy Washington to AA, Oct. 16, 1924, PA R 80136.
2 Consulate General Chicago to AA, Nov. 13, 1924, “Betrifft Führer des ZR-3 Dr. Hugo Eck-
ener,” PA R 80136.
Obstacles and New Beginnings, 1921–1924118
This widespread impression was not entirely misplaced. The zeppelin’s 
flight came at the tail end of a period of unprecedented distress for the German 
Republic. Only the previous year, French and Belgian troops had occupied the 
industrial Ruhr district to force Germany to make reparations payments, and 
Germany’s subsequent policy of passive resistance as well as the ensuing hyper-
inflation had brought it to the brink of social, political, and economic disinte-
gration. By the fall of 1923, the republic was under attack from radical forces on 
the left and right, its people hopeless and hungry, its currency worthless. One 
year later, however, things were looking up. Many of the issues that had over-
shadowed German-American relations in the five years after Versailles had, 
at least for the moment, been resolved. In early 1923, America had withdrawn 
its last occupation troops from the banks of the Rhine, and the U. S. Congress 
had released all confiscated German property valued at under $10,000. More 
importantly, American involvement had brought the reparations conflict to a 
preliminary conclusion in early 1924. At the London Conference in August that 
year, American representatives had pushed for the adoption of a settlement 
that tied German reparations annuities to the country’s ability to pay, which 
was to be determined by an independent American agent for reparations. This 
step helped depoliticize the reparations question, shielded Germany from 
French sanctions, and cleared the way for American loans. Though America’s 
interest in an economically and politically stable Europe and not any special 
sympathy for Germany drove the country to get involved financially, this took 
place in a public climate that had lost much of its bitterness toward Germany. 
By the fall of 1924, while the cultural and moral blockade against Germany had 
not disappeared altogether, it had at least crumbled considerably.
German public diplomacy made only a modest contribution to this nor-
malization of transatlantic relations. Though German representatives could 
be trusted to use occasions like the arrival of the airship to generate favorable 
publicity, they capitalized on random opportunities more than on systematic 
efforts. While Germany rediscovered softer forms of outreach as a valuable 
substitute for its failed wartime propaganda strategies, it struggled to develop, 
let alone implement, a constructive public diplomacy agenda in the postwar 
years. Nevertheless, as the next chapters of this book will illustrate, the mid-
1920s witnessed a veritable explosion of cultural initiatives directed at the 
United States. It is the purpose of this chapter then, to solve this apparent puz-
zle of why so little happened before 1924 and so much thereafter. With this in 
mind, I explain in this chapter (i) why and to what extent Germany committed 
to cultural diplomacy toward the United States, (ii) how it rebuilt transatlantic 
networks, and (iii) why these developments did not make themselves felt until 
the mid-1920s.
Many studies gloss over the developments of the early 1920s. They assert 
that Germany developed a new commitment to cultural diplomacy after the 
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Great War but that it did not truly implement cultural diplomatic measures be-
cause the field was novel, there were tremendous political pressures at the time, 
and funds were lacking. Accordingly, the early 1920s are often treated as a pe-
riod that – apart from its retarding effect – had little long-term impact on how 
and why German cultural diplomacy programs developed as they did. But the 
opposite is true. The early 1920s proved crucial to the form and organization 
of German policies after 1924, at least with regard to the United States. They 
generated interest in certain fields (and not others) and saw the emergence of 
new actors on both sides of the Atlantic. If we want to understand the devel-
opment of German cultural diplomacy and the emergence of characteristics 
that have often remained seminal up to today, the early 1920s are of paramount 
importance.
The United States and Public Diplomacy: The German “Propaganda Problem”
In light of the foreign policy significance of American opinions on Germany 
(Chapter 1), Germans began to make observations about the state of U. S. sym-
pathies and to debate how to influence U. S. attitudes almost immediately after 
the armistice. But whereas few doubted the necessity of winning over Ameri-
cans, they did not know how to go about doing so. Consequently, an acrimoni-
ous and sometimes contradictory public discussion ensued in the early 1920s.
German difficulties in this field arose largely from postwar American sen-
sitivity, “almost to the point of obsession” (as a British observer remarked) 
about all attempts to influence public opinion.3 Having been the primary target 
of German, British, French, and, in the end, their own government’s wartime 
propaganda, Americans objected to the many real and imagined attempts to 
shape how they thought and felt about the world in the 1920s. Rather than 
subsiding, this opposition only grew stronger over the course of the decade 
because Americans began to question the role that propaganda had played in 
their attitudes toward the war.4 Subscribing to the widespread assumption that 
public opinion could be manipulated at will if only the right kind of technique 
were used, American isolationists eventually blamed Allied propagandists for 
3 Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 68.
4 The many studies on the subject that appeared in the interwar period were especially influen-
tial in this regard. See, e. g., George Creel, How We Advertised America (1920); Walter Lippmann’s 
trilogy on public opinion: Liberty and the News (1920), Public Opinion (1922), and The Phantom 
Public (1925); Edward Bernays’s works Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), and Propaganda 
(1928); Harold Laswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927); Arthur Ponsonby, False-
hood in Wartime (1928); George Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (1930); J. D. Squires, British 
Propaganda at Home and in the U. S. 1914–17 (1935); and H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War: 
The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914–1917 (1939).
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having “duped” Americans into the war.5 In the United States, as Lee Huebner 
has remarked, “publicity, the hope of the Progressive Era, became propaganda, 
the scourge of the Twenties.”6
While Americans, in the end, were contemptuous of all propaganda, in-
cluding Allied and American campaigns, they initially directed their ire most 
toward the former enemy. In contrast to Allied agitation efforts, which had re-
lied strongly on the unobtrusive power of the British news empire and elite net-
works, Germany’s clumsy propaganda had been highly visible. Moreover, long 
after German propaganda activities had ceased, American patriotic groups and 
official propagandists continued to draw on fears of German subversion to mo-
bilize a reluctant, heterogeneous society for war.7 The bogeyman of “German 
propaganda” helped justify the suspension of civil liberties in the Espionage 
Act of 1917 as well as America’s own comprehensive and successful propaganda 
operations.8 American paranoia about foreign influences continued after the 
armistice. As late as February 1919, the U. S. Congress conducted a sensational 
inquiry into the workings of German propaganda, which kept Germany’s al-
leged conspiracies in the headlines just as the “Red Scare” once again height-
ened American fears of outside interference. Throughout the 1920s, even the 
most innocent German actions could–and would–rekindle American fears of 
German propaganda.
In this climate, all Germans who were well acquainted with the United 
States saw that any return to a more assertive German propaganda, such as 
the mass distribution of print material or agitation among German Amer-
icans, seemed out of the question. Based on wartime lessons and a realistic 
assessment of Germany’s postwar position, Berlin’s new “America experts,” like 
Walther Drechsler (the wartime director of the Amerika-Institut, who joined 
the Foreign Ministry’s press department in 1918) and Karl Alexander Fuehr 
(the former head of the German propaganda office in New York, who now 
worked in the new America department), strongly advised against any such 
agitation. German propaganda, they noted, had not only failed to sway Amer-
icans in Germany’s favor but had heightened suspicions against it. As early 
as November 1920, the America desk of the press department referred to any 
“unauthorized propaganda” in the United States as “extremely unwelcome, if 
not outright dangerous.” Given the high degree of American nativism in the 
5 For an early example of that famous theory, see Philip Francis, The Poison in America’s Cup 
(New York, 1919).
6 L. W. Huebner, quoted in Daniela Rossini, “Censorship in World War I: The Action of Wilson’s 
Committee on Public Information,” in Political Repression in U. S. History, ed. Cornelis van Min-
nen and Sylvia Hilton, 103–16 (Amsterdam, 2009), 114.
7 According to their portrayals, the “tentacles of the German octopus” reached into America’s 
every nook and cranny; Earl E. Sperry, The Tentacles of the German Octopus in America (New 
York, 1917).
8 Creel, How We Advertised America, 9.
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postwar years, this applied especially to any political agitation among German 
Americans. Any “meddling in the domestic affairs of the Union,” the report 
made clear, would alienate the American administration and public.9 In June 
1921, the Foreign Ministry once more outlined the tight parameters govern-
ing all German opinion-shaping attempts in the United States to the Office of 
the Reich President: German propaganda could not be officially organized nor 
could it appear to aim to estrange the United States from its former Allies or 
at the political mobilization of German Americans.10 In other words, as the 
Foreign Ministry’s “America experts” pointed out, any propaganda Berlin had 
hitherto considered worthwhile was more likely to arouse than to mitigate hos-
tility toward Germany.
And yet, while wartime experience advised against German propaganda, 
the political reality seemed to require some attempts at shaping American 
opinion. Given the urgency of the reparations question, the “wait and see” ap-
proach many of Germany’s “America experts” would have preferred was simply 
inadequate. If Germany’s fate hinged on American public opinion, then how 
could Berlin forego what many contemporaries considered the “one weapon 
remaining to us”?
Two factors, in particular, called for something more than a hands-off 
approach. For one, Germany’s key political rival, France, was undertaking an 
alarming number of opinion-shaping activities. Since France, too, was depend-
ent on American goodwill and capital to rebuild its economy, avoid collection 
of its war debt, and enforce the peace treaty, French policymakers and pri-
vate organizations had begun to think about how to retain America’s fragile 
wartime sympathies as soon as the armistice was signed.11 To this end, they 
adopted what the historian Robert Young has called “a broadly cultural course 
of action.”12 The resurgent interest in France as a tourist destination, the appeal 
of French universities to American students, and the frequent commemora-
tions of wartime events offered such groups ample opportunity for promoting 
France and French culture to America’s elites. Working primarily through bi-
lateral friendship organizations like the France-America Society and Franco-
phile Americans, like heiress Anne Morgan (the daughter of J. P. Morgan), they 
sought to remind Americans of their erstwhile brotherhood in arms, the sac-
rifices French people had made, and Germany’s “unreconstructed” attitudes. 
With a curious mixture of admiration and alarm, the German embassy in Paris 
described French cultural propaganda as “a most elaborate network that spans 
9 Note referring to VI A. V. 877 Nov. 3, 1920, PA R 80287.
10 AA to Office of the Reich President, June 10, 1921, PA R 80293.
11 William Keylor, “How They Advertised France. The French Propaganda Campaign in the 
United States During the Break Up of the Franco-American Entente, 1918–1923,” Diplomatic 
History 17, no. 3 (July 1993): 351–373.
12 Young, Marketing Marianne, 102.
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the entire globe down to its remotest corners.”13 And though the French them-
selves liked to describe their work as “intercultural interpretation,” German 
observers thought of it as near-Machiavellian. “In the end,” publicist Paul Rühl-
mann (a former member of the Central Office for Foreign Services) noted in 
1919, “French cultural propaganda is not pure, real cultural propaganda, but 
power politics under the cloak of cultural policy, often so skillfully draped that 
its true purpose, global dominance, is hardly discernible.”14 Indeed, observing 
French mastery in the field became something of a German obsession in the 
interwar years, serving as both a motivation and yardstick for Germany’s own 
efforts in the United States.
Yet French competition was not the only factor. There was also a clear need 
for the German government to exert greater control over renegade German 
propagandists. Militant revisionist groups regularly ignored the official pol-
icy of caution and advocated a forceful propaganda campaign among Amer-
icans in general and German Americans in particular.15 German-American 
propagandists themselves, like poet and publicist George Sylvester Viereck, 
also resumed their work on behalf of the German cause shortly after the war, 
organizing mass rallies to protest German war guilt and the so-called Black 
Horror, i. e., the French use of colonial troops in the occupation of the Rhine-
land.16 Regardless of how German diplomats evaluated Viereck’s overall objec-
tive, the methods he employed were clearly detrimental to the German cause 
because they kept alive fears of “German propaganda.”17 As informed observ-
ers like Austrian professor Josef Redlich or Wilhelm Cuno, director of the 
HAPAG and future German chancellor, explained to German diplomats in the 
spring of 1921, “America wants no propaganda of that kind, at least no German 
13 German Embassy, Paris to AA, Dec. 17, 1921, “Französische Propaganda,” PA R 60430; Ger-
man Embassy, Paris, to AA, No. 407, Mar. 21, 1925, “Französische Propaganda,” PA R 60447; on 
the importance of French competition to the development of German cultural diplomacy in the 
United States, see Elisabeth Piller, “The Transatlantic Dynamics of European Cultural Diplo-
macy: Germany, France and the Battle for U. S. Affections In the 1920s,” Contemporary European 
History, forthcoming 2021.
14 Rühlmann, Kulturpropaganda, 15.
15 “Zur Deutsch-Amerikanischen Annäherung,” Der Reichsbote, Apr. 25, 1922; Edmund von 
Mach, “Eine politische Organisation von Amerikanern deutschen Stammes?,” Der Ausland-
deutsche 3, no. 16 (Aug. 1920): 481–482; Fritz Heinz Reimesch, “Erwachendes Deutsches Leben 
in Nordamerika,” Germania, Nov. 10, 1921; “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner finden sich,” Volk und 
Heimat 2, no. 6 (Apr. 1921): 64–65; Aufzeichnung (Noebel), VI A 263, Feb. 16, 1922, PA R 60104.
16 Niel M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist (DeKalb, IL, 
1972).
17 Throughout the early 1920s, German representatives in the United States repeatedly bore the 
brunt of the State Department’s indignation as it complained about abrasive German propa-
ganda arriving on American shores. German Embassy, Washington (Lang) to AA, Apr. 24 1922, 
PA R 80294.
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propaganda.”18 These developments reinforced the central lesson that German 
officials had drawn from the war: public diplomacy had to be carried out by 
“responsible” circles acquainted with foreign psychology and willing to work 
within the Foreign Ministry’s “yet to be determined framework.”19
This question of American sentiment came to a head in the spring of 1921. 
The gridlock in the reparations negotiations, the political threat of the French 
campaign, the problematic nature of renegade propaganda operations, and 
America’s ever clearer political withdrawal from Europe necessitated a more 
constructive course of action to solve one basic dilemma: how to win Ameri-
can hearts and minds without arousing American suspicions. In this context, 
Germany began, tacitly at least, to consider cultural diplomacy a distinct policy 
option.
*
Before I delve into some of the efforts German authorities made toward this 
end, I must admit that their immediate response to the propaganda prob-
lem was not cultural diplomacy but to try and avoid the appearance of “Ger-
man propaganda.” In the spring of 1921, the Foreign Ministry established and 
funded several “front organizations” to coordinate and expand existing revi-
sionist initiatives and reverse world opinion on the peace treaty.20 The most 
important of these, the Working Committee of German Associations (Arbeit-
sausschuß Deutscher Verbände) served as an umbrella organization for a vast 
number of revisionist groups (about 2,000 by 1930), which it used to channel 
German outrage over territorial losses, the war guilt verdict, the “Black Hor-
ror,” and reparations payments into one effective “people’s movement” against 
Versailles. Large demonstrations, publications, and lecture tours aimed to keep 
domestic indignation alive, thereby generating broad popular support – and 
hence democratic legitimacy – for Germany’s revisionist demands abroad.21 
Importantly, however, organizations like the Arbeitsauschuß did more than re-
hash Germany’s wartime methods in the disguise of a nonstate actor. Aware of 
18 German Embassy, London to AA, Apr. 27, 1921, “Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten,” 
PA R 80132; and letter by Cuno to Dr. Hasselmann, May 25, 1921 (copy), PA R 80132.
19 Note referring to VI A. V. 87, Nov. 3, 1920, PA R 80287.
20 Addressing a range of revisionist issues, they were particularly active in the agitation against 
German war guilt, generally understood as the most significant stumbling block to Germany’s 
moral rehabilitation. On the scientific Zentralstelle für die Erforschung der Kriegsschuldfrage 
(Center for the Study of the War Guilt Question) and the more popular Arbeitsausschuß 
deutscher Verbände (Working Committee of German Associations), see Herman Wittgens, “The 
German Foreign Office Campaign against the Versailles Treaty: An Examination of the Activities 
of the Kriegsschuldreferat in the United States” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1970).
21 For a good overview of the recent literature and the tensions within the Black Horror-cam-
paign, see Roos, “Nationalism, Racism and Propaganda in Early Weimar Germany.”
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the deficiencies of previous propaganda efforts, the Arbeitsausschuß purpose-
fully departed from the “old type of [brochure] propaganda.” Instead, it sys-
tematically built ties with respectable interlocutors abroad, including church 
organizations, women’s groups, and historians, especially in the United States, 
who would then serve as a “ferment” for Germany’s revisionist ideas.22 This 
reorientation toward ostensibly private initiatives thus went hand in hand with 
an emphasis on quieter, less obtrusive contacts with multiplier groups.23 Be-
hind this shift stood the realization that overt propagandizing, even with no 
obvious state imprint, stood little chance of success with the American public.24
This explains, too, the growing official support for reestablishing cultural 
relations with the United States. The discussions on the fate of the Ameri-
ka-Institut in Berlin in 1921 provide a window onto the motives and ideas that 
shaped this debate. Founded in 1910 as a clearinghouse for transatlantic aca-
demic relations, the Amerika-Institut was almost the sole survivor of Wilhelm-
ine Amerikapolitik. By mid-1921, the Institut’s desolate financial situation made 
it necessary to clarify its future. Trying to garner Reich support, Karl Oscar 
Bertling, the Institut’s Harvard-trained director since mid-1919, presented its 
publication exchange with the Library of Congress (which had been resumed 
in late 1920) as a stepping stone for the Institut’s actual work: the cultivation of 
American academic elites in Germany’s interest. Bertling submitted a memo-
randum to Foreign Minister Friedrich Rosen in July 1921, emphasizing that the 
Institut’s cultural liaison work was particularly important because it accessed 
American opinion-shapers in a “politically unassailable way.”25 Bernhard 
Dernburg, who had directed Germany’s wartime propaganda office in New 
York until 1915, seconded the Amerika-Institut’s interpretation and declared it 
a “very valuable cultural bridge (…) and a welcome opportunity to resume or 
establish – in a politically unassailable form – ties with influential circles in the 
United States.”26 Bernstorff, the former ambassador to Washington, likewise 
stressed the Amerika-Institut’s role as a “not to be underestimated substitute” 
for the “almost hopeless” endeavor of “open propaganda.”27 More than any new 
22 This strategy is outlined in “Erweiterung der deutschen Volksbewegung für die Revision von 
Versailles zur Weltbewegung,” Arbeitsausschuß deutscher Verbände, May 1922, 14; BArch R 43-
I/227; on this reorientation, see also Gärtner, Botschafterin des Guten Willens, 72.
23 Wittgens, “The German Foreign Office Campaign,” 49.
24 A mass rally against the black horror organized by George Sylvester Viereck in Madison 
Square Garden provoked the ire of the U. S. State Department and immediate counter-demon-
strations by the American Legion. Even generally German-friendly, liberal magazines turned 
emphatically against German exaggerations; see Nelson, “Black Horror on the Rhine,” 621.
25 Amerika-Institut, Arbeitsprogramm des Amerika-Instituts, July 28 1921, PA R 64997.
26 See the documents reprinted in Siegfried Grundmann, Einsteins Akte. Einsteins Jahre in 
Deutschland aus der Sicht der deutschen Politik (Berlin, 1998), 97.
27 IX D 2417 Schmidt-Ott to AA, May 4 1921, PA R 64997.
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institution, he believed, the Amerika-Institut could help re-establish for Ger-
many a measure of trust and influence in the United States.28
The fact that two Reich ministries financially committed to the Ameri-
ka-Institut in November 1921 signaled their basic agreement with such ideas. 
Both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior agreed to support 
the Amerika-Institut for the next five years. While inflation soon rendered this 
financial arrangement meaningless, its true significance lay in the Reich’s long-
term commitment to advancing cultural relations with the United States.29 
Though the Amerika-Institut officially remained under the aegis of the Prus-
sian Ministry of Culture, its relations with the Foreign Ministry were close. 
The Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung was represented on the Amerika-In-
stitut’s board of trustees and in the early 1920s even “apprenticed” its attachés 
to the Amerika-Institut.30 After 1920, the Amerika-Institut’s former director, 
Walther Drechsler, headed the America desk in the Foreign Ministry’s press 
department, while Bertling, whom a friend later described as a “walking di-
rectory,” informally advised the Wilhelmstrasse on American intellectual and 
cultural life.31 In hosting American scholars during their stay in Germany, the 
Amerika-Institut frequently assumed quasi-diplomatic functions that German 
officials would or could not undertake themselves. By supporting the Ameri-
ka-Institut in 1921, German officials took a clear step toward subtler, cultural 
means of influence in the United States.
Nevertheless, the importance of this step should not be overstated. For one, 
the support was not as emphatic as one might have expected given the broader 
lessons of the war. As noted above, the authorities paid the greatest attention, 
both materially and morally, to the groups that had a clear revisionist agenda. 
The Foreign Ministry and peaceful revisionists like Dernburg or Bernstorff did 
not believe that the Amerika-Institut and similar programs had value in them-
selves so much as they “substituted” for the “real” propaganda they could no 
longer engage in on account of American suspicions. Moreover, this reorienta-
tion toward cultural outreach was neither unique nor, seen in a wider European 
context, novel. In the propaganda-hostile climate of the United States in the 
1920s, Britain and France settled on similar strategies to retain American elites’ 
wartime sympathies. Aware of American sensitivity, the British, in particular, 
quickly dismantled their most overt wartime propaganda machinery only to 
28 Amerika-Institut to Foreign Minister Rosen, July 27 1921, “Die Tätigkeit des Amerika-Insti-
tutes zu Berlin,” PA R 80516.
29 Abschrift zu UIK Nr. 2047.1. Niederschrift über das Ergebnis der Sitzung im Amerika-Insti-
tut v. 6. 10. 1921; R 64997 zu IX A 415, Abt VI, Feb. 4, 1921 [handwritten note].
30 For one example, see Amerika-Institut to AA, Tgb-Nr. 1453/23, June 8, 1923, PA R 65519.
31 Heinrich Albert to Ernst Hanfstaengl (ca. 1945/46), Ana 405 Nachlass Ernst Hanfstaengl, 
Box 45, Korrespondenz Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
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replace them with subtler forms of cultural outreach and information policy.32 
Arguably, the enthusiasm for transatlantic cultural exchanges in the interwar 
period primarily expressed Europeans’ desire to shape American opinions, and 
the necessity of doing so in the least offensive way. And while such a “broadly 
cultural course” might have constituted a novelty in other countries, in Ger-
man-American relations (as Chapter 2 has shown) it enjoyed a comparatively 
long tradition. Apart from greater diplomatic involvement, the early 1920s ini-
tially seemed more like a return to the subdued strategies of prewar days than 
an actual departure toward cultural diplomacy with different modes, actors, 
and objectives. Rather, as will be shown below, this actual departure took place 
only in response to the adversities of the postwar period.
“A Particularly Menacing Piece of German Intrigue and Propaganda” : 
German Cultural Diplomacy and the Long Shadow of the War
In the postwar years, German culture did not prove to be the valuable asset 
publicists and politicians had imagined it to be. While the Amerika-Institut, 
for example, resumed some of its basic functions, the German government’s 
tacit commitment to a “cultural approach” in the United States translated into 
few concrete initiatives, let alone concerted ones. A lack of “energy and inspi-
ration” among German officials and severe financial constraints were certainly 
to blame.33 But in the case of America, Germany also faced a unique set of 
constraints and obstacles to luring Americans back into its cultural domain: 
the relatively long period until a separate peace treaty was signed, American 
contempt for German Kultur and pervasive nativist paranoia, and, not least, 
the strong disappointment among many educated Germans concerning Amer-
ican wartime behavior.
32 Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 69; one example of this reorientation is the British Library of 
Information in New York, which opened in the fall of 1919. By providing reference material on 
Britain and keeping contacts with American journalists and academics, it tried to shape the Brit-
ish image in the United States while avoiding the semblance of propaganda for the next twenty 
years: David A. Lincove, “The British Library of Information in New York: A Tool of British 
Foreign Policy, 1919–42,” Libraries and the Cultural Record 46, no. 2 (2011): 156–184, 159; on the 
British Library of Information’s role as a monitoring tool for the British Foreign Office, see B. J. C. 
McKercher, “The British Diplomatic Service in the United States and the Chamberlain Foreign 
Office’s Perceptions of Domestic America, 1924–1927: Images, Reality and Diplomacy,” in 
Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895–1939, ed. B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss, 
221–247 (Edmonton, 1984).
33 Schröder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 213; von 
Twardowski, Anfänge deutscher Kulturpolitik zum Ausland, 13; the Foreign Ministry limited 
 itself to supporting more or less random opportunities such as occasional transatlantic trips, 
 often calculated for short-term (propagandistic) gain.
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For one, Germany was quite simply unprepared. Because the few plans re-
gading cultural diplomacy that it had developed during the war had all been 
premised on German victory, they now proved useless in the postwar reality. In 
the United States, moreover, efforts to salvage Germany’s image were compli-
cated by the lack of a peace treaty between the two nations. Not until July 1921 
did President Harding officially end the state of war, and only on November 
11, 1921 – exactly three years after the armistice – did a separate peace treaty 
officially restore “friendly relations.” The long period of uncertainty preceding 
this peace affected transatlantic relations on many levels. Though commercial 
relations were re-established relatively swiftly, many Americans still felt uneasy 
about visiting, studying or doing business in a country they were not officially 
at peace with yet.34 While Germans were not overly pessimistic about this de-
velopment – hoping in vain that the delay might result in a separate, more leni-
ent peace agreement – it effectively put the return to transatlantic “normalcy” 
on hold until late 1921.
The economic impact of inflation on German cultural endeavors was even 
more serious. Just when Germany decided to make more systematic use of its 
soft power assets, their foundation was crumbling. This was particularly no-
ticeable in the academic and scientific fields, where inflation had eroded uni-
versity and institute budgets to produce a much-discussed “distress of German 
science and scholarship” (Not der deutschen Wissenschaft).35 With inflation, 
chemicals, laboratory equipment, paper, and books became increasingly un-
affordable, hampering scientists and scholars from conducting and publishing 
their research. Access to international publications, in particular, declined dra-
matically.36 Many students found it challenging just to continue their studies 
as their parents’ wealth and income melted away. What gave the “distress of 
German science and scholarship” such resonance in postwar Germany was not 
that inflation affected universities and research institutions more than, say, mu-
seums, but that these cultural organizations had been assigned a crucial role in 
Germany’s resurgence. Their prostration at the time of the fatherland’s greatest 
need was widely seen as a national “tragedy.”37 The Foreign Ministry’s Kultu-
rabteilung summed up the situation in 1922: “Today, when we depend more 
than ever on righting wrong perceptions abroad, which lie at the bottom of all 
34 Aufzeichnung, Oct. 31, 1922 [Abt B], PA R 65519.
35 On the “distress of German science and scholarship” and its various manifestations, see Edu-
ard Wildhagen, “Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft,” Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissen-
schaft, Kunst und Technik 15, no. 1 (Oct. 1920): 1–33.
36 The Prussian State Library subscribed to 2,300 international publications before the war but 
subscribed to only 140 in 1920; Georg Schreiber, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der 
geistigen Arbeiter. Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Reiches (Leizpig, 1923), 20.
37 It was, as Schreiber noted, the “tragedy of German science that it experiences its greatest 
distress in the very moment when its greatest tasks are before it.” Schreiber in Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Reichstags Bd. 357, 267, Sitzung, Nov. 15, 1922, 8995 D.
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international measures against us, today, the German Wissenschaftler not only 
continuously reduces his everyday relations with neutral countries but is un-
able to regain ground in former enemy countries, where, after emotions quiet 
down, old doors are opening again.”38 Though the German government and ac-
ademic circles took steps to keep German science and scholarship afloat – such 
as founding the Emergency Society of German Science (Notgemeinschaft der 
deutschen Wissenschaft) in 1920 – German Wissenschaft had difficulty assum-
ing its designated role for the time being.39
Similar financial constraints negatively affected all levels of Weimar’s incip-
ient cultural diplomacy. The funds available for cultural affairs in the Wilhelm-
strasse were usually earmarked for a few important budget items (especially 
the maintenance of German schools abroad), making other measures difficult 
to finance and justify in light of the genuine material distress in Germany.40 
The Amerika-Institut frankly admitted that it was regarded as a “luxury” of 
imperial days.41 Still, the lack of funds should not be overemphasized as the 
major retarding element, at least with regard to the United States. Up to about 
mid-1922, there was usually financial support for endeavors with a clear and 
promising strategy. Accordingly, the government distributed funds with rela-
tive largesse to German war guilt propagandists and for rebuilding the German 
school system abroad.
What most hampered German efforts was not a lack of funds but the ex-
perience of the war. Whereas German cultural diplomats could rely on prewar 
blueprints for rebuilding cultural infrastructures and influence in other coun-
tries, the war had so profoundly altered German-American relations that a re-
turn to Germany’s earlier Amerikapolitik soon proved to be out of the question. 
France, for example, was able to build liberally on the momentum of wartime 
cooperation with the United States. By contrast, Germany was forced to fight 
an uphill battle against the long shadow of the war, which had left Americans 
with deep resentments and many unpleasant memories.
Only slowly did German officials realize just how difficult it would be to 
re-establish transatlantic relations in the field of culture. In the United States, 
the fight against the German enemy had ultimately turned into a fight against 
German culture, and the driving forces behind this cultural assault long out-
38 Aufzeichnung, Oct. 31, 1922 [Kult B], PA R 65519.
39 On the Notgemeinschaft, see Ulrich Marsch, Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. 
Gründung und frühe Geschichte 1920–1925 (Frankfurt, 1994); and Notker Hammerstein, Die 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschafts-
politik in Republik und Diktatur, 1920–1945 (Munich, 1999); on students, see Michael H. Kater, 
“The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 10, no. 1 (1975): 71–94.
40 Examples include a note related to VI A 1823 Dec. 16, 1922, PA R 60431; Aufzeichnung, Oct. 
21, 1922, PA R 65519; AA to German Legation, Stockholm, Nov. 16, 1922, PA R 60430.
41 Bertling, “Das Amerika-Institut in Berlin,” Hochschule und Ausland 7, no. 3 (Mar. 1929).
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lived the armistice. Nativist sentiment, for example, only peaked in the sum-
mer of 1919, with nationwide prohibition, the success of the revived Ku Klux 
Klan, and restrictive immigration legislation being visible tokens of its strength 
in the early 1920s.42 As they had during the war, “100 % Americans” turned 
against both domestic and foreign expressions of German culture.43 When 
Ohio legislators banned teaching the German language below the eighth 
grade in May 1919, they claimed that German instruction was both a “distinct 
menace to Americanism” and “part of a plot by the German government to 
make school children loyal to it.”44 Amidst such paranoia, patriotic Ameri-
can groups, such as the newly founded American Legion, forcefully opposed 
attempts to normalize American treatment of German culture.45 Efforts to re-
store German books to library circulation, German opera to concert halls, and 
German-language instruction to American schools all faced such resistance.46 
In short, German cultural initiatives encountered just as much suspicion as any 
political propaganda, especially whenever German Americans were involved.
The pronouncements of American patriotic groups were just one indica-
tion of the more fundamental problem Germany faced: its lack of access to the 
American public. For the most part, neither the institutional infrastructures 
nor the personal networks of prewar days still existed. Those who still publicly 
supported Germany (such as George Sylvester Viereck) had been discredited 
by their wartime activity.47 In any case, what Germany needed were not mili-
tant champions but respectable, moderate advocates who enjoyed access to the 
American establishment and were willing to serve as cultural brokers between 
Germany and the United States. Yet the groups that had previously assumed 
this role, especially American academics, had either fallen silent or broken 
with Germany altogether. American Germanists, who had always felt most 
called to mediate between the two countries, had been personally and profes-
sionally devastated by the war. Under the impact of wartime suspicion and a 
drastic drop in enrollment numbers, they had found themselves ousted from 
42 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (New Brun-
swick, 1983).
43 Gustavus Ohlinger, The German Conspiracy in American Education (New York, 1919).
44 Ohio governor (and 1920 Democratic presidential candidate) James M. Cox in front of the 
Ohio General Assembly, quoted in Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community,” 431.
45 In 1921, an official German report noted that “the through and through anti-German and 
pro-French character of the American Legion manifests itself on all occasions.” Report on the 
American Legion, May 25, 1921, PA R 80293.
46 The American Legion declared German music “incompatible with ‘one hundred per cent 
Americanism’,” New York Times, Sep. 24, 1919, cited in Barbara Wiedemann-Citera, Die Aus-
wirkungen des Ersten Weltkrieges auf die Deutsch-Amerikaner im Spiegel der New Yorker Staatsze-
itung, der New Yorker Volkszeitung und der New York Times, 1914–1926 (Frankfurt, 1993), 224; 
see also clipping, “German Opera Ban Made Permanent; to Sing English,” New York World, Oct. 
28, 1919, BArch R 901/72721.
47 See Chapter 4.
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their positions, their departments closed down, and their subject slandered as 
part of a sinister German plot. As long as nativist sentiments ran high, few of 
them were likely to come out publicly for Germany again.
In hindsight, it is easy to see that America’s continued hostility and Ger-
many’s lack of access were part of a realignment of U. S. cultural relations away 
from Germany. What is striking, however, is that even after the experiences of 
war and defeat, neither German officials nor German academics seem to have 
been prepared for the degree to which their cultural capital abroad had been 
lost. Not that there had been no warnings. As early as 1915, farsighted observers 
like Paul Rohrbach had cautioned that “we have to face the embarrassing but 
irrefutable fact that our reputation as a Kulturnation […] has been shaken, and 
that it will have to be re-established before we can once again interact with 
other nations on the basis of our common cultural background.”48 Despite such 
premonitions and widespread German feelings of victimization, the true ex-
tent of the “cultural blockade” only sank in slowly after 1921.49
*
Just how difficult – indeed, impossible – it would be for Germany to fall back 
on established patterns to advance its interests became readily apparent with 
regard to Germany’s academic and scholarly standing, which had long counted 
as its strongest asset in the United States.
Germans’ initial hope in the nation’s academic capital was perhaps most 
evident in the debate surrounding the first postwar ambassadorial appoint-
ment to Washington. In the spring of 1921, with a separate German-American 
peace treaty in sight, the delicate question of who should be appointed to this 
important Washington post garnered increasing attention. Given America’s 
disdain for German officials (who were heavily implicated in wartime espio-
nage, sabotage, and propaganda), former ambassador Bernstorff suggested not 
a trained diplomat, but a “political homo novus of world renown,” namely, a 
German scholar.50 President Wilson’s former advisor, Colonel Edward House, 
seconded the idea, recommending in April/May 1921 that the Wilhelmstrasse 
send someone unassociated with the war, whose primary job would be to influ-
ence public opinion, preferably a “distinguished and striking figure, perhaps a 
professor.”51 At the request of Foreign Minister Walter Simons, Bernstorff then 
asked the eminent church historian Adolf von Harnack to accept the post, if 
48 Rohrbach, Woher es kam, 28.
49 One example is Karl Kerkhof, “Die internationalen naturwissenschaftlichen Organisationen 
vor und nach dem Weltkriege,” Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 
15, no. 3 (Jan. 1921): 225–242.
50 Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 203.
51 Aufzeichnung (Reichsminister Rosen) meeting with House, June 4, 1921, PA R 28487.
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only for a year.52 When Harnack declined, the Foreign Ministry unsuccessfully 
approached a number of other scholars with a liberal reputation, including the 
economist Lujo Brentano.53
In nations like the United States, France, and Great Britain, which all reg-
ularly appointed accomplished businessmen and scholars to diplomatic posts, 
the episode might have held little significance. But in Germany, matters were 
different. There, the Foreign Service had been a closed system for more than a 
generation, the preserve of aristocrats and trained professionals. Since 1871, not 
a single “outsider” had been appointed to a major diplomatic post, let alone one 
as important as Washington after the war. While the practice became slightly 
more common after 1919, almost only in the United States did the German 
government consider a scholar, and not a politician or a businessman, for an 
ambassadorial post.54 This extraordinary choice, then, clearly underscores the 
idea that Wissenschaft was one of Germany’s remaining assets for rebuilding 
trust and prestige in the United States. Whereas a German diplomat or pol-
itician would arouse suspicion and disdain, Bernstorff explained, a German 
scholar might be less burdened by the “many unfortunate memories” of the 
war.55 Even a man as familiar with American psychology as the former am-
bassador seems to have hoped that cultural relations could provide the needed 
common ground for a transatlantic rapprochement.
The outcome of this episode, however, only revealed how unrealistic such 
assessments were and how greatly German scholars really had been implicated 
in the “many unfortunate memories” of the war. Negotiations with both Har-
nack and Brentano stalled, not only because both of them felt ill-prepared to 
take on the post but also because the American press reacted unfavorably to the 
idea. When rumors (were) leaked that Brentano was being considered for the 
post, American journalists immediately pointed out that he – like Harnack – 
had signed the Manifesto of the 93 and had never satisfactorily retracted his 
wartime statement.56 If such reservations applied to men as politically mod-
erate as Brentano and Harnack, then almost any German academic of world 
renown, save Albert Einstein, could be ruled out.
52 Nottmeier, Harnack, 481; Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 204.
53 Lujo Brentano, Mein Leben im Kampf um die soziale Entwicklung Deutschlands (Jena, 1931), 
477.
54 The only other case was that of Professor Wiedenfeld, who was appointed to Moscow in 1921. 
His case was different, however, because the appointment of a scholar was intended to “minimize 
the political significance of this diplomatic exchange in the eyes of the Western Powers”; see Hajo 
Holborn, “Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic,” in The Diplomats, 1919–
1939, ed. Gordan A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, 123–71 (Princeton, NJ, 1953), 153.
55 Bernstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe, 203.
56 “Brentano Talked of as German Envoy Here: He was one of the Professors Who Signed the 
Famous Manifesto to the World,” New York Times, July 2, 1921, 19.
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This experience was but one indication of the obstacles that had to be over-
come to reconcile with American academics. Their moral indignation toward 
Germany survived the war unscathed, and even earlier advocates of close cul-
tural relations took years to overcome their alienation. Columbia president 
Nicholas Murray Butler voiced the persistence of these sentiments in an open 
letter to the rector of Uppsala University in April 1919, speaking of the as yet 
unforgotten “amazing prostitution of [German] scholarship and science to 
national lust” in the Manifesto of the 93.57 Even when it became clear in the 
United States that many signatories had not known the content and wording 
of the manifesto, American contempt for German “self-prostitution” remained 
pronounced.58 Not only were individual educators like Butler at first unwill-
ing to re-establish contact with Germany, but America’s sprawling commit-
ment to international education (spearheaded by the Carnegie Endowment 
under Butler) ignored Germany almost entirely until the mid-1920s. By the 
same token, prewar cultural programs were systematically discredited. For ex-
ample, the professorial exchange, the Amerika-Institut reported, was seen as 
a “particularly menacing piece of German intrigue and propaganda.”59 With 
the American campus transformed from a beacon of German influence into a 
haven of anti-German sentiment, Germany had lost its most significant means 
of accessing American cultural elites. Only in 1921, it is fair to say, did the true 
extent of wartime devastation to Germany’s cultural reputation sink in. In a 
memorandum of October 1922, the Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung astutely 
noted that the former Allies were well on their way to establishing a “cultural 
international against and without Germany.”60
At this point, we must also acknowledge the more fundamental shift in 
transatlantic relations and American mentalities that underpinned this Amer-
ican position. The war provided Americans with a new sense of national pride 
that made them increasingly sensitive to the Old World’s claims of cultural 
superiority. An American journalist conducted a survey among the famous 
“Ninety-Three” (the signatories of the 1914 manifesto) in 1920 and was not only 
dissatisfied with their generally unrepentant answers but was also quick to de-
tect – and reject – “the old feeling of superiority to ‘ignorant Americans.’”61 
57 “Butler Arraigns German Scholars,” New York Times, Apr. 19, 1919.
58 See also “German Intellectuals Speak Up,” The Literary Digest, Aug. 30, 1919, 32–33; “Kultur 
Manifesto Foisted on Signers: Many Germany Intellectuals Say They Were Misled by Vague 
Summary of Document,” New York Times, Nov. 5, 1920. Yet while the manifesto itself had made 
front page news and was commonly reprinted and referred to, the story behind the manifesto 
was only reported on page 17 of the New York Times.
59 Amerika-Institut, Tgb.-Nr. 2053/23 to AA, Sep. 1, 1923, PA R 64998.
60 Aufzeichnung, Oct. 31, 1922 [Abt B], PA R 65519.
61 See Harvey M. Watts, “Present Attitude of the Ninety-Three German Professors,” Pub-
lic-Ledger Philadelphia, Jan. 25, 1920, reprinted in Ungern-Sternberg and Ungern-Sternberg, Der 
Aufruf ‘An die Kulturwelt!’, 296–306.
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Americans, well aware of the economically and ideologically decisive role their 
nation had played in the war and proud of their increasingly well-staffed and 
well-endowed universities, libraries, and concert halls, found this continued 
cultural conceit ever more irritating.62 As the German ambassador Otto Wied-
feldt would later observe about European lecturers in the United States, “the 
war has rightly made the Americans a self-confident people, who instinctively 
rebel against being given advice from foreigners in their own country.”63 Even if 
Germans and Americans would one day bridge their differences, their relation-
ship would never be the same.
Aside from all financial troubles, then, German leaders would find capi-
talizing on the prestige of German science and culture in mending relations 
with the United States more difficult than they had anticipated. Once they had 
realistically assessed the status of German culture in America, the major objec-
tive of the postwar years became maintaining rather than expanding cultural 
relations, and even this grew ever harder to accomplish. In the sober light of 
the postwar period, the ultimate aim of cultural diplomacy could no longer 
be a prewar version of “moral conquest” but rather moral redemption;64 not 
the establishment of wide-ranging German influence but the removal of the 
worst instances of the cultural blockade. In other words, constructive cultural 
diplomacy had to let go of earlier ideas of cultural imperialism and admit that 
merely re-establishing ties with America would be an uphill battle, a long and 
generally unpleasant experience. In short, German scholars – with caution, a 
measure of self-effacement, and the will to make a fresh start – would have 
to rebuild American contacts through slow and painstaking efforts. Unfortu-
nately, few were willing to take on such an uninviting task.
Reluctant Cultural Diplomats
Indeed, if we turn to those who had previously been Germany’s major cultural 
diplomats in the United States, especially German professors, it is apparent that 
it was very difficult for them to continue prewar efforts. For years after the 
war, many German scholars remained intransigent toward the international 
academic community and actively sabotaged the attempts of those (including 
the Foreign Ministry) trying to steer a more conciliatory course. Humiliated by 
the peace agreement and insulted by Allied charges of moral deficiency, they 
62 Levine argues that it was only “during the 1920s and 1930s that American schools of higher 
education moved into the mainstream of American economic, social and cultural life.” See David 
Levine, The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915–1940 (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 17.
63 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Dec. 11, 1922, “Angebliche Vortragstour des ehemali-
gen Reichskanzler Wirth in Amerika,” PA R80294.
64 See Rohrbach, Moralische Eroberungen.
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had strong reservations about such efforts and often rejected them outright. 
Once they recognized the extent of their exclusion from international schol-
arly organizations and networks – what German scholars would soon come 
to identify as the “boycott of German science” – the newly founded Associa-
tion of German Universities (Verband deutscher Hochschulen, est. 1920) re-
sponded with a “counterboycott.” In particular, it asked German scholars to 
abstain from attending international conferences or university jubilees until 
German scholarship once more received the acknowledgment it intellectually 
deserved.65 In the American case, academic resentment was only intensified by 
the great disappointment many German scholars felt toward their colleagues. 
They attributed the fact that their wartime appeals had found so little favor 
with American academics not to the deficiency of their own arguments but 
to American ill-will and ingratitude. Accordingly, they believed that any re-
sumption of transatlantic relations would first require American academics to 
apologize.66
Rampant cultural and political anti-Americanism among Germany’s con-
servative elites in the 1920s further hindered the mending of transatlantic ac-
ademic ties. In the face of America’s rise to economic and financial pre-emi-
nence, German cultural arrogance became even more pronounced. While the 
U. S. impressed Germans with its prosperity, they abhorred its allegedly mech-
anized, soulless, money-grabbing culture. Reducing the American image to the 
two poles of industrial greatness and cultural shallowness, even those with a 
liking for America regarded it as a country without culture or, at most, a cul-
ture in the making.67 Such cultural arrogance was, of course, not new, but it 
now affected transatlantic relations more than it had two decades earlier; not 
only had American elites grown less patient with it, but two important factors 
that had previously helped German professors overcome their opposition to 
America no longer existed: For one, the war had dashed their hope that they 
could gain a measure of influence in the United States through programs like 
the professorial exchange. Although German professors had previously agreed 
to participate in such endeavors to establish Germany’s cultural pre-eminence 
65 Schroeder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 181–211; 
see Declaration of German Professors in Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen 
5, no. 1 (Jan. 1925): 50.
66 The sentiment of the more irreconcilable parts of German academia is embodied by Meyer, 
Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.
67 Even those with good personal knowledge of the country could never entirely rid themselves 
of their cultural conceits. The counselor of embassy in Washington, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, at 
first found “this country without history unappealing; the lack of culture, music and art is terri-
ble.” See Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften, 88; This was repeated by the German ambassa-
dor to Washington as late as 1935: The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry, 
June 28, 1935, Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), Series C, Vol. 4, Document 
No. 184.
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in the United States, the war seemed to have demonstrated the faultiness of 
such assumptions, making them considerably less likely to take on similar 
tasks.68 Secondly, these academic initiatives no longer enjoyed the prestige of 
the Kaiser’s interest in the 1920s. Whereas many German professors had previ-
ously been willing to go abroad as “Kaiser Wilhelm Professors” to enhance the 
reputation of imperial Germany, they often had no desire to serve the current 
government in the same way. Indeed, many of them had strong reservations 
about the new republic, if not outright hostility. Accordingly, they kept their 
distance from Germany’s peace-burdened republic despite their loyalty to both 
state and nation as seemingly eternal entities. Though there were some notable 
exceptions (as we will see), most German professors were unwilling to swal-
low their pride and prejudice to help an unloved government re-establish itself 
internationally. The irreconcilable mentalities of Germany’s foremost “expo-
nents of culture” became a constant source of frustration to German ministries 
and semi-private organizations alike.69 In the early 1920s, German mandarins 
turned out to be very reluctant cultural diplomats.
*
All in all, cultural, and especially academic, relations were not at first the much-
needed “neutral ground” that publicists and politicians had hoped. In practice, 
scarcely any other field was as burdened by wartime memories. A significant 
number of the individuals who had previously facilitated transatlantic cultural 
exchanges had defected from the cause, and the few who were still commit-
ted, like the Amerika-Institut, were hampered by financial constraints, a lack 
of overseas partners, and the general atmosphere of distrust. The psychological 
hurdles the war had erected proved to be much higher than initially anticipated. 
Partly for that reason, German diplomats tended to approach the subject with 
caution. Their standard response to private initiatives, like sending a German 
orchestra to the United States, was often dissuasion. When weighing the little 
good that cultural representations could do against the great harm they might 
cause, diplomats often deemed such endeavors a risk not worth taking.70
Moreover, with the London schedule of reparations payments in 1921 the 
German government set out on an economic course that appealed less to 
American sympathies than to America’s self-interest in a politically and eco-
nomically stable Europe. The German government argued that these repara-
68 See Chapter 5.
69 Amerika-Institut to AA [Heilbron], Mitteilungen des Amerika-Instituts an die Mitglieder des 
Kuratoriums, May 20 1922, PA R 64997.
70 German Embassy, Washington [Wiedfeldt], to AA, Sep. 23 1922, “Auf den Erlass vom 25 Okt. 
1922 VI C 2071,” PA R80294; German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Feb. 26, 1924, “Deutsche 
Amerikafahrer,” PA R80297.
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tions payments overburdened Germany and – applying the logic of world eco-
nomic interdependence – would ultimately undermine all of Europe’s, as well 
as America’s, prosperity.71 Thus, it was in America’s own best interest to help 
Germany in adjusting the total reparations sum and the payment modalities. 
Accordingly, a businessman rather than a scholar was appointed ambassador 
to Washington. Assuming the post in March 1922, Otto Wiedfeldt, director of 
the Krupp Iron Works, was to use his economic acumen and contacts to “sell” 
the German version of the reparations problem and secure American involve-
ment.72 In the end, business, not culture, provided the needed common ground 
in the early 1920s.
Nevertheless, while this set of obstacles stifled German initiative in the 
short run, it also gradually led to a more realistic assessment of the means and 
ends of public diplomacy. Whatever German hopes had been, there could be 
no campaign to capitalize on the reputation of German culture, nor anything 
but the most tacit, most unassailable attempts to reach out to German Ameri-
cans. Cultural diplomacy would primarily mean overcoming distrust and gain-
ing access to an American public whose notions of German culture – or Kultur, 
as Americans still mockingly spelled it – were singularly negative.73 In con-
crete terms, this meant Germany needed to build a new stock of “cultural dip-
lomats” willing and able to act in accordance with a more conciliatory foreign 
policy and to find alternate ways of reaching out to the American public. The 
first opportunity to this end arose not by design, but by chance – and across 
the Atlantic.
Cracks in the Blockade: American Aid to Germany, 1919–1922
A first major breach of German isolation immediately followed the Treaty of 
Versailles in the shape of American humanitarian aid for Germany. In the first 
few years after the war, relief work offered an important outlet for America’s 
71 For this argument, see Manfred Berg, “Germany and the United States: The Concept of World 
Economic Interdependence,” in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922, ed. Carole 
Fink, Axel Frohn et al., 77–93 (New York, 1991).
72 As the newly appointed Wiedfeldt explained to a German newspaper, Germans would have 
to “give our best to fulfill the conditions we have signed, and to show through our honest attempt 
at fulfillment, that they cannot be actually fulfilled.” Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, Mar. 23, 
1922, in Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter der Weimarer Republik, ed. Schröder, 159–
238 (Essen, 1971), 197; on the importance of Wiedfeldt’s appointment, see also Document 42, 
Von Schubert to Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, March 11, 1922, in Peter Krüger, ed., Carl von 
Schubert (1882–1947). Sein Beitrag zur internationalen Politik und europäischer Ordnung in der 
Ära der Weimarer Republik. Ausgewählte Dokumente, 199–201 (Berlin, 2017).
73 Aufzeichnung des Konsuls Dr. Kraske vom 10. Oktober 1924 (attachment to German Em-
bassy report, Jan. 30, 1925), PA R 61130.
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internationalist impulses, constituting the most significant U. S. involvement 
with postwar Germany.74
German Americans spearheaded these American efforts. Affected by Ger-
man appeals after the armistice and haunted by the idea of their kin suffering 
overseas, German Americans began to organize relief aid for Germany as early 
as the spring of 1919. Once the peace treaty had been signed and the sea block-
ade raised, German-American organizations and individuals devoted them-
selves almost entirely to alleviating the distress of an ever-growing number of 
German beneficiaries. By 1920, large fundraising campaigns for suffering chil-
dren, students, and the middle classes were being organized across the country 
and millions of parcels dispatched to relatives and acquaintances overseas.75 
German-American communities established their own children’s homes, or-
phanages, and tubercular wards across Germany, formed knitting groups, and 
collected “quarters” for German children after every Sunday service. Overall, 
German-American donations to Germany in the first half of the 1920s are es-
timated at a staggering 150 million dollars.76 Relief work became the central 
ethnic occupation for German Americans of the postwar period, and, indeed, 
of the entire 1920s.
Yet, Anglo-Americans also grew more involved in aiding Germany. As in 
other countries, children served as universal symbols of innocent suffering, 
and their plight garnered a broad humanitarian response.77 As early as August 
1919, the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) established an emer-
gency relief program for undernourished and tubercular German children.78 
With the financial and logistical support of American “relief czar” Herbert 
74 Ruth Rouse, Rebuilding Europe: The Student Chapter in Postwar Reconstruction (London, 
1925), 10.
75 On U. S. aid to Germany, see Charles Strickland, “American Aid for the Relief of Germany 
1919–1921” (M. A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1959); Elisabeth Piller, “German Child Dis-
tress, American Humanitarian Aid and Revisionist Politics, 1918–1924,” Journal of Contempo-
rary History 51, no. 3 (2016): 453–486.
76 Central Relief Committee to German Ministry of Labor, Nov. 1, 1921, BArch R 3901/9107; 
Hermann Stöhr, So half Amerika (Stettin, 1936), 122; the head of the New York Relief Committee 
Emanuel de Marnay-Baruch estimated in November 1923 that German Americans had donated 
a total of 350 million dollars; “Von unserer Arbeit. Vortragsabend,” Der Auslanddeutsche 6, 
no. 21 (Nov. 1923): 623.
77 On children and women in humanitarian campaigns, see R. Charli Carpenter, “‘Women, 
Children and Other Vulnerable Groups’: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civil-
ians as a Transnational Issue,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 2 (2005): 295–334; for the 
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American Red Cross,” European Review of History 23 (2016): 33–62.
78 See Tammy M. Proctor, “An American Enterprise? British Participation in US Food Relief 
Programmes (1914–1923),” First World War Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 29–42; Mary Elisabeth Cox, 
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ken, “Feeding Germany: American Quakers in the Weimar Republic,” Diplomatic History 43, 
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Hoover, it soon grew into one of the largest aid programs on the continent. 
By mid-1921, the Quakers’ feeding program for children (known as the Quäk-
erspeisung) provided a daily meal for one million children across Germany. 
In the following years, Americans would also be at the forefront of intellec-
tual aid by trying to improve the living conditions of German students and 
supplying German libraries and universities with much-needed international 
publications.79 By the time a separate peace treaty between the two countries 
was signed, Americans had already delivered books, meals, and clothes valued 
at millions of dollars to Germany.
To be sure, the Americans groups involved used their relief work for widely 
different agendas. Perhaps the only conviction they shared was that German 
relief was not solely about alleviating physical or intellectual hardship. For the 
majority of German Americans, aiding Germany was deeply personal. After 
having been cut off from family and friends for more than two years, they saw 
relief work as a way to renew transatlantic connections and express affection 
for their former fatherland in a politically inoffensive manner. As one German 
American wrote to his German aunt: “even though no peace has been estab-
lished between Germany and America, the circumstances are so good that one 
is allowed to have pity on one’s kin without being persecuted or condemned.”80 
Many also saw German aid as a way to protest Germany’s international iso-
lation. German-American leaders, for their part, hoped that a humanitarian 
campaign could help them forge a common political platform against Ver-
sailles.81 While such hopes remained vain, German Americans did use relief 
work as a socially acceptable way to express their compassion, affection, and 
support for Germany in the first half of the 1920s.
While German-American aid was often personal and emotional, Herbert 
Hoover and his American Relief Administration pursued more pragmatic 
objectives. Following the simple and persuasive notion that “hunger breeds 
Bolshevism,” Hoover systematically used American food to further a coun-
ter-revolutionary agenda and to stabilize a Central Europe under siege by “rad-
79 Germanistic Society, Appeal [late 1920], Franz Boas Papers, Box 31, American Philosophical 
Society (APS). In April 1921 the German program – like similar ones in Austria and Poland – 
passed into the hands of the recently founded European Student Relief. A. Ruth Fry, A Quaker 
Adventure: The Story of Nine Years’ Relief and Reconstruction (London, 1926), 333; on the Euro-
pean Student Relief, see Elisabeth Piller, “European Student Relief, Humanitarianism, and Post-
World War I Reconciliation,” in Online Atlas on the History of Humanitarianism and Human 
Rights, ed. Fabian Klose, Marc Palen, Johannes Paulmann, and Andrew Thompson,  urn: 
nbn:de:0159–2019042427; on intellectual aid in the postwar period more generally, see Tomás 
Irish, “The ‘Moral Basis’ of Reconstruction? Humanitarianism, Intellectual Relief and the League 
of Nations, 1918–1925,” Modern Intellectual History 17, no. 3 (2020): 769–800.
80 Quoted in Wolfgang Helbich, ed., Amerika ist ein freies Land … Auswanderer schreiben nach 
Deutschland (Darmstadt, 1985), 187.
81 Charles Strickland, “American Aid to Germany, 1919–1921,” The Wisconsin Magazine of His-
tory 45 (1962): 256–270.
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ical” elements. Moreover, Hoover regarded American child relief as a prime 
image-building tool and made sure that European recipients knew their food 
was coming from a “beneficent America.”82 In the specific case of Germany, 
Hoover’s involvement was also an effort to wrest an emotional topic like child 
suffering from the hands of resentful ethnic leaders.83 Reluctant to undertake 
the unpopular German work himself, however, he entrusted it to the politically 
reliable Quakers.
Between German Americans and Hoover, there were also American 
church, reform, and university circles. These were neither as emotional 
nor as pragmatic as the former, approaching German relief as a reform and 
peace-building project. Groups like the American Quakers set about their 
work to provide hope and sympathy to a German people who were “not only 
hungry, but discouraged and in despair.”84 Where others saw only the unloved 
enemy, they saw an unprecedented opportunity to convert a resentful and mili-
taristic society to the principles of peace and forgiveness. “There is a wonderful 
opening for us here,” wrote one enthusiastic Quaker relief worker, “the phi-
losophy of force has crumpled in our hands.”85 For example, the YMCA-led 
European Student Relief, steeped in social gospel thinking, gave extensive aid 
to German students, considering its work part of a reform agenda to eradi-
cate dangerous national chauvinism, stabilize the fledgling German republic, 
and draw Germany back into the family of nations.86 As Conrad Hoffmann, 
the American executive of the European Student Relief, explained in 1919, it 
was “high time, now that Germany had been defeated, that the hand of Chris-
tian helpfulness and fellowship be extended to the German people. They need 
encouragement in their efforts to become a democracy welcome in the soci-
ety of nations.”87 To be sure, behind this rhetoric of goodwill and solidarity 
American aid at times came close to a re-education program. For instance, the 
YMCA not only provided financial aid to German students but systematically 
encouraged American-style “work study,” not least to promote democratic and 
82 Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 21; Americans served food only in canteens where an 
American flag was displayed; Franz Adlgasser, American Individualism Abroad: Herbert Hoover, 
die American Relief Administration und Österreich, 1919–1923 (Vienna, 1993), 95.
83 Strickland, “American Aid to Germany, 1919–1921.”
84 Sidney Brooks, Germany and America, 1918–1925 (New York, 1925), 145.
85 Carolena Wood, quoted in Rufus Jones, A Service of Love in War Time: American Friends 
Relief Work in Europe, 1917–1919 (New York, 1920), 260.
86 Rouse, Rebuilding Europe, 129; Elisabeth Piller, “‘Can the Science of the World Allow This?’ – 
German Academic Distress, Foreign Aid and Cultural Demobilization, 1919–1924,” in The Aca-
demic World in the Era of the Great War, ed. Tomás Irish and Marie-Eve Chagnon, 189–211 
(London, 2017).
87 Conrad Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany: A Narrative of ‘Y’ Service among Prison-
ers of War (New York, 1920), 265.
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egalitarian attitudes.88 Above all, U. S. aid, wittingly or not, projected Amer-
ican efficiency, power, and prosperity overseas. Whatever its other qualities, 
American relief work was also a vehicle for American economic and cultural 
expansion in Europe.89
And yet, such observations still fail to capture the entire significance of 
American relief – at least in Germany. In fact, hardly any other activity was as 
important to redeveloping transatlantic cultural contacts in the long run. It did 
so in at least three ways. First, it rebuilt organizations. As an allegedly apolitical 
task, it helped German Americans, in particular, to restructure their defunct 
institutional life without running afoul of nativist sentiment. This is true both of 
the many ethnic Vereine and of high-brow cultural organizations like the Ger-
manistic Society (est. 1904). Unable to resume its prewar transatlantic activities 
in the face of widespread hostility, the Germanistic Society, for example, had 
found a new purpose providing intellectual aid to Germany by 1920.90 This use-
ful and generally unobtrusive work enabled it to recover its prewar membership 
of prominent bankers, editors, and professors relatively rapidly.91 Although the 
Germanistic Society wisely advertised its work as a way of spreading Ameri-
can influence in Europe, its fundraising appeals still aimed to elicit respect for 
German cultural accomplishments. By the time it officially resumed its work in 
1925, it had already played an important transatlantic role for half a decade.92 
For the Germanistic Society, as for a large range of German-American organ-
izations, relief work provided an important purpose and organizational focus 
that helped reinvigorate their work while steering clear of nativist suspicions. 
For Germany, the survival of these organizations and their tacit alliance with 
Anglo-Americans (especially in child and intellectual aid) would become sig-
nificant.
88 See Elisabeth Piller, “Prelude to ‘Re-Education’: U. S. Internationalists, German Students and 
the Search for a New World Order, 1918–1948” (working paper).
89 On this point, see Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 39–50; and Rosenberg, Spreading the 
American Dream, 74; for a more recent contribution, see Julia Irwin, “Sauvons Les Bébés: Child 
Health and U. S. Humanitarian Aid in the First World War Era,” Bulletin of the History of Medi-
cine 86, no. 1 (2012): 37–65.
90 Emergency Society in Aid of European Science and Art, Special Meeting of the Society, 
Nov. 30, 1920, Franz Boas Papers, Box 24, APS.
91 By 1922 it again boasted a membership of 150 – compared to 200 before the war – made up 
of German-American academics, businessmen, and editors. Charles Nagel, the former U. S. Min-
ister of Labor and Commerce and one of the most prominent German Americans of his time, 
served as president of the society. Scholars and intellectuals such as Camillo von Klenze of City 
College, F. W. J. Heuser of Columbia, Oswald Garrison Villard of the Nation, Victor Ridder of the 
New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, banker James Speyer, Henry Morgenthau, Paul Warburg, and anthro-
pologist Franz Boas served as officers. Well-known philanthropists such as Henry Heide, Rudolf 
Pagenstecher, and Curt Reisinger supported its work.
92 By 1927 the Emergency Society for German and Austrian Art and Science, which the Ger-
manistic Society had founded for that purpose, had administered more than $107,544 in aid; 
Germanistic Society Report for the Year 1928.
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Second, American relief work improved transatlantic sentiment. For one, 
the fundraising drives communicated a German image to Americans that was 
at odds with the one created during the war. The focus on suffering German 
children once again humanized the German people, while intellectual aid re-
minded Americans of the important contributions German “culture” had made 
to civilization before it had become “Kultur.”93 Although such representations 
elicited active sympathy among only a small group of Americans, they still re-
asserted the fundamental difference between German culture and politics and 
between the German people and the government, which the war had nearly 
erased. According to Schoenthal, relief work was one of the postwar factors 
that helped normalize American attitudes toward Germany.94 But in Germany, 
too, American aid softened sentiments toward the former enemy. While Ger-
mans were genuinely grateful for America’s generous child aid, they also ap-
preciated its intellectual and student relief as a token of ongoing regard for 
German science and universities. For some academics, at least, American aid 
made it psychologically easier to re-enter transatlantic relations.
Most importantly, American aid (re)built transatlantic networks. Personal 
“gifts of love” (Liebesgaben, charitable gifts) and large-scale child-feeding pro-
jects brought American ethnic, reform, church, and academic circles back into 
contact and cooperation with their German peers. Indeed, it would be wrong 
to conceive of aid as a unidirectional endeavor. In the field of intellectual aid, 
for example, the Germanistic Society partnered with the Notgemeinschaft der 
deutschen Wissenschaft to supply American publications to German librar-
ies, thereby re-establishing intellectual exchange on the most basic level. In the 
field of student aid, too, the American-led European Student Relief developed 
such close ties with German student self-help organizations that, by 1923, it en-
joyed perhaps its closest contacts not with former allies but with the former en-
emy. That the millions of individual “gifts of love” German Americans sent also 
profoundly strengthened transatlantic ties requires no special explanation.95 In 
terms of re-establishing institutional infrastructures, personal networks, and 
internationalist exchanges, no activity of the postwar period remotely matched 
America’s multifarious relief operations. What is more, while historians have 
traditionally understood the role of aid operations as vehicles of American cul-
tural and economic expansion in Europe, German students, professors, and 
officials could easily ignore these Americanizing undertones and see them also 
93 See Elisabeth Piller, “Can the Science of the World Allow This?”
94 Schoenthal, “American Attitudes toward Germany,” 89.
95 For one example of individual “gifts of love” and the substantial transatlantic correspondence 
accompanying them, see Princeton Special Collections, MC034, Arthur von Briesen Papers, Box 
11, Folders 35 and 41, Family Correspondence; von Briesen’s many “gifts of love” to his family in 
Germany included caskets of eggs, milk, bacon, and cheese.
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as something else: cracks in the blockade.96 Not merely passive “recipients,” 
they saw U. S. aid as a window of opportunity for redeveloping transatlantic 
contacts and eliciting sympathy among respectable Americans. In late 1922, the 
German Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung thus considered academic relief 
work the most promising development for the “re-establishment of a true uni-
versitas litterarum.”97
“The Average American Is Mad All the Time He Is in Germany” :  
American Tourists and the Pathology of Inflation, 1922
American relief offered a first opportunity to rekindle transatlantic contacts in 
the postwar period, yet the ratification of the separate peace treaty in late 1921 
officially normalized transatlantic relations and broadened Germany’s range of 
outreach options. Inflation uniquely aided this development. To be sure, cur-
rency devaluation had many disadvantages, but it also had its upsides. As it 
cheapened German services, living costs, and products, it facilitated cultural 
promotion. Due to inflation, for example, German books soon enjoyed world-
wide demand, German universities saw an unprecedented increase in foreign 
(albeit not American) enrollment, and international tourism to Germany 
boomed, thereby giving Germany a chance to rectify its image and to fight 
wartime antipathies with the lure of a peacetime bargain. German psychology, 
however, made it difficult to capitalize on this opportunity. Nowhere was this 
more apparent than with regard to transatlantic tourism. Despite promising 
prospects, Germany suffered its most striking failure in this field. In the long 
run, however, the Foreign Ministry’s new commitment to cultural diplomacy 
arose from these very difficulties.
It seems surprising at first that international tourism would be so fraught 
with problems. In fact, representatives of the German tourist trade had used the 
war to develop a coherent program of peacetime action that they had already 
presented to the Foreign Ministry in several memoranda in early 1919. The idea 
that travel promotion was not solely a commercial undertaking but also an 
unobtrusive way to shape how the world thought and felt about Germany was 
a key aspect of their vision.98 Personal impressions alone, they argued, could 
eradicate wartime prejudices and lead to a fairer assessment of Germany. The 
publicity director of the newly founded German Tourism Promotion Office 
96 The German case confirms Emily’s Rosenberg’s contention of a “reciprocal agency that recip-
ients could exercise upon the plans and strategies of donors.” Emily Rosenberg, “Missions to the 
World: Philanthropy Abroad,” in Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History, ed. 
Friedman and McGarvie, 241–257 (New York, 2003), 242.
97 VI A 1727 Aufzeichnung für den Herrn Reichsminister, Nov. 29, 1922, PA R60002.
98 See Chapter 6.
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(Reichszentrale für Verkehrswerbung, RDV, est. 1920) presented this argument 
as follows:
if we could with one stroke guide 100,000 educated and attentive foreigners through our 
Germany, show them our people at work, invite them from time to time to a friendly 
and contemplative stay, and if they then were to return home with lively memories, with 
memories of a country that looks so completely different than Northcliffe [Britain’s main 
wartime propagandist] made it look, we could thereby do more for the revision of Ver-
sailles than all the diplomats in the world.99
Once Germany and the United States had re-established peaceful relations, 
prospects for tourism were indeed excellent. Thanks to inflation, the German 
tourist trade recovered by leaps and bounds and, by 1922, there were far more 
tourists than in the prewar period in those cities for which data are available.100 
The low cost of a trip to Germany helped Americans overcome their prejudices 
against visiting Germany, especially as they were complaining of rising prices 
in other European countries.101 In 1922, during the first travel season after Ger-
many had signed the separate peace with the United States and the first time 
the popular Oberammergau Passion Play planned to put on its performance in 
over a decade, up to 100,000 American tourists were expected to visit south-
ern Germany.102 If the German Tourism Promotion Office held that 100,000 
visitors could “do more for the revision of Versailles than all diplomats in the 
world,” this marked a unique chance.
Germany almost completely passed up this chance, however. Rather than 
encountering a hospitable atmosphere in which their opinions on Germany 
might have softened, visitors found themselves harassed by inconvenient cus-
toms regulations and steep extra fees. By late 1921, travelers were no longer al-
lowed to take even goods for daily usage out of the country and were subjected 
to harsh searches, heavy fines, and confiscation of unaccounted-for materials 
at the border.103 Hotels, theaters, restaurants, and shops often charged them 
several times the ticketed price, and newly introduced municipal taxes and so-
99 Maximilian Kraus, Die zukünftigen Aufgaben der deutschen Verkehrswerbung im In- und Aus-
lande (Berlin, 1921), 10.
100 Instead of 140,000 foreign visitors in 1913, Munich hosted 230,000 in 1922. Whereas 40,000 
foreigners visited the spa of Wiesbaden before the war, 100,000 did in 1922. In a trade fair city 
like Leipzig, the number of prewar visitors even increased five-fold to over 150,000 in 1922; the 
numbers are taken from Gerald Feldman, “Welcome to Germany? The Fremdenplage in the We-
imar Inflation,” in Geschichte als Aufgabe, ed. Wilhelm Treue, 629–49 (Berlin, 1988), 631.
101 “American Dollars Go Far in Germany,” New York Times, July 31, 1921, 85; “Low Prices Big 
Surprise To Travelers in Germany,” Washington Post, July 31, 1921, 50.
102 Its last prewar performance in 1910 had drawn about 200,000 visitors, of whom the single 
largest group had been Americans; “Liners Booked Up for Passion Play: One Hundred Thousand 
Americans Are Believed to Visit Oberammergau,” New York Times, Apr. 9, 1922.
103 Reichsanzeiger, no. 257, Oct. 31, 1921.
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journ permits added to the inconvenience. Popular tourist destinations, like 
Bavaria, implemented a system of dual price scales (for foreigners and locals) 
across the board. Commenting on such practices, one U. S. citizen concluded 
in 1920: “the average American is mad all the time he is in Germany.”104
There were many good reasons for such German measures. Given the im-
mense purchasing power of foreign currency, strict customs regulations and 
dual price scales were primarily intended to dam the constant outflow of Ger-
man valuables and hold German consumer prices in check.105 Accordingly, 
popular support for discriminatory measures rose and fell with the pace of in-
flation. But it was also influenced by postwar psychology. Having seen their 
own standards of living decline (and attributing it to the Treaty of Versailles), 
many Germans resented foreigners benefiting from their plight and being able 
to afford the luxuries Germans themselves could not. As one might expect, 
visitors from less prosperous regions, especially Eastern Europe, and those of 
the less affluent classes aroused the most resentment. Germans complained 
that many visitors who could barely afford a third-rate hotel at home were 
now taking advantage of the exchange rate to live in “undeserved” splendor 
in Germany. Concerning American tourists, the situation was slighty differ-
ent. In this case, Germans’ exaggerated sense of American prosperity and their 
notion that Americans “owed” Germany after President Wilson’s “betrayal” at 
Versailles convinced them that Americans could afford to pay a little extra. 
At a time when the German public largely blamed the provisions of the peace 
treaty rather than the war itself for the country’s malaise, it was not ready to be 
more welcoming of former enemies. As the American Consulate in Munich 
reported, Bavarian authorities tried to clamp down on the worst instances of 
extortion, but “in the face of the more or less pathological state of mind of 
the public it is going to be exceedingly difficult to keep charges within rea-
sonable bounds … travelers coming to Munich should be prepared to expect 
overcrowding, discrimination against foreigners, and regulations which at best 
will prove annoying.”106
104 Parke Brown, “Rise in Marks Boosts Prices in all Germany,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 24, 
1920, 7.
105 Particularly in tourist and border regions, foreigners seen wining and dining on the cheap 
aroused public resentment and fears about price increases for the local population; see Verhand-
lungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Bd. 351, 145. Sitzung, Nov. 17, 1921, 5019.
106 American Consulate, Munich, to State Dept, Apr. 5, 1922; “Tourist Travel at Munich; Atti-
tude toward Foreigners,” NARA RG 59 Box 9623 862.111/154.
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Fig . 6: The image captures German 
fears of a sell-out
Erich Schilling, “Kunstraubzug des 
Dollars [The Dollar’s Art Pillage],” 
Simplicissimus, 1922
The consulate’s predictions soon proved all too accurate. By mid-May 1922, 
throngs of American tourists left Germany with the distinct feeling of hav-
ing been “ripped off.” While indignation had flared up from time to time with 
regard to customs regulations or extra charges, now a veritable storm of unfa-
vorable reporting erupted in the American press. American newspapers and 
their Paris editions gave extensive coverage to discriminatory practices and 
even called for a boycott of German (especially Bavarian) destinations.107 Re-
ports that an American had been robbed in Berlin led the New York Times 
to quip that Americans were robbed every minute and “all over Germany.”108 
Though many Americans admitted that Germany remained a comparatively 
cheap travel destination, even with extra charges, they objected, on principle, 
107 “Tourists Avoid Germany,” New York Times, June 17, 1922; “Powers Protests to Reich over 
Extortions,” Chicago Tribune, Paris Edition, May 25, 1922; “Pay $10 to Leave Berlin,” Chicago 
Tribune, Paris Edition, May 24, 1922; “American Women Outwit German Extortionists,” Chicago 
Tribune, Paris Edition, May 24, 1922; “Prussians Seek to Tax Tourists,” New York Herald, Paris 
Edition, May 23, 1922; “Bavarians Exact Exorbitant Fees from Americans,” New York Herald, 
Paris Edition, May 23, 1922; “Trade Reports Show How Germans Fleece Tourists,” Chicago Trib-
une, Paris Edition, May 22, 1922; American Consulate, Munich, to State Dept., June 1, 1922, 
“Tourist Travel at Munich,” NARA RG 59 Box 9623 862.111/162; “Boycott of Munich Is in Full 
Swing,” Amaroc News, June 8, 1922, 1.
108 “Robbing Americans All Over Germany,” New York Times, May 19, 1922, 1.
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to being charged more for the same service. And while extortion was com-
mon to some degree in all tourist destinations, such practices easily reawak-
ened the widespread antipathy toward Germany that tourists had grudgingly 
ignored for the promise of a cheap vacation. German Americans, the only 
group staunchly in favor of Germany at that point, who also comprised a very 
considerable share of American visitors to Germany in 1922, were particularly 
indignant about such maltreatment. Having just raised millions of dollars to 
alleviate German hardship, they were outraged at being treated like all other 
foreigners.109 For example, the director of the Germanistic Society Frederick 
Heuser wrote his friend Franz Boas that “[e]very ill in Germany is attributed 
to the foreigner and I am beginning to get very tired of this foolish agitation. 
The Germans are undoubtedly losing many sympathies by the annoying reg-
ulations which are enforced against foreigners without distinction.”110 The ex-
periences of American tourists, in short, kept alive rather than eroded their 
wartime hostilities toward Germany.111 Instead of improving Germany’s image, 
tourism confirmed Americans’ preconceived notions.
To make matters worse, unfavorable tourist impressions easily reflected 
back on the ongoing reparations negotiations. American visitors and newspa-
pers interpreted the behavior of German individuals and the crowdedness of 
cafés (often a result of inflation itself) as signs of German prosperity and ap-
plied these impressions to the larger economic questions at stake. One Ameri-
can business traveler was so outraged at being charged double or triple at hotels, 
restaurants, shops, and even the municipal police station that he concluded: 
“the Germans will not pay the reparations, but everyone has money […] The 
Germans eat enormous and expensive meals and sit in the cafes drinking beer 
all day long and then say they cannot pay damages to France.”112 This was ex-
actly the sort of image that Germany needed to avoid carefully and that parts of 
the American press delighted in printing: a deceitful, unreconstructed nation 
in search of American money but without any warmth for or appreciation of 
the former enemy. The fact that this storm of publicity hit just as American 
bankers were gathering in Paris for informal talks with the Reparations Com-
mission (from May 24 to June 9, 1922) made for a worst-case scenario.113 Ger-
many had failed to use the unique chance tourism offered to mold American 
attitudes in its favor.
109 On German-American indignation, especially in the context of the relief program, see, for 
example, Clipping: “Eine Steuer auf amerikanische Gäste?,” Chicago Abendpost, May 15, 1922, 
Abendausgabe, 34/114, German Consulate Chicago to German Embassy, Washington, PA 
Deutsche Botschaft, Washington, 1493.
110 Heuser to Boas, Jan. 20, 1923, Boas Papers, Box 39, APS.
111 Wendschuch to Reichszentrale für Verkehrswerbung, June 21, 1922, BArch R 901/25904.
112 “Robbing Americans All Over Germany,” New York Times, May 19, 1921, 1.
113 On these talks, see Karl Dietrich Erdmann, “Deutschland, Rapallo und der Westen,” Viertel-
jahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11, no. 2 (1963): 105–165, 155–63.
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These problems and their obvious repercussions for foreign affairs finally 
forced German officials out of their lethargy. Throughout May and June 1922 
(on May 18, 23, 25, 27, and June 2), the German embassy in Washington re-
ported the extent of American irritation. By late May, Ambassador Wiedfeldt 
warned that American complaints had come in at such a rate that he “feared 
for German-American relations.”114 To him, these extortionate practices were 
nothing short of financial folly. With Germany’s recovery dependent on Amer-
ican loans, he felt it was sheer lunacy to threaten these prospects for the “pa-
per profits” of some Bavarian cities.115 As he admonished a few months later, 
“such odds and ends do not bring in significant amounts, but they damage us 
significantly with regard to the general opinion in this country. What good is 
the extra income of the Bavarian … police force if it holds back American in-
tervention in Europe even by some months[?]”116 He urged Berlin to critically 
rethink the treatment of American travelers in its foreign policy. If improving 
American opinion really was among Germany’s primary foreign policy goals, 
Wiedfeldt noted, then the German authorities would have to address these dis-
criminatory practices.117
In the following months, the Foreign Ministry pushed Germany’s foreign 
policy interests with tourist groups, Bavarian officials, and the Reich Ministry 
of Finance. It prompted the nation’s foremost tourist interest groups to agree 
to abandon discriminatory practices and adopt a public statement condemn-
ing discrimination against foreigners on July 22.118 While the dramatic drop 
in American tourist spending certainly helped to gain their cooperation, the 
crisis had also evoked greater concern for the German “image” among liberal 
circles.119 On June 22, 1922, the left-liberal Frankfurter Zeitung featured an ed-
itorial on the “sheer madness” of existing practices. It warned that German 
behavior was playing perfectly into the hands of its enemies, who were bent on 
cementing an unfavorable German image abroad:
114 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 27, 1922, PA Botschaft Washington, 1493.
115 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, “Politische Wirkung fremdenverkehrs-feindlicher 
Maßnahmen in Deutschland,” May 18, 1922, PA R246958.
116 Report of the German Embassy, Washington, Oct. 4, 1922, PA Botschaft Washington, 
No. 1493, Vol. 1: 1921–25.
117 German Embassy, Washington, to AA “Politische Wirkung fremdenverkehrs-feindlicher 
Maßnahmen in Deutschland,” May 18, 1922; PA R 246958; German Embassy, Washington, to 
AA, June 19, 1922, PA R 246958.
118 Circular AA to foreign missions, July 31, 1922, BArch, R 901/25904.
119 Whereas 30,000 foreigners visited Garmisch-Partenkirchen in June 1921, only 40,000 did 
the following year. By the end of the American travel season in late August, only 20,000 Ameri-
cans were said to have attended the Oberammergau play; see “Greatest Season for the Passion 
Play,” New York Times, Aug. 28, 1922; American Consulate, Munich, to State Dept., July 29, 1922, 
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By our present attitude, we have seriously injured ourselves. And we have in this way 
done a great favor to our enemies. The Northcliffe press and the American yellow jour-
nals and all the other unfriendly organs have seized with avidity upon this material. We 
must ask our readers to look at the matter very seriously. …. The fact is that in North 
and South America, in Great Britain and in neutral countries there is a growing feeling 
against Germany on account of its improper treatment of foreigners. We should have 
learned from the experience of the war that politics frequently depend largely upon the 
feeling of the people. In our present political situation the most important article for 
export, which we have to offer foreigners is a good opinion about ourselves. We have not 
recognized this enough. It is time that we did.120
With this argument, the editorial laid its finger on the crucial problem of 
the postwar period. At a time when Germans liked to blame all ills on the “for-
eigner,” the editorialist realized that negative opinions of Germany were not 
the product of a sinister enemy’s machinations but were at least partly home-
made. Germany was isolated, and it had isolated itself.
It was precisely this realization that drew the Foreign Ministry into fields 
that had long been outside its purview. More and more frequently, Germany’s 
foreign missions reported on the negative repercussions of discriminatory 
practices, not only against tourists but also against foreign students (who were 
similarly subjected to steep extra fees). These reports increasingly focused the 
attention of German ministries, parliamentarians, and liberal publicists on is-
sues like university admissions, the hospitable treatment of visitors, and the at-
titudes of German professors.121 In fact, in the same way that the Foreign Min-
istry began to push for a more accommodating stance toward tourists, it also 
began to champion more lenient admission criteria for international students 
at German universities and tried to effect more conciliatory attitudes among 
German professors.122 All these efforts attest to a growing sense among Ger-
man officials of responsibility for public and cultural relations, a far cry from 
the lukewarm concern of even 1921. An internal memorandum of November 
29, 1922, by the Kulturabteilung on Germany’s international cultural relations 
illustrated this process. While the Kulturabteilung affirmed that maintaining 
ties with millions of Germans outside the Reich’s borders was its priority, it 
also – for the first time since the war, it seems – underlined the importance of 
resuming the “cultural exchange with foreign peoples.”123 To be sure, many offi-
cial efforts to engender a more accommodating stance toward foreigners went 
nowhere, but it was precisely the ensuing frustrations that made these fields an 
120 American Consulate, Frankfort-on-Main, to State Dept., June 22, 1922, “Paraphrase of Edi-
torial in the Frankfurter Zeitung,” NARA RG 59 Box 9623 862.111/164.
121 German Legation, Stockholm, to AA, Apr. 8, 1922, PA R64853.
122 Aufzeichnung (Kulturabteilung), Oct. 31, 1922, PA R65519.
123 Aufzeichnung (Kulturabteilung) für den Herrn Reichsminister, Nov. 29, 1922, PA R60002.
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official responsibility in the end. At the Wilhelmstrasse, every scientific con-
ference German professors declined to attend, every pestered tourist, every 
rejected international student only hardened its resolve to establish a greater 
measure of official control once the opportunity arose.
*
Under the conditions of inflation, however, this was not going to happen. Of 
course, the Foreign Ministry did achieve some smaller successes from time to 
time, but it could not maintain them for long. Whenever a new phase of infla-
tion came, any reductions in tourist surcharges or international student fees 
that it had painstakingly negotiated over months was immediately reversed. 
No appeal to patriotic service or invocation of French competition could make 
the German tourist industry or universities forfeit this source of extra income 
at a time when their financial foundations were rapidly being eroded. And 
no rational argument could overcome the “more or less pathological state of 
mind” of many Germans who blamed their malaise on foreign actions. In other 
words, the German public could not be convinced that foreigners needed to 
be cultivated at a time when foreigners were seen as Germany’s very problem. 
Minor exceptions aside, the inflation provided neither the economic nor the 
psychological climate for systematic public diplomacy.
The situation in America clearly attests to this. By late 1922, four years af-
ter the armistice, German inroads in the United States were still remarkably 
modest. Efforts to regain a measure of trust and sympathy had hardly reached 
beyond German Americans and a very small group of American liberals.124 
In early 1923, the Foreign Ministry’s America Department prepared a list of 
“influential pro-German Americans” that shows just how little Germany di-
plomacy had accomplished. Of the only two dozen names on the list, all were 
German-American and none was truly “influential.”125 Recurring bouts of na-
tivism and wartime resentment, a lack of networks and sympathetic interlocu-
tors, and the financial and psychological impact of inflation all stifled German 
endeavors. As Germany entered the period of hyperinflation in the early fall of 
1922, American opinion seemed to have moved no closer to intervening in the 
reparations struggle on Germany’s behalf.
124 This was also the basic conclusion Ambassador Wiedfeldt drew from the thoroughly pessi-
mistic picture of American interests and attitudes he presented to Germany’s leading industrial-
ists in the summer of 1922; see Wiedfeldt in Schröder, Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter 
der Weimarer Republik, 199.
125 Liste von einflussreichen pro-dt. Amerikanern [list of influential pro-German Americans], 
ca. 1923, PA R80295: the list included Prof. John A Mandel, Rudolph Pagenstecher, Fr. Professor 
von Klenze, Prof. Dr. Julius Hofmann, Otto L. Schmidt, Albert O Troetel, Ferdinand Thun, John 
D. Horst, Prof. John A Walz, Howard E Wurlitzer, Godfray Schirmer, and Charles Nagel.
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Germany’s Year of Crises and the Move toward Public Diplomacy, 1923–1924
1923 has rightly been called Germany’s “year of crises.” On January 11, 1923, 
following a German default on coal and timber deliveries, French and Belgian 
troops occupied the industrial Ruhr as a “productive pledge” for German rep-
aration payments. In response to this dramatic climax of the reparations strug-
gle, the German government proclaimed a policy of passive resistance in the 
Ruhr. Intended to render the occupation economically futile, it only hastened 
Germany’s financial breakdown. By November 1923, left- and right-wing coups 
shook the republic. Un- and underemployment numbers had soared to un-
precedented heights. One dollar bought 4,210,500,000,000 marks.
Ironically, this time of profound crisis would bring Germany closer to a 
policy field as elusive as cultural diplomacy. The experiences of 1923 reaffirmed 
the German government’s policy of caution toward the United States under 
conditions of extreme duress, underlined its need to reorganize international 
cultural relations, and, not least, occasioned the long anticipated reversal of 
American sentiment. It was during Germany’s greatest trials in the fall of 1923 
that the Foreign Ministry and private groups adopted a more coherent cultural 
approach distinct from the wartime legacy of propaganda. In the end, Ger-
many would have a clearer idea of how to facilitate cultural rapprochement and 
a better chance of achieving it.
*
The Ruhr crisis brought the question of American public sentiment into sharp 
relief. With economic odds stacked against it, Berlin was determined to capi-
talize on what it considered an act of French aggression in the “midst of peace.” 
As the chief press officer of the Foreign Ministry outlined in early 1923, Ger-
many needed to use the French occupation to score a decisive moral victory in 
the eyes of the world,126 and especially in the United States, where this turn of 
events, it was hoped, would permit the U. S. administration to become involved 
in the reparations question.127 As the German ambassador to Washington ex-
plained in his report of January 7, which he wrote in anticipation of the French 
advance into the Ruhr, Germany should broadcast all social and economic 
126 W 236, Aufzeichnung, Jan. 15, 1923, PA W Ruhr, Propaganda, Die Besetzung des Ruhrgebi-
ets, Propaganda, Vol. I, 1923. Reichskanzlei (Hamm) Circular, “Aufzeichnung des Pressechefs 
der Reichsregierung über die Aufklärungsarbeit im In- und Ausland,” Apr. 18, 1923, in ADAP, 
Serie A, Band VII, 469–476.
127 Cuno to Leiter der Presseabteilung der Reichsregierung, Feb. 23, 1923, PA W Ruhr, Propa-
ganda, Die Besetzung des Ruhrgebiets, Propaganda, Vol. I, 1923; see Stresemann’s assessment in 
Berg, Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten, 130; Wiedfeldt to AA, “Graf Kesslers Unterredun-
gen mit Hughes und Castle,” July 31, 1923, ADAP, Serie A, Vol. 8, Document No. 89, 232–234.
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disturbances that developed during the occupation immediately, presenting 
France as an aggressive and militaristic power seeking not reparations but its 
former enemy’s territorial dismemberment and long-term economic prostra-
tion. If Germany took this strategy, the Ruhr occupation could isolate France, 
place pressure on its currency, force it back into negotiations, and, finally, with 
U. S. support, settle the reparations question.128 In short, the Ruhr crisis, if por-
trayed in the right way, could facilitate America’s “return” to Europe.
While the ends were clear, officials heatedly debated the means to adopt 
throughout the first half of 1923. Berlin’s policy relied predominantly on the 
press. The Foreign Ministry’s press department channeled information through 
German news agencies, encouraged prominent Germans to write articles in 
international periodicals, and distributed materials through private and osten-
sibly private organizations.129 But the most effective work, it believed, was to 
be done in the United States itself. Beginning in mid-January 1923, the press 
department sent daily news cables on French “atrocities” to Washington, which 
it expected the embassy to somehow place in the American press.130 Scholars 
have concluded that the Ruhr crisis in many regards meant a return to wartime 
mentalities – a cultural remobilization. This was certainly the case with regard 
to propaganda.
The German embassy in Washington, in contrast, advocated a low-profile 
approach. It was adamant that caution was needed more than ever as Amer-
icans were divided on the Ruhr occupation and the Republican Harding ad-
ministration was taking a decidedly neutral stance.131 Though Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes had already suggested that the United States could 
participate in a reparations conference of businessmen in late December 1922, 
he was convinced that Europe needed to enjoy its “own bit of chaos” before 
it would be ripe for American intervention.132 That Americans would, in the 
meantime, not respond well to European propaganda efforts became appar-
ent when the otherwise so cautious French opened a public relations office in 
New York City in early 1923 that drew significant American criticism.133 “In this 
128 Wiedfeldt to AA, “Politische Lage,” Jan. 7, 1923, in ADAP, Serie A, Vol. 7, No. 14, 38–41.
129 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, June 18, 1923, PA R 80296; see the activities in PA R 
121349.
130 See the collection in PA Botschaft Washington, 1240, Telegramme betreffend: Wirkung der 
französischen Ruhraktion, 1922–1923.
131 Wiedfeldt to AA, July 20, 1923, “Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten,” ADAP, Serie A, 
Vol. 8, No. 76, 185.
132 Quoted in Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten, 134.
133 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, April 29, 1923, “Fremde Propaganda in den USA,” 
PA R 80295.
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country,” Ambassador Wiedfeldt repeatedly proclaimed, “propaganda is only 
disadvantageous.”134
Although the embassy’s advice was well-founded, it was hard to commu-
nicate to a “home front” that attributed America’s lack of support to a lack of 
propaganda. Throughout the spring, zealous German and German-American 
visitors to the embassy believed they had found the solution to the alleged Ger-
man propaganda problem.135 German publicists, politicians, and businessmen 
submitted detailed propaganda plans to the Wilhelmstrasse and even outfitted 
vanguard groups to scout out publicity opportunities in the United States.136 
One business-funded propaganda hub submitted a confidential 16-page mem-
orandum to Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, outlining the establishment of a grand 
German propaganda apparatus in the United States at the phenomenal cost of 
$7 million (the embassy’s quarterly press fund at that time amounted to $100). 
This plan envisioned movies, lecture tours, and brochures, all in the service of 
what it deemed the “urgent readjustment” of American public opinion.137
On July 20, 1923, with calls for propaganda and Berlin news cables arriv-
ing on the embassy’s doorstep non-stop, Ambassador Wiedfeldt penned a 41-
page clarification about the situation for German and “enemy” propaganda in 
the United States that decisively shifted Germany’s postwar debate. Wiedfeldt 
painted a pessimistic picture of the German situation, juxtaposing it with that 
of France. France, he lamented, still fed off a great amount of wartime sympathy 
and had gained the favor of large swaths of American elites and opinion-shap-
ing circles. For one thing, American women were bedazzled by the fashion and 
charm of Paris, and, for another, American academics, the American Legion, 
most churches, and large foundations like the Carnegie Endowment were all 
sympathetic to France. Its strongest supporters were America’s first families, 
who “annually go to do their shopping in Paris, whose daughters are brought 
up in French finishing schools, and who – if they served as nurses in the war – 
now think back to this time with delight.” A host of language schools, theaters, 
museums, and other cultural institutions, had helped the French succeed in 
maintaining and institutionalizing their favored wartime position. Ambassa-
dor Jules Jusserand, who had been in Washington for twenty years, generously 
bestowed French decorations upon Americans, “surely,” Wiedfeldt commented 
bitterly, finding some words “for France and against Germany” in the process. 
134 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Mar. 15, 1923, PA R 121326; the advice he formu-
lated throughout was to work on American news correspondents in Berlin, not through the em-
bassy.
135 For Wiedfeldt’s amusing account of these suggestions, see Wiedfeldt to AA, July 20, 1923, 
“Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten,” ADAP, Serie A, Vol. 8, No. 76.
136 See the report by Haniel and Burgers (early 1923), PA R 80295.
137 Rhein-Ruhr, Freie Arbeitsgemeinschaft wirtschaftlicher Verbände, “Denkschrift über die 
Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika,” to Wilhelm Cuno, PA R 80296; the 
embassy’s response: German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Sep. 6 1923, PA R80296.
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But the true core of France’s propaganda, Wiedfeldt believed, was the special 
treatment and attention French officials accorded American news correspond-
ents in Paris. In this way, the French had negatively influenced Germany’s im-
age, highlighting its instability, low tax rates, and flight of capital. In the “fa-
vorable context” of the postwar years, Wiedfeldt concluded, “the French prop-
aganda has been able to play itself out at will.”138
Germany’s situation was starkly different. Germany, Wiedfeldt made clear, 
had neither the “means nor the opportunity” to do anything resembling the 
French campaign. No strong, usable economic ties currently existed between 
Germany and the United States. The churches, women’s groups, and academic 
circles were mostly “anti-German,” and German Americans still had no ap-
preciable influence on mainstream opinion. Widespread suspicion, a lack of 
financial resources, and the absence of respectable American advocates for the 
German cause had hampered the embassy’s previous efforts, leading to “mea-
ger” results.139 Given the generally hostile climate and the size and diversity 
of the United States, it was “a hopeless endeavor,” Wiedfeldt argued, for Ger-
man propaganda to try to reach even five percent of the population. Whereas 
France could rely on the remnants of inter-Allied infrastructure and goodwill, 
Germany was left with “nothing,” the war having “cut all ties.” “Every single 
thread,” the ambassador wrote, “has to be knotted anew, has to be spun out and 
tightened bit by bit.”140
Wiedfeldt wrote his long report in the critical weeks of the Ruhr crisis, pri-
marily as an attempt to tamp down expectations that the United States would 
immediately intervene, and to relieve pressure on the embassy. His admoni-
tions went beyond calculated pessimism, however; above all, he pleaded for 
a more realistic assessment of the powers of propaganda. As a businessman, 
Wiedfeldt regarded the notion of propaganda as an effective weapon one could 
wield at will as absurd because, aside from the special constraints Germany 
was facing, the ultimate aim of German propaganda – American involvement 
in the reparations question – simply lay “beyond the reach of propaganda.”141 
Indeed, after half a year of German efforts, Americans seemed just as divided 
over and, generally, more apathetic about the European crisis than at the out-
set. This was not because there was not enough German propaganda, Wied-
feldt argued, but because propaganda was just not that powerful. To believe 
that a masterful stroke of public diplomacy could convince the United States to 
take immediate action, Wiedfeldt remarked, was tantamount to a mere “belief 
in miracles.” What Germany needed was not more propaganda but a modern 
138 Report of the German Embassy, Washington, July 20, 1923, “Propaganda in den Vereinigten 
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press and information policy that influenced American news about Germany 
where it was actually made: in Berlin. Instead of sending press releases to the 
embassy in Washington, German officials needed to try and cultivate contacts 
with American news correspondents back in Berlin. Providing them with swift 
and accurate information, the ambassador believed, was the only way to gener-
ate more favorable coverage of Germany.
While paying attention to American news correspondents was certainly at 
the heart of Wiedfeldt’s suggestions, he considered it just as necessary for Ger-
many to systematically cultivate cultural and personal ties to the United States. 
This is clear from his substantial focus on French cultural influence as well as a 
number of discrete steps he took in that direction. Not only did he consistently 
highlight the political impact of angering U. S. tourists, as we have seen, but he 
also repeatedly asked for a German theologian to speak in front of American 
churches and universities.142 As he had already noted in late 1922: “One can 
only get at 115 million people by getting in touch with the intellectually leading 
forces; besides the press, these are the schools, the universities and church or-
ganizations […] If a change in attitude can be effected among these circles, the 
impact will trickle down and broaden by itself.”143 All in all, the ambassador ar-
gued, Germany had to let go of its short-term perspective and engage in more 
systematic image-building efforts. Only in this way could it “change the lack of 
information and one-sided sentiment […and] prepare the ground for future 
events and decisions.”144
While Wiedfeldt was not the first to formulate such recommendations, his 
advice carried considerably greater weight because it was packaged in a 41-page 
report at the very height of the Ruhr crisis. As scholars have shown, his report 
went on to serve as a blueprint for German public diplomacy in the United 
States in the 1920s.145 It was no coincidence that Foreign Minister Stresemann, 
only a few months later, introduced regular press conferences for international 
news correspondents for the first time and convened the Foreign Ministry’s 
Cultural Advisory Council, which had been dormant since 1921.146 Ironically, 
the Foreign Ministry finally adopted a public relations approach more coher-
ent and more neatly separated from the wartime legacy of propaganda at the 
142 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 16, 1923, “Einladung eines deutschen Theolo-
gen nach Amerika,” PA R 121326.
143 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Dec. 27, 1922, PA R 80295.
144 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, July 20, 1923, “Propaganda in den Vereinigten 
Staaten,” ADAP, Serie A, Vol. 8, No. 76.
145 Robert Gottwald, Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Stresemann (Berlin, 
1965), 16.
146 The Foreign Ministry’s “Cultural Advisory Council” was to secure public support for pro-
grams deemed politically useful and had been planned since 1921, but Stresemann was the one 
who reactivated the idea and arranged its very first meeting in early 1924; see Stresemann to 
Schenck (Reichsverband der Deutschen Hochschulen), Nov. 30, 1923, BArch R 8088/640.
“Propaganda Is Only Disadvantageous in this Country” 155
height of the German crisis in late 1923. In November 1923, the Kulturabteilung 
declared that its primary objective would henceforth be “the support and deep-
ening of cultural relations [with foreign countries], that is, cultural propaganda 
in its very widest sense” in order to slowly re-establish Germany’s moral stand-
ing in the world.147 It took the shock of the Ruhr occupation for Berlin to truly 
re-evaluate its approach to public relations in the United States.
*
Equally important, however, was the marked shift in some segments of Ger-
man and American public opinion that Germany’s year of crisis prompted. 
Detlev Peukert perceptively characterized late 1923 as Germany’s “zero hour,” 
the moment that laid bare the futility of its postwar approaches, precipitat-
ing a fundamental reappraisal. This was as true for official policy as it was for 
many of the peaceful revisionists we will encounter in the following chapters. 
The experiences of 1923 – the recurrence of war in the midst of peace – finally 
convinced a group of German liberals that the policy of intransigence was sure 
to end in disaster. While they had always disagreed with the tenets of the scien-
tific “counterboycott,” liberal professors like Alfred Weber at the University of 
Heidelberg and publicists like Ernst Jäckh in Berlin now realized that Germa-
ny’s isolation, from within and without, might cost it its place among nations, 
paralyze its cultural development, and render a generation of young Germans 
provincial.148 At the peak of the Ruhr crisis, many of them demobilized cultur-
ally and began to push reconciliation with the West, primarily with the pow-
erful United States. From 1923 onwards, a growing number of these peaceful 
revisionists resumed transatlantic contacts or encouraged their students to 
venture across the Atlantic.149 Whether this new interest in America could have 
withstood continued American apathy is impossible to say. Fortunately, it was 
never put to the test.
Indeed, in November and December of 1923, by all contemporary accounts, 
American opinion changed dramatically in Germany’s favor. Whereas Amer-
icans had seemed largely apathetic, even hostile, toward Germany as late as 
August, Counselor of Embassy Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff attested to a com-
plete reversal of opinions just three months later: “Increasingly the idea that 
America entered the war against Germany with a wrong mindset is gaining 
147 Aufzeichnung [betreffend “Urteile über Bedeutung der Pflege kult. Beziehungen,” Kultur-
abteilung], Dec. 8, 1923, PA R60445.
148 Alfred Weber to Reichspräsident, Sep. 20, 1924, PA R63121.
149 For example, the Munich physicist Arnold Sommerfeld floated the idea of initiating an ex-
change of assistants with American universities; AA to Sommerfeld, VI B 2504 II, Apr. 5, 1924, 
NL 89 Arnold Sommerfeld, 030, Mappe Hochschulangelegenheiten, Archiv des Deutschen Mu-
seums, München.
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currency; ever greater is the discomfort that America was so involved in draft-
ing the Versailles peace. I cannot stress just how strongly this turnabout in 
public opinion has begun to manifest itself recently.”150 This change was due 
less to any special American regard for Germany than to increasing concern 
about France’s actions and their consequences for European stability. In the 
postwar years, the U. S. had gradually grown estranged from France over 
war debt and rearmament. In this context, France’s military enforcement of 
the peace treaty, given its lack of positive results, truly alienated many Amer-
icans.151 In particular, the Stresemann government’s decision to end passive 
resistance in September 1923 made the French look even more aggressive. At 
the same time, left- and right-wing coups, as well as the impending financial 
collapse and territorial disintegration of Germany, elicited widespread concern 
that the Weimar Republic might not survive. The developments of 1923, thus, 
ended the “one-sided moral indictment” of Germany that had prevailed since 
1914.152 Instead, it provoked many Americans to return to their traditional view 
that power politics and militarism were more of a general European malaise 
than a specifically German problem. More importantly still, these events fed 
a growing conviction that only American common sense could solve Europe’s 
seemingly endless squabbles. In late 1923, the Harding administration decided 
that Germany had now enjoyed enough of its “own bit of chaos.” Bolstered by 
public sentiment, it used its creditor position to push France to accept a settle-
ment of the reparations question under U. S. guidance. The Dawes expert com-
mittee, an international commission headed by American businessmen, would 
organize this American involvement in a deliberately nonstate way. Even so, 
Europeans widely (and rightly) saw this step as a U. S. “return” to Europe.
Nevertheless, America also “returned” in ways other than this economic 
and financial involvement. Changing American sentiments also entailed 
broader sympathetic concern for Germany for the first time since 1914. New re-
lief drives for German children and students now gained wider Anglo-Amer-
ican interest, and American elites were more likely to welcome German cler-
gymen and scholars back into their midst.153 Five years after the war, and faced 
150 Dieckhoff to Bülow, Dec. 19, 1923, cited in Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften, 81.
151 Keylor, “How They Advertised France,” 371.
152 Müller, Auswärtige Pressepolitik und Propaganda, 139; Reuben Clarence Lang, “Die Mein-
ung in den USA über Deutschland im Jahr des Ruhrkampfes und des Hitlerputsches,” Saeculum 
17 (1966): 402–416; Schoenthal, “American Attitudes Toward Germany,” 145, concludes that the 
Ruhr invasion made Americans come closer to a pro-German viewpoint “not due to any particu-
lar enthusiasm for Germany, but rather to the widespread and bitter criticism of France.”
153 In the winter of 1923/24, America’s Protestant churches and even parts of the American 
Legion supported a large, nationwide relief drive for German children organized under the lead-
ership of General Henry T. Allen, the former commander of American troops in the Rhineland. 
On the organization and the results of the campaign, see Henry T. Allen Papers, Box 29, Ameri-
can Committee for the Relief of German Children, LoC.
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with Germany’s imminent collapse, American internationalists culturally 
demobilized.154 Nowhere was this change more visible than in the previously 
irreconcilable academic field. In the early months of 1924, an American relief 
campaign for German intellectuals and artists enlisted the support of several 
prominent university men, many of whom had carefully avoided involvement 
with Germany since 1914.155 In the face of the Ruhr occupation, even Nicholas 
Murray Butler gave up his decade-long presidency of the France-America So-
ciety and advocated American financial and moral support for Germany. By 
early 1924, the “cultural blockade” was rapidly breaking down.
*
Germany’s incipient public diplomacy played only a modest role in paving 
the way for U. S. economic engagement with Germany. In mid-1924, when 
the Dawes Plan and the subsequent London Conference settled the repara-
tions question and allowed for American capital to flow into Germany, cul-
tural relations between the two nations were still tenuous and scant, especially 
compared to the prewar period. Actually, the ensuing economic cooperation 
hastened and deepened the rebuilding of cultural ties rather than the other 
way around. In fact, American investments in Germany placed transatlantic 
relations on a new psychological footing, giving American creditors a vested 
interest in Germany’s future prosperity. Attributing the U. S. entry into the war 
at least partly to its financial entanglement with the Allies, Foreign Minister 
Stresemann was not alone in identifying American loans as Germany’s most 
meaningful psychological asset in the United States. Once Americans were fi-
nancially committed, he noted in September 1924, Germany could count on 
an “army of supporters” overseas that would not tolerate strong anti-German 
propaganda, foreign sanctions, or anything else imperiling their investment.156 
This was the atmosphere in which the zeppelin took its transatlantic journey, 
giving rise to a new rhetoric of transatlantic cooperation. As Stresemann ex-
plained in a programmatic foreign policy speech on November 13, 1924, the 
recent entanglement of German and U. S. material interests had already posi-
tively affected the “friendly rapprochement” between the two nations:
The flight of the zeppelin to the United States, this masterpiece of German 
technology and German daring, has been met with the most cordial respect 
154 In late 1922, the Rockefeller Foundation, for example, began to support German medical 
research; see Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report 1922, 338–339.
155 Ludwig Bendix to Wiedfeldt, Jan. 31, 1924, PA Botschaft Washington, 1534 Ludwig Stein.
156 “Stresemann Rede auf dem Parteitag des Berliner Wahlkreisverbandes der DVP, Sep. 
27 1924,” in Gustav Stresemann. Reden der Kanzler- und Außenministerzeit (1923–1929), ed. 
Wolfgang Elz, 410–25, 414 https://neuestegeschichte.uni-mainz.de/files/2018/07/Strese-
mann-Reden_1924.pdf (last acc. July 24, 2020).
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in the United States and has deepened both countries’ conviction that they, in 
peaceful cooperation, are called to contribute to the solution of the cultural 
tasks (Kulturaufgaben) that face mankind.157
Political rhetoric aside, the flight of the zeppelin marked only the begin-
ning of a long and arduous campaign to rewin American “hearts and minds.” 
Germany had finally secured initial American engagement, yet its ambitions 
would continue to depend on American goodwill. In a few years’ time, the pro-
visions of the Dawes settlement would have to be renegotiated, and U. S. senti-
ment toward Germany would partly determine how favorable they would be. 
As Ambassador Wiedfeldt concluded in late 1924, “whether America wants to 
help us and in how far it can do so will depend on the attitudes of the Amer-
ican administration and public opinion.”158 Although postwar animosity had 
abated, Germany enjoyed neither the particular interest nor the trust of the 
American public. And while German financial and political stabilization once 
again facilitated long-term planning and eased Germans’ resentments towards 
their former enemies, the end of inflation also made German cultural and eco-
nomic exports expensive. For the first time since the war, Germany’s tourist 
destinations and universities, like its manufacturers, had to compete under 
market conditions. With the inflation over, the real work had just begun.
*
The early 1920s turned out to be a transformative period. There were few con-
crete programs or accomplishments in this period, yet it set the course for 
much of what was to come. A brief review of why so little “happened” seems 
apt at this point. For one, the plans developed in anticipation of German vic-
tory were ill-suited to the psychological and financial realities of the postwar 
period. Pervasive American nativism, continuing anti-German sentiment, and 
the long absence of peaceful relations hampered the operations even of com-
paratively well-established actors like the Amerika-Institut. Arguably, how-
ever, the most significant hurdles lay in Germany itself. Germany’s traditional 
“cultural diplomats” were reluctant to resume a transatlantic role after the pro-
found disappointments of the war and inflation proved to be both a financial 
and psychological liability. Throughout the early 1920s, Germany was not just 
isolated: it isolated itself. Under these circumstances, Germany was not able to 
successfully utilize opportunities to improve its image, like American tourism.
Nevertheless, the very prevalence of these constraints fostered the expan-
sion of public diplomacy after 1924. The specific frustrations of the postwar 
157 “Rede in der Sitzung des Zentralvorstandes der DVP in Dortmund, Nov 13, 1924,” in ibid., 
438–55, 449 https://neuestegeschichte.uni-mainz.de/files/2018/07/Stresemann-Reden_1924.pdf 
(last acc. July 24, 2020).
158 Wiedfeldt to AA, Nov. 15, 1924; cited in Schröder, ed., Otto Wiedfeldt, 232.
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period encouraged commitment to cultural undertakings among private and 
official groups. Paradoxically, the Foreign Ministry adopted a more coherent 
approach to public diplomacy, aiming to manage fields that had long been out-
side the purview of the traditionalist Foreign Service, during the crisis of late 
1923. The experience of isolation and the resumed hostilities in the “midst of 
peace” prompted liberal German groups, too, to reappraise the German situa-
tion. Importantly, their cultural demobilization was mirrored across the Atlan-
tic. Faced with the specter of unrest and disorder in Europe, Americans grew 
friendlier toward Germany – or at least less friendly toward France – after late 
1923. When German currency stabilized in November 1923 and Americans in-
vested in Germany after the fall of 1924, this forged tangible connections and 
a new psychological climate between the two nations. Collectively, these de-
velopments precipitated an explosion of cultural endeavors from 1924 onward.

Part II  
Peaceful Revision: Winning American Hearts and 
Minds, 1924–1929

Backdrop: Peaceful Revision and Peaceful Revisionists, 1924–1929
For the Weimar Republic, the years 1924 to 1929 were a period of “relative sta-
bilization.” Domestically, it enjoyed broader political support than ever before. 
Coalition governments included or were tolerated by parties ranging across 
almost the entire political spectrum, from the National Conservatives (DNVP) 
to the Social Democrats (SPD). At the same time, foreign investments, pro-
ductivity, and the standard of living increased. Internationally, Foreign Min-
ister Gustav Stresemann (1923–1929) and State Secretary Carl von Schubert 
(1924–1930) steered a policy course of “peaceful revision” and reconciliation 
with the West. By satisfying French security needs and integrating Germany 
more tightly in the European system, Stresemann aimed at achieving a gradual 
and consensual revision of the peace treaty’s most odious terms: to throw off 
inter-Allied controls, decrease reparations payments, end the occupation of the 
Rhineland, and revise the eastern borders.
This policy of reconciliation, as many scholars have pointed out, differed 
from earlier approaches in its consensus-oriented means more than in its ul-
timate objectives. Stresemann, no less than most Germans of his age and ed-
ucation, desired first and foremost a return to German great power status and 
always thought in terms of Germany’s national interest;1 yet he realized that co-
operation, not confrontation, offered the most realistic and promising course 
to this end. Rather than harnessing Germany’s controversial (and unavailable) 
military might, he relied on its more acceptable economic power to pursue 
Germany’s national interests within the constraints of the postwar international 
order.2 As Karl Dietrich Erdmann poignantly put it, Stresemann pursued a “na-
tional policy of revision as [an] international policy of conciliation.”3 However, 
historians continue to debate whether – and for how long – this amounted to 
a genuinely “Republican Foreign Policy,” that is, a foreign policy different from 
its predecessor in both its means and its ends, as Peter Krüger has held.4 What 
is certain is that Stresemann’s multilateral strategy was quite successful, at least 
in hindsight. The “economic peace” at the London reparations conference of 
1924 was followed by the “political peace” at the Locarno Conference in 1925. 
Germany’s admission to the League of Nations in 1926 signaled its return to the 
family of nations as an equal (if not entirely sovereign) power. To be sure, the 
inherent tension between revisionist ends and conciliatory means was never 
entirely resolved, and rightwing criticism of the policy of reconciliation never 
1 Eberhard Kolb and Dirk Schumann, Die Weimarer Republik, 8th edition (Munich, 2013), 251.
2 Gottfried Niedhart, Die Außenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 2006), 39.
3 Erdmann, quoted in Impekoven, Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, 156.
4 Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar, 43.
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entirely subsided.5 Still, Germany’s international position improved notably in 
the mid-1920s, which, in turn, contributed to its domestic stabilization.
Though the United States never officially took part in these European de-
velopments, it played an important role in German foreign policy. Stresemann’s 
pursuit of an economic foreign policy pivoted on the United States, and he was 
convinced, as he told the German ambassador to Washington Ago von Maltzan 
(1925–1927) in 1925, that “the determination of Europe’s future depends in the 
last analysis on the United States.”6 During his tenure as foreign minister, Stre-
semann pursued an accommodationist Amerikapolitik that courted the United 
States for financial and, tacitly, political support. This Amerikapolitik “paid” off, 
in the literal sense of the word. In the five years after 1924, U. S. financiers in-
vested more than $3 billion in German companies, municipalities, and state 
bonds, thereby underwriting Weimar’s “relative” political and economic sta-
bilization.7 Throughout the 1920s, a strong mutuality of interests and methods 
undergirded German-American relations: the German policy of recapturing 
its international position by way of economic recovery aligned with the U. S. 
inclination to conduct world affairs through informal economic diplomacy;8 
and Germany’s desire for a peaceful revision of the new international order 
created at Versailles dovetailed with an American policy of consensual “peace-
ful change” in Europe.9 In the mid-1920s, both countries shared a commitment 
to Germany’s economic reconstruction within a consolidated European sys-
tem.
If the development and positive consequences of Germany’s predominantly 
economic Amerikapolitik have been extensively researched, the next three 
chapters illuminate a lesser-known aspect of German peaceful revisionism in 
the United States. They explore German efforts to rebuild and strengthen trans-
atlantic ties through a broader public relations campaign. As we will show, We-
imar’s Germandom policy (Chapter 4), academic diplomacy (Chapter 5), and 
travel promotion (Chapter 6) tied in closely with larger foreign policy objec-
tives. Collectively, they leave no doubt that Germany’s economic appeals were 
accompanied by a quite substantial, concerted cultural Amerikapolitik that 
5 Detlef Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York, 1993), 195.
6 Stresemann to Maltzan, Apr. 7, 1925, quoted in Andreas Dorpalen, “American Isolationism 
and German Foreign Policy During the Weimar Era,” in Deutschland und die USA, 1918–1933, 
ed. Georg Eckert, 44–52 (Braunschweig, 1968), 44.
7 American financial investments in Germany were so substantial that Werner Link spoke of 
Germany as a “penetrated system.” Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik.
8 On U. S. informal diplomacy more generally, see Melvyn Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America’s 
Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979); Rosen-
berg, Spreading the American Dream; Costigliola, Awkward Dominion.
9 Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten; Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspoli-
tik; Frank Costigliola, “The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s,” 
Business History Review 50, no. 4 (1976): 477–502.
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aimed to strengthen U. S. commitment to German reconstruction by building 
trust and sympathy across the Atlantic. Just as, in Detlev Peukert’s words, “Stre-
semann mobilized Germany’s economic potential as a way of enhancing her 
political weight in the world,” so, too, did he – and certainly not he alone – sys-
tematically mobilize Germany’s cultural potential to the same end.10
*
Identifying Stresemann’s partners in this endeavor highlights a group that 
might best be characterized as peaceful revisionists. Werner Link showed that 
an “external foreign policy bureaucracy” of financial and business experts con-
ducted most financial and economic relations with the United States, yet trans-
atlantic cultural politics relied on informal cultural diplomats as well. These 
included academics, journalists, tourist organizers, businessmen, and the di-
rectors of semi-official “Amerika organizations,” all of whom operated outside, 
albeit often in close touch with, the German foreign policy establishment.11 
These men, and very few women, provided funds for transatlantic endeav-
ors, sat on the boards of academic exchange programs, directed semiofficial 
organizations like the Amerika-Institut or the Vereinigung Carl Schurz (see 
Chapter 5), or assumed quasi-diplomatic functions at transatlantic events and 
conferences. Among them were financier Max Warburg, industrialists like Carl 
Duisberg and Robert Bosch, parliamentarians like Anton Erkelenz, publicists 
like Ernst Jäckh, and a wide set of educators including the economists Moritz 
Julius Bonn and Alfred Weber, the legal scholar Albrecht Mendelssohn Bart-
holdy, and the university/science administrators Reinhold Schairer and Adolf 
Morsbach. Former diplomats like Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff and liberal 
officials like Prussian Minister of Culture Carl Heinrich Becker may also be 
counted among this group.12
While these peaceful revisionists had no single club, journal, or party 
in common, and they certainly never self-identified under that epithet, they 
shared a number of characteristics and convictions that makes it possible to 
identify them as a more or less distinct group: For one, they generally belonged 
to Germany’s educated urban bourgeoisie, the Bildungsbürgertum. They were 
products of Germany’s elitist school and university system, and nearly all of 
them held a doctorate, then the prerogative of only 0.0001 percent of the Ger-
man population. Their elite educational and bourgeois background endowed 
them with the sort of moral and cultural capital one acquired from mastering a 
10 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 198.
11 Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 565, 572.
12 A particularly telling career is that of Carl Heinrich Becker, professor and Prussian Minister 
of Culture during the Weimar years; see Guido Müller, Weltpolitische Bildung und Akademische 
Reform. Carl Heinrich Beckers Wissenschafts- und Hochschulpolitik 1908–1930 (Cologne, 1991).
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rigorous canon of literature, classical languages, and advanced scholarly work. 
At the same time, it shaped their ideas of Kultur and Germany’s position in 
the world. They self-identified as bearers of what they deemed a unique and in 
some respects superior German culture (Kulturträger), and though they were 
neither chauvinists, nor provincials, they felt that Germany had to recapture 
the prominent position in the world that it deserved from an intellectual and 
cultural standpoint.
Although they shared this background and outlook with large swaths of 
the German elite, they distinguished themselves by their generally positive at-
titude toward the republic. Among their ranks were a considerable number 
of “republicans by reason” (Vernunftrepublikaner), as well as some staunch 
democrats. Politically, most of them were associated with or leaned toward 
the left-liberal German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, 
DDP) and, during the Stresemann years, the export-oriented wing of his lib-
eral-conservative German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP). Most 
of them, like Stresemann himself, belonged to the generation born between 
1860 and 1885. Their formative experiences fell in the Kaiserreich years before 
1900, which were relatively calm on the international front, and they had al-
ready established successful careers when World War I broke out. This is true, 
for example, of Ernst Jäckh (b. 1875), who had been the editor-in-chief of sev-
eral newspapers and journals before the war; of Alfred Weber (b. 1868), who 
had held the chair in economics at the University of Heidelberg since 1907; of 
Moritz Julius Bonn (b. 1873), who had been the founding director of Munich’s 
Handelshochschule (commercial college), as well as an economics professor 
there, from 1910 onward; and of Carl Duisberg (b. 1861), who had directed one 
of the world’s largest chemical companies, Bayer, since 1900. Whereas World 
War I largely shaped the “front generation” and the war child/youth genera-
tion, it was not the defining moment in the biographies of these men.13
In contrast to many others of their generation, however, these Vernunftre-
publikaner had often been critics of certain aspects of Wilhelmine Germany, 
including its conduct of foreign policy. Indeed, many of them had championed 
a peaceful, liberal imperialism before the war and had advocated economic 
and cultural expansion as a more promising alternative – or at least a neces-
sary complement – to Wilhelmine Weltpolitik. As Christoph Gusy showed, it 
was the combination of generational identity and the long-standing impetus 
for reform that determined their constructive stance toward the republic and, 
13 On these defining generational features of Weimar’s Vernunftrepublikaner, see Andreas 
Wirsching and Jürgen Eder, “‘Vernunftrepublikanismus’ in der Weimarer Republik. Neue 
Analysen und offene Fragen,” in Vernunftrepublikanismus in der Weimarer Republik. Politik, Lit-
eratur, Wissenschaft, ed. Andreas Wirsching and Jürgen Eder, 9–26 (Stuttgart, 2008), 18–20.
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arguably, their embrace of peaceful revision.14 To be sure, the group’s generally 
liberal persuasion made its members neither less patriotic nor less revisionist. 
On the contrary, they all shared in the broad revisionist consensus of their class 
and time and were often among the earliest and most determined critics of 
the Versailles settlement, which they regarded as deeply unjust and ultimately 
“peaceless.”15 What distinguished them from their more conservative peers was 
not so much their ultimate objective – Germany’s resurgence and recovery of 
its rightful place among nations – but the means they wished to adopt to this 
end. In keeping with their earlier ideas of “peaceful imperialism,” they now 
championed a consensual revision of Versailles and embraced a foreign policy 
built on soft power. For them, the best option for regaining Germany’s position 
in the world did not seem to be brooding intransigence, secret rearmament, or 
a spiteful orientation toward the East (as conservatives suggested), but détente 
and cooperation with the West.
The myriad initiatives they pursued toward the United States were one 
means toward that end. In their minds, a peaceful change of the Versailles or-
der required first and foremost a better understanding of the German situation 
abroad and an end to Germany’s “distorted image.” Alongside their consider-
able agitation against German “war guilt,” they thus devoted themselves to re-
building Germany’s international contacts and trust in it.16 Closer relations 
with the United States, an influential country outside of the European system, 
seemed particularly promising in this respect. Their ensuing cooperation with 
the United States and U. S. organizations like the Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace and the Institute of International Education thus expressed 
both their longer-standing internationalist convictions as well as their clear 
revisionist agenda. As Katharina Rietzler, Peter Weber, and others recently 
suggested, men like Ernst Jäckh are best understood as “national internation-
alists.”17 Like Stresemann himself, the group of peaceful revisionists believed 
in international cooperation in the national interest. This said, their special 
interest in the United States was sustained by ambitions other than inter-
national concerns: many German scholars looked to the prosperous United 
14 Christoph Gusy, “‘Vernunftrepublikanismus’ in der Staatsrechtswissenschaft der Weimarer 
Republik,” in Vernunftrepublikanismus in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Wirsching and Eder, 195–
217.
15 Jürgen C. Heß, ‘Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein’. Demokratischer Nationalismus in der We-
imarer Republik am Beispiel der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei (Stuttgart, 1978), 15.
16 Sitzung des Vorstandes der Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft, Jan. 1926; Allge-
meiner Bericht Dr. Schairers über seine Amerika-Reise, BArch R149/235.
17 Peter Weber, “Ernst Jäckh and the National Internationalism of Interwar Germany,” Central 
European History 52, no. 3 (2019): 402–423; Katharina Rietzler, “Philanthropy, Peace Research, 
and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Rela-
tions in Weimar Germany,” GHI Bulletin Supplement 5 (2008): 61–79; Jan Stöckmann, “Studying 
the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations Scholarship in Ger-
many, 1912–1933,” International History Review 38, no. 5 (2016): 1055–1080.
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States to sponsor their research, social reformers and businessmen sought to 
study Amerika as a potential solution to Germany’s social and economic woes, 
and the German export industry – especially chemical, electrical, and ship-
ping companies (IG Farben, AEG, Siemens, HAPAG, North German Lloyd) – 
wished to improve transatlantic trade and facilitate the transfer of technologi-
cal know-how. In short, the confluence of professional, political, and economic 
interests engendered their strong interest in the United States in the 1920s.
These men’s revisionist convictions and international contacts, as will be-
come clear in the following chapters, made them key partners for Germany’s 
official foreign policymakers in the 1920s. Their relations with Germany’s for-
eign policy establishment tended to be close, and sometimes extraordinarily 
so: the law professor Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (Hamburg) was en-
trusted with the delicate task of editing and publishing the Foreign Ministry’s 
prewar records, Ernst Jäckh and his Hochschule für Politik in Berlin trained 
the ministry’s attachés, and the economist Moritz Julius Bonn (Berlin) served 
as a governmental advisor and envoy to various reparations conferences. Of 
course, individual and state interests were not always identical. For example, 
Reinhold Schairer, a passionate internationalist with close ties to the Interna-
tional Student Christian Movement (and a principal organizer of academic 
exchange: see Chapter 5), remained foreign, even suspect, to many within the 
Foreign Ministry.18 At the same time, German diplomats recognized the great 
appeal that internationalist enthusiasm like Schairer’s had to Americans and 
the crucial role they could play in projecting an image of republican convic-
tion and stability.19 Throughout the 1920s, the German Foreign Ministry was 
clearly willing to support internationalist initiatives for the sake of a common 
revisionist agenda.
This is not to suggest that there was no ambivalence in German attitudes 
toward the United States. Sharing neither the naïve enthusiasm for America 
of segments of the political Left nor the rabid anti-Americanism of the politi-
cal Right, Germany’s peaceful revisionists were both hopeful and apprehensive 
about what American power would mean for Germany.20 German companies 
desired America’s cooperation just as they feared its competition;21 and the 
Bildungsbürgertum was far too steeped in German idealist thought not to pon-
der and dread the implications of “American” materialism, mechanization, and 
18 See Aufzeichnung AA (Zimmermann), ca. July 1926, PA R 64793.
19 Maltzan reported that he had taken Erkelenz to Anglo-American circles in the summer of 
1925 and he had “left the best of impressions everywhere”; German Embassy, Washington, to 
AA, Aug. 24, 1925, “Besuch des Reichstagsabgeordneten Erkelenz,” PA R 80297.
20 This was the case for the left-liberal DDP; see Heß, ‘Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein’, 283.
21 Werner Link described this ambivalent relationship as “competition through cooperation”; 
see Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 374–381.
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standardization for German culture.22 But even as they worried about Ameri-
ca’s ominous cultural and commercial expansion, Germany’s peaceful revision-
ists always understood the opportunity that the United States presented: it was 
across the Atlantic that Germany’s international position could be restored, 
and for this reason they set out to build a politically and economically desirable 
transatlantic “friendship.” The following three chapters will detail this effort.
22 See, for example, the statement by Alfred Weber in Christian Jansen, “Auf dem Mittelweg von 
rechts. Akademische Ideologie und Politik zwischen 1914 und 1933,” in Auch eine Geschichte der 




German Cultural Diplomacy Between German 
Americans and Anglo-Americans
With millions of Americans of German birth and descent, Germa-ny’s approaches to the United States differed fundamentally from those it took toward other Western countries. The large number of 
ethnic kin overseas was a defining feature of all German calculations, and the 
distinction between “Anglo-Americans” and “German Americans” was axio-
matic to most contemporaries. However problematic or simplistic this distinc-
tion may appear in hindsight, it profoundly shaped how German diplomats, 
journalists, and politicians thought about the landscape of American public 
opinion, and it defined the scope, direction, and content of German outreach 
in the United States. They generally recognized German Americans as a group 
of Americans particularly sympathetic to Germany, and they understood that 
Germany’s image was tightly bound to the standing of their ethnic brethren 
in American society. Just as Germany’s status as a friendly or hostile power 
affected American attitudes toward German Americans, so, too, did the esteem 
in which German Americans were held affect Germany’s standing overseas. 
This interdependence of the German and the German-American image ren-
dered German Americans a particular concern: whether as potential targets, 
partners, or saboteurs of German ambitions, they always had to be factored in.
This situation was not peculiar to the 1920s. Since about 1900, as we have 
seen, Germany had treated German Americans as a potential pro-German 
pressure group, and in the last decade before the war transatlantic visits by 
naval cruisers and exchange professors had aimed to maintain their ties to the 
fatherland. During the war, unrealistic assumptions about their unity, ethnic 
loyalty, and political influence had led to redoubled German mobilization 
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efforts – with disastrous results. As transatlantic relations soured, German 
Americans found themselves attacked as unreliable “hyphenates” and German 
agents on American soil. This process would repeat itself in a different guise 
after 1933, when Nazi agitators on both sides of the Atlantic once again cast 
doubt on the loyalty of parts of the German-American community. As it had 
during World War I, German agitation in the 1930s became the focus of public 
suspicion and congressional investigations.1
While this recurrence of German agitation and American suspicion may 
suggest a certain continuity from the Wilhelmine to the Nazi period, we lack 
a key piece of information crucial to evaluating the nature of this continuity, 
namely, information on Weimar’s policy. Indeed, our extensive knowledge 
about pre-1917 and post-1933 initiatives has no counterpart in the historiog-
raphy of Weimar’s approaches.2 In particular, there are no studies that place 
German strategies in the larger context of Weimar-era “Germandom policies,” 
on the one hand, and public diplomacy, on the other. This is lamentable not 
only because Germany’s dealings with German Americans offers one of the 
best indicators for continuity and discontinuity in its Amerikapolitik, but be-
cause these dealings had a very significant impact on transatlantic relations.
This chapter assesses the shifts in the intricate relationship between Ger-
mans, German Americans and Anglo-Americans. Throughout, it employs 
the terms “Anglo-American” and “German-American” – not because they ad-
equately express the complexity of ethnic identity in a multiethnic America 
but because this binary pervaded contemporary assessments. German repre-
sentatives in the United States are placed at the heart of the story. While this 
obscures some of the private initiatives (which do not seem to have ever been 
substantial), it uncovers and highlights the pivotal role that ambassadors and 
consuls played both in implementing and in formulating Germandom policy. 
In a field in which policy often remained underarticulated, personal initia-
tive and inclination could prove to be defining factors. All in all, the chapter 
suggests that a German disavowal of political agitation contributed markedly 
to reconciling German Americans and Anglo-Americans and, by extension, 
1 See U. S. Congress, Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda: Hearing before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Sixty-Fifth Congress Sec-
ond and Third Session Pursuant to German Americans. Res. 307 (Washington, 1919); and U. S. 
Congress, Investigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities and Investigation of Certain Other Propa-
ganda Activities, Public Hearings before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, 
House of Representatives, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1934).
2 See Wala, “Reviving Ethnic Identity,” 326–341; and Hans-Werner Retterath, “Deutschameri-
kanertum und Volkstumsgedanke. Zur Ethnizitätskonstruktion durch die auslandsdeutsche Kul-
turarbeit zwischen 1918 und 1945” (PhD diss. Marburg University, 2000); most research has fo-
cused on the “disappearance” vs. the “ethnic survival” of German Americans as an ethnic group; 
see Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community”; Russell Kazal, “Becoming ‘Old Stock’: 
The Waning of German-American Identity in Philadelphia, 1900–1930” (Phd diss. University of 
Pennsylvania, 1998).
Germandom Policies in the Weimar Republic: A Short Introduction 173
Germany and America. By the late 1920s, German attention was increasingly 
shifting from German Americans to Anglo-Americans, just as wealthier, bet-
ter-educated German Americans were once more assuming the role of media-
tors between the two countries.
Germandom Policies in the Weimar Republic: A Short Introduction
Before we delve into the intricacies of the American context, we must acknowl-
edge the prominent role accorded to “Germandom policies” (contemporaries 
spoke of Volkstumspolitik or Deutschtumspolitik) in postwar Germany. Prewar 
efforts to organize the broad German diaspora paled in comparison to the 
wide-ranging undertakings of the postwar period. After 1919, the study and 
cultivation of “Germans abroad” (Auslandsdeutsche) grew phenomenally. By 
the mid-1930s, no less than seventy-six institutes and organizations – many 
of them founded or greatly expanded in the 1920s – were active in this field, 
attempting to strengthen the emotional and intellectual ties to ethnic Germans 
around the world.3 Long-standing member organizations such as the Verein 
für das Deutschtum im Ausland in Berlin (est. 1881), wartime establishments 
like the Deutsches Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart (est. 1917), and postwar asso-
ciations like the Schutzbund in Berlin (est. 1919) and the Deutsche Akademie 
in Munich (est. 1925) were all devoted to various aspects of this project. On the 
ministerial level, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior set up 
richly funded Germandom sections, which helped to subsidize and coordinate 
the most important of these initiatives.4 With this broad ministerial, parlia-
mentary and popular support, Germandom activists had the means to spend 
millions of marks and an inestimable amount of time and energy circulating 
German publications, keeping up correspondence, and supporting German 
schools abroad. Whether they belonged to newly emerging German minorities 
in the territories lost after the war or to long-standing German “colonies” in 
Latin America and elsewhere, Auslandsdeutsche became the focus of signifi-
cant attention during the interwar period.
This commitment was fueled by a number of factors. For one, German 
ethnic nationalism had long facilitated the notion that collective cultural and 
ethnic (later, racial) attributes rather than national boundaries comprised the 
3 Arthur L. Smith, The Deutschtum of Nazi Germany and the United States (The Hague, 1965), 3; 
the bibliographies published in Der Auslandsdeutsche, the magazine of the Deutsches Aus-
land-Institut in Stuttgart, provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the extensive scholarly and 
popular interest in the subject in the 1920s.
4 On this coordination effort in the Foreign Ministry, see Aufzeichnung, Jan. 5, 1923, PA R 
60002.
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German nation.5 Ethnic Germans’ common experience of patriotic enthu-
siasm and anti-German resentment during World War I considerably deep-
ened their sense of a worldwide German “community of fate.” This was the 
connection that Germandom organizations set out to perpetuate beyond the 
end of the war. Similarly influential, however, were the immediate hardships 
that German minorities suffered in the postwar period. The territorial pro-
visions of the peace treaty had trapped millions of ethnic Germans beyond 
the Reich’s borders, giving rise to a broad political consensus that maintaining 
their livelihood and sense of ethnic belonging was a “right, duty and privilege” 
of the German nation.6 Notions of “Germans abroad” as a means of world-
wide influence reinforced these emotional factors. After the peace treaty, it was 
estimated that more than 30 million Germans were living beyond Germany’s 
national borders. Leading Germandom enthusiasts propagated the idea of a 
deterritorialized German nation of 100 million (Hundert-Millionen-Volk)7 
and hoped that their active association could compensate for some of the hard 
power that Germany had lost. As German outposts in the world, they could 
promote trade relations, spread German culture, and lobby for political con-
cessions. Thus, it was vital to the nation’s future that these ethnic Germans 
continue to feel German.8 Gustav Stresemann, who commented frequently 
on the importance of Germans in the world, deemed the creation of a “cul-
tural Volksgemeinschaft” a national task of prime importance.9 All postwar 
German governments considered Germandom and minority policies a major 
element of German foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the ultimate objectives, modes of operation, and degrees 
of official involvement in Germandom policies differed widely by region. In 
the lost territories, where about 10 million former German citizens now lived 
outside the Reich, Germandom policies tended to be richly funded, aggres-
5 It encompassed such positively connoted characteristics as industriousness and diligence, love 
of home, and “loyalty” (Treue), as well as negative ones like political naiveté and an excessive 
readiness to adapt to new circumstances at the expense of one’s own cultural heritage.
6 Hans Steinacher, “Kulturpolitik als Gemeinschaftsaufgabe,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte 28, no. 4 
(Jan. 1931); Rogers Brubaker, for example, sees Weimar Germany as a particularly intriguing 
case study for the idea of external homeland nationalism, which viewed those Germans – also 
now belonging to a different state – as truly belonging to the German “homeland”; Rogers 
Brubaker, “Accidental Diasporas and External Homelands’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Past 
and Present,” in Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis-)order, ed. Eliezer 
Ben – Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg, 461–482 (Leiden, 2009).
7 Otto Boelitz, Das Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtum. Seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung (Mu-
nich, 1930), 7.
8 Boelitz, Das Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtum, 5.
9 Stresemann, “Aufgaben der Kulturpolitik,” Dec. 13, 1925, in Gustav Stresemann: Vermächtnis, 
Vol. 2, ed. Henry Bernhard, 312–15 (Berlin, 1932), 313.
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sively pursued, and marked by a high degree of official involvement.10 Work-
ing through ostensibly private “front organizations,” the German government 
supported ethnic parties, provided substantial economic grants, and bolstered 
cultural programs to offset the effects of economic discrimination, political 
marginalization, and forced acculturation that Germans in the lost territories 
experienced.11 By maintaining German settlements and a German sense of 
identity, they hoped to lay the foundation for German irredentism in the East. 
Their immediate distress and their designated role in territorial revision made 
these Germans a priority for all official and unofficial efforts. In contrast, in-
terest in Germans overseas arose from “softer” revisionist objectives. In places 
with significant, economically secure ethnic “colonies” like Latin America, 
Germandom policies tended to be less aggressive in nature – working primar-
ily through the German school system – and aimed to use ethnic Germans as 
cultural and economic assets.12 Ethnically conscious “Germans abroad” were 
to aid the rehabilitation of the fatherland by opening up markets for German 
products, conveying German cultural achievements, and guaranteeing a fa-
vorable public climate for revisionist ideas in their respective host countries. In 
late 1923, a Foreign Ministry memorandum noted that only if Germans abroad 
“actively contribute to building and maintaining the intellectual and moral 
bridges to the world can we successfully leave behind our hopeless isolation 
and replace the utter lack of understanding, which is the best breeding ground 
for all incendiary and deceitful propaganda of the other side, with an accurate 
impression of the German character.”13
All in all, “Germandom policies” in their various guises became a defining 
feature of Weimar’s foreign relations. The fate of “Germans abroad” galvanized 
public and parliamentary support for a number of international programs 
and produced, at least numerically, notable successes. The system of German 
schools abroad, for example, recovered and even expanded from 853 schools 
with 48,000 students in 1913 to 1,600 schools with 80,000 students in 1933.14 
In theory, it was hoped that these ties to ethnic Germans would facilitate con-
10 Germandom policies in Poland certainly offer the most extreme example: Norbert Krekeler, 
Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik. Die Subventionierung der 
deutschen Minderheit in Polen 1919–33 (Stuttgart, 1973); John Hiden, “The Weimar Republic 
and the Problem of the Auslandsdeutsche,” Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977): 273–289, 
277.
11 Within just three years of the peace, for example, two-thirds of the 1.1 million Germans in 
the provinces of Poznan and West Prussia had left for the Reich; see Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch 
und geheime Ostpolitik, 48.
12 Rinke, Der Letzte Freie Kontinent, passim.
13 AA [Soehring] to Boelitz, Preuss. Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, 
Dec. 7, 1923, “Skizze zu der Frage der geistigen Beziehungen zwischen Auslandsdeutschtum und 
Heimat,” PA R 64853.
14 See Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 150.
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tacts with broader, non-German audiences;15 but in practice, the predominant 
focus on the former often meant that little attention was paid to the latter.16 
This insight prompted the Foreign Ministry to separate the “school fund” from 
its general cultural diplomacy budget in 1929. Even then, however, “Germans 
abroad” remained the basic motivation for a substantial part of German cul-
tural diplomacy. As Foreign Minister Julius Curtius explained to the Reichstag 
in 1930: if the Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung saw “Germany’s rapproche-
ment with foreign lands as its major task, the cultivation of Germandom 
[stood] as a leitmotif above all of its activities.”17 In short, we cannot fully com-
prehend the contours of Weimar’s public diplomacy without looking at Ger-
mandom policies.
Germandom Policies in the United States
As German Americans comprised the single largest group of ethnic Germans 
outside the Reich, the strategies German foreign policymakers and German-
dom activists developed to engage with them are especially important. Was the 
expansion of Germandon activities also noticeable in the United States? What 
roles did Weimar’s Amerikapolitik assign to German Americans, and were they 
actually willing and able to assume these roles? Did a focus on German Amer-
icans detract attention from Anglo-Americans?
German foreign policymakers and numerous private groups honed in on 
German Americans soon after the war, resuming detailed observations of Ger-
man Americans, the state of their transatlantic sympathies, and their standing 
in American society as early as the summer of 1919.18 In particular, they no-
ticed German Americans’ large-scale charitable giving after July 1919, often per-
ceiving it as a declaration of ethnic loyalty to and interest in the fatherland.19 
In late 1920, the Foreign Ministry recruited Hermann Davidsen, formerly a 
professor of German at Cornell University, as a “German-America expert” for 
its press department.20 Davidsen joined the ranks of the Foreign Ministry’s 
new “America experts” alongside Karl Alexander Fuehr at the America depart-
ment and Walther Drechsler at the press department. Collectively, these men 
offered detailed and generally cautionary assessments of German Americans 
and postwar America. Once official relations resumed in late 1921, German 
15 Ibid., 119.
16 Abelein, Die Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches, 165.
17 Entwurf zu der Rede des Herrn Reichsministers betreffend die Aufgaben der Kulturabtei-
lung, June 10, 1930, PA R 61125.
18 Fr. II963, Sep. 9, 1919, Aufzeichnung, BArch R901/80965.
19 Johannes Kreyenpoth, Die Auslandshilfe für das deutsche Reich (Stuttgart, 1932).
20 Amerika-Institut to Schmidt-Ott, Dec. 18, 1921, NL Schmidt-Ott 539, GSPK.
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consular and diplomatic personnel, too, were expected to re-establish contact 
with and report on German Americans as they had before the war.
This interest notwithstanding, German observers fully recognized the war’s 
devastating impact on German Americans. Even though German Americans’ 
wartime experiences differed significantly by region, religious belief, profes-
sion, and degree of acculturation, the social stigma attached to their ethnicity 
had clearly affected them. Individually, many had withdrawn from organized 
“German America” and “privatized” their ethnic maintenance.21 Ethnic asso-
ciations, newspapers, and churches lay dormant and had shifted, often irre-
versibly, to English language use. To be sure, the war served as a catalyst for an 
already advanced Americanization process among German Americans, but it 
also reduced this browbeaten group considerably. Accordingly, its ethnic life 
re-emerged only slowly in the nativist postwar climate,22 and the nationwide 
implementation of Prohibition in 1920 deprived many ethnic clubs of a key ele-
ment of revenue and, more importantly, sociability.23 For German Americans, 
the 1920s would prove to be a period not of ethnic resurgence but of “amelio-
rated Americanization.”24
And yet, while ethnic pride had reached a low point, the institutional 
structures of “German America” had not disappeared entirely. At least on pa-
per, it still had formidable strength in numbers and organizational potential. 
The 1920 census identified 1.7 million German-born individuals and 5 million 
with at least one German parent, making them America’s largest ethnic group 
of first- and second-generation immigrants.25 German estimates even reck-
oned that up to 25 million Americans – nearly a quarter of the population – 
had German ancestry. Though half of all German-language publications had 
gone under during the war, about 500 remained, with the first postwar years 
even witnessing a “mild revival” of ethnic institutions.26 Millions of German 
Americans, moreover, still had relatives overseas, and the humanitarian relief 
they provided to them and German children often expressed not just a pro-
found personal sympathy but a rejection of the peace treaty’s underlying moral 
assumptions.27 While traditional factionalism soon resurfaced, many German 
21 Don Heinrich Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community: The Cincinnati Germans, 
1918 through 1932” (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 1983), 370.
22 James M. Bergquist, “German Americans,” in Multiculturalism in the United States: A Com-
parative Guide to Acculturation and Ethnicity, ed. John D. Buenker and Lorman A. Ratner, 149–
172 (Santa Barbara, CA, 2005), 162.
23 The Cannstatter Volksfestverein may serve as an example: Mss 128 Cannstatter Volksfestv-
erein, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP).
24 LaVern. J. Rippley, “‘Ameliorated Americanization’: The Effect of World War I on Ger-
man-Americans in the 1920s,” in America and the Germans, ed. Trommler and McVeigh, 2:217–
231.
25 Rippley, “Ameliorated Americanization,” 222.
26 Bergquist, “German Americans,” 162.
27 Strickland, “American Aid to Germany, 1919–1921.”
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Americans did harbor common grievances – indignation about their wartime 
treatment, opposition to Prohibition, and the rejection of the Versailles Treaty – 
which they vented at the ballot box.28 German foreign policymakers could cer-
tainly not afford to ignore this group of several million people, pro-German 
in orientation and settled in a country so crucial to Germany. How Germany 
should approach this group and how much – and what kind of – attention it 
should give it would occupy policymakers throughout the 1920s.
“Not Simply Unwelcome, but Downright Dangerous” – German Officials and 
the Question of Political Agitation, 1919–1924
It is possible to identify at least two distinct phases in this German debate, both 
of which are closely linked to wider domestic and international developments. 
During the first phase, which lasted until about 1924, the debate focused on 
whether and how German Americans could hasten the American intervention 
so urgently desired. Accordingly, discussions revolved around the degree of 
political influence German Americans had, the extent to which they were or-
ganized, and whether and how best to aid their ethnic mobilization from Ger-
many. Eventually, the debate put to rest long-cherished myths and unrealistic 
expectations about the “German element” in the United States, paving the way 
for a more constructive “second phase” after 1925.
This German debate unfolded largely in step with German-American ac-
tions. While German Americans’ charitable work first drew German attention 
to them once again, the founding of two German-American organizations, the 
Steuben Society and the German-American Citizens League, fed popular Ger-
man impressions of a political awakening across the Atlantic. After the war, 
both of them vied to succeed the National German-American Alliance even 
as they addressed what they saw as its major shortcoming: its lack of polit-
ical initiative. The abysmal treatment of German Americans during the war 
had only been possible, self-appointed ethnic leaders argued, because they had 
28 For German-American hopes for and reactions to the peace treaty, see John B. Duff, “Ger-
man-Americans and the Peace, 1918–20,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly 59, no. 4 (June 
1970): 424–444; the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was not dependent on ethnic politics, 
even though a group of German as well as Irish Americans counted among its most outspoken 
opponents. As Ambrosius holds, Republicans organized the strongest opposition to the treaty, 
not mainstream German Americans or Irish Americans, though both groups were conveniently 
blamed by Wilson supporters; see Lloyd Ambrosius, “Ethnic Politics and German-American Re-
lations after World War I: The Fight over the Versailles Treaty in the United States,” in Germany 
and America: Essays on Problems of International Relations and Immigration, ed. Hans Trefousse, 
29–40 (New York, 1980), 32.
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been too divided and politically apathetic in the prewar years;29 the only way to 
avoid future persecution and force concessions on issues that mattered to them 
(Prohibition, German language use, and a revision of Versailles) was to unify 
the German-American vote. The Chicago-based Citizen’s League, founded in 
January 1919, saw itself as the direct heir of the National German-American 
Alliance and served as an umbrella organization for a range of ethnic Vereine, 
especially in the Midwest. The New York-based Steuben Society, on the other 
hand, founded a few months later, was more elitist in its self-understanding.30 
It restricted membership to American citizens and adopted English as its offi-
cial language.31 These tactical differences aside, both articulated a clear politi-
cal leadership strategy that aimed, as the Steuben Society wrote, “to bring about 
the complete rehabilitation of the Germanic element in the United States, po-
litically, socially and economically and its universal recognition as an integral 
part of our citizenry on the basis of absolute equality in all things.”32
To a number of German observers, these new organizations appeared to be 
the harbingers of a German America that was unified and politically aware. The 
German press followed their activities attentively, often quoting their leaders’ 
more militant speeches, which conveyed an impression of a German America 
on the cusp of successful political mobilization.33 A 1921 article in Volk und 
Heimat (a publication of the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland) held that 
their wartime treatment had finally freed German Americans from their polit-
ical lethargy and had even separated the wheat from the chaff.34 While many 
had passed straight into “Yankeedom,” the article maintained, a hard core of 
politically minded German Americans now seemed ready to stand up for Ger-
man interests in the United States.35 Exposed to wartime lies and discrimina-
tion, irritated by Prohibition, and incensed by the Versailles Treaty, German 
Americans were seen – and projected themselves – as having overcome their 
traditional factionalism and being ready to throw their united weight into the 
29 Rudolf Loreck, “Die Zukunft des Deutschtums in Amerika” (New York, 1929), quoted in 
Hugo Grothe, Die Deutschen in Übersee. Eine Skizze ihres Werdens, ihrer Verbreitung und kultur-
ellen Arbeit (Berlin, 1932), 186.
30 As Tolzmann notes the “League’s aims were overtly political, its rhetoric abrasive, and the 
strategy one of demands and concessions.” Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community,” 
286.
31 The Steuben Society was associated with Viereck’s The American Monthly and Issues of Today; 
its rhetoric and idea was extremely close to many right-leaning German publications.
32 Rudolf Cronau, The Army of the American Revolution and its Organizer (Cronau, 1923), 149.
33 See, for example, “157. Stiftungsfest der ältesten deutschsprachigen Vereinigung in Amerika,” 
Volk und Heimat 3, no. 2 (Feb. 1922): 38; “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner finden sich,” Volk und Hei-
mat 2, no. 6 (Apr. 1921): 64–65; “Die Zusammenschlussbewegung der Deutschen in Nordamer-
ika,” Volk und Heimat 2, nos. 15/16 (Aug 1921): 154.
34 “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner finden sich,” Volk und Heimat 2, no. 6 (Apr. 1921): 64–65, 65.
35 Albert Bencke, “Das Deutschtum Chicagos,” Der Auslanddeutsche 3, no. 23 (Dec. 1920): 705–
706; for a similar take, see Boelitz, Das Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtum, 173.
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political arena.36 As a consequence, Germandom enthusiasts felt the time for a 
more forceful German propaganda to aid this political mobilization had come. 
Calls to action submitted to the Foreign Ministry portrayed this mobilization 
as the surest way to gain American concessions.37
The “America experts” at the Wilhelmstrasse emphatically disagreed. 
While they regularly commented on the activities of German Americans, they 
largely disavowed attempts at political mobilization due to both wartime ex-
periences and postwar nativism. As early as November 1920, the Foreign Min-
istry’s America Department penned a memorandum characterizing any un-
sanctioned attempt at politically mobilizing German Americans as “not simply 
unwelcome, but downright dangerous.”38 External “America experts” like the 
Americanist Friedrich Schönemann or Karl Oscar Bertling, director of the 
Amerika-Institut, opposed even publicly discussing ethnic mobilization be-
cause it was bound to raise expectations that German Americans could never 
fulfill.39 After German representatives arrived in the United States in early 
1922, they strongly seconded these voices of caution. When Berlin wondered 
whether “ethnic committees” could not be loosely attached to German con-
sulates, as had been done successfully in Spain, the embassy emphasized the 
entirely different nature of the American case: here, one was not dealing with 
a German “colony” but with a large U. S. citizenry of German descent whose 
political loyalties had to be exclusively American.40 The consul general in Chi-
cago declared categorically: “We have to avoid even the semblance of wanting 
to influence German-American circles here.”41
Wartime lessons were most influential in this assessment as German in-
volvement after 1914 had only served to harm German Americans and transat-
lantic relations in general. But it was also based on a sober calculation of Ger-
man-American influence on the group that was of primary interest to German 
foreign policy: Anglo-Americans.42 Germany would have to rebuild a measure 
of political trust and business confidence among this group, which led America 
36 For German-American self-interpretations, see Edmund von Mach, “Eine politische Organi-
sation von Amerikanern deutschen Stammes?,” Der Auslanddeutsche 3, no. 16 (Aug. 1920): 481–
482; Amerika-Institut (Kartzke) to AA, Mar. 23, 1922, PA R 60104.
37 For German calls to action, see Abschrift VI A V 877, Oct. 28 1920, PA R 80287; Aufzeich-
nung (Noebel), VI A 263, Feb. 16, 1922, PA R 60104; newspaper articles discerned a political 
reawakening of Deutschtum in the United States and advocated support for its allegedly unifying 
forces; Clipping: Fritz Heinz Reimesch, “Erwachendes Deutsches Leben in Nordamerika,“ Ger-
mania, Nov. 10, 1921, PA R 60104; Clipping: “Zur Deutsch-Amerikanischen Annäherung,” Der 
Reichsbote, Apr. 25, 1922, PA R 80293.
38 Aufz. zu VI A. V. 877 Nov. 3, 1920, PA R 80287.
39 Friedrich Schönemann, “Amerikanische Stimmungen,” Vossische Zeitung, Sep. 30, 1920; and 
Amerika-Institut to AA (Heilbron), Jan. 12, 1922, PA 60104.
40 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Jan. 30, 1923, PA R 60104.
41 German Consulate General, Chicago, to Embassy, Jan. 22, 1923, PA R 60104.
42 G. A., Oct. 19, 1920, PA 80131.
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politically, socially, and economically. As a consequence, German Americans 
were usually judged only on how well they could aid this process. Theoreti-
cally, at least, there were two ways German Americans could attain a measure 
of influence on American policy. First, they could champion a pro-German 
position in public debate, providing a much-needed corrective to prevalent an-
ti-German views. Second, they could assert indirect influence on American 
foreign policies through a unified “German vote.” Germany’s “America ex-
perts” considered neither of these options very likely.
For one thing, at that point German Americans were a marginalized 
and disarrayed group, so they were ill-suited to being “multipliers” of a Ger-
man-friendly position. Moreover, most of them did not want to be associated 
with the German cause at all. While they felt comfortable engaging in human-
itarian work, they had no desire to open themselves up again to the sort of 
attacks they had endured during the war. The few that did, such as the publicist 
George Sylvester Viereck or art scholar Edmund von Mach, either lacked access 
to Anglo-American circles or were already heavily implicated by their wartime 
work.43 Despite initiatives like that of the Steuben Society, unified political ac-
tion also appeared highly improbable. Having observed the fractured institu-
tional landscape of German Americans, their religious divisions, social stratifi-
cation, dispersed geographical settlement, and general apathy to national pol-
itics, German diplomats and “America experts” were skeptical that this group 
would be capable of united political action.44 Unlike the Irish, who carried 
considerable political weight through their allegiance to the Democratic Party, 
“German America” had never mustered a united ethnic vote in national elec-
tions – and probably never would. If anything, the war had only hardened the 
belief in German America’s political impotence because, although the group 
had been relatively well organized at the time, it had not had any positive ef-
fect on general public opinion, let alone on the course of American foreign 
policy before 1917. Quite the contrary, their attempts at ethnic politicking had 
only heightened Anglo-American suspicion. Once the United States had en-
tered the war, German Americans had not risen in defense of the fatherland 
but proved themselves the loyal American citizens they had been all along.45 
This “failure” of German America sobered German expectations.46 In the end, 
43 Amerika-Institut to AA, Dec. 8, 1920, Memorandum, PA R 121325. The advice of the Amer-
ika-Institut was based on a memorandum by Führ and, thus, represented official opinion.
44 “America experts” such as Friedrich Schönemann and Karl Oscar Bertling warned publicly 
against misjudging the sympathies and influence of German Americans; see Friedrich Schöne-
mann, “Amerikanische Stimmungen,” Vossische Zeitung, Sep. 30, 1920; and Amerika-Institut to 
AA (Heilbron), Jan. 12, 1922, PA R 60104.
45 “Aus Zeitungen und Zeitschriften,” Der Auslanddeutsche 8, no. 16 (Aug. 1925); 479.
46 Rolf Weber, “Deutschamerikanische Liebestätigkeit,” Volk und Heimat 1, no. 4 (Feb. 1920): 
51–52; on a particularly vicious German accusation about German-American “betrayal,” see 
Kreuzzeitung, May 1917, quoted in Michael Singer, Jahrbuch der Deutschamerikaner für das Jahr 
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the short-lived existence of the Citizens’ League, the Steuben Society’s general 
lack of influence, and the ineffective attempts at ethnic politicking during the 
national election campaigns of 1924 and 1928 proved that this skepticism was 
well-founded.47
In light of these pessimistic assessments, the negative trade-offs of any 
strategy of ethnic mobilization (at least wherever it stood any chance of de-
tection) simply appeared too grave. German representatives repeatedly em-
phasized that all American administrations aimed to reintegrate the German 
element and further Americanize it, and that accusations of German agitation, 
even if unwarranted, would only precipitate a new wave of resentment against 
both Americans of German descent and Germany.48 As the America desk of 
the press department noted, “any sort of propaganda designed to further the 
political organization of Germans would also evoke the distrust of the Ameri-
can government, no matter whether Republican or Democrat, and would once 
more afford the American press the welcome opportunity to accuse us of med-
dling in the domestic affairs of the Union and of trying to create an anti-Amer-
ican movement on American soil.”49 If Germany’s primary goal was to win 
American support, it could not risk antagonizing Anglo-Americans for an out-
come as unlikely as the political mobilization of German Americans. Weighing 
all factors, the Wilhelmstrasse found that the costs associated with a more as-
sertive Germandom policy in the US clearly outweighed its potential benefits.
Based on such considerations, German objectives had to be altogether 
different. Rather than fueling ethnic separatism, they needed to facilitate 
German America’s return to the fold of mainstream society. Indeed, only if 
they lost their stigma as “German propagandists” and regained the courage 
to speak out – and found an audience – could they ever be of any use to Ger-
man interests. In other words, diminishing the rift between German America 
and Anglo-America had to be a primary objective of German foreign policy. 
This realization affected not only the appraisal of German actions, but shaped 
Germany’s attitudes toward German Americans’ own agitation. While German 
officials had previously welcomed ethnic organizers as potential champions of 
the German “cause,” they now began to see them as extremist groups whose 
1918 (Chicago, 1917), 162; the widespread disappointment among German Americans is also 
noted by Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 230–231.
47 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 15, 1924, PA R 80136; also Frederick C. Luebke, 
“German-American Leadership Strategies between the World Wars,” in Germans in the New 
Worlds: Essays in the History of Immigration, ed. Luebke, 51–78 (Urbana and Chicago, IL, 1990).
48 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Oct. 18, 1922, “Stimmung in den Vereinigten Staaten 
gegenüber Deutschland,” PA R 80134. This caution was part of a larger policy; Hiden, “The Wei-
mar Republic and the Problem of the Auslandsdeutsche,” 281.
49 Aufzeichnung, Nov. 3, 1920, PA R 80287. Corresponding with the Bureau of the Reich Presi-
dent, the Foreign Ministry summed up its stance in June 1921: AA to Büro des Herrn Re-
ichspräsidenten, June 10, 1921, PA R 80293.
“Not Simply Unwelcome, but Downright Dangerous” 183
policy of demands and concessions perpetuated, rather than bridged, wartime 
divisions.50 Sworn to a “policy of reckoning” (Abrechnungspolitik), a number 
of professional German Americans engaged in loud agitation and abrasive 
language, typically merely provoking nativist backlashes that trapped German 
Americans in their marginalized position and ultimately contradicted both the 
average German American’s craving for a quiet “return to normalcy”51 and 
German interests.52 In practice, then, German officials had to avoid the “sem-
blance” of German meddling and keep their distance from German-American 
attempts at political mobilization as represented by the Steuben Society, the 
Citizens’ League, and other self-appointed ethnic leaders. All the evidence sug-
gests that this is precisely what they did.53
This official restraint was profoundly aided by the lack of interest German-
dom organizations showed in German Americans. While Germandom pub-
lications occasionally surveyed the American situation, at times even issuing 
calls to action, there seems to have been no more forceful agitation. It was true 
that organizations like the Deutsches Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart quietly built 
a network of subscribers for their publications, kept in contact with ethnic 
leaders, and collected funds in the United States, but these were neither par-
ticularly assertive nor visible.54 Given the ethnic emergencies and promising 
projects around the world, the attention these organizations paid to German 
Americans was relatively fleeting. If German America held a privileged place 
in Germandom policy, then only as a cautionary tale. Pertinent publications 
presented German Americans primarily as a group that had rapidly lost its eth-
nic identity. Comparing the large number of Americans of German descent 
to the small number of active German speakers,55 Germandom specialists like 
50 For examples of this militant rhetoric and forceful calls for unity against Anglo-American 
insults, see the preface in Johannes Glaesser, Deutsch-Amerikanisches Vereins-Adressbuch für das 
Jahr 1921 (Milwaukee, 1921); and Edmund von Mach, “Deutsche, Heraus!,” Viereck’s American 
Monthly, Aug. 1, 1920, 167.
51 Frederick C. Luebke, “German-American Leadership Strategies between the World Wars,” 
52–53.
52 Especially the wealthier, better-educated, and thus more influential German Americans 
tended to steer clear of organizations accused of pro-German agitation. The strong responses of 
the Chicago Tribune to the third annual meeting of the Citizens’ League on July 21, 1922, Stein-
bach believed, only reinforced the caution of the better elements in dealing with German-Amer-
ican organizations. German Consulate, Chicago, to AA, Aug. 5, 1922, “Deutsch-Amerikanisches 
Vereinswesen,” PA R 80294.
53 Nowhere was this more apparent than with regard to George Sylvester Viereck, the wartime 
German propagandist; C. A. Vertraulich May 31, 1922 (Davidsen) PA R 80287.
54 DAI (Wanner) to Cronau, Jan. 7, 1928, Folder 5; DAI to Cronau, Sep. 1, 1927, Folder 7, Ms 
1010 Rudolf Cronau Collection, Horner Memorial Library.
55 Germandom specialists, in particular, tended to inflate their numbers, calculating 25–30 mil-
lion of “German blood”; Grothe, Die Deutschen in Übersee, 178; F. Schönemann estimated about 
15–18 million Americans of German descent; Friedrich Schönemann, Die Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika. Vol. 1: Von der Kolonie zum Weltreich. (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1932), 303; Boelitz set 
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Hugo Grothe calculated that 22 million had simply been “lost” to German-
dom.56 “Millions who could have been intermediaries and supporters of Ger-
man culture, German prestige and German economy [in the United States],” 
declared the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland in 1921, “now serve An-
glo-Saxondom.”57 From this perspective, German American “failure” during 
World War I seemed but the last in a long series of shortcomings. Though Ger-
man Americans were clearly courted for their money, there were few attempts 
at any more forceful agitation. The commonly told story of German-American 
assimilation underlined past sins of omission in order to avoid them elsewhere, 
not to redress them across the Atlantic. For German diplomats, this defeatism 
about ethnic survival in the United States proved fortuitous. As they usually 
were unable to control or contain unwelcome Germandom efforts, it was pri-
marily this widely accepted inevitability of German-American assimilation 
that allowed for a policy of restraint.58
This is not to say that there were no attempts to mobilize German Ameri-
cans. German “Black Horror” campaigners, for example, were especially active 
in the United States and found enthusiastic partners in men like Viereck.59 
Nor is it to suggest that German officials had no contact with ethnic leaders. 
Both in Germany and the United States, informal connections and conversa-
tions were clearly re-established. But this never led German officials to aban-
don their general caution. Indeed, the opinions of the Foreign Ministry and its 
representatives abroad on this matter were more consensual than scholars have 
suggested. There is little evidence that German representatives in the United 
States had to resist “massive and repeated pressure from Berlin to mount prop-
aganda efforts in the United States,”60 at least not as far as German Americans 
were concerned. While there were numerous conflicts about the appropriate 
the number of those of German descent between 15 and 20 million or about 25 percent of the 
white population, as compared to 32 percent English and Scottish; Boelitz, Das Grenz- und Aus-
landdeutschtum, 166.
56 The 25 to 30 million of German “blood” could be contrasted with only 8 million of German 
stock (of which 75 percent had been born in the United States) and only three million German 
speakers, producing a “deficit” of at least 22 million. Grothe, Die Deutschen in Übersee, 178.
57 “1881–1921. 40 Jahre Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland,” Volk und Heimat 2, nos. 7/8 
(May 1921): 73–78, 75.
58 This relative lack of control is exemplified in the ultimately futile efforts of German diplomats 
to keep Robert Treut – from the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland – from lecturing in the 
United States. Despite repeated efforts and despite the fact that the Verein für das Deutschtum 
im Ausland was heavily subsidized by the Foreign Ministry, all efforts to this end failed. See Ger-
man Embassy, Washington, to AA, Jan. 30, 1926, “Sammlung und Vorträge des Studiendirektors 
Dr. Treut in den Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 60105. Aufzeichnung, July 16, 1928, PA R 60106.
59 The Wilhelmstrasse was repeatedly confronted with wide-ranging German plans on precisely 
how to organize successful propaganda campaigns among German Americans, e. g., VI B 9929, 
Abschrift Dr. Heinrich Brühl to Minister für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Volksbildung, July 9, 
1923, PA R 64887.
60 Wala, “Reviving Ethnic Identity,” 341.
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extent of agitation in the United States, there were few concerning the folly of 
ethnic politicking. Wartime experiences, postwar nativism, and the primacy of 
Anglo-American sympathy all too clearly advised against it.
Importantly, this points to a general professionalization of Germany’s 
Amerikapolitik. By the early 1920s, long-standing tensions between cautious 
representatives abroad and more eager officials at home were largely resolved 
as men with an intimate knowledge of the United States rose to positions of re-
sponsibility in the Wilhelmstrasse. In stark contrast to the war years, the Press 
and America Departments were staffed with men who had often witnessed the 
negative effects of Germany’s clumsy propaganda firsthand.61 While men like 
Walther Drechsler, Karl Alexander Fuehr and Hermann Davidsen did not hold 
particularly high-ranking positions, their superiors, such as the influential 
head of the America Department (and later secretary of state) Carl v. Schubert, 
seconded their calls for moderation.62 In this regard, the regional principle 
introduced during the Foreign Ministry’s postwar reforms clearly fulfilled its 
intended purpose: to create expert knowledge attuned to foreign psychology. 
Accordingly, the more forceful Germandom policy practiced in other coun-
tries in the 1920s never materialized in the United States. Heeding the lessons 
of the war, Berlin adopted a more realistic assessment of German Americans’ 
position and influence.
“To Strengthen Respect for Germany and Germandom” : German Americans and 
Cultural Diplomacy, 1924–1929
After 1924, the predominantly political discussion of the postwar years gave 
way to a broader, ultimately more constructive debate. This was clearly neces-
sary. Given the imperative for caution, by the mid-1920s there was still nothing 
akin to a comprehensive strategy for approaching German Americans. While 
official representatives had always been expected to maintain informal contacts 
with ethnic clubs, businessmen, and editors in their districts, the overall place 
61 At the America branch most matters pertaining to U. S. public opinion passed through the 
hands of Karl Alexander Fuehr, head of the German propaganda bureau in New York from 
1915–1917. At the press branch Dr. Drechsler served as the “Amerika Referent.” Educated in the 
United States, and director of the Amerika-Institut from 1910 to 1920, he also had an intimate 
knowledge of American affairs and psychology.
62 On support for caution by the head of the Kulturabteilung, see Abschrift No VI B 10304, 
(Heilbron) June/Aug. 1922, PA R 80294; on Schubert’s support, zu III A 942, Mar. 13, 1922, PA 
80133; on Schubert more generally, see Peter Krüger, Carl von Schubert. Außenpolitker aus Lei-
denschaft. Sein Beitrag zur internationalen Politik und europäischer Ordnung in der Ära der Wei-
marer Republik (Berlin, 2017); and Peter Krüger, ed., Carl von Schubert (1882–1947). Sein Beitrag 
zur internationalen Politik und europäischen Ordnung in der Ära der Weimarer Republik. Aus-
gewählte Dokumente (Berlin, 2017).
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of German Americans in German Amerikapolitik remained undefined.63 Not 
until 1925 was there a more systematic debate on the state of their emotional 
and cultural attachment to Germany, which led, in the end, to the adoption of 
a broadly cultural course.
Internal and external developments affected the timing and nature of this 
debate. For one, by 1925 ethnic life was once again becoming more visible, as 
in the increasingly public “German Day” celebrations, prompting a need for 
clarification of the German positions.64 Though ethnic associations empha-
sized their American character, German Americans still craved their old fa-
therland’s attention. If Germany kept too great a distance, it would have un-
necessarily offended a group of Americans who were often lovingly attached 
to their old Heimat and who, potentially at least, could act as purveyors of a 
more German-friendly feeling in the United States.65 By 1925, too, nativist sen-
timent and patriotic scrutiny of ethnic groups had decreased, in part due to 
the strict Immigration Laws of 1924, thus allowing Germany to take a more 
active approach. Moreover, Germany’s economic and political stabilization af-
ter the Dawes Plan improved transatlantic relations just as it provided some 
financial leeway in previously neglected fields of policy. Under these circum-
stances, whether and how to maintain at least German Americans’ emotional 
and cultural affinities without antagonizing Anglo-Americans emerged as a 
major issue.
A new appointment at the Washington embassy in early 1925 provided a 
significant impulse in this regard. Indeed, the role of German representatives, 
ambassadors, and consuls, in implementing and even in formulating German 
public diplomacy is often underrated. The embassy and Germany’s eight con-
sulates were a natural focal point for German ethnic life in the United States.66 
This was true both for obvious ethnic centers like Chicago, New York City, and 
St. Louis (which was re-opened in 1925 to maintain ties to German Americans), 
as well as for places that may initially seem less ethnically dominated, like San 
Francisco and New Orleans.67 The individual interest, initiative, and compe-
63 Zu III A 942, Mar. 13, 1922, PA 80133.
64 The German Day celebrations, for example, re-emerged from their often private, charity-fo-
cused existence of the postwar years into the public limelight after the mid-1920s. In Cincinnati, 
for example, the German Day celebrations resumed in 1926; Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Eth-
nic Community,” 223.
65 Zu III A 942, Mar. 13, 1922, PA 80133.
66 German consulates were all closed in 1917 and reopened in early 1922: Boston, Chicago 
(consulate general), Cleveland (from 1926), New Orleans, New York City (consulate general), St. 
Louis (1922–1923, from 1925), San Francisco, Seattle (until 1923 and from 1925); an investiga-
tion of consular appointments would probably illustrate similar variations.
67 On St. Louis, see Mundt, “Wichtigkeit des Berufskonsulats in St. Louis,” (ca. Feb. 1925), PA R 
80238. On San Francisco, a consular district with more than 300,000 German-born, “the number 
of visitors would take no end. First, there came the prominent Germans, the directors of long-es-
tablished, partly already strongly Americanized companies, then the presidents of the German 
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tence of consuls and ambassadors greatly shaped public diplomacy. While a 
full investigation of consular activity lies beyond the scope of this study (and 
the scope of available archival material), Weimar’s three ambassadors to Wash-
ington alone displayed marked variations in the direction and intensity of their 
public diplomacy during their tenures. For all their shared policy directives, 
they had three distinct “ambassadorial styles” for managing ethnic and public 
relations more generally.
The most marked shift in ambassadorial style occurred in early 1925 when 
Otto Wiedfeldt, the first postwar ambassador to Washington, left his post. 
Throughout his three years in Washington, the Krupp manager and economic 
expert never seemed particularly inclined to engage in public diplomacy. He 
did not share the enthusiasm for propaganda typical of the times and had al-
ways remained convinced that a sound economic plan, not public outreach, was 
the key to improving transatlantic relations.68 By temperament and training, 
Wiedfeldt felt much more comfortable discussing German problems with his 
Anglo-American peers behind closed doors than engaging in public speeches 
or hosting soirees.69 Under his watch, the embassy never exhausted its mod-
est quarterly press fund of 100 dollars completely and also spent it exclusively 
on purchasing American periodicals.70 Not prone to Germandom romanti-
cism anyway, Wiedfeldt was especially reserved concerning German Ameri-
cans and had avoided public appearances, particularly at ethnic events.71 Al-
though postwar suspicions rendered this position sensible, for the most part, 
the “reclusive” ambassador was increasingly criticized, not the least by Ger-
man Americans. After a bitter falling-out with Foreign Minister Stresemann, 
Wiedfeldt – who had originally taken on the difficult post only as a short-term 
 favor – returned to Krupp in early 1925.
His successor, Adolf Georg Otto (called Ago) von Maltzan, essentially re-
versed Wiedfeldt’s position on public diplomacy.72 Indeed, there may have 
been two major reasons why Maltzan – despite his lack of American experience 
and his rather problematic reputation as the principal “architect of [the treaty 
of] Rapallo”73 – was assigned to the important Washington post. For one, after 
Vereine, the editors of German newspapers, and last but not least the American press.” See von 
Hentig, Mein Leben. Eine Dienstreise, 255.
68 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Sep. 23, 1922, “Besprechungen mit führenden Amer-
ikanern,” PA R 80134.
69 German Embassy Washington, to AA Mar. 25, 1923, “Reise des Botschafters nach dem Süden 
der Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 80135.
70 See the correspondence and receipts in PA R 121070.
71 Informally, Wiedfeldt had indeed made some efforts to reach out to ethnic leaders; see what 
is left of the “top secret” report (probably early 1924) in PA R30641.
72 Aufzeichnung (AA), Aug. 18, 1925, BArch R 43–I/96.
73 Maltzan’s name was primarily associated with the Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia, 
which had caused great unease in the West. Upon meeting Maltzan in Dec. 1922, William Castle, 
head of the State Department’s Western European section, characterized him simply as “a bad 
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the negative experience with the “outsider” Wiedfeldt, Berlin was determined 
to appoint an “insider,” a type Maltzan epitomized.74 Born into old nobility, 
trained in legal studies, and a member of the “right” sort of fraternity, Maltzan’s 
social and educational background was typical of the traditional Foreign Ser-
vice75 – a fact that facilitated the meteoric rise of his career after 1906. By 1921 
he had become head of the important Russian Department and by December 
1922, at only 45 years of age, had risen to state secretary, the most influential 
diplomatic post in the Wilhelmstrasse. His undoubted competence, his shrewd 
commitment to German interests, and his (despite some differences in policy) 
mutually trusting relationship with Stresemann certainly helped to bring him 
into consideration for Washington.76 But so, too, did his strong interest in pub-
lic affairs. Though Maltzan possessed all the trappings of the aristocratic career 
diplomat, he professed none of this “type’s” alleged aversion to public relations. 
The new ambassador’s very first action was to double the embassy’s quarterly 
press fund to 200 dollars (he raised it again a year later to 500 dollars), and, 
unlike his predecessor, he always spent it completely.77 From the very first, 
too, he tried to establish good contacts with American newspapermen, who in 
turn described his demeanor as “affable and democratic.”78 In the following 
years, he revived common practices of ambassadorial representation, keeping 
a busy social calendar, hosting German musical soirees, and modernizing the 
embassy building.79 His personal correspondence reveals a deep concern with 
restoring German standing and cultural influence in the United States.80
man. He alone was responsible for the Rapallo Treaty (…).” William Castle Diary, Oct. 23, 1922, 
cited from Niels Joeres, “Architekt von Rapallo, Der deutsche Diplomat Ago Maltzan im Kaiserre-
ich und in der frühen Weimarer Republik” (PhD Diss. Universität Heidelberg, 2005), 586.
74 For another example of the German diplomatic corps wanting to appoint an “insider” over an 
“outsider,” see the case of Harry Graf Kessler and the London ambassadorship in Peter Grupp, 
“Harry Graf Kessler und das Auswärtige Amt. Funktionselite und elitärer Außenseiter,” in Eliten 
in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. und 20 Jahrhundert. Strukturen und Beziehungen, Vol. 1, 
ed. Rainer Hudemann and Georges-Henri Soutou, 293–302 (Munich, 1994).
75 See Peter Krüger, “Struktur, Organisation und außenpolitische Wirkungsmöglichkeiten der 
leitenden Beamten des Auswärtigen Dienstes 1921–1933,” in Das Diplomatische Korps 1871–
1945, ed. Klaus Schwabe, 101–170 (Boppard am Rhein, 1985).
76 There has long been a discussion about whether Maltzan was placed in Washington to get an 
influential advocate of German East-orientation out of the way, but more recent studies generally 
highlight that the relationship between the ambassador and the foreign minister was a good and 
productive one and that Maltzan’s appointment primarily underlined the importance of the 
Washington post; see Maltzan to Stresemann, May 1, 1925, Gustav Stresemann Vermächtnis II, 
282–283.
77 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Mar. 8, 1927, “Antrag auf Erhöhung des Pressefonds,” 
PA R 121070.
78 Clipping: The Boston Globe, June 23, 1925, “German Ambassador Popular at Magnolia: 
President’s ‘Neighbor’ is Affable and Democratic in Manner,” PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 48.
79 The ambassador’s busy schedule is borne out by his social calendar held at the Politisches 
Archiv. PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 54, Tageskalender Botschafter Maltzan.
80 Maltzan to Bernhard (Voss. Zeitung), Dec. 16, 1925, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
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Maltzan was able to demonstrate his public relations skills just weeks into 
his ambassadorship when General von Hindenburg’s election as Reich Pres-
ident on April 26, 1925, caused considerable unease among American inves-
tors and politicians. Denouncing him as a “place holder for the Kaiser,” the 
American press called the war hero’s election a “mental goosestep” on the part 
of the German people, tantamount to a rejection of Germany’s agreed-upon 
obligations.81 To calm these prevalent fears, Maltzan assembled Wall Street in-
vestors and representatives of the nationally syndicated New York press and 
underlined Germany’s continued commitment to fulfillment. This proactive 
press policy – if we are to believe Maltzan’s own account – helped to defuse the 
situation and re-established America’s trust in the Weimar Republic’s stabili-
ty.82 The “election of the field marshal,” he reported on April 30, “will no longer 
be a liability to [our] political and economic relations with America.”83 Follow-
ing this early example, Maltzan gave public diplomacy new momentum until 
his untimely death in an airplane accident in September 1927.
*
Not long after his arrival in Washington, Maltzan began to take a more pro-
nounced interest in German Americans. There is little doubt that the ambas-
sador was concerned about the situation of German Americans in its own 
right as he shared the romantic notions of ethnic nationalism typical of his 
time.84 But this general disposition was reinforced by two events during the 
early summer of 1925. For one, an invitation to Chicago by Vice-President 
Charles G. Dawes in July 1925 illustrated the crucial role that German Amer-
icans’ continued interest and support could play in revising the peace treaty. 
Spending a pleasant afternoon at Dawes’s sprawling estate and jointly presiding 
over a large German-American banquet, Maltzan was certain that his cordial 
reception was owed primarily to his host’s political ambitions in the heavily 
German Midwest. Whatever its shortcomings, the “German vote,” Maltzan 
concluded, still affected attitudes, perhaps even policies, toward Germany.85 
This general insight coincided with conservative German criticism about the 
passivity of German authorities in the face of German-America’s speedy Amer-
81 Clipping: “Faithful to the Old Masters,” Saturday Evening Post, May 2, 1925, PA NL Maltzan, 
Vol. 48.
82 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Apr. 30, 1925, “Amerika vor den Hindenburgwahlen,” 
PA R 80136.
83 On Hindenburg’s election and the considerable stir it created, see the clippings and reports in 
PA R 28490.
84 Maltzan to Rudolf Cronau, Jan. 22, 1926, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
85 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, July 18, 1925, “Besuch des Botschafters Maltzan beim 
Vizepräsidenten Dawes in Chicago,” PA R 80137.
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icanization.86 Unlike his predecessor, who had almost categorically objected 
to German involvement in this matter, Maltzan found it a “very grave prob-
lem” worthy of more careful consideration. On August 3, 1925, therefore, he 
asked all German consuls in the United States to report on the situation of 
German Americans and – within the boundaries of a general policy of political 
restraint – whether “cultural maintenance of their Germandom” was possible 
and desirable.87 The result was the decade’s most comprehensive survey on the 
state of “German-America.”
The German consuls clearly welcomed this opportunity to report on the 
state of German-American ethnic identity. Though their reports differed in 
some aspects, they first and foremost bade a resounding farewell to any con-
crete notion of “German-America.” Germans in the United States, all of them 
agreed, assimilated more rapidly and completely than anywhere else.88 The 
majority of German immigrants integrated into American life completely 
within just a few years, leaving only a relatively small, mostly lower-class group 
to cultivate German traditions in a plethora of clubs and associations. The sec-
ond generation, at the latest, which at that point made up more than two-thirds 
of German Americans, was sure to become “hopeless Vollamerikaner.”89 A ten-
dency to overadapt inherent in the German character, the substantial economic 
and social rewards for acculturation, and the generally low educational level of 
German immigrants were blamed for this process.90 While wartime discrim-
ination and postwar nativism had hastened this development, the restrictive 
immigration quota of 1924 sounded the death knell for ethnic survival. In one 
generation, there would be no more German Americans.91
These consular reports departed from prewar responses not so much in 
their general pessimism as in their prescriptions for how to deal with the sit-
uation. Even before the war, the notion of the United States as a “mass grave” 
of Germandom had achieved the status of conventional wisdom;92 but it was 
only in the 1920s that German authorities abandoned their anti-assimilationist 
86 Clipping: Fritz Heinz Reimesch, “Vom Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten,” Deutsche 
Warte (Sonderbeilage zur Kreuzzeitung), PA R 60105.
87 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Aug. 3, 1925, “Deutschtum in Amerika,” PA R 60105.
88 Boelitz, Das Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtum, 168.
89 For this specific phrase, see an earlier characterization: German Consulate General, New 
York, to AA, Dec. 8, 1924, “Anfrage des Generalleutnants a. D. von Livonius, betreffend Organi-
sation des Deutschtums,” PA R 80287.
90 John Eiselmeier, “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner,” Deutsche Arbeit 24, no. 4 (Jan. 1925): 98–101.
91 “The German-American element,” wrote Consul General Steinbach from Chicago, “is 
shrinking rapidly and inevitably. The war has demolished the last connections. The great relief 
work on our behalf after the war will probably have been the last time that the German-Ameri-
cans acted in a united fashion, and even then only non-politically.” German Consulate General, 
Chicago (Steinbach), to Embassy, Sep. 29, 1925, PA R 60105.
92 Michael Ermath, “Hyphenation and Hyper-Americanization: Germans of the Wilhemine Re-
ich View German-Americans, 1890–1914,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 2 (2002): 
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stance, deeming ethnic maintenance neither possible nor even politically ex-
pedient. On the contrary, since the highest political and social positions were 
reserved for those whose manners, education, and demeanor were entirely 
“American,” the acculturation of German Americans was – from a purely polit-
ical, if not necessarily from an emotional, perspective – only to be welcomed.93 
What had to be ensured, however, was that even the fully assimilated American 
of German birth or descent retained a vague affinity, that “inclination of the 
heart,” for his ancestral land. “Trying to counter the process of assimilation,” 
Consul General Steinbach in Chicago concluded, “is a useless endeavor in my 
opinion. But our task is to ensure that the assimilated Germans do not lose all 
touch with and interest in the old Heimatland.”94 To this end, in their reports 
all the consuls advocated that the Foreign Ministry develop and direct, albeit 
covertly, a broadly cultural campaign that addressed German Americans not 
as Germans, but as Americans.95 A secure news supply to German-American 
newspapers, a focus on academic exchanges, concerted book promotions, and 
support for German language teaching, they hoped, could rekindle contacts 
even with those who had been completely Americanized. What was needed, 
Steinbach concluded, was “Kulturpropaganda in the best sense of the word […] 
to strengthen respect for Germany and Germandom.”96
Balancing Acts, 1925–1927 
Between German and Anglo-Americans
As Michael Wala has shown, these consular suggestions provided the blueprint 
for much of German outreach during the following years. It was through cul-
tural – or at least not overtly political – measures that Berlin sought to revive 
a sense of ethnic identity and maintain German Americans’ connection to 
their fatherland. To this end, consuls attended ethnic festivities, hosted Ger-
man lecturers, and honored ethnic leaders. The Foreign Ministry and the Ger-
man Naval Command organized visits of German cruisers to American ports, 
which often resulted in popular patriotic celebrations and an upsurge in ethnic 
pride.97 Such measures clearly attest to an effort to reach out to German Amer-
icans while avoiding the political entanglements that had harmed German and 
German-American interests in the past.
33–58, 49; for a contemporary assessment, see Julius Goebel, Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Nord-Amerika (Munich, 1904).
93 German Consulate, Seattle, Oct. 7, 1925, PA R 60105.
94 German Consulate General, Chicago, Aug. 27, 1925, PA R 60105.
95 Aufzeichnung des Konsuls Dr. Kraske (German Consulate General, New York), Oct. 10, 
1925, R 60105.
96 German Consulate General, Chicago, Aug. 27, 1925, PA R 60105.
97 Wala, “Reviving Ethnic Identity,” 340.
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But the pursuit of such a “cultural course of action” took different priori-
ties and contours during the tenures of ambassador Maltzan and his successor 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, which tells us something about 
the shifting fortunes of transatlantic relations as well as these men’s individual 
preferences. The specific strategy Maltzan suggested (who assembled all con-
suls in Washington in November 1925 to discuss future Germandom policies, 
among other things) derived largely from a desire not only to steer clear of An-
glo-American suspicions but at the same time to reconcile German Americans 
with postwar Germany.
Indeed, if German Americans have so far been presented as sympathiz-
ers of Germany, this requires an important qualification: To be sure, many of 
them were incensed about the Versailles Treaty, opposed the idea of German 
war guilt, and actively supported German economic, political, and moral re-
habilitation. But their sympathy applied to the German people and a nostalgic 
version of the fatherland, not the Weimar Republic. German-born individuals, 
especially, found it difficult to come to terms with the end of the Wilhelmine 
Empire and had encountered few opportunities in the first half of the 1920s 
to develop trust or confidence in the new Germany.98 For years after the war, 
German-language papers had focused on the economic distress, political in-
stability, and international humiliations that had beset the old fatherland and 
frequently attributed the situation (which they often exaggerated to elicit funds 
and sympathy) not to Wilhelmine mistakes but Weimar’s inaptitude. German 
Americans’ traditional understanding of German politics also rendered them 
particularly susceptible to the “stab-in-the-back” myth.99 An ample number 
found Weimar’s policy of reconciliation nothing short of dishonorable.100
By itself, this distance from the Weimar Republic’s foreign policy might 
not have been especially disconcerting – after all, it hardly hindered German 
Americans’ revisionist convictions – had it not increasingly hampered Ger-
man ambitions to reconcile with Anglo-Americans. Indeed, German efforts 
to rebuild support and sympathy among influential but formerly critical An-
glo-Americans caused considerable dismay among more conservative German 
Americans and repeatedly provoked vicious attacks on Ambassador Maltzan in 
the United States and, by extension, in Germany’s right-leaning press and the 
Reichstag.101 At the same time, a bolder revisionist tone that might have recon-
98 This was Rohrbach’s experience, for example; see Horst Bieber, Paul Rohrbach – Ein konserv-
ativer Publizist und Kritiker der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 1972), 24; San Francisco Consul von 
Hentig, for example, remembers that one of the two major German papers in California, the 
California Journal, was more “patriotic” (vaterländisch) and headed by an editor “with connec-
tions to Imperial Germany”; von Hentig, Mein Leben, 265.
99 See Anton Erkelenz, “Der Amerikanische Deutsche,” Berliner Tageblatt, Jan. 6, 1926.
100 See Clipping: Chicago Abendpost, Oct. 15, 1924, “Verbrüderungsduselei,” PA R 80136.
101 German Embassy, Washington, to Stresemann, Sep. 6, 1925, PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 29; 
German Embassy, Washington, to Carl von Schubert, May 28, 1927, PA R 80143; Verhandlungen 
Balancing Acts, 1925–1927 193
ciled German Americans with the republic was sure to alienate Anglo-Ameri-
cans and awaken suspicions that had just been painstakingly calmed. German 
officials were thus forced to engage in a delicate balancing act: to convince Ger-
man Americans that the republic deserved their support just as the monarchy 
had while avoiding playing into the hands of Americans who saw the republic 
as a place where monarchist convictions and militarist aspirations continued 
under a republican cloak.102 In other words, the challenge was to convince An-
glo-Americans that Germany had fundamentally changed while assuring Ger-
man Americans that it had remained essentially the same.
During his tenure from 1925 to 1927, Ambassador Maltzan tried to solve 
this dilemma by exercising formal restraint even as he engaged in nonpolitical, 
but quite deliberately traditional, forms of outreach. The ambassador himself 
employed a strategy of “Anglo-Americans first.” Though everything suggests 
that he took a genuine interest in German Americans, during his first two years 
in Washington he focused nearly exclusively on winning the trust of the Amer-
ican press, Congress, and State Department. His busy social calendar, he pri-
vately admitted, aimed not least to establish a foundation of trust upon which 
to base outreach to German Americans. As he wrote to German-American 
author Rudolf Cronau, “It is especially to the American element of German 
descent that I have devoted my special interest, not to say love. You, as much 
as I, will recognize that I have so far not allowed myself to show this interest all 
too publicly [… I] have first to try to gain a firm foothold and win trust among 
government and congressional circles here before I can follow the voice of my 
heart.”103 As a consequence, his few public interactions with German Ameri-
cans were arranged in the least threatening way: to convey gratitude for ethnic 
charity, acting as the “ambassador of German children.”104
In the meantime, the German consuls resumed active but relatively tra-
ditional non-political outreach, arranging events that managed to engender 
a sense of enthusiasm for and connection to Germany among attendees. The 
lecture tours of Felix Graf von Luckner and Hellmuth von Mücke, the captains 
of the famed World War I cruisers Emden and Seeadler, for example, conveyed 
the stories of adventure, heroism and German daring that German Ameri-
cans delighted in hearing,105 while the visit of German cruisers to American 
des Reichstag III. Wahlperiode 1924/26 Nr. 2681 Interpellation (v. Westarp und Fraktion), Nov. 
13, 1926.
102 AA to all German missions abroad, Nov. 22, 1921, PA R 28039.
103 Maltzan to Rudolf Cronau, Jan. 22, 1926, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
104 German Consulate General, Chicago to AA, Tgb. Nr. 261/27, May 2, 1927, “Besuch des 
Herrn Botschafters in Chicago,” PA R 80299.
105 German Consulate General, Chicago, to AA, May 6, 1927, “Besuch Graf Luckner’s in Chi-
cago,” PA R 80299; see all of PA Generalkonsulat San Francisco, Paket 48, Vortragsreise von Graf 
Felix von Luckner durch die USA 1927–28; on Luckner’s impressions of America, see Felix Graf 
von Luckner, Seeteufel erobert Amerika (Leipzig, 1928).
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ports elicited pride in Germany’s accomplishments and (persistent) worldwide 
reach. Such visits frequently celebrated bygone Imperial greatness more than 
present-day Germany – and spurred enthusiasm for the Reich rather than the 
republic – yet German representatives clearly tolerated this. After all, con-
nections such as these kept alive German-American ethnic consciousness as 
well as convictions about the injustice of the Versailles Treaty, which, they still 
hoped would somehow impact the important congressional decisions of the 
coming years.106 While such events promoted the republic very little, German 
diplomats did try to use them to calm fears of German socialism. The visit of 
a number of Weimar parliamentarians in late 1925, Maltzan felt, had demon-
strated “that the German Republic is not a Bolshevist state, but – especially 
under the leadership of President Hindenburg – a highly respectable and pre-
sentable institution. Especially for our German Americans, who used to be 
strongly in favor of a Republic in earlier days, and now that we have become 
one, have adopted a monarchist, or at least black-white-red attitude, this visit 
was very instructive.”107
This approach, to be sure, was not without shortcomings. For one, ethnic 
festivities or visits of World War I heroes held only limited attraction to those 
outside the German-American community, be they Anglo-Americans or ac-
culturated German Americans.108 More importantly, even the most nonpoliti-
cal activities could still arouse Anglo-American suspicion if “official Germany” 
was involved. While the arrival of German naval cruisers in American ports 
and their more or less open serving of alcohol generated great enthusiasm 
among German Americans, it hardly improved Germany’s standing with the 
Anglo-American establishment. When the cruiser Hamburg visited Los An-
geles in 1926, for example, federal Prohibition agents wound up investigating 
the event, and the embassy had to get involved.109 As counselor of embassy 
Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff wrote to his mother: “I opposed the visit right from 
the outset (…). There is nearly always trouble if only one crew member leaves 
the boat (…) But that a German cruiser – the first since the war – can come 
to America, anchor in Los Angeles harbor for ten days and day in day out sell 
beer to American visitors, I still would not have deemed possible. The German 
cruiser, a swimming bar! And all of this in a country where the sale of alcohol 
106 The next few years would bring significant political and economic decisions in the United 
States, including the settlement of war claims and the readjustment of reparations payments, for 
which the Reich had to secure American public and congressional goodwill. In this context – 
and all non-political rhetoric notwithstanding – German Americans were to keep pressure for 
revising the treaty alive, even as Germany publicly proclaimed its every intention of fulfilling it.
107 Maltzan to Bertling, Jan. 7, 1926, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
108 Consul von Hentig only felt deeply saddened by festivities; see German Consulate General, 
San Francisco, to AA, Sep. 6, 1928, “Deutscher Tag in Los Angeles,” PA R 60107.
109 Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1926, 5.
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is illegal! It is really unbelievable.”110 That one and the same action proved ap-
pealing to German Americans and appalling to (at least some) Anglo-Ameri-
cans spelled out a dilemma Germany was never entirely able to resolve.
Ultimately, such experiences revealed the clear limits of any official form 
of outreach, no matter how nonpolitical, and convinced German authorities 
that a more systematic campaign was best left to private groups. The German 
consul in Seattle had already come to this conclusion in October 1925: “in my 
opinion, there is little that can be done by the official representatives in the 
United States apart from a careful cultivation of relations to Germandom and a 
constant cordial exchange of ideas with its intellectual leaders. Yet in my opin-
ion there is quite a lot that could be done through private activity from Ger-
many, which could perhaps be arranged and controlled by the government.”111 
It was no coincidence that Maltzan singled this report out for special praise. 
German officials realized that the Weimar Republic needed an ostensibly pri-
vate organization to implement its moderate cultural approach without the 
restraints – and political scrutiny – that even the most harmless official under-
taking would face.
The Vereinigung Carl Schurz: An Instrument of German Cultural Diplomacy
It was precisely to this end that the Vereinigung Carl Schurz (VCS), an ostensi-
bly private, state-funded transatlantic friendship organization, was established 
in early 1926. Its origins went back to a private initiative in the fall of 1925, 
when the Vereinigung’s first director, Anton Erkelenz, a Reichstag delegate of 
the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP), toured the United States. As 
Erkelenz’s biographer has shown, republican frustration was a strong motivat-
ing factor for his trip to America.112 By late 1924, the DDP, a major supporter 
of the republic, had already entered a long period of decline. In 1919, it had 
received 18 percent of the vote in the national elections, but its share had dwin-
dled to only 6 percent at that point. All the while, some of its foremost concerns, 
such as the reconciliation of workers and employers and the civic education of 
the German people, remained unresolved. Consequently, Erkelenz traveled to 
the United States in search of models of democratic renewal and social recon-
struction. After spending five months crisscrossing America, visiting factories, 
labor leaders, and educational reform projects, he returned convinced that 
American solutions could help “make over” German democracy and industry. 
Importantly, Erkelenz dismissed common notions of European cultural supe-
110 Dieckhoff to his mother, May 30, 1926, cited in Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften, 84.
111 German Consulate, Seattle, Oct. 7, 1925, PA R 60105.
112 Brantz, “German-American Friendship,” 232.
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riority, finding the United States to be not just a place of flat materialism and 
standardization but a country with its own, in many respects exemplary, cul-
ture.113 To facilitate the transfer of democratic ideas, to strengthen intellectual 
and personal contacts, and to improve German standing overseas, Erkelenz 
conceived of founding a transatlantic friendship organization and naming it 
after Carl Schurz, the champion of democratic reform in both countries. He 
aimed to base the organization on contacts with German Americans.114
Erkelenz’s liberal agenda tied in closely with German officials’ desire to 
maintain contact with German Americans while refraining from political and, 
if possible, official involvement. As Ambassador Maltzan intimated to Erkelenz 
in repeated conversations, a private organization committed to a moderate, 
nonpolitical course could count on official support as long as “the government 
and the Foreign Ministry will under no circumstances be publicly associated 
with the projected undertaking.”115 Back in Berlin, Erkelenz thus approached 
the Foreign Ministry in January 1926 with a memorandum that echoed the 
moderate Germandom policy he had discussed with the ambassador. Al-
though the war had irreversibly weakened the position of German Americans, 
the memorandum explained, they could still be a valuable resource for Ger-
many in the long run if one fostered closer ties. However, such work could only 
proceed from several premises, including recognition of German Americans’ 
full political Americanization and the abandonment of any designs to use them 
as a political pressure group in the United States in favor of a broadly cultural 
program to keep alive their interest in and sympathy for the old fatherland. 
This included academic exchange, lecture tours, and visitor hospitality. Above 
all, the entire endeavor had to be privately organized, its advisory board com-
prised of democratic politicians, professors, and businessmen, not officials. 
Unsurprisingly, the nonpolitical, ostensibly private nature of the Vereinigung 
Carl Schurz met with the Wilhelmstrasse’s hearty approval. In early 1926 the 
Foreign Ministry provided an initial 5000 marks to “jump-start” the organiza-
tion and was henceforth informally represented on its board.116
Importantly, Erkelenz also succeeded in gaining support from German in-
dustrial and parliamentary circles. Indeed, the Vereinigung Carl Schurz pro-
vides a unique window onto the economic and political interests that under-
113 Anton Erkelenz, Amerika von heute. Briefe von einer Reise (Berlin, 1926), 35–41, 79–80, 89.
114 Similar British organizations, he noted, had “for a hundred years – and quite deliberately – 
abstained from the political thought of an American reunion with England. But all the more 
forcefully and all the more intelligently, it emphasizes and supports the cultural and intellectual 
relationship.” Anton Erkelenz, “Der Amerikanische Deutsche,” Berliner Tageblatt, Jan. 6, 1926.
115 Memorandum Abteilung III (Haas) to Heilbron, PA R 121328.
116 The Foreign Ministry was represented on the board through Edmund Schüler, the architect 
of the 1919/1920 reforms, who frequently undertook quasi-official missions, particularly where 
cultural affairs and the United States were concerned. On his cultural activities in the USA, see 
Edmund Schüler, Lebensbericht, PA NL Edmund Fritz Schüler.
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pinned peaceful revisionist alliances. The German export industry, especially 
the chemical industry (IG Farben) and the large shipping lines (HAPAG and 
NDL) generously supported the Vereinigung, hoping to strengthen ties with 
American customers and improve American opinion prior to the settlement of 
war claims.117 Liberal industrialist Robert Bosch served as its president up until 
1933, lending both his “international name” and “indisputable republicanism” 
to the endeavor, as Erkelenz noted.118 In the wake of Weimar’s orientation to 
the West, the Vereinigung Carl Schurz also united representatives of all dem-
ocratic parties from the Social Democrats to Stresemann’s liberal-conservative 
DVP and in later years repeatedly underlined its Republican base by staging 
transatlantic celebrations in the Reichstag. The influence of the Foreign Min-
istry, too, remained strong and only increased over time. By the Vereinigung’s 
second year of operation, the initial grant of 5,000 marks had already turned 
into 25,000 marks in annual subsidies, and by 1929, the Vereinigung’s annual 
budget had more than tripled to 85,000 marks, with more than half coming 
from official sources.
Throughout, the Vereinigung Carl Schurz assumed work that German offi-
cials would or could not undertake themselves. As an ostensibly private organ-
ization, it set out to rekindle ties with German Americans, focusing particu-
larly on a hospitality agenda in Germany itself. By organizing teas and dinner 
banquets for German-American visitors or by inviting them to tour Germany, 
it engaged in a soft form of revisionism that tried to build personal contacts 
while raising sympathy for the republic’s problems and accomplishments. In 
the summer of 1927, for example, it invited a dozen German-American journal-
ists and editors to tour Germany, hoping to elicit more accurate and favorable 
coverage in the German-language press of “how we [Germans] bear and man-
age our hard fate.”119 While the Vereinigung never enjoyed the elite support 
that would have turned it into a German equivalent of the English-Speaking 
Union, it still met a specific need in Germany’s emerging public diplomacy. As 
German official representatives in the U. S. continued to cultivate the trust of 
Anglo-American circles, the Vereinigung offered an unobtrusive way to revi-
117 This was just one of many efforts in this direction; the North German Lloyd also strongly 
supported the transatlantic airplane flight of 1928 not only to market German aviation but to 
improve the German image among American customers. On hints of the NDL’s involvement in 
marketing the transatlantic flight, see Inge Marszolek, “Der erste Nordatlantikflug von Europa 
nach Amerika. Transatlantische Aushandlungen über Helden, Ehre, Nation und Modernität,” in 
Ehrregime, ed. von Reeken and Thiessen, 69–88, 86.
118 Heuss to Secretary of Robert Bosch, NL Erkelenz 37, BArch, Koblenz; German Embassy, 
Washington, to AA (De Haas), Mar. 27, 1926, Attachment Abschrift: Letter Erkelenz to Maltzan, 
Jan. 11, 1926, PA R 80298.
119 Pamphlet: Vereinigung Carl Schurz, Folder Allemagne – Divers- 1927, CEIP, Centre Europ-
een, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
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talize the German-American “touch and interest in the old Heimatland.”120 As 
such, it played a distinct and successful role in the German balancing acts of 
the mid-1920s.
*
By 1927, the general restraint practiced in cultural diplomacy since 1919 grad-
ually allowed for more official steps to be taken. This was most apparent in 
Ambassador Maltzan’s several month-long trips across the South and Midwest 
after March 1927. Even then, however, the trip was carefully curated to avoid 
even the semblance of ethnic outreach. For example, the ambassador only vis-
ited cities which Anglo-Americans had invited him to, and in the dozens of 
German clubs he visited, he emphasized emotional and cultural – never polit-
ical – matters. Acting as the “ambassador of the children” once more, he high-
lighted how strongly German-American charity had helped to shape the image 
of a benevolent America and asked German Americans to support the repub-
lic in facilitating a transatlantic “friendship.”121 Behind the scenes, to be sure, 
Maltzan lobbied ethnic and business leaders alike for a revision of the Dawes 
Plan, and did not hesitate to bring up more delicate questions such as German 
war guilt.122 In the end, the trip’s most profound results likely derived not from 
anything Maltzan said or did but from his manner. His tactful, “democratic” 
demeanor calmed Anglo-American fears of a Germany “faithful to her old 
masters,” just as his aristocratic background counteracted German-American 
trepidations concerning Weimar radicalism.
Certainly, the consular reports (to be taken with a pinch of salt, of course) 
claimed that the ambassadorial visit – to many locations the first in more than 
a decade – had had an overwhelmingly positive impact. They recorded both 
increased respect for Germany within influential Anglo-American circles and 
a heightened sense of ethnic pride among German Americans. “One can cer-
tainly claim,” the consulate in St. Louis wrote, “that this outreach has been an 
enormous psychological help to the local Germans in overcoming their in-
feriority complex (…) at least as far as it was created by the calamitous war 
psychosis.”123 Ambassador Maltzan himself was greatly pleased with his trip, 
which had allowed him to establish contacts with business and university elites 
across the country and had even earned him an honorary doctorate from Mar-
quette University, the very first given to a German ambassador in a former 
120 German Consulate General, Chicago, Aug. 27, 1925, PA R 60105.
121 German Consulate, St. Louis, Apr. 12, 1927, “Besuch des deutschen Botschafterpaares aus 
Washington in St. Louis und Kansas City,” PA R 80141.
122 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 28, 1927, PA R 80141.
123 German Consulate, St. Louis, Apr. 12, 1927, “Besuch des deutschen Botschafterpaares aus 
Washington in St. Louis und Kansas City,” PA R 80141.
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enemy nation. Still, he believed the major impact of his travels pertained to 
the “so far greatly neglected relations with the German-American element.”124 
Having previously won a measure of trust among Anglo-American elites, he 
felt his outreach to German Americans had been “entirely successful, without 
arousing any suspicion among American authorities.”125 Public accommoda-
tion and unobtrusive revision thus went hand in hand during this critical tran-
sitional period in transatlantic relations.
*
Arguably, this strategy of restraint in cultural relations abetted a threefold pro-
cess of reconciliation: for one, it overcame some of the distance between Ger-
man Americans and the Weimar Republic. Not that the republic or its colors 
ever came to inspire any greater degree of enthusiasm among German Amer-
icans (or that German officials tried to make it do so),126 but the visits of Ger-
man politicians, diplomats, and cruisers, the awards and honors bestowed on 
ethnic leaders, and increasing travel to the old fatherland helped them to over-
come at least some of their initial unease about the new Germany. Secondly, 
and at least as importantly, German restraint helped to decrease Anglo-Amer-
ican suspicions about ethnic separatism and facilitated German Americans’ 
return into the American mainstream. By late 1927, prominent Americans like 
U. S. Ambassador to Germany Jacob Gould Schurman could once more attend 
ethnic festivities such as the Steuben celebration of 1927 and publicly praise the 
unique qualities and historical contributions of German Americans.127 Finally, 
German restraint helped to normalize transatlantic relations at large. Abstain-
ing from political agitation among German Americans decreased American 
suspicions and increased trust in Germany’s cordial intentions. On an official 
level, this normalization was visible in the release of German property in a 
congressional bill of 1928 and the German-American arbitration agreements 
signed shortly thereafter. By the spring of 1928, the new ambassador to Wash-
ington, Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron (henceforth Prittwitz), 
found that “the psychosis of the immediate postwar years [had] given way to 
an atmosphere of which the Steuben speech of Ambassador Schurman has 
been a visible and fitting expression. The passing of the property bill in the 
124 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 28, 1927, PA R 80141.
125 Ibid.
126 Even ten years after its founding, German representatives registered a notable skepticism 
toward the republic and a widespread popularity of the stab-in-the-back legend. German Consu-
late General, Chicago, to AA, June 25, 1928, “Dienstreise von Generalkonsul Dr. Simon,” PA R 
80145.
127 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nr. 1328, Dec. 8, 1927, “Steubenfeier,” PA R 80299.
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senate and its passing into law marks the appreciable end of this difficult phase 
of a first re-establishing of German-American relations.”128
These reconciliations must be understood in relation to one another. As 
the developments of the Great War had shown, the standing of “Germans” in 
America and that of Germans across the Atlantic were closely intertwined. Just 
as earlier American suspicions of a “German threat” had had both a domestic 
and an international dimension, the transatlantic rapprochement of the later 
1920s improved the image of both Germans and German Americans. At the 
same time, these two processes fed into each other in a number of ways: the ris-
ing esteem the Weimar Republic enjoyed among the general American public 
heightened its acceptance among German Americans, just as the increasingly 
German-friendly expressions of American elites reduced the chasm between 
them and German Americans. To be sure, these reconciliations were shaped by 
numerous external factors: The subsiding of American nativism after 1924, the 
notable decline of ethnic pride and visibility, and even the election of Paul von 
Hindenburg to the Reich presidency were relevant to these developments. But 
we need not entirely dismiss the notion that German policy contributed to this 
rapprochement. The restraint practiced by the German government shielded 
Germany from accusations of meddling in America’s domestic affairs just as 
it shielded German Americans from accusations of ethnic separatism. While 
influence is always difficult to ascertain, post-1933 developments would once 
again demonstrate just how quickly and profoundly a more assertive “German-
dom policy” could alienate a multiethnic America.129 Arguably, the most signif-
icant decision Weimar Germany ever made in its public diplomacy toward the 
United States lay not in anything it did but in something it did not do.
Beyond “German Americans” and “Anglo-Americans” : Ambassador Prittwitz’s 
Take on Germandom Policy, 1928–1930
Importantly, the friendlier climate of the late 1920s never tempted Weimar-era 
diplomats to return to a more assertive policy. When Maltzan’s successor, Frie-
drich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, arrived in Washington in early 1928 
he immediately renewed Maltzan’s commitment to a restrained Germandom 
policy while introducing yet another “ambassadorial style” to public diplo-
macy. Only 43 years old at the time of his appointment, Prittwitz was a rela-
tively rare species in the Foreign Ministry. It was not just his youth or his mete-
oric promotion – pushed through by Stresemann himself – from counselor of 
128 Prittwitz to Carl von Schubert, May 29, 1928, PA NL Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und 
Gaffron, Vol. 4.
129 See Chapter 8.
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embassy in Rome to ambassador in Washington that set him apart, but also his 
ideological convictions: Prittwitz was a staunch democrat. In late 1918 he had 
come out publicly in support of the republic and had even run for the Reich-
stag on a left-liberal DDP ticket. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Prittwitz 
tendered his resignation – the only high-ranking diplomat in all of the German 
Foreign Service to do so.
Like his predecessor, Prittwitz saw German Americans as an important 
factor in transatlantic relations, but he set quite different priorities. First, he 
redoubled efforts to promote the republic. Indeed, he was the diplomat who 
first developed a compelling narrative of the “New Germany” and repeatedly 
reminded his audiences that, in light of Germany’s democratic movements in 
the nineteenth century, the revolution of 1918 was not an accident or an ab-
erration but the logical result of German history.130 In 1929, for example, he 
embraced the celebration of Carl Schurz’s one-hundredth birthday as a unique 
opportunity to underline the long history of democratic ideals shared by both 
Germany and the United States that had been expressed by the German rev-
olutionaries of 1848 (Schurz among them) and fulfilled in 1918/1919.131 Cele-
brations were organized in New York, Washington, and Berlin (through the 
Vereinigung Carl Schurz), and Prittwitz felt the occasion had found an appre-
ciable echo even beyond the German-American community.132
This points to the second aspect of Prittwitz’s strategy: a reorientation of 
German public diplomacy away from German Americans. Even though the 
improved transatlantic climate would have allowed for greater leeway with re-
gard to German Americans, Prittwitz avoided discrete ethnic appeals in favor 
of stressing a transatlantic mutuality of ideals – and not just for tactical rea-
sons. While Maltzan’s speeches, for example, had varied dramatically depend-
ing on whether he was speaking to a German American or an Anglo-American 
audience, Prittwitz’s addresses betrayed no such distinction. Rather, he used a 
broadly cultural approach to appeal to Americans irrespective of their ethnic 
background. To Berlin he reported in late 1928 that “the more we continue to 
confine our American activities to the fields of cultural and economic cooper-
ation and the less we openly bother them with European problems, the more 
surely we will maintain American sympathies and have decisive American 
public opinion on our side when particular problems crucial to Germany’s fu-
ture stand to be discussed or decided.”133
130 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 17, 1930, “Reise nach dem Mittelwesten der 
Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 80147; German Consulate General, Chicago, to AA, Jan. 31, 1929, 
“Botschafterbesuch in Chicago,” PA R 80145.
131 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 2, 1928, PA R 80288.
132 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, “Jahrhundertfeier des Geburtstages von Carl Schurz,” 
Mar. 8, 1929, PA R 80289.
133 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Oct. 30, 1928, “Stand der Beziehungen zwischen 
Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 80145.
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Prittwitz’s actions, I would argue, reflect a more general process of de-eth-
nicization of German public diplomacy in the United States. By the later 1920s, 
the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, to give one example, abandoned its discrete eth-
nic ambitions in favor of a broader American agenda. Having organized a Ger-
man tour for German-American editors in 1927, it repeated the tour with An-
glo-American journalists a year later.134 At the same time, the attention diplo-
mats did pay to German Americans successively lost some of its ethnic imprint. 
Even though Germany’s budding landscape of student exchange programs, 
holiday language courses, and tourist advertisements (to be explored in later 
chapters) was often intended to resonate specifically among Americans of Ger-
man birth or descent, this was not readily apparent since they were marketed 
to an “American” audience more generally. Indeed, Berlin increasingly came 
to realize that the distinction between German Americans and Anglo-Amer-
icans was largely artificial – and not just in a political sense. Members of the 
second or third generation, in particular, balked at the idea that they should 
hold any special sympathy for Germany because of their family’s emigration 
history. Certainly, outdated ethnic festivities or the flag-waving patriotism of a 
German cruiser visit held little sway over these Americans. This younger and 
better-educated generation often found a vacation or study abroad in Germany 
attractive, but only if it was advertised through commercial travel bureaus 
or universities, not ethnic organizations. Like their non-German peers, they 
proved receptive to Germany’s allure – but only if it fit their tastes as Ameri-
can consumers, tourists or students, not as ethnic Germans. It was during the 
late 1920s that Berlin began to realize fully that German Americans, while they 
could not be kept “German,” constituted a reservoir of American citizens more 
favorably disposed to German appeals and advertisements if, and only if, they 
catered to their American predilections. Arguably, the best “Germandom pol-
icies” Weimar Germany ever mustered in the United States had, outwardly at 
least, nothing at all to do with “Germandom.”
134 “[T]he [Vereingung Carl Schurz] does not at all limit itself to cultivate relations with Ger-
man-Americans but tries – emphasizing the idea of cultural exchange between both countries – 
to establish contacts also with Americans of non-German descent.” See AA to German Embassy, 
Washington, Aug. 31, 1927, PA R 80299.
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Fig . 7: The Steuben Club from New York touring Berlin, 1929, Bundesarchiv, Georg Pahl, Bild 
102–08179
*
Over the course of the 1920s, then, the “German Americans as Americans” 
approach turned increasingly from theory into practice. Though more tradi-
tional ethnic outreach continued – not least to cater to the German-born – the 
reductionist binary of Anglo-Americans and German Americans gradually 
dissolved, albeit never entirely. Unlike in other countries, where Germandom 
policies stunted any more general outreach, the focus on German Americans 
never impeded the growth of broader public diplomacy in the United States 
but rather nourished its development. The prominence Germany gave to its 
cultural programs in the United States derived in part from officials’ desire to 
reconnect with the large number of Americans of German birth or descent and 
the imperative of having to do so in a way that was not overtly ethnic. Much 
like this chapter within Part II of this study, ethnic considerations often stood 
at the beginning of more comprehensive German programs. As the New York 
consulate general had already concluded in 1925, “what really matters is that 
the greatest possible number of American citizens are – in a cultural sense – 
on our side. This will predominantly be the case with those of our stock, but 
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does not necessarily have to be limited to them.”135 It speaks to the new sense 
of realism in Germany’s Amerikapolitik that when asking German-American 
questions, German diplomats arrived at American answers.
German-American Partners : American Germanists and the Carl Schurz 
Memorial Foundation (CSMF), 1929–1930
In this process, German Americans evolved from being “targets” of German-
dom work to being, as the Deutsche Akademie in Munich put it, “trailblaz-
ers and intermediaries” in a policy designed to appeal to foreign elites.136 The 
idea of German Americans as well-nigh ideal intermediaries was, of course, 
a long-standing one. German programs had long built on the initiative and 
largesse of German Americans, and as early as 1925 the German consulate in 
New York City (which was home to a particularly well-organized and affluent 
group of German Americans) had identified them not only as “objects” but 
as “partners for German cultural diplomacy.”137 But even the most optimistic 
proponents of this strategy acknowledged that it applied to only a small eth-
nic elite. Most German Americans, German diplomats agreed, could never be 
effective interpreters of Germany or German culture. While more successful 
and educated German Americans often swiftly abandoned their ethnic herit-
age, the lower middle classes, which clung to it most tightly, seemed particu-
larly ill-suited to representing Germany: they neither enjoyed access to Amer-
ican opinion-shapers nor were they – in German diplomats’ decidedly elitist 
views – worthy “carriers of German culture” (Kulturträger). On the contrary, 
German diplomats and visitors frequently commented on their low intellectual 
and educational level. Without recourse to a classical education and having left 
for a better life across the Atlantic long before, most of them had only a faint 
idea of German Kultur and present-day Germany.138 As the consul in San Fran-
cisco explained: “the vast majority of Germans who emigrate to this country 
have – as is well known – only an elementary school education. They are by all 
means honorable, respectable and hard-working people and they are, for the 
most part, lovingly attached to the old Heimat. Such attachment, however, is 
but of sentimental nature. They cannot be creative exponents of German Kul-
135 Aufzeichnung des Konsuls Dr. Kraske (German Consulate General, New York), Oct. 10, 
1925, PA R 60105.
136 “Bericht über die fünfte Hauptversammlung der Deutschen Akademie in Berlin,” Mitteilun-
gen der Deutschen Akademie 2, no. 5 (Nov. 1930): 277–302, 288.
137 Aufzeichnung des Konsuls Dr. Kraske (German Consulate General, New York), Oct. 10, 
1925, PA R 60105.
138 For this long-standing criticism, see also Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Failure of German-Amer-
icanism,” Atlantic Monthly 118 (1916); Max Quadt, “Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika nach dem Kriege,” Der Auslanddeutsche 13, no. 2 (Jan. 1930): 36–39, 38.
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tur in the United States. Not due to a lack of good intentions, but because they 
lack the qualities required for a Kulturträger.”139 The consul general in Chicago 
even emphatically declared: “there is no more inappropriate use of the intellec-
tual weapon that remains to us than to entrust it to the German Americans.”140
Nevertheless, there was a small elite of respectable and highly educated 
German Americans who became increasingly visible and active after the mid-
1920s. Once nativist sentiment subsided, successful, fully Americanized men 
like the lawyer Charles Nagel (who was also former U. S. Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor in the Taft Administration), the bankers Paul Warburg and 
James Speyer, and the businessmen Julius Rosenwald (of Sears and Roebuck), 
Ferdinand Thun, Gustav Oberlaender, and Henry Janssen (all of the Textile Ma-
chine Works in Reading, Pennsylvania) redirected their generosity from alle-
viating overseas suffering to promoting German culture in the United States.141 
Unlike the Steuben Society, which pursued a confrontational and political 
course, these men shared Germany’s desire for a moderate cultural course of 
action to showcase German accomplishments and reconcile Anglo-Americans 
with Germany.142 To this end, they endowed university chairs in German lan-
guage and culture, helped to reopen the Deutsches Haus at Columbia Univer-
sity (originally opened in 1911, closed in 1917), and donated money for German 
language contests.
While these men provided the funds, American Germanists, i. e., teachers 
and professors of German, provided the initiative. During the second half of 
the 1920s, this group resumed its transatlantic activity and traditional cultural 
leadership strategy. The reintroduction of German language teaching in Amer-
ican schools and universities – albeit never to the same extent as before the war 
– gave them new confidence, prestige, and professional opportunities.143 Prewar 
cultural infrastructures like the Germanistic Society or the Deutsches Haus at 
Columbia University were slowly rebuilt and new ones like the American As-
sociation of Teachers of German (est. 1926) founded. It was among American 
Germanists – men like John A. Walz and Kuno Franke (Harvard), Alexander 
Hohlfeld (Wisconsin), Camillo von Klenze (CUNY), Frederick Heuser and 
Robert Fife (Columbia), Adolph Busse (Hunter College), A. B. Faust (Cornell), 
139 German Consulate General, San Francisco, Sep. 21, 1925 (Ziegler), PA R 60105.
140 German Consulate General, Chicago (Steinbach), Sep. 29, 1925, PA R 60105.
141 Charles Nagel had warned against ethnic politicking early on, noting that “German ambi-
tions in America can only be cultural ambitions.” Der Auslanddeutsche 4, no. 6 (March 1921): 
174; Tolzmann calls Nagel “perhaps the most widely respected German-American involved in 
public affairs at the time.” Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Ethnic Community,” 205.
142 Luebke, “German-American Leadership Strategies,” 68.
143 On the recovery of German language teaching, see The German Quarterly 1 (Jan. 1928); and 
for the positive interpretation of these developments by the Deutsche Akademie, see Franz Thi-
erfelder, “Deutsch im Unterricht fremder Völker,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Akademie 28 
(Aug./Sep. 1928): 1015–1055, 1037–1039.
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as well as Otto E. Lessing (Illinois) and William Alpha Cooper (Stanford) – 
that the promotion of German culture and language found its single strongest 
ally in the United States.
German diplomats clearly recognized this. They carefully monitored and, 
whenever they could, aided the recovery of German language enrollments at 
high schools and universities, not least to support this valuable group of in-
terlocutors.144 In most consular districts, professors of German were an inte-
gral part of the consulate’s informal network, suggesting American students for 
German fellowships, arranging lectures for German visitors, and sharing infor-
mation on academic and ethnic developments. This is not to suggest that they 
were German “agents,” as wartime propaganda had claimed. Their relation to 
German officials was informal, and their activities often served their own pro-
fessional advancement and academic prestige as much as Germany’s cultural 
promotion. But it is true that the German side did try to keep their interest and 
sympathies alive: German universities invited them to give lectures, German 
shipping lines and publishers offered steep discounts, and Germandom organ-
izations (often following official suggestions) honored their commitment to 
German culture through awards and medals.145 Much like France at the same 
time, Germany cultivated its valuable American intermediaries through sym-
pathetic attention and small honors.
Their particular value to German public diplomacy derived from three 
factors. First and foremost, they self-identified as transatlantic mediators and 
often assumed this role with missionary zeal. Kuno Francke of Harvard Uni-
versity, for example, felt his profession was called to be the “heir and guardians 
of German culture in this country,”146 while his colleague at the University of 
Wisconsin, Alexander Hohlfeld, saw his mission as “purposeful German-Eng-
lish mediation.”147 To this end, Germanists possessed two unique qualities. For 
144 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 17, 1930, “Reise nach dem Mittelwesten der 
Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 80147.
145 For example, A. B. Faust, the Cornell Germanist who had made a name for himself by writ-
ing the first comprehensive history of the German element, was invited to give the keynote ad-
dress at the DAI’s 1929 convention in Stuttgart. His reputation as an “ethnic leader” and pro-Ger-
man academic secured him honors and banquets along the way, including an invitation to 
President von Hindenburg. Duly flattered by the immense attention, Faust communicated these 
honors to a large number of friends back home. A. B. Faust to Ferdinand Thun, Sep. 8, 1929, 
Faust Papers, Box 6, Correspondence, 1927–28 (actually contains Correspondence 1928–30), 
Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
146 Francke, German After War Problems, 1927, quoted in Tolzmann, “The Survival of an Eth-
nic Community,” 290.
147 Quoted in Henry J. Schmidt, “Rhetoric of Survival: The Germanist in America from 1900 to 
1925,” America and the Germans, ed. Trommler and McVeigh, 2:204–16, 214. As Theodore He-
witt of the University of Buffalo summed up in 1930, “the most effective work (of mutual under-
standing) is to be done with the rising generation in our schools and colleges and a large part of 
this task by its very nature falls upon teachers of German [….] Thus America still retains the 
reputation of being devoid of a proper appreciation of art, music, literature and scholarship, and 
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one, they maintained close ties with contemporary, educated Germany. After 
the war, they were among the first to visit Germany, and long semester breaks, 
sabbaticals, and exchange programs helped them to keep abreast of German 
developments.148 Second, they enjoyed ample access to educated Anglo-Amer-
icans, whether as colleagues, students, or through their social circles. Impor-
tantly, too, they felt called to mediate not so much between German-America 
and Anglo-America as between Germany and the United States. Unlike eth-
nic organizations, they celebrated not Steuben or Pastorius, but Beethoven, 
Goethe, and Schiller. Finally, as this group began to articulate a clearer cul-
tural leadership strategy, they carefully avoided both the political agitation of 
the Steuben Society and the militant rhetoric of prewar cultural chauvinists. 
Kuno Francke summed up forty years of experience in 1927: Rather than clos-
ing themselves off in political groups, German Americans should cultivate the 
best of their cultural heritage, not by “boasting of German achievements” or by 
engaging in filiopietism, but through genuine cultural contributions, including 
financial endowments for German culture. Only in this way could he further 
“his own prestige as well as that of Germany.”149
This cultural leadership strategy found its most ambitious expression in the 
Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation (CSMF). Established in 1929 to mark the 
one-hundredth birthday of the prominent German-American politician and 
diplomat, the Philadelphia-based foundation was the brainchild of a number 
of prominent German-American businessmen and educators, including Fer-
dinand Thun, Paul Warburg, Frederick Heuser, A. B. Faust, and Franz Boas.150 
Through tireless campaigning they managed to raise a $500,000 endowment, 
which allowed the foundation to undertake a number of German-American 
cultural initiatives including German lecture tours in the United States, stu-
dent exchanges, and large-scale celebrations. Although its executive secretary, 
in fact any form of idealism, while Germany is still regarded as unable to depart from a psychol-
ogy that fails to understand the finer points of what in common parlance is termed “the spirit of 
good sport.” Theodore Hewitt, “Friendlier Contacts,” The German Quarterly 3, no. 4 (Nov. 1930): 
139–141, 139.
148 Already in 1923, Frederick Heuser of Columbia University informed the Amerika-Institut 
that German Americans would never play any other than a cultural role in the United States and 
that the Germanistic Society was still the most respectable German society in America, with the 
potentially best connections to Anglo-Saxondom. Amerika-Institut to AA, June 8, 1923; PA R 
65519.
149 Kuno Francke, Deutsche Arbeit in Amerika (Leipzig, 1930), 91; Camillo von Klenze, for ex-
ample, emphasized their mission to garner appreciation for German culture not “in hostile op-
position to English traditions but as a fruitful addition to them.” Camillo von Klenze, “Unsere 
Pflicht,” Die Vereinigten Deutschen Gesellschaften der Stadt New York, Broschüre zum 
Deutschen Tag 1928; copy in PA R 80288.
150 businessmen like Paul Warburg, Ferdinand Thun, Henry Janssen, Gustav Oberlaender, Ju-
lius Rosenwald, James Speyer, editors like Victor Ridder and Oswald Garrison Villard, educators 
like Kuno Francke, Franz Boas, Heuser, Robert Herndon Fife and politicians like Charles Nagel.
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Wilbur K. Thomas (the former director of the Quaker child-feeding program) 
and a small number of its directors, such as former ambassador Jacob Gould 
Schurman, were not of German descent, the foundation was an almost exclu-
sively German-American endeavor in terms of its endowment, planning, and 
self-understanding.
Its primary purpose, indeed, was to improve the public standing of Ger-
man Americans. By increasing the esteem for German culture in the United 
States, its founders hoped to safeguard German Americans against any recur-
rence of wartime discrimination. How deeply the war experiences shaped the 
CSMF’s founding members was revealed at the foundation’s first annual meet-
ing. Attributing the discrimination of a largely acculturated and productive 
part of society to a deep lack of “appreciation of the literary, artistic, and moral 
character of the German people,” they agreed that “an effort should be made 
to infuse the whole of American life and thought so thoroughly with the best 
that the Germans have to offer that never again can they be singled out and 
persecuted because of a more or less remote ‘foreign’ origin.”151 To the CSMF’s 
leaders, this seemed to have been German-America’s greatest sin of omission. 
Unlike other ethnic groups, which maintained active organizations like the 
English-Speaking Union, the American Scandinavian Foundation, the Alliance 
Française, the Kosciuszko Foundation, and the America-Italy Society, German 
Americans, despite their great number, had never mustered an organization to 
interpret German culture to Americans.152 Whereas British and French visitors 
to the United States had access to a nationwide network of upper-class con-
tacts through the Alliance Française or the English-Speaking Union, German 
visitors were usually restricted to ethnic or, at best, academic audiences. As 
the historian Frederick Luebke concluded, the CSMF, in identifying the lack 
of a united cultural rather than political action as German Americans’ great-
est previous shortcoming, exemplified a new culture-based approach to ethnic 
leadership in the late 1920s.153
Ironically, a distinctive feature of this “ethnic leadership strategy” was to 
systematically de-emphasize its “ethnic” nature. Not only was the CSMF de-
signed to appeal primarily to Anglo-American elites, but it steered clear of 
ethnic associations altogether for fear of being dragged into their “petty club-
biness” (Vereins-Meierei).154 Instead, it tried to methodically recruit prominent 
Anglo-American members to “ensure the integrity and neutrality of the fu-
151 First Annual Meeting of the Members of the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, May 4, 
1931, Coll Mss 176 National Carl Schurz Association, Inc Records Box 33/5, HSP.
152 The files of the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation illustrate the brainstorming process prior 
to and after its founding and the close attention paid to other cultural initiatives; see Coll Mss 
176 National Carl Schurz Association, Inc, Box 2/6, HSP.
153 Luebke, “German-American Leadership Strategies,” 68.
154 Eugene Hennigson to Hanns Gramm, Feb. 10, 1930. Instead, the CSMF addressed its ap-
peals to those “high-minded, unselfish, cultured people in every nation who are constantly seek-
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ture Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, which should not become known as 
one of the many German-American affairs.”155 Even though the foundation 
ultimately aimed to improve the standing of German Americans, its approach 
was indirect, trying to elicit regard not for German-American, but for German 
accomplishments. By early 1930, the CSMF was beginning to plan tours for 
German and American journalists overseas, to fund academic exchanges, and 
to establish local chapters across the United States.156 With time, it hoped to 
establish itself as the central clearinghouse for all American-German cultural 
relations. By the end of the postwar decade, German Americans seemed poised 
to assume the mediating role they had always shied away from – to their own 
and their old fatherland’s detriment.157 As we will see in Chapter 7, with its non-
political, non-ethnic orientation, the CSMF was to become an ideal partner for 
German cultural diplomacy in the early 1930s.
*
Over the course of the 1920s, a unequivocal shift in German public diplomacy 
can be observed. While German Americans emerged as a matter of primary 
concern almost immediately after 1919, the war had shown clearly that Ger-
man Americans had to be seen within the wider context of American opin-
ion. The basic dilemma for Germany was how to reach out to German Amer-
icans without running afoul of (Anglo-)American sentiment. Weimar’s three 
ambassadors approached this issue in different ways that reflected their own 
personal preferences and shifting transatlantic fortunes. While Otto Wiedfeldt 
employed the greatest possible restraint, keeping his distance from German 
Americans both formally and informally, Ago von Maltzan sought to reconcile 
the necessity of winning over Anglo-Americans with a desire to cultivate Ger-
man Americans. The mid-1920s thus saw an approach that coupled official re-
straint with informal, non-political outreach that aimed tacitly to overcome the 
distance between the Weimar Republic and German Americans. This restraint, 
this chapter demonstrated, helped reconcile not only Germany and America 
but German Americans and Anglo-Americans. Weimar’s last ambassador Prit-
twitz finally overcame the binary that had dominated assessments of German 
ing fellowship with those of like spirit in other countries.” CSMF – Circular, Aug. 20, 1934; Coll 
Mss 176 National Carl Schurz Association, Inc Records, HSP, Box 218.
155 Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation (Gramm) to Faust, Sep. 19, 1929, Albert B. Faust Papers, 
#14–18–85. Box 6, Correspondence, 1927–28 (actually contains Correspondence 1928–30), Di-
vision of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
156 “Pamphlet: the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation,” Coll Mss176 National Carl Schurz As-
sociation, Inc Records, Box 26/6, HSP.
157 A. B. Faust to Carl E. Schmidt, Sep. 10, 1928; Albert B. Faust Papers, #14–18–85. Box 6, 
Correspondence, 1927–28 (actually contains Correspondence 1928–30), Division of Rare and 
Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
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Americans for so long. His increasing focus on the younger, completely Amer-
icanized generation led to a successive de-ethnicization of German public di-
plomacy in the United States. In the United States, the Weimar government 
never attempted a clearly structured Germandom policy of the kind it devel-
oped in Latin America because the U. S. had no tight-knit ethnic community 
of that sort. What distinguished Weimar’s approaches from previous German 
administrations was that Weimar was realistic enough to truly recognize this 
fact, while the United States was too important for Weimar to fail to do so. 
Ultimately, German Americans emerged from the 1920s not so much as targets 
but as partners of German ambitions. Taken together, by 1930 these factors had 
brought German public diplomacy much closer to the “Kulturpropaganda in 
the best sense of the word, to strengthen respect for Germany and German-
dom” that German consuls had suggested in 1925. With regard to German 
Americans, the lessons of World War I had thus occasioned a massive shift in 
German Amerikapolitik.
Chapter 5  
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy 
and the United States
Throughout the nineteenth century, much of Germany’s influence and prestige in the world had been bound up with its universities. But World War I fundamentally transformed international academic relations. It 
disrupted well-entrenched flows of communication, ideologically divided the 
international scientific community, and set in motion a process of intellectual 
dissociation from Germany.1 Arguably, this recalibration of the academic world 
was particularly visible in the United States, where the intellectual and moral 
movement away from Germany had begun already in 1914, years prior to the 
U. S. entry into the war.2 After 1917, America’s own aspirations for moral lead-
ership and Allied efforts to use Germany’s absence to strengthen their toehold 
in the American educational landscape provided transatlantic alliance-building 
with a strong academic component. A steady flow of exchange professors, ed-
ucational delegations, and honorary degrees between American, British, and 
French universities helped to forge a “cultural entente.”3 In the process, the in-
ternational academic world of prewar days was recast in an inter-Allied mold.
While much is known about how the international academic community 
broke apart after 1914, we know surprisingly little about how it grew together 
again. Indeed, some scholars have doubted it ever did. Neither the relatively 
tight-knit academic community of prewar days nor the belief in scientific uni-
versalism ever fully recovered. After the war, wartime rifts were cemented. New 
1 Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 71–72.
2 Irish, The University at War, 5.
3 Tomás Irish, “From International to Interallied: Transatlantic University Relations in the Era 
of the First World War, 1905–1920,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, no. 4 (2015): 311–325.
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scientific and academic organizations were established along inter-Allied lines 
and excluded the erstwhile Central Powers from membership, conferences, and 
joint projects. German academics, for their part, responded to this international 
“boycott” with an equally self-righteous “counter-boycott,” refusing to join these 
organizations even once they were asked to in the mid-1920s.4 The academic world 
thus remained split into “two hostile camps” long after peace had been re-estab-
lished.5 Historians have even characterized the 1920s as a “cold war in interna-
tional scientific relations.”6 To be sure, this academic and scientific blockade of 
Germany was never airtight. In their private correspondence, many scholars took 
a more conciliatory, pragmatic position toward colleagues from former enemy 
nations,7 so the formal “cold war” was accompanied by informal research collab-
orations and sympathetic contacts – especially, it seems, between Germany and 
the United States. By the late 1920s, even otherwise critical German scholars and 
diplomats felt that transatlantic academic relations had been more or less restored.
But how were transatlantic divisions overcome, and who, if anyone, drove 
this rapprochement and for what reasons? The answers provided in this chap-
ter are necessarily limited. No doubt, a great number of informal transatlantic 
contacts, as well as the passing of time, shaped this academic rapprochement. 
But the present chapter is concerned less with academic relations per se than 
with their strategic management in international politics, that is, academic di-
plomacy,8 so it focuses on the German ministries. Still, it should be clear that 
university administrators, professors, and students were never merely objects 
of official strategy but strong actors in their own right. While not every aca-
demic action ought to be classified as a quasi-diplomatic act and not every ac-
ademic traveler as a “sub-diplomatic ambassador,” the ambitions and activities 
of universities and their members have to be taken into account.9 By tracing 
the interplay of state and nonstate actors, the chapter aims to elucidate the or-
igins of German academic diplomacy, assess the role of the United States, and 
4 Schroeder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 181–211.
5 Daniel Kevles, “‘Into Hostile Political Camps’: the Reorganization of International Science in 
World War I,” Isis 62, no. 1 (1971): 47–60.
6 Paul Forman, “Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and its 
Manipulation in Germany after World War I,” Isis 64, no. 2 (1973): 150–180, 152.
7 For one such moderate voice see Max Planck in Gabriele Metzler, “‘Welch ein deutscher Sieg!’ 
Die Nobelpreise von 1919 im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft,” Viertel-
jahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 44, no. 2 (1996): 173–200.
8 There are, of course, many other definitions of academic diplomacy. Dorothee Bouquet, for 
example, has defined the term broadly as “any attempts or practices of international relationship 
through individuals who benefitted from an intellectual reputation or of an affiliation with a fa-
mous academic institution.” Dorothee Bouquet, “French Academic Propaganda in the United 
States, 1930–39,” in Teaching America to the World and the World to America, ed. Richard Garlitz 
and Lisa Jarvinen, 155–172 (New York, 2012), 169.
9 For this point in particular, see Lerg, “Uses and Abuses,” 80; as well as Lerg, Universitätsdiplo-
matie.
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increase our understanding of the process of cultural demobilization on both 
sides of the Atlantic.10 In all, the chapter explores when, how, and why inter-Al-
lied academic relations once again became international.
With this in mind, the chapter is divided into four parts. First, it briefly re-
views the considerable problems German officials faced in returning to prewar 
traditions of academic diplomacy in a climate marked by German isolation 
and self-isolation. Second, it shows how this nonavailability of more traditional 
means of academic outreach refocused official attention on international stu-
dent relations. In this context, America’s importance in shaping German aca-
demic diplomacy is emphasized. It is in the transatlantic context of the 1920s 
that we first observe a thorough “geopoliticization” of international students.11 
The rapid expansion of this field was facilitated in particular by the mutual 
interests of German academics and American cultural internationalists. Third, 
the chapter looks at the difficult development of an academic rapprochement 
in the latter half of the 1920s and the more constructive role it allowed German 
universities to assume, albeit only for a brief period, on behalf of the Weimar 
Republic’s foreign policy. Finally, the chapter critically examines the conditions 
of this “academic peace,” revealing some of the deeper tensions that underlay 
transatlantic academic relations after World War I.
Weimar’s Academic Diplomacy: Promises and Problems in the early 1920s
One of the vital necessities of the state [is…] to maintain those great assets it still holds. 
Among these assets, German Wissenschaft assumes an outstanding position. It is the 
most important prerequisite not just for the maintenance of education in the country, 
for Germany’s technology and industry, but also for its reputation and world position, 
on which in turn depend its standing and credit. These facts are so well known that they 
require no explanation. Before the war, Germany’s standing rested on its military power, 
its industry (and commerce) and its Wissenschaft […] But now our military power is de-
stroyed, industry and commerce are profoundly weakened; but Wissenschaft, despite the 
loss of thousands of those working in and promoting it, still stands […].12
10 If the United States is widely acknowledged as a major factor in such pioneering endeavors as 
the prewar professorial exchange, its impact in the 1920s is still underappreciated; Michael Wala, 
“‘Gegen eine Vereinzelung Deutschlands’. Deutsche Kulturpolitik und akademischer Austausch 
mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Deutschland und die 
USA in der internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Manfred Berg and Philipp Gas-
sert, 303–315 (Stuttgart, 2004), remains one of the only exceptions.
11 On this geopoliticization, see Paul Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? International Stu-
dents and U. S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 5 
(2009): 775–806.
12 Harnack, February 1920, quoted in Notker Hammerstein, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Dik-
tatur, 1920–1945 (Munich, 1999), 33.
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These words, which the eminent theologian and science organizer Adolf von 
Harnack spoke before the Reichstag just weeks after the Versailles Treaty had 
taken effect, eloquently expressed what was rapidly becoming a commonplace 
notion among German journalists, diplomats, and educators: that science and 
scholarship were of vital importance to Germany’s international relations; that 
in the absence of its political, military, and (for a time) economic power, the 
cultural and symbolic capital bound up in Germany’s universities – and its 
Wissenschaft more generally – was a “last remaining weapon” to re-establish 
the nation’s standing and influence in the world.13 In the 1920s, Germans came 
to recognize, and often overestimate, the Weltgeltung deutscher Wissenschaft 
(the world influence of German science).14
Fig . 8: This cover of a tourism brochure shows how 
important German universities were to promoting 
Germany more generally . Willi Dzubas, “German 
Universities,” German Tourism Promotion Office, 
ca . 1930
13 A very similar assessment occurs in Max Planck’s speech before the Prussian Academy of 
Sciences on November 14, 1918, quoted in Michael Grüttner, “Nachkriegszeit,” in Geschichte der 
Universität unter den Linden, Vol. 2, eds. Grüttner and Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, 5–65 (Berlin, 
2012), 59.
14 Sylvia Paletschek, “Was heißt ‘Weltgeltung deutscher Wissenschaft?’ Modernisierungsleis-
tungen und -defizite der Universitäten im Kaiserreich,” in Gebrochene Wissenschaftskulturen. 
Universität und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Michael Grüttner et al., 29–54 (Göttingen, 2010).
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While Germany’s educated elites did not doubt that the unique resource of 
German Wissenschaft had to be used to improve its global standing, tactical 
differences on how exactly to use it soon emerged. Although the Foreign Min-
istry’s Kulturabteilung did not have a section solely devoted to academic and 
scientific matters until 1926 (but only a broader section on artistic and scientific 
relations), it expressed a clear desire to put German universities in the service 
of foreign policy and to replace the Prussian Ministry of Culture as the locus of 
German academic diplomacy. The need for academic diplomacy seemed pro-
nounced in the United States, where substantial prewar traditions, the alarm-
ing academic activity of France, and U. S. political withdrawal from Europe all 
suggested it was a necessary and appropriate way of re-establishing German 
influence. 15 Inter-elite channels of communication, German diplomats hoped, 
could be reopened on the “neutral ground” of international learning, thereby 
breaking down wartime resentments, arousing sympathetic consideration of 
German problems, and ultimately engendering a climate conducive to the re-
vision of Versailles.16
To this end, the Foreign Ministry advocated an ambitious policy of inter-
national outreach early on. It never left any doubt that it regarded Germany’s 
re-integration into the academic world as not a cultural but a political issue. 
“As long as the [scientific] boycott persists,” the state secretary concluded in 
1921, “the intellectual elites of the former enemy countries will never be able to 
leave the war psychosis behind; the war will be continued in the cultural field 
and there will be no positive response to a policy of conciliation.”17 By serving 
as visiting professors, attending international conferences, attracting foreign 
students, or bestowing honorary doctorates on influential foreigners, German 
professors and German universities were to help re-establish Germany’s influ-
ence vis-à-vis France.18 In light of the profound international challenges Ger-
many faced – and the dearth of other available instruments – a more forceful 
academic diplomacy appeared imperative.19
As we have already seen in Chapter 3, such convictions only slowly carried 
over into more concrete academic policy concerning the United States. While 
15 On one French program, see Whitney Walton, “Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad: 
American Students in France in the 1920s and 1930s,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 2 (2005): 255–
278; for German observations in the early 1920s, see the various reports and memoranda in PA 
R 63382; and Bernhard Harms, Französische Kulturpropaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika (Kiel, 1924).
16 Abschrift zu UIK Nr. 2047.1. Niederschrift über das Ergebnis der Sitzung im Amerika-Insti-
tut, Oct. 6 1921, PA R 64997.
17 AA to Nadolny (Stockholm), Apr. 28, 1921, PA R 64979.
18 Aufzeichnung, Oct. 31, 1922, PA R 65519.
19 State and private groups alike deemed it clear that German universities would henceforth 
have to fight a “culture war” to recapture Germany’s standing and liberate it from Versailles. A. 
Timpe, “Die Auslandsaufgaben der deutschen Akademiker und die deutschen Hochschulen,” 
Deutsche Arbeit 24, no. 10 (July 1925) 256–261, 260.
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a certain lack of “energy and inspiration” and severe financial constraints were 
partly to blame, German efforts encountered structural and psychological ob-
stacles on both sides of the Atlantic.20 In the United States, neither the in-
stitutional nor the personal infrastructure of the prewar period still existed: 
the professorial exchanges had been paused in 1915, German departments had 
been greatly weakened, and cultural bridgeheads, like the Deutsches Haus at 
Columbia University, had been closed. Still, the psychological hurdles to re-
newed understanding were even more problematic than the loss of organiza-
tional structures. The war had not personally affected American scholars as 
strongly as many of their French or Belgian colleagues, but anti-German sen-
timent still ran high among them, sustained by a moralistic understanding of 
the Great War that cast a once well-respected scholarly community as the cat’s 
paw of a militaristic, autocratic state. Though not all American scholars shared 
such deep resentment of Germany, few had any desire to meet their German 
colleagues in the near future. Nowhere in America, a German embassy report 
noted as late as early 1923, were “expressions of German hatred still as common 
as in school and university circles.”21 As long as the war’s emotional and moral 
alliances prevailed, efforts to re-establish academic relations would likely falter 
across the Atlantic.
American resentments were not alone to blame for the slow re-estab-
lishment of academic exchange, however. German professors, in particular, 
quickly became an unmanageable group in the Foreign Ministry’s efforts at 
reconciliation. Although professors were state employees and higher educa-
tion was publicly funded, universities were self-governing institutions with a 
significant degree and sense of autonomy. Inviting international visitors, estab-
lishing exchange programs, or awarding honorary degrees required a (usually 
unanimous) faculty vote. And while German professors agreed that their uni-
versities had a crucial role to play in re-establishing German standing abroad, 
many of them saw a policy of active outreach as inappropriate.22 The newly 
founded Association of German Universities (Verband der Deutschen Hoch-
schulen, est. 1920), representing 41 institutions of higher learning, served as a 
lobby group for professorial interests and soon adopted a stance at odds with 
the Foreign Ministry.23 In particular, it promoted reserve toward the recent 
enemies in the West as a more effective and dignified means of re-establishing 
German prestige and influence. Once it became truly aware of the “scientific 
boycott” around 1921, it began to organize a “united line of defense” that asked 
German universities to abstain from attending international academic jubilees, 
20 Schroeder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 213.
21 Geman Consulate General, New York (Kraske) to AA, Jan. 7, 1923, PA R 80295.
22 Schädel to Schenk, June 13, 1921, BArch R8088/146.
23 On the early years of the Verband der deutschen Hochschulen, see Franz Bauer, Geschichte 
des Deutschen Hochschulverbandes (Munich, 2000), 14–19.
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and individual professors to reject personal invitations to international con-
ferences, as long as German science in general remained excluded from inter-
national collaboration.24 Ultimately, association members believed, the very 
indispensability of German science – not German amends – would prompt 
the international community to readmit it in the equal (or more than equal, as 
some German scholars believed) position it intellectually deserved. For a time, 
at least, the German professoriate largely approved of this stance.25
To be sure, the question of how best to secure the prestige of German sci-
ence in the United States – through active promotion or dignified reserve – had 
been discussed along similar lines even before 1914.26 But the disappointments 
of war and peace gave the question an unprecedented emotional dimension. 
Embittered by foreign accusations, Germany’s educated elites often understood 
their isolation as a studied insult and hence a matter of “national dignity.” Al-
though America was hardly as unpopular as France in the postwar years, Ger-
mans had taken its wartime rejections especially badly. The wartime behavior 
of the large number of German-trained American professors was considered 
nothing short of ingratitude, and the fact that it had followed upon a decade 
of lively academic exchange seemed only to suggest the futility of any further 
outreach.27 Anti-Americanism was also widespread among the generally con-
servative German professoriate, with President Wilson’s perceived “betrayal” 
at Versailles only intensifying it.28 Moralistic accusations from Americans, 
which continued in the 1920s, also sustained a defensive mentality among Ger-
man professors, initially complicating gestures of conciliation even among the 
small group of liberal German professors inclined to make them.
Moreover, in the postwar years, professorial intransigence also expressed a 
struggle within Germany about who would shape academic diplomacy. The As-
sociation of German Universities and many of its members viewed the Foreign 
Ministry’s aspirations with suspicion, strongly doubting its competence in such 
delicate, intellectual matters – based not least on wartime experiences. 29 It was 
24 Schroeder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 181–211; 
see Declaration of German Professors in Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen 
5, no. 1 (Jan. 1925), 50.
25 Many clearly rejected the tenets of the professorial counter-boycott; Prof. Dr. Weizsäcker 
(Heidelberg) to Schriftleitung des Verbandes der deutschen. Hochschulen, Jan. 2, 1924, BArch 
8088/770.
26 E. g., Bericht Clemen, May 15, 1908, NL Schmidt-Ott 480, GSPK.
27 Because a great number of those disappointed by American behavior, such as the historian 
Eduard Meyer (in the Hochschulverband) and Friedrich Schmidt-Ott (as president of the Notge-
meinschaft), continued to occupy central positions in science, transatlantic reconciliation con-
tinued to face considerable hurdles in the 1920s: Meyer, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 
180–181; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 163.
28 Schäfer, Mein Leben, 238.
29 It was the association’s declared aim to grow strong enough to counter the influence of the 
state ministries of culture and the Foreign Ministry in all international questions; Prof. Schenck 
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precisely because they recognized, as one professor put it, that “international 
scientific relations are among the much-cited ‘imponderables’ of politics, in 
whose management we have lacked both enthusiasm and skill” that these rela-
tions seemed best left in the hands of those who embodied the highest ideals of 
the nation and remained above the fray of lowly (party) politics: German pro-
fessors.30 In the 1920s, the distance professors kept to the republic reinforced 
this prevalent “mandarin ideology.”31 While many professors had originally 
been willing to accept and adapt to the new government as long as it promised 
an honorable peace, the reality of Versailles placed them, often irreversibly, in 
opposition to the republic.32 The experience of inflation, the reformist impulses 
of the first republican governments, and the international humiliations of the 
early 1920s only cemented their alienation from the Weimar “system,” whose 
supporters they began to blame for Germany’s defeat and the dishonorable 
peace. If Emperor Wilhelm II’s interest in international outreach had often 
helped to overcome professorial opposition before the war, many professors 
were now unwilling to place their acumen, prestige, and networks in the ser-
vice of the republic and its purportedly “dishonorable” policy of fulfillment.33
Still, it was not until late 1924 that the irreconcilable attitudes of Germa-
ny’s conservative mandarins truly proved a liability to Weimar’s foreign policy. 
Only when diplomatic relations with the Western powers grew friendlier after 
mid-1924 did the near absence of academic contacts and the belligerent tone of 
professorial pronouncements become a source of official embarrassment and 
a stumbling block to a policy of reconciliation.34 At a time when French and 
to Prof. Seeberg, June 16, 1921, BArch R 8088/821; it even collected incriminating evidence to 
document the Foreign Ministry’s wartime blunders; see materials in BArch 8088/821.
30 Prof. Dr. Gast, “Die Auslandsbeziehungen der deutschen Hochschulen,” Mitteilungen des 
Verbandes der deutschen Hochschulen (2. Sonderheft), 17–24.
31 Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 
1890–1933 (Cambridge, MA, 1969).
32 Herbert Döring, Der Weimarer Kreis. Studien zum politischen Bewusstsein verfassungstreuer 
Hochschullehrer in der Weimarer Republik (Meisenheim am Glan, 1975), 60; on the original ar-
rangement of German universities with the Weimar Republic and their post-Versailles fallout, 
see Michael Grüttner, “Nachkriegszeit,” 5–65.
33 Using the Kaiser’s interest to circumvent professorial opposition and raise private funds was 
a practice perfected by the Prussian Ministry of Culture; see Bernhard vom Brocke, “Die Kai-
ser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Kaiserreich,” in Forschung im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Ge-
sellschaft. Geschichte und Struktur der Kaiser-Wilhelm-/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, ed. Rudolf Vier-
haus and Bernhard vom Brocke, 17–160 (Stuttgart, 1990), 65.
34 Especially the opening of the League of Nation’s Institute of Intellectual Cooperation in Paris 
in early 1925 (widely perceived as a French monopolization of cultural relations) notably in-
creased public and parliamentary pressure for more forceful academic diplomacy. The Center 
Party issued a request for official commentary on the state of international scientific relations; 
see Abschrift III 754 II Ang Protokoll der Sitzung, betreffend Interpellation Nr. 375 Dr. Schreiber 
und Genossen im Reichsministerium des Innern am 17. Februar 1925, PA R 65521; this is shown 
also by Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, “Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und auswärtige 
Kulturpolitik 1919–1933. Vom Boykott und Gegen-Boykott zu ihrer Wiederaufnahme,” in 
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British universities, for example, were liberally awarding honorary degrees to 
American politicians, diplomats, and generals, the German Foreign Ministry 
had to expend considerable time and energy securing similar honors even for 
German-friendly Americans like ambassador Houghton.35
In order to resolve these issues, the Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung 
called a meeting with German professors in February 1925. In particular, 
it hoped to secure their cooperation on three matters that had proven to be 
sources of frustration during the previous years. For one, it tried to convince 
German professors that honorary degrees should be awarded in line with the 
nation’s foreign policy interests; second, it asked to be informed directly (not 
through the state ministries of culture) of international conference invitations 
and professorial travels abroad; third, it hoped to get individual scholars to 
adopt a more lenient attitude toward attending international conferences, even 
when the groups issuing the invitations were associated with the “boycott or-
ganizations.” In short, the meeting aimed to secure a basis of professorial co-
operation and allow the Foreign Ministry to more actively “manage” interna-
tional academic relations in line with its policy of peaceful revision. Given the 
controversial nature of these issues, the meeting had been prepared carefully. 
Rather than engaging in a futile discussion with the Association of German 
Universities, the Kulturabteilung sought to reach an agreement with a mix 
of influential professors and science organizers, who could thereafter make 
the decisions palatable to their peers. Though half of those assembled were 
right-leaning scholars, including historian Eduard Meyer and Otto Franke of 
the Association of German Universities, more liberal scholars, including the 
Heidelberg economist Alfred Weber and the Kiel geographer Albrecht Penck, 
were clearly overrepresented in light of the generally conservative professori-
ate.36
The careful preparation notwithstanding, the meeting failed to yield the 
desired results. All the professors present roundly rejected the use of honorary 
degrees as quasi-political instruments on the grounds that this was incompat-
ible with university autonomy. Opinions were more diverse on the matter of 
Forschung im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Gesellschaft, ed. Vierhaus and vom Brocke, 858–885, 
872.
35 The attempt to get an honorary degree for General Henry T. Allen, who had led a relief cam-
paign for German children in early 1924, took several years and proved nearly impossible; Ger-
man Embassy, Washington [Wiedfelt], to AA, May 18, 1924, BArch 3901/9111; Hans von Gwin-
ner to v. Maltzan, Jan. 6, 1925, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
36 Liberals: the theologian Adolf Deissmann, the economist Alfred Weber, the geographer Al-
brecht Penck, and the physicist Arnold Sommerfeld (all of whom had strong connections to, or 
had recently visited, the United States). Right-leaning scholars included historian Eduard Meyer, 
the theologian Reinhold Seeberg, the sinologist (and head of the association’s international com-
mittee) Otto Franke and Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, president of the Notgemeinschaft; on the meet-
ing: Protokoll der Sitzung im Auswärtigen Amt vom 6. Februar 1925 betr. Verhalten der 
deutschen Gelehrtenwelt gegenüber dem Auslande, PA R 64981.
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conference attendance. Whereas right-leaning professors stressed the insulting 
nature of the “boycott” and demanded that international scholars make a “dec-
laration of loyalty” prior to even the renewal of informal, personal contacts, 
liberals at least wanted to cultivate the goodwill of foreign scholars who had 
shown themselves willing to move on. Ultimately, they agreed that they should 
redevelop personal rather than institutional relations and avoid any behav-
ior  that could be misjudged as “pursuing” foreigners. Though the assembled 
professors made some minor concessions, such as expressing willingness to 
share official conference invitations with the Foreign Ministry (a concession 
that they then repeatedly failed to honor), the meeting had generated only 
negligible improvements from an official perspective.37 Certainly, the focus 
on personal rather than institutional relations hardly lent itself to ministerial 
management of academic affairs. Rather than paving the way for congenial co-
operation, the meeting only made clear that the Foreign Ministry was getting 
nowhere with the German professoriate. Although some German professors 
were quite willing to lend themselves to war guilt agitation or anti-Western 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, many were decidedly more reserved when 
it came to reconciliation with the West.
By mid-1925, a number of things had become clear. For one, the foreign 
policy “uses” of German higher learning would depend on rebuilding a trans-
atlantic infrastructure and overcoming the deep resentments the war had en-
gendered; in addition, this policy would require winning a wider set of indi-
vidual and institutional partners within German academia willing and able to 
support it. The success of academic diplomacy, in short, hinged on improving 
German professorial attitudes toward America and toward Berlin. This would 
be a slow and cumbersome process, however. For those interested in harness-
ing German universities to Germany’s emerging Amerikapolitik, the prewar, 
professor-centered approach had, at least for the moment, proven a dead end.
A New Academic Diplomacy: Geopoliticizing the Student, 1924–1929
At this point in the 1920s, attention shifted dramatically toward other academic 
actors: students. With international scholarly relations an intractable issue, the 
Foreign Ministry and academic circles themselves refocused on questions of 
international education. In the five years after 1924, they would encourage and 
initiate international fellowship and exchange programs, set up summer and 
language courses, and create a broader student hospitality infrastructure. From 
37 Later that year, the Senate of Berlin University advised its members not to attend interna-
tional conferences under the auspices of the boycott organizations, and American scientists 
planning to work at the university hospital were asked to issue a public declaration denouncing 
the boycott; see Siebe, Germania Docet, 439.
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1924 to 1929, Reich subsidies for international education increased more than 
tenfold, from 40,000 to 500,000 marks.38 By the late 1920s, no other cultural 
policy field had expanded at a faster pace or risen more in public recognition. 
While these undertakings remained comparatively limited in scope (at least 
when judged by any post-1945 standard), they still constituted a striking de-
parture from earlier professor-focused efforts and laid the foundations for Ger-
many’s student-centered academic diplomacy of the twentieth century. This 
seminal development, I argue, cannot be adequately understood without con-
sidering Weimar’s Amerikapolitik.
First, of course, it must be acknowledged that the reorientation toward 
students was not solely a German phenomenon. In the aftermath of the war, 
the question of international education acquired new urgency in many coun-
tries. The incipient support for international student exchanges that had ex-
isted before the war gave way to a large number of national, international, and 
transnational organizations devoted to facilitating student migrations. Inter-
national bodies like the League of Nations and transnational actors like the 
World Student Christian Movement began to champion student exchange and 
travel as a key to international understanding.39 Likewise, individual countries 
established (often state-endowed) centers for that purpose, recognizing that 
the world’s future elite offered an avenue for national influence. In 1919 alone, 
France enlarged its Office National des Universités et Écoles Françaises, Great 
Britain expanded its Universities Bureau of the British Empire, and American 
internationalists founded the Institute of International Education (IIE) in New 
York City. By the late 1920s a global network of information offices, student 
travel, and exchange opportunities catered to the more than 50,000 students 
then studying abroad.40 Whether in the name of peace or in the name of na-
tional interest – and most often, a combination thereof – the interwar years 
witnessed the “discovery” of students in international politics.41
In the German case, defeat and inflation – or more accurately, the eco-
nomic and psychological conditions they created – delayed this discovery at 
first. During the first postwar years, German universities experienced a phe-
38 In 1931 the Foreign Ministry expended 515,000 RM on the DAAD and its branch offices in 
Paris and London; see Haushaltsplan 1931, PA R 64223.
39 See Daniel Laqua, “Activism in the ‘Students’ League of Nations’ International Student Poli-
tics and the Confédération Internationale des Étudiants, 1919–1939,” English Historical Review, 
132, no. 556 (2017): 605–637.
40 Reinhold Schairer, “Ausländische Studenten an deutschen Hochschulen,” in Das Akademis-
che Deutschland III, ed. Michael Doeberl et al., 525–542 (Berlin, 1930), 529.
41 Siebe, Germania Docet, 375. Looking back in 1928, the League of Nation’s Committee for 
International Intellectual Cooperation characterized the previous decade as a “typical founder’s 
period” in international education; see University Exchanges in Europe: Handbook of the Institu-
tions and Measures in all the European Countries to Facilitate the Work of Professors, Students and 
Teachers Abroad (Paris, 1928), 5.
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nomenal rise in international student numbers. At the height of inflation in 
1923, 15,000 foreign students were studying in Germany, where they could gain 
an excellent education at bargain prices. However, since German universities 
already had to cope with two generations of German students (those return-
ing from the war and those enrolling for the first time), international students 
were generally regarded as a liability, not an asset. The “foreigner question” 
(Ausländerfrage) – whether and under what conditions international students 
ought to be admitted to German universities – was bitterly discussed at the 
time and resulted in a number of discriminatory measures, in particular, the 
introduction of steep extra fees to ward off “currency profiteers.” This applied 
especially to students from politically or racially “undesirable” backgrounds, 
including Jews, Poles, and in some cases, all former enemy nationals.42 As long 
as inflation and wartime mentalities prevailed, the Foreign Ministry and liberal 
university circles were unable to prompt more welcoming treatment, despite 
repeated attempts.43
A more constructive debate on international students only became possi-
ble following Germany’s relative economic and political stabilization after 1924. 
Once living conditions and university finances improved, attitudes toward for-
eigners lost some (albeit never all) of their bitterness. At the same time, the end 
of the attractive valuta conditions led to a veritable exodus of foreign students 
from German universities. Their number plummeted from around 15,000 in 
1923 to a mere 5,000 one year later.44 For the first time since the war, the real-
ity of Germany’s lost academic prestige was truly laid bare and suddenly gave 
weight to much longer-standing warnings about French advances in interna-
tional education. From 1924 onwards, professorial and student organizations as 
well as federal and state ministries pondered how they could best re-establish 
the attractiveness of German universities.
The first step was to abandon the extra fees for international students. As 
early as January 1, 1924, just weeks into currency stabilization, the Foreign 
Ministry issued a circular to all state ministries of culture that (not for the 
first time) advocated a significant reduction of fees for international students. 
It emphatically underlined the absurdity of Germany’s discriminatory meas-
ures at a time when Italy, France, and the USA were vying to attract foreign 
students to their universities and when “the cultivation of cultural relations 
is one of the few fields in which Germany can actively operate abroad.”45 The 
appeal was successful: Prussia, home to two-thirds of all German universities, 
removed international tuition rates the following year, with all other states fol-
42 Siebe, Germania Docet, 430.
43 By late 1922 the Foreign Ministry had arrived at a clear position to increase international 
scientific and academic contacts; Aufzeichnung, Oct. 31, 1922 [Abt B], PA R 65519.
44 Siebe, Germania Docet, 371.
45 AA to German State Ministries of Culture, Jan. 1, 1924, PA R 64853.
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lowing suit by 1927.46 While this resolved one of the most contentious academic 
issues of the early 1920s, it did not do much to address the larger problem of 
dwindling international enrollment. With advantageous currency conditions 
gone, German universities would not just have to remove artificial hurdles but 
actively compete for international students, matching the advertising, fellow-
ship, exchange, and hospitality structures Germany’s Western rivals had since 
created. The end of inflation, in short, necessitated a shift from passive to active 
academic diplomacy.47
Within just two years of 1925, these considerations gave rise to a number 
of complementary and competing private and official initiatives devoted to an 
ever more comprehensive “management” of international education in the na-
tional interest. One of the first and most important of these was the Academic 
Exchange Service (Akademischer Austauschdienst, AAD). Heidelberg student 
Carl Joachim Friedrich initiated the effort, helping to organize a small Ger-
man-American student exchange program (later named the American-Ger-
man Student Exchange) at the University of Heidelberg’s Institute of Social 
and Political Science in 1923/24. From these modest origins, it soon evolved 
into a large and increasingly state-sponsored program. By its second year, the 
AAD had moved from Heidelberg to Berlin, and professors like Alfred Weber 
of Heidelberg had surrendered its administration to Prussian bureaucrats. Co-
operating with the Institute of International Education in New York, the AAD 
steadily increased the volume of transatlantic exchanges, also expanding its 
program to Britain and France in the later 1920s. Under the directorship of Ad-
olf Morsbach (1927–1934), a prewar Rhodes Scholar, it developed a clear pro-
file and began to work more closely with the Foreign Ministry, which by 1930 
provided a whopping 200,000 marks in annual subsidies. By 1931 the renamed 
and expanded German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer 
Austauschdienst, DAAD) had emerged as the German office for international 
academic affairs – which it remains to this day.48
The AAD, however, was only part of an emerging infrastructure of inter-
national education with close ties to German authorities. In June 1925, the 
Foreign Ministry founded the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to serve 
as an instrument of its increasingly student-focused academic diplomacy. Its 
objective, as the Foreign Ministry noted, was to provide fellowships to promis-
ing international students based on political rather than charitable criteria and 
thereby to bring 80 to 100 “talented and German-friendly” students a year to 
46 Laitenberger, “Organisations- und Strukturprobleme der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik,” 74.
47 See Impekoven, Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.
48 On the AAD/DAAD, see Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und Auswärtige Kulturpoli-
tik; a recent exploration of the intellectual roots of the Heidelberg student exchange is Udi 
Greenberg, Weimar Century: German Emigres and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War 
(Princeton, NJ, 2014), 41–44.
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Germany, of whom it “can be expected with some certainty that they will one 
day be politically and economically useful to us in their home country.”49 To 
avoid charges of “German propaganda,” the foundation (as well as the AAD) 
systematically obscured the extent of official involvement, utilizing commit-
tees of professors and businessmen to represent them. Internally, of course, 
the Foreign Ministry never left any doubt that the Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation was “to be seen as a part of the Kulturabteilung [… and that] it 
carries that name for obvious reasons only to obscure the Foreign Ministry’s 
financial involvement.”50 By late 1925, Berlin thus had access to two ostensibly 
private organizations that saw themselves clearly as “handmaidens of foreign 
policy.”51 The founding of an independent section devoted solely to scientific 
and academic matters at the Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung in early 1926 
signaled the beginning of a more constructive second phase in Weimar’s aca-
demic diplomacy.
Such academic diplomacy, to be sure, was hardly the exclusive domain of 
German ministries. On the contrary, as the origins of the AAD demonstrate, 
academic circles were becoming decidedly more active in this regard. A more 
activist, war-influenced student generation played a key role in these devel-
opments. As early as 1921, the German Student Association had formulated 
its intention to develop a “student foreign policy” (studentische Außenpolitik), 
and once financial conditions allowed, it came up with a number of important 
initiatives,52 including the America Work Student Service (Amerika-Werkstu-
denten-Dienst, AWD, est. 1925), one of the decade’s most successful programs. 
This transatlantic trainee service placed over 300 young German engineers in 
American companies between 1925 and 1930. Like the AAD, the AWD went 
back to the initiative of a handful of students who had first ventured to the 
United States in 1923 to “temp” in a hard-currency country, and who, by 1925, 
had managed – aided by German industrialists like Carl Duisberg, American 
groups like the YMCA, and the German embassy – to translate their individual 
experience as “student trainees” into an officially accredited industrial trainee 
program. Though the program relied on an official agreement between the 
German government and the American Department of Labor, it was adminis-
tered by the Wirtschaftshilfe der deutschen Studentenschaft, the German Stu-
dent Association’s social service organization.
49 AA to v. Dirksen, Mar. 21, 1925, PA R 64794.
50 Zu I D 539 4/25 (Aufzeichnung), June 23, 1925, PA R 64794; on the founding and work of the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation more generally, see Impekoven, Die Alexander von Hum-
boldt-Stiftung, 69–77.
51 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 314.
52 This is expressed in Walter Zimmermann, “Deutsche Studentenschaft und Ausland,” Der 
Auslanddeutsche 5, no. 2 (1922): 34; there is still no larger study on German student foreign pol-
icy.
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The AWD was only one expression of German universities’ more compre-
hensive involvement in international education. The director of the AWD, Dr. 
Reinhold Schairer, played a crucial role in this regard. A left-liberal education 
manager with close ties to the international Student Christian Movement, 
Schairer emerged as one of Germany’s foremost advocates of international ed-
ucation in the 1920s.53 He was convinced that only personal elite contacts could 
successfully counter Germany’s “distorted image” abroad and create the trust 
and respect its international resurgence demanded. 54 Following a six-month 
visit to the United States in 1925, he urged ministries and universities in a num-
ber of detailed memoranda to come together in a concerted academic cam-
paign to be led by the Association of German Universities. The association, 
indeed – while maintaining its scientific counter-boycott – had also begun to 
discover international education as a more constructive, less controversial way 
to counter the decline of Germany’s academic standing in the world and what 
it deemed “enormous French cultural propaganda.”55 Once negotiations on a 
joint approach with the Foreign Ministry failed, it established its own Interna-
tional Academic Office (Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle) in Dresden in 
early 1927.56 Directed by Schairer, this office would in the coming years work 
closely with student and professorial circles to advertise German universities 
abroad, organize international student travel, and create a university-based 
hospitality structure for international students.57 In merely two years after 
1925, the need for active academic diplomacy had thus created a novel net-
work of competing and cooperating offices and organizations committed to 
managing academic relations in the German interest. Thus, in the mid-1920s, 
Germany laid the foundation for its modern academic diplomacy with the es-
tablishment of organizations like the AAD and the Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation.
53 On Schairer, see Malcolm Richardson, “Reinhold Schairer and the Revival of the German 
Philanthropic Tradition from Weimar to the Federal Republic,” in German Philanthropy in 
Transatlantic Perspective, ed. Gregory Witkowski and Arndt Bauernkämpfer, 143–153 (Cham: 
2016).
54 Sitzung des Vorstandes der Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft (Jan. 1926); All-
gemeiner Bericht Dr. Schairers über seine Amerika-Reise, BArch R 149/235.
55 Akademische Auslandsstelle to Herren Rektoren der angeschlossenen Hochschulen (early 
1927), BArch R 8088/800; see also Prof. Schlink, “Zur Frage der Betreuung ausländischer Stu-
denten,” Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen (1927): 141–153.
56 The Foreign Ministry disliked both the idea of placing the work in the hands of the Associa-
tion of German Universities and Schairer’s overly internationalist approach to student migra-
tions, and especially any connection with the world student movement that Schairer was part of; 
see Aufzeichnung AA (Zimmermann), ca. July 1926, PA R 64793.
57 On the planning process, see Protokoll der vom Verband der Deutschen Hochschulen ein-
berufenen Besprechung über die Fragen der Förderung der Auslandsbeziehungen und Aus-
landsbeziehungen der deutschen Hochschulen, Nov. 9, 1926 BArch R 8088/1221; Entwurf für 
den Aufbau und die praktischen Arbeiten der Deutschen Akademischen Auslandsstelle, Dec. 
1926, BArch R8088/799.
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*
This emerging network directed its attention overwhelmingly across the Atlan-
tic – a fact all too often ignored. Though scholars rightly point out that German 
cultural diplomacy of the 1930s focused on southeastern Europe, where Ger-
many hoped to build an “informal empire,” they often fail to note that it con-
centrated on the United States during the 1920s:58 The America-Workstudent 
Service operated exclusively in the United States; the numerically largest group 
of exchange students in Germany was comprised of Americans (and in the 
United States of Germans);59 and of the fellowships that the Humboldt Foun-
dation had awarded by 1930, the second largest number had gone to American 
students as well.60 In addition, the rapidly expanding number of summer and 
language courses at German universities often catered primarily to Americans, 
and special academic programs like the Junior Year in Munich (est. 1930) did 
so exclusively.61 There can be no doubt: in the 1920s no other country figured as 
prominently in Germany’s international educational efforts as did the United 
States. But how can this predominant focus on the United States be explained?
Seldom have scholars attributed this focus on the United States to foreign 
policy concerns. The most comprehensive study on German academic diplo-
macy in the interwar period, Volkhard Laitenberger’s 1976 monograph on the 
AAD, concluded, and more recent studies have repeated, that the initial geo-
graphical focus on the United States “was not the result of cultural diplomatic 
considerations but largely coincidental.”62 While Laitenberger was right to 
note that student initiative first determined this focus on the United States, 
his conclusion still falls short in two repects. For one, he ignored the ques-
tion of why students like Carl Joachim Friedrich of Heidelberg University and 
the student trainees went to the United States and not elsewhere in the first 
58 See Stephen G. Gross, Export Empire: German Soft Power in Southeastern Europe, 1890–1945 
(Cambridge, UK, 2015).
59 Düwell, Deutschlands auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 175; as Paulus shows of the 1,219 German 
exchange students that studied in 21 countries from 1924 to 1938, 616 (51 %) went to the United 
States; of the 1,179 international exchange students in Germany, 566 (48 %) came from the 
United States. By comparison, only 182 (15 %) came from Great Britain, 131 (11 %) from France, 
and 106 (9 %) from Italy; see Stefan Paulus, Vorbild USA? Amerikanisierung von Universität und 
Wissenschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1976 (Munich, 2010), 89.
60 See Impekoven, Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, 226.
61 See the numbers of the Heidelberg summer courses in Alexander David Tutt, “Ausländerbe-
treuung an der Universität Heidelberg, 1928–1938. Das Akademische Auslandsamt und die Ver-
gangenheit” (BA thesis University of Heidelberg, 2012), 22.
62 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 175: Holger Impekoven 
explicitly notes that foreign policy aspects played a greater role than emphasized by Laitenberger, 
albeit not in the United States. With regard to the United States, he fully agrees with Laitenberger 
that “its strong position” was due not to foreign policy concerns but to “the tradition of Ameri-
can study in Germany”; Impekoven, Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, 118.
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place. Indeed, looking more carefully at the origins of this orientation toward 
the United States, one finds that informal transatlantic ties (developed through 
U. S. postwar student relief) usually provided the opportunity, while a deep cu-
riosity about living, working, and studying in the United States provided the 
motivation. 63 In other words, to see the early focus on the United States as a 
result of the more or less accidental journeys of a few students across the Atlan-
tic is to neglect what drove these students overseas in the first place: the desire 
to get to know a powerful and prosperous America.
More importantly, however, Laitenberger failed to explain why these Amer-
ica-focused student initiatives, and not others, received the critical support that 
eventually turned small, private educational endeavors into large, official or-
ganizations and ultimately into the bedrock of Germany’s cultural diplomacy 
today. In this, political and economic reasons were paramount. Indeed, the 
student exchanges constituted first and foremost an alternative effort to break 
the inter-Allied hold on Americans. They aimed to reverse the recalibration of 
academic relations in a country where German losses appeared to be particu-
larly dramatic and politically detrimental. A widely circulated memorandum 
penned by Reinhold Schairer in 1927 detailed this decline: in 1895 Americans 
had accounted for 20 percent of all international students (445) in Germany, 
only to drop to 4 percent (163) by 1911 and 0.7 percent (53) by 1925. At that point 
only 53 Americans were enrolled at German universities, while 419 were study-
ing in Britain and 5,000 in France.64 Even though French numbers were inflated 
by the inclusion of summer students, the trend could not have been clearer.65 
At the same time, Schairer and others were confident that Germany could still 
tap a considerable reservoir of academic prestige in the United States. Ameri-
cans displayed continued respect for German Wissenschaft and a growing dis-
enchantment with wartime propaganda, suggesting that they could be drawn 
back to German universities if only an appropriate effort were made.66 America, 
as Schairer repeatedly put it, was “ripe” for a systematic German campaign.67
63 Especially the close contacts with the American YMCA helped implement the Ameri-
ka-Work-Student Service; Herbert Krippendorf, Die Entstehung der Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft, 
1982, Abt. 352 Carl Duisberg-Gesellschaft, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv.
64 “Auslanddeutsche Studierende an deutschen Hochschulen,” Der Auslanddeutsche 8, no. 23 
(Dec. 1925): 667–677, 669.
65 In late 1923, the German embassy in Washington forwarded a Washington Post article that 
reported that many more Americans studied in France than studied in Germany since the war 
and that interest in the French language had risen. German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Dec. 2, 
1923, PA R 65520.
66 Denkschrift (vertraulich) über die Fragen der Ausländischen Studenten in Deutschland, Apr. 
7, 1927, BArch R8088/804; also Bericht über meinen Studienaufenthalt in den Vereinigten 
Staaten (written by Remme or Picht), PA R80287.
67 Reinhold Schairer, Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle des Verbandes der Deutschen 
Hochschulen. Bericht über die Zeit vom April bis September 1927 sowie Vorschläge für die Wei-
terführung der Arbeit, BArch R8088/802.
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This feeling of opportunity was complemented by a desire to build a pool 
of experts on the United States. Groups of German businessmen, politicians, 
and professors had long worried about the lack of international education Ger-
many’s future elites were receiving, and a decade of propaganda and limited 
travel opportunities had only intensified their trepidations. Liberal professors 
like Alfred Weber in Heidelberg supported student exchange programs early 
on because they saw the need to deprovincialize German youths, whose in-
ternational experience was only marginal compared to previous generations.68 
And while German elites often remained convinced that American education 
was generally inferior, they regarded the opportunity to study the United States 
(rather than to study at its universities), now that it had newly become so im-
portant, as highly valuable. 69 In this way, students could also work on their lan-
guage skills and develop a grasp of American psychology – facilities Germany 
had sorely lacked before and during the war.70 Unsurprisingly, such utilitarian 
considerations were especially pronounced in the case of industrial trainee 
programs like the AWD, which operated in a field of undisputed American 
predominance. By training young German engineers in successful American 
companies like Ford or General Motors, German industry hoped to facilitate 
the transfer of American technical and industrial know-how in order to mod-
ernize its own production.71 Little wonder that ambassador Wiedfeldt, a former 
Krupp manager, regarded the trainee program as a “particularly useful pro-
gram.”72
Finally, and no less importantly, this focus on the United States expressed 
the distinct needs of German foreign policy after 1924. At a time when Ger-
many was having to rebuild trust in its intentions and confidence in its in-
dustry, intelligent German youths, who had often “worked their way through 
college,” seemed to be the most appropriate ambassadors. At the same time, 
it was hoped that young Americans visiting German universities could de-
velop a greater sympathy for Germany’s “hard fate.”73 By facilitating and mul-
68 Alfred Weber to Reichspräsident, Sep. 20, 1924, PA R 63121.
69 Bericht über meinen Studienaufenthalt in den Vereinigten Staaten (written by Remme or 
Picht), BArch, R80287, 8.
70 In the early 1920s, publicists argued that a lack of understanding for American mentalities 
was, not least, to blame for the thwarted wartime efforts. Schönemann noted, “it is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that we eventually lost the war because we did not know the United States 
enough. We even lost the Versailles peace because we had no clear grasp of Wilson’s position to-
ward his people.” Friedrich Schönemann, “Amerikakunde. Eine zeitgemäße Forderung,” Die 
Grenzboten 80 (1921): 189–192, 191.
71 On these larger efforts, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the 
Modernization of Germany (New York, 1994).
72 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Sep. 15, 1924, “Deutsche Amerikafahrer,” PA R 80297; 
German Embassy, Washington, to AA, July 28, 1924, “Studium Deutscher auf amerikanischen 
Universitäten,” PA R 63121.
73 Siebe, Germania Docet, 383.
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tiplying elite contacts, German educators and officials thus hoped to overturn 
transatlantic misperceptions and to foster a climate in which Germany could 
peacefully undo the Versailles Treaty. Whereas professorial exchanges had pre-
viously appeared to be promising trust- and prestige-building measures, war-
time experiences now suggested students – at a more impressionable age and 
less burdened by wartime memories – as a much better long-term investment. 
74 To Adolf Morsbach, the director of the AAD, the German task in the United 
States was not to conduct propaganda, but, given the opinion-shaping power 
of American universities, “to enter into relations with America’s intellectual 
leaders of today, and especially of tomorrow, and to carefully cultivate these 
relations and to cautiously and unerringly use them for Germany’s cultural 
and political interests.”75 The American orientation of German academic diplo-
macy during the 1920s was thus very far from “largely a coincidence.” Quite the 
contrary, it followed directly from academic tradition, economic interests, and 
discrete foreign policy priorities. Germany’s academic Amerikapolitik speaks 
to the “geopoliticization” of international students, long before the Cold War.
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This process of geopoliticization was not exclusive to Germany, however. In 
fact, to understand these developments we need to acknowledge that the es-
tablishment of German educational programs unfolded in step with Ameri-
can sentiments and ambitions toward Germany. Americans were the targets 
of German public diplomacy as much as they themselves were pursuing a 
program of cultural and ideological expansion in Europe. The receptive cli-
mate for educational exchange that Germans found in the United States by 
1924/1925 was yet another reason their efforts focused so heavily on the United 
States. Without the support of prominent Americans like Stephen P. Duggan, 
the director of the Institute of International Education, the German-American 
banker Paul Warburg, and Columbia philosopher John Dewey, who all offered 
their influence and contacts to secure the cooperation of American institutes, 
companies, and universities, German ambitions could never have been real-
ized. 76 But what were American motivations and objectives at the time? And 
why did Americans decide to support German initiatives when they did?
74 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Sep. 15, 1924, “Deutsche Amerikafahrer,” PA R 80297.
75 Bericht des Oberregierungsrat a. D. Dr. Morsbach über seine Reisen nach Amerika Januar–
Mai 1929; März–Juli 1930, PA R 64236.
76 The AWD Advisory Board in the United States included German Consul General von Lewin-
ski, Magnus T. Alexander, president of the National Industrial Conference, David R. Porter of 
the Student Department of the YMCA, financier Paul Warburg, and Stephen P. Duggan of the 
Institute of International Education; the American advisory board for American-German Stu-
dent Exchange attached to the IIE included Edwin M. Borchard, professor of law, Yale; Joseph P. 
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy and the United States 230
These questions call for a brief review of the American situation. In the 
United States, World War I and its aftermath had brought about a phenome-
nal expansion of organizations devoted to aspects of international education. 
When the United States entered into the war, it had led to a centralization of 
university interests in the American Council on Education, which also oversaw 
the emerging “cultural alliances” with England and France. With the deploy-
ment of American soldiers, American educational offices, too, went abroad. In 
1917, an American University Union was established in Paris to support Amer-
ican college alumni stationed in France, while organizations like the YMCA 
and the American Library Association provided education and information 
services to American doughboys overseas. After the war, these organizations 
often continued their international work and expanded their European pres-
ence. They were joined by myriad – a 1925 survey listed no less than 117 – new 
societies, institutes, lecture programs, and round table conferences devoted to 
aspects of international education.77 Of these, the Institute of International 
Education (IIE, est. 1919) in New York City was arguably the most important. 
Established on February 1, 1919, through a $30,000-grant from the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, it soon established itself as a clearing-
house for the management of America’s intellectual and educational relations 
with the world.78 In addition to coordinating student exchanges (about 250 
fellowships by 1929) and organizing lecture tours, it published reference works 
on studying abroad and lobbied Congress for student visas and transatlantic 
shipping lines for student rates.79 A working agreement with the American 
Council on Education connected it domestically to hundreds of American uni-
versities, while the American University Union provided it with an overseas 
presence in Paris, London, and Rome. An untiring advocate of international 
education, the IIE’s director, CUNY professor Stephen P. Duggan, systemati-
cally expanded its field of operation and would become a key figure in Ger-
man-American academic relations.80
Chamberlain, professor of law, Columbia; John Dewey, professor of philosophy, Columbia; Ste-
phen P. Duggan; Livingston Farrand, president, Cornell; Irving Fisher, professor of economics, 
Yale; Frank J. Goodnow, president, John Hopkins; Henry Goddard Leach, editor, The Forum; 
W. A. Neilson, president, Smith; Ellen F. Pendleton, president, Wellesley; Henry Suzzalo, presi-
dent, Washington; Frank W. Taussig, professor of economics, Harvard; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Stan-
ford.
77 See David A. Robertson, “International Educational Relations of the United States,” Educa-
tional Record, 91–150.
78 See Stephen Mark Halpern, “The Institute of International Education: A History” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 1969), 65; fourteen large national educational organizations were repre-
sented on the IIE’s Administrative Board; News Bulletin of the Institute of Pacific Relations (April 
1928): 3–8, 4.
79 See the Institute of International Education, Annual Bulletins.
80 See his considerable attention to his German experiences in Stephen Duggan, Professor at 
Large (New York, 1943), passim.
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Behind this expansion of international education stood a liberal interna-
tionalist agenda.81 Searching for a viable postwar settlement, American inter-
nationalists sought ways to apply themselves meaningfully to overseas recon-
struction and the creation of a stable world order. Guided by the belief that 
wars arose principally from international “misunderstandings” and applying 
the progressive idea that education bred peace and progress, they discov-
ered international education as a particularly important peace-building field. 
If leaders around the world could just learn to understand and respect each 
other’s positions and idiosyncrasies, they felt, conflicts could be resolved in a 
peaceful fashion or avoided altogether.82 Paul Monroe, a professor at Columbia 
University and a trustee of the Institute of International Education, made pre-
cisely this argument:
Nations come into contact with nations through commerce, through travel, through poli-
tics, through religion, through cultural activities and interest. Each of these has its advan-
tages and disadvantages in connection with the development of international good will. 
But of them all, that contact which we call education – i. e. the cultural and intellectual 
contact – is the one which has the fewest disadvantages and the greatest advantage, from 
the point of view of those who are interested in cultivating international understanding 
and good will.83
After the war, both the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP, 
est. 1910) and the Rockefeller Foundation (RF, est. 1913) abandoned prewar 
agendas of legal internationalism in favor of a cultural and education-based 
approach. Throughout the interwar period, their largesse funded many of these 
81 These included the Carnegie Union, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. By 1934 they had allocated $18 million for social sciences 
and $15 million for academic exchanges; see Pells, Not Like Us, 23.
82 Nicholas Murray Butler, an officer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, had 
already summed up this ideology as the “International Mind” in 1912. According to Ninkovich, 
this “international mind … which, given the adoption of a universal set of values, would func-
tion as an international superego. To a large degree, moral transformation would be achieved 
through transnational contacts, with cultural relations serving as the vehicle of reeducation,” 
Ninkovich, Diplomacy of Ideas, 11; as Duggan summed up, “The Institute believes that it is essen-
tial for Americans to know of the difficulties and problems of other countries as for the people of 
other countries to know something about us, in order that international good-will may be real-
ized,” Stephen P. Duggan, “The Institute of International Education,” School and Society 12 
(1920): 642.
83 Quoted in Liping Bu, “Education and International Cultural Understanding: The American 
Elite Approach, 1920–1937,” in Teaching America to the World, ed. Garlitz and Jarvinen, 111–
133, 112.
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international education initiatives, which they deemed a more effective means 
of building a stable and peaceful world order.84
This more peaceful world, to be sure, was clearly conceived under the 
moral leadership, at least, of the United States. American internationalism 
was strongly underpinned by notions of American exceptionalism and the be-
lief that American economic and cultural models could reform and uplift the 
world. Foreign countries, too, could alight on the road to peace and prosperity 
if they were introduced to American values and standards – from hygiene to 
individualism. While such reform sentiments had long informed American at-
titudes toward less developed countries, a devastated, essentially bellicose Eu-
rope seemed no less in need of American solutions.85 An early memorandum 
on the IIE noted that “no other land, for obvious reasons [emphasis added], is 
so well fitted as the United States to take the initiative in such an enterprise. No 
time could be more suited than the present to start the movement, for all the 
Allied countries are eager to cement the spiritual bond created by the War and 
all recognize that by education more than by any other force mutual under-
standing (not understandings) can be brought about.”86 Certainly, American 
programs also pursued a clearly anti-Bolshevist agenda. By integrating Central 
and Eastern European students into the “West,” U. S. internationalists aimed 
to secure a tighter ideological and emotional grip on Europe’s future leaders, 
combating both a “narrow nationalism” on the right and rivaling forms of 
internationalism on the left. Finally, by sending American students overseas, 
business leaders hoped not only to generate international goodwill but to train 
future elites for their increasingly global role in the “American century.”87
So how did the politics of American cultural internationalists relate to of-
ficial American foreign policy? American foundations and their subsidiaries 
were, in fact, America’s foremost public diplomacy actors during the interwar 
period. While most European countries inaugurated government-sponsored 
cultural programs in the 1920s, the U. S. administration remained relatively 
aloof from these matters. After the war, the federal government abandoned the 
Committee on Public Information, which had espoused American ideas and 
84 See Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus?,” 788; on the work of American foundations in sup-
porting political science and international studies as a way to reform international politics, see 
Katharina Rietzler, “American Foundations and the ’Scientific Study’ of International Relations 
in Europe, 1910–1940” (PhD University College London, 2009).
85 As Emily Rosenberg argues, cultural internationalism was closely “associated with liberal ex-
pansionism” and “the globalization of the American liberal tenets of private enterprise, the open 
door, and free flow”; Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 115.
86 Memorandum for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Concerning the Estab-
lishment of an American Institute of Education, Sep. 27, 1918, Box 486 Vol. 154, CEIP, Columbia 
University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
87 Marcus M. Mars, “International Travel and Study – An Official College Extension,” The Edu-
cational Record 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1924): 40–43, 40.
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values at home and abroad, and it was not until 1938 that it established a culture 
and information section at the State Department in response to Nazi expan-
sion in Latin America.88 Meanwhile, the U. S. erected what historian Frank 
Ninkovich has characterized as a “half-way house” with American philanthro-
pies undertaking public diplomacy, largely in line with and in lieu of official 
foreign policy agendas. This alignment between private and official foreign 
policy was not usually the product of formal agreements – though foundation 
officers often had close ties to the Foreign Service – but of a shared educa-
tional and ideological background.89 Convinced of America’s moral authority, 
disdainful of European power politics, and driven by anti-Bolshevism, these 
groups shared the vision of a peaceful, liberal, capitalist world order organized 
along American lines. But where American officials were constrained by con-
gressional mandates and public opinion, American foundations had the inter-
national clout, political independence, and financial resources to pursue their 
ideological convictions. During the 1920s, foundation officers held fast to the 
notion that America had a profound role to play in European reconstruction 
and even sought to deliberately compensate for America’s largely inactive offi-
cial foreign policy.90
For America’s cultural internationalists, Germany at first played a second-
ary role. Their sprawling commitment to the organization of international ed-
ucation focused overwhelmingly on France, Britain, and Italy, ignoring Ger-
many almost entirely until the mid-1920s. This was the product of wartime 
resentments but it was also based on the assumption that strengthening the 
wartime cultural alliances with the Western Allies was the best guarantee of 
European stability. Especially when inter-Allied tensions rose after 1919, U. S. 
internationalists felt called to maintain Franco-American amity.91 Amidst bit-
ter public debates over U. S. nonratification of the peace treaty and French debt 
payments, they instituted large-scale study abroad programs like the Ameri-
can Field Service Fellowships and the Junior Year Abroad to memorialize and 
88 Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. 
Foreign Policy (New York, 2013), 21.
89 On these issues, see Katharina Rietzler, “Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philan-
thropy and Cultural Diplomacy in the Inter-War Years,” Historical Research 84, no. 223 (Feb. 
2011): 148–164, 153–155.
90 Joseph W. Winn, “Nicholas Murray Butler, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
and the Search for Reconciliation in Europe, 1919–1933,” Peace and Change 31, no. 4 (2006): 
555–584, 560; Ninkovich concludes that “the liberal internationalist outlook, in cultural affairs 
and foreign policy as a whole, solved a basic riddle of American foreign policy by promoting 
American global interests without involving the nation in Weltpolitik or resorting to an undesir-
able reliance on state power”; Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 23.
91 The CEIP decided to help rebuild the libraries of Louvain (Belgium) and Rheims shortly after 
the war and provided funds for medical aid to France and to the Societé France-Amerique; like-
wise the Rockefeller Foundation gave millions for the rebuilding of France.
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy and the United States 234
perpetuate the two countries’ brotherhood in arms on a cultural level.92 In the 
same vein, wartime bodies like the American University Union were refitted 
as “educational embassies” to represent the United States in Paris, London, 
and Rome.93 For years after the war, educational and cultural exchanges with 
Europe primarily served to bridge the political and economic divides in the 
inter-Allied world.
In contrast, Germany remained largely excluded from America’s cultural 
internationalist forays. Judging by the Institute of International Education’s 
1922 annual report, for example, Germany was truly a nonentity in America’s 
educational landscape. The report’s twenty pages, packed tightly with descrip-
tions of academic exchanges with France, England, and Italy, left Germany 
essentially unmentioned.94 And though some of the Carnegie Endowment’s 
large-scale postwar projects such as the Economic and Social History of the 
War and the international inquiry into school textbooks did involve a very se-
lect number of German scholars, the endowment’s pro-Allied bias often per-
petuated the hostile sentiments it officially sought to overcome.95 Its two “spe-
cial correspondents” on Germany (after 1922, the pacifists Hellmut von Ger-
lach and Wilhelm Foerster) were so far removed from the German mainstream 
that their widely circulated reports merely reinforced prevailing views of an es-
sentially unreconstructed nation.96 With a few exceptions, postwar Germany 
remained more an object of study than a subject of international cooperation 
for U. S. cultural internationalists.
This only changed following Germany’s year of crises in 1923. The Ruhr 
occupation cooled American internationalists’ pro-French sentiment, just as 
Germany’s near social, economic, and political breakdown during the fall and 
its potentially grave ramifications for all of Europe caused serious concern. As 
Germany’s postwar isolation seemed bound to topple the Weimar Republic, 
92 Walton, “Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad,” 257.
93 Report: American University Union in Europe, Jan. 1921, 18; American Council on Educa-
tion, Box 28 Folder 6, Hoover Institution Archives.
94 Germany was only mentioned once but in a different context; see IIE, Annual Report 1922, 
11.
95 On these ambivalences, see Tomás Irish, “Peace through History? The Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace’s Inquiry into European Schoolbooks, 1921–24,” History of Education 45, 
no. 1 (2016): 38–56.
96 Gerlach, for example, was convinced of German war guilt, a position taken by only an ex-
ceedingly small number of German professors. The German Foreign Ministry believed that Ger-
lach’s reports seriously damaged Germany. The German embassy in Washington wrote Berlin 
that “You cannot imagine the effect of these reports. One carries them to the President, to Con-
gress, to the Administration and takes them to be the gospel”; quoted in Rietzler, “Before the 
Cultural Cold Wars,” 162; the editors of Gerlach’s letters emphasize, in contrast, that Gerlach 
might have painted a more positive picture of Germany than actually existed to maintain Ger-
many’s credit abroad; Karl Holl and Adolf Wild, ed. Ein Demokrat kommentiert Weimar. Die 
Berichte Hellmut von Gerlachs an die Carnegie-Friedensstiftung in New York, 1922–1930 (Bremen, 
1973), 47.
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however imperfect it might be, American internationalists moved to reinte-
grate Germany, not least in the field of international education (see Chapter 3). 
When German students like Carl Joachim Friedrich visited the United States in 
late 1923, they thus encountered American professors and foundation officers 
who had already begun to define renewed cooperation with Germany as an 
American interest. Announcing the establishment of the American-German 
Student Exchange in July 1924, Stephen Duggan of the IIE concluded “that the 
antagonism of the war has sufficiently passed away to […] bring about educa-
tional relations in higher education with Germany again.” Still, he felt the need 
to assure his audience that the German students it would bring to the United 
States “will probably come chiefly from Heidelberg, which has always been lib-
eral and has established an institute primarily for the study of Anglo-Amer-
ican history and institutions.”97 With this emphasis on Heidelberg’s liberal, 
pro-American tendencies, Duggan apparently intended to quiet any remaining 
apprehensions among America’s educated classes while also holding out the 
promise of German “democratization.”
Indeed, the student exchange program between Germany and the United 
States differed from inter-Allied ones in some telling ways. From the very first, 
it clearly aimed not only to overcome Germany’s potentially dangerous iso-
lation but to integrate it more tightly into a “Western” system by encourag-
ing and strengthening its fledgling democratic institutions. American cultural 
internationalists hoped to use German student contacts with America as a 
way to democratize and pacify future German leaders.98 By attracting young 
engineers and social scientists to American companies and universities, they 
aspired to facilitate the transmission of both American industrial and educa-
tional models and the more democratic, egalitarian mindset they believed un-
derpinned them. They likewise hoped that introducing American business and 
cultural practices would stabilize Germany economically as well as political-
ly.99 Decidedly, the intention of these nonstate efforts foreshadowed the much 
larger and state-sponsored “re-education” programs after 1945.
One cannot help but notice how closely American cultural initiatives par-
alleled the larger course of transatlantic politics. The Franco-German confron-
tation, Germany’s financial breakdown, and the implications of both for Eu-
ropean stability led American foreign policymakers to “return” to Europe in 
1923/24. Constrained in their formal actions by American isolationist currents, 
they worked informally through American businessmen and financiers to help 
settle the reparations dispute. Henceforth, the United States – mostly exert-
ing financial pressure – furthered a consensual revision of the peace treaty in 
97 “The Institute of International Education,” The Educational Record 5, no. 3 (July 1924): 190.
98 Duggan, Professor at Large, 53.
99 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 13; Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 167–183.
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exchange for guarantees of French security, a policy that facilitated the recov-
ery of Germany within a consolidated European system in the end.100 Amer-
ica’s cultural expansion into Germany constituted another, equally informal 
way to stabilize Europe in line with America’s policy interests. While scholars 
have long emphasized America’s economic intervention of 1923/24, it is worth 
stressing the cultural intervention that followed tightly on its heels. Like Amer-
ica’s economic “linkage groups,” its cultural “linkage groups” set out to stabilize 
Germany in response to its year of crises in 1923. The educational exchanges 
of the coming years reflected America’s commitment to “peaceful change” in 
Europe no less than its involvement in the Dawes settlement did.
Geopoliticizing the Student
For Germany’s peaceful revisionists, the American cultural internationalists 
were well-nigh ideal partners. Their ambition to reintegrate Germany into “the 
West” matched Germany’s desire to overcome its isolation in step with a pow-
erful America. After 1924, America’s policy of “peaceful change” and Germa-
ny’s policy of “peaceful revisionism” dovetailed not just in the economic but 
also in the cultural field. One consequence of these overlapping interests was 
the rapid development of educational exchanges. In the five years after 1925, 
the number of German fellowships at the IIE more than tripled from 14 to 50, 
while the American fellowships at the AAD quintupled from 9 to 47. During 
the same time, the AWD placed more than 310 student trainees in American 
companies. Toward the end of the 1920s, hundreds of American students began 
to attend summer and language courses at German universities. Though over-
all numbers are modest by any Cold War standard, they were quite substantial 
for the time. For both the DAAD and the American IIE, the American-Ger-
man Student Exchange was the single largest and most successful exchange 
program.101
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that the two countries differed quite 
significantly in their ultimate objectives. Unlike many Americans, most Ger-
mans saw international understanding not as a value in and of itself but as 
100 Patrick Cohrs put it this way: America (and Britain) sought to find a solution to “the epicen-
tre of Europe’s disorder: the problem of how the vanquished Germany, the burdened Weimar 
Republic, could be reintegrated into a viable international order without jeopardising the secu-
rity of France”; Patrick O. Cohrs, “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlement after the First World War: 
Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno 1923–1925,” Contemporary 
European History 12, no. 1 (2003): 1–31, 2; a similar take can be found in Arnold Offner, “Re-
search on American-German Relations: A Critical View,” in America and the Germans, ed. 
Trommler and McVeigh, 2:168–182, 170.
101 See Stephen P. Duggan, “Der deutsche Einfluss auf die amerikanische Erziehung,” Hoch-
schule und Ausland 9, no. 1 (Jan. 1931): 7.
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a vehicle for a peaceful revision of Versailles. They fostered cordial relations 
with the United States primarily to help them realize their interests vis-à-vis 
competing French ambitions. Americans, by contrast, always saw relations 
with Germany embedded in a larger European strategy that sought to balance 
French and German demands.102 In short, whereas Americans imagined a sta-
ble, peaceful Europe under America’s (moral) leadership, German elites envi-
sioned a transatlantic partnership that would allow them to regain their semi-
hegemonic position in Europe. Their shared interest in a peaceful change of the 
status quo proved mutually beneficial at a time when Germany was just begin-
ning to escape its isolation, yet it was bound to create tensions once Germany 
tried to unseat French influence more forcefully. Ultimately, American involve-
ment helped realize German interests in the short run, but would circumscribe 
them in crucial ways later on. In the meantime, both sides aimed to organize 
educational programs in a way that minimized their potential drawbacks and 
maximized their potential benefits.
“Geopoliticization” in Practice: The German Student as Ambassador
A consideration of how abstract political ambitions were translated into con-
crete practices seems appropriate at this point. By what means exactly were 
German objectives, in particular, to be achieved?103 To answer this question 
it is necessary to distinguish between the different roles assigned, and mecha-
nisms applied, to outgoing German and incoming American students. German 
students going abroad were generally perceived as informal ambassadors of 
Germany and expected to represent an attractive national image to Ameri-
cans, most of whom had not come into contact with Germans in over a decade. 
Reinhold Schairer summed up the importance of choosing the right students 
for this function: AWD students would have to demonstrate their abilities “as 
workers, as students, and first and foremost as human beings. The failure even 
of only a small part of these students – especially where their personal side, 
their character, is concerned – would heavily damage the trust gained and 
shown. The selection of the right personalities will be an especially difficult and 
responsible task.”104
102 German Embassy, Paris, to AA, May 29 1926, PA R 28491.
103 For a study of this “geopoliticization” that focuses not predominantly on the German side 
but also explores American infrastructure and ambitions based on the records of the Institute of 
International Education, see Elisabeth Piller, “Eradicating Misunderstanding? The Institute of 
International Education, Student Exchanges & Transatlantic Relations in the 1920s,” Rockefeller 
Archive Research Report, Sleepy Hollow, NY (Nov. 2018) http://rockarch.issuelab.org/re-
sources/33683/33683.pdf
104 Vorläufiger Bericht über den Aufenthalt Dr. Schairers in den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nord-Amerika, Dec. 24, 1925, BArch R149/234.
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To this end, both the AAD and the AWD developed intricate screening 
processes overseen by committees of liberal professors, ministerial represent-
atives, and, in the case of the AWD students, prominent industrialists and en-
gineers.105 Their selection criteria reflected their desire to identify future elites 
who would later occupy the sort of political, educational, or business positions 
in which they could make the best use of their American education and con-
nections. In looking for indicators of future success, professional and scholarly 
merit (based on grades and references) played a strong role, but so, too, did 
the candidates’ social and family background.106 The considerable number of 
exchange students coming from well-known ministerial and professorial fam-
ilies reflected the relatively rigid German class structure, a degree of favorit-
ism, as well as the selection committee’s essential conviction that their own 
class, the Bildungsbürgertum, constituted the most “qualified representative(s) 
of the German people abroad.”107 Under Adolf Morsbach’s directorship after 
1927, the AAD began placing more emphasis on certain ambassadorial qual-
ities, including an attractive personality, open-mindedness, social skills, and 
even good looks.108 An active interest in sports, for example, was considered 
highly beneficial for developing friendships in the United States. In short, the 
selection process generated a pool of candidates that struck a balance between 
those most likely to advance in the German system (by way of grades, field of 
study, political orientation, and family background) and those most likely to 
represent Germany in a way that appealed to Americans (by way of personality, 
social skills, or hobbies).
At the same time, there was a clear emphasis on national “reliability.” Only 
students of a certain age and with a solid sense of national identity were con-
sidered suited to representing Germany abroad, not least as they would be able 
to withstand the not-to-be-underestimated dangers of “Americanization.”109 
105 In the case of the AWD these included: Geheimrat Dr. (Carl) Bosch (BASF), Dr. Robert 
Bosch, Dr. Buecher, Dr. Cuno (HAPAG), Deutsch (AEG), Duisberg (Bayer), Dr. Eckener, Dr. 
Einstein, Dr. Fehling (Rockefeller Foundation), Dr. Haber, Dr. Harnack, Klingenberg (AEG), Dr. 
Heinecken (Norddt. Lloyd), Dr. ing. Köttgen (Siemens), Prof. Matschoss (engineer), Exc. von 
Miller (Dt. Museum), Prof. Naegel (engineer), Dr. Penck (Prof., Kiel), Dr. Petersen (Hamburg), 
Max Planck, Dr. Schacht (Reichsbank), Dr. Schairer (Studienstiftung, Wirtschaftshilfe der dt. 
Studentenschaft), Schmidt-Ott (Notgemeinschaft der dt. Wissenschaft), Carl Friedrich von Sie-
mens, Prof. Dr. Sommerfeld (Munich; first Carl-Schurz-Professor in Wisconsin after the war), 
Prof. Spranger (Berlin), Dr. von Stauss, Dr. Edmund Stinnes (Dr. Ing; Stinnes AG, son of Hugo 
Stinnes), Prof. Dr. Stumpf, Generaldirektor Vögler (Ver. Stahlwerke), Max Warburg.
106 The selection of Friedrich Franz von Papen (son of Franz von Papen, German Chancellor, 
1930–1932), Anneliese von Halle (daughter of Professor Ernst von Halle), Eduard Baumgarten 
(nephew of Max Weber), and Reimer Koch-Weser and Volker Koch-Weser (sons of minister 
Koch-Weser) attest to this.
107 Quoted in Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 187.
108 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 187.
109 German Consulate General, New York, to AA, July 2, 1925, PA R 63122.
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The AAD’s selection committee thus prioritized older applicants, many of 
whom had already earned a doctorate. The 1928 cohort of exchange students, 
for example, was 27 1/2 years old on average.110 This preference was also evi-
dent with regard to the AWD students, all of whom were actually postgraduate 
engineers. From the German perspective, in fact, sending “students” actually 
made very little sense because it only delayed the transfer of valuable American 
know-how to German industry. Careful selection, in short, aimed to maximize 
the programs’ political and economic gains.
This screening process was soon complemented by a measure of instruc-
tion to outgoing students. A “departure camp” close to Berlin and an “arrival 
camp” in New York familiarized German exchange students with each other, 
explained American idiosyncrasies, and briefed them on current political, so-
cial, and economic topics.111 These camps stressed a German image suited to the 
overall revisionist objective: a country united in a heroic fight against the injus-
tices of Versailles. At the same time, students were advised to carefully abstain 
from any sort of partisan propaganda. National issues like the German youth 
movement, rearmament, the war guilt question, or reparations were deemed 
appropriate topics of discussion, but domestic politics was not. In the United 
States, exchange students were not to act as though they were “representative of 
a party or an ideology, but of Germany abroad.”112 Above all, these instructions 
were to imbue German students with a sense of national mission and raise 
awareness about the political implications of their behavior. The AWD student, 
for example, was reminded that “through his entire demeanor on and off the 
job, he is obligated to increase the esteem in which the German name is held 
as a representative of Germanness in most difficult surroundings. He is to do 
so by way of maximum fulfillment of duties, a superb work ethic and tactfully 
restrained behavior. Every breach of this self-evident duty could damage the 
German reputation most severely.”113
110 Bericht des Oberregierungsrat a. D. Dr. Morsbach über seine Reisen nach Amerika Januar–
Mai 1929; März–Juli 1930, 45, PA R 64236.
111 These were usually equipped with recent summaries on reparations and disarmament.
112 Quoted in Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 210.
113 Soziale und Wirtschaftliche Lage; Mitteilungen über die Möglichkeit von Werkarbeit in den 
Vereinigten Staaten (streng vertraulich), BArch R149/217.
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Fig . 9: German Exchange Students at the Arrival Camp at Storm King, 1930, Rockefeller Archive 
Center, Collection: IIE RG 4 Series 1, Photographic Files FA#1288 Box 35 Folder 284
According to all available evidence, these selection and instruction mechanisms 
procured an attractive, politically conscious, and articulate group of German 
students in the United States. The first cohorts included a disproportionate 
number of future publicists, professors, diplomats, and pastors, including the 
journalist Klaus Mehnert, the historian Alfred Vagts, the theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, as well as, in the 1930s, the founder of German public opinion re-
search Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. Their internal communication reveals a set 
of young men and women proud and eager to represent Germany abroad.114 
Among themselves, they exchanged advice on what topics to mention or to 
avoid and on how best to explain German developments (disarmament, repa-
rations, war guilt, “what about Hitler?”) to a frequently uninformed American 
audience.115 Their activities show that they very much wished to use the many 
outlets for nuanced political debate available on the American campus. Many 
of them joined the university’s international relations societies, shared their 
insights with friends, local newspapers, churches, and rotary clubs, and served 
as college delegates to model League of Nations conferences.116 Above all, they 
had internalized the idea that their bearing on and off campus was an integral 
114 Anneliese von Halle to F. Schmidt-Ott, June 9, 1926, PA R 64211.
115 See the exchange student letters in RDA, Rundbrief Deutscher Austauschstudenten; copies 
for 1931–33 in HML, German-American Collections, Uncataloged Pamphlets, Box 12.
116 See the reports in RDA, Rundbrief Deutscher Austauschstudenten in Amerika, no. 2 (Dec. 
1931/32).
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part of Germany’s image-building endeavors. It is as “living propaganda,” one 
exchange student remarked in 1932, that “we can best do justice to our task.”117 
That same year, the obvious zeal of German exchange students prompted the 
French ambassador Paul Claudel to share his fears with the Quai d’Orsay that 
the Germans were better-trained propagandists for their nation than their 
French peers.118
Despite their relative success, German organizations soon found them-
selves confronted with an issue they had not anticipated: how to maintain the 
link between German students and their fatherland during their extended stays 
abroad. Especially in larger cities, this “retention” work often fell to German 
consulates, which sponsored regular gatherings and festivities.119 Students who 
lived further away from official representatives received regular newsletters 
and, in the case of the AWD students, visits from a delegate of the New York of-
fice.120 Collectively, these measures aimed to keep them in touch with German 
developments and to remind them of their duty both to be “informal” ambas-
sadors and, no less importantly, to leave behind the promising American job 
market and help rebuild the struggling fatherland. The AWD frankly admitted 
that “one main function of the New York headquarters is to keep the contact 
with the AWD students so lively that they remain emotionally invested in Ger-
many and do not stay in America for good.”121
These and similar initiatives highlight an unpleasant truth that German 
diplomats and educators alike experienced: the “pull” of the United States in 
the 1920s. Germany’s young engineers, in particular, showed an unabashed en-
thusiasm for the United States. For a generation that had grown up under the 
shadow of war, defeat, hunger, inflation, and national humiliation, the United 
States did, indeed, seem much like the Promised Land.122 Besides their access 
to cars and adventure, the trainees marveled at the immense optimism that 
117 Dr. Hermann Schnitzler, “Wenn ich Dr. Morsbach wäre …,” RDA, Rundbrief Deutscher Aus-
tauschstudenten, No. 5 (Mar. 1932).
118 Whitney Walton, “National Interests and Cultural Exchange in French and American Edu-
cational Travel, 1914–1970,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, no. 4 (2015): 344–357, 346; Ste-
phen Duggan also later remembered that “no foreign students were so popular in our colleges as 
the Germans, who were attractive young men and women as well as good scholars”; Duggan, 
Professor at Large, 176.
119 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Sep. 15, 1924, “Deutsche Amerikafahrer,” PA R 
80297. In San Francisco, Consul Werner Otto v. Hentig used German students as something of a 
cultural attaché squad; they helped him organize social gatherings and chauffeured the consu-
late’s intoxicated party guests home; see Klaus Mehnert, Ein Deutscher in der Welt. Erinnerungen 
1906–1981 (Stuttgart, 1981), 141.
120 Fritz Weidner, Der Bericht [des Reiseonkels] Sommer 1929 Abt. 352 Carl Duisberg- 
Gesellschaft, 352–14–7, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv.
121 Reisebericht Dr. Schairer, Berlin, Sep. 13, 1929, BArch R149/91.
122 For the profound impression made by the beautiful, well-fed, and well-clad Americans on 
the Berkeley campus on one German exchange student: Mehnert, Ein Deutscher in der Welt, 127.
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prevailed in American industry and the nation at large.123 Whereas German 
universities and shop floors appeared to be places of anxiety, political confron-
tation, and class strife, they found American companies pervaded by a live-
and-let-live mentality, friendly competition, and boundless confidence. Several 
advisors to the AWD, steeped in the bourgeois conceit of their time, were un-
able to suppress just how uneasy they felt finding the returned work-students 
“impressively attach[ed] to the advantages of the American character, […] vo-
cal defenders and fiery apologists of the youthful continent.”124 A significant 
number of the German trainees stayed on for a second or third year, and some 
stayed for good. To the German organizers, America at times seemed like a “gi-
gantic magnetic mountain that draws in ships and merchandise shipments and 
the war debts of nations […] sounding the siren calls of prosperity, of happi-
ness, of contentment and of [a high] living standard.”125 In its sons and daugh-
ters’ responses to Amerika, the German Bildungsbürgertum caught yet another 
disconcerting glimpse of the “irresistible empire.”126
123 This was encapsulated in a frequently related anecdote: A German professor had visited a 
large American industrial plant and, inspecting American machinery, diligently jotted down his 
impressions in his notebook. When approached by one of the American engineers, the German 
professor – afraid of being taken for an industrial spy – entered into a long-winded defense as-
suring the engineer that his sketches served purely academic purposes. The American then de-
parted from the scene, leaving the professor behind in anguish, only to return a few minutes later 
with a set of engineering blueprints, which he handed the startled German. Asked whether he 
did not fear that Germany could copy his machines, the engineer asserted, “by the time you 
Germans have rebuilt the machine, we’ll have built something even better.” Apocryphal or not, 
the anecdote encapsulated many a German work student’s experience of American confidence.
124 Georg Schreiber, “Amerika-Werkstudenten-Dienst der Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Stu-
dentenschaft,” Der Arbeitgeber, Aug. 1, 1928, Clipping: BArch R149/52.
125 Georg Schreiber, “Amerika-Werkstudenten-Dienst der Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Stu-
dentenschaft,” Der Arbeitgeber, Aug. 1, 1928, Clipping: BArch R149/52.
126 Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge, MA, 2005).
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Fig . 10: This photograph of exchange 
student Inge von Müller at Bates College 
captures some of the excitement of 
studying in the United States . Rockefel-
ler Archive Center, Collection: IIE RG 4 
Series 1, Photographic Files FA#1288 
Box 34 Folder 283
“Geopoliticization” in Practice: Creating the Hospitable University
It was not least the German students’ manifest enthusiasm for America that 
reminded German professors and officials that the successful “geopoliticiza-
tion” of students hinged on American experiences in Germany. In this regard, 
the key was not usually selection – American students were mainly selected 
by American institutions like the Institute of International Education127 – but 
cultivation. Perhaps the most important lesson liberal university groups had 
127 A glimpse into the American selection process can be gleaned from the Minutes of the Sixth 
Meeting of the Advisory Board American-German Student Exchange of the Institute of Interna-
tional Education, May 3, 1926, Samuel McCune Lindsay Papers Box 32/Folder: American-Ger-
man Student Exchange, Columbia University Libraries, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collec-
tions. The only exception was the relatively small number (18) of American Humboldt fellows, 
who were suggested by German consulates in the United States. These suggestions (as far as they 
are still available) indicated a clear preference for students of the humanities and of German de-
scent; see, for example, the case of Harold John Grimm (who would go on to become a famous 
American Renaissance scholar), German Consulate, Cleveland, to AA, “Bewerbung um ein Sti-
pendium bei der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung,” Dec. 21, 1928, PA R 64211.
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taken from the war was that affection was not a quasi-automatic result of stud-
ying in Germany. Rather, study abroad could result in affection or alienation, 
depending not so much on academic but on personal experiences. This per-
sonal factor, they felt, was what they had previously neglected. International 
students had been largely left to their own devices without recourse to system-
atic language preparation, excursions, let alone “international houses.” While 
this had already seemed inadequate before the war, it was even less appropriate 
in the 1920s, when many students were rather less fluent in German and stayed 
for shorter periods of time. Rescuing them from isolation, bringing them into 
contact with German culture and people, and affording them the opportunity 
to build friendships with their German peers – in short, creating a “hospitable 
university” – was now a serious goal.
Although state offices increasingly organized student exchanges, the ques-
tion of hospitality fell primarily to the German universities and student cir-
cles themselves. After 1927, Reinhold Schairer and his International Academic 
Office began to systematically build international clubs, offices, and houses at 
German universities based on American or French models like the Rockefeller 
International House in New York City (est. 1924) or the Cité Internationale 
Universitaire in Paris (est. 1925).128 These international institutions were in-
tended to help international students with admissions, language courses, and 
suitable accommodation.129 Most importantly, Schairer emphasized, they were 
to provide “active hospitality to pierce the personal and social isolation often 
present [for international students].”130 By organizing dinners and excursions, 
by offering a meeting place for German and international students, they hoped, 
as Schairer acknowledged, to foster the “personal connections that can be of 
128 On these initiatives, see Guillaume Tronchet, “Diplomatie universitaire ou diplomatie cul-
turelle? La Cité internationale universitaire de Paris entre deux rives (1920–1940),” in La Babel 
étudiante. La Cité internationale universitaire de Paris (1920–1950), ed. Dzovinar Kévonian and 
Guillaume Tronchet, 59–88 (Rennes, 2013); and Liping Bu, Making the World Like Us, chapter 3.
129 In this development, America served as an important point of reference. Though France, 
with its wide hospitality structure, remained both a model and motivation for German initia-
tives, German hospitality advocates were no less impressed by the American system. Visiting 
America in 1925, Reinhold Schairer admired the YMCA-organized welcome committees at 
American universities and was so impressed by the Rockefeller-funded International House in 
New York City (est. 1924) that he secured its architectural blueprints and sought to win first 
Rockefeller, then (and more successfully) industrialist Carl Duisberg for similar projects in Ger-
many. Friedrich Beck, who ran the international office at Munich University, felt that the popu-
larity of American universities were due to the fact that “barriers between American and foreign 
students are hardly noticeable and there exists a free, happy fellowship among students.” See 
Friedrich Beck, “Ausländerstudium im Ausland und in Deutschland,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte 
28, no. 4 (Jan. 1931): 246–253, 250; on French influences, see American Institute in Munich to 
AA [Terdenge], Aug. 20, 1929, “Zuschuss für das Amerikanische Institut München,” PA R 
65788a.
130 Schairer, Denkschrift (streng vertraulich) Gedanken zu der Frage des Ausländerstudiums in 
Deutschland – ca. Juni 1926, BArch R8088/799.
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great import in human, cultural and political terms, especially to Germany in 
its current situation.”131 Though Schairer rejected the idea of subjecting foreign 
students to anything resembling political propaganda, he was still convinced of 
the political, even short-term, benefits of this work: a greater familiarity with 
postwar Germany, for instance, would quite naturally dispel the myth of Ger-
man prosperity and challenge the nation’s capacity to pay reparations.132
In institutional and quantitative terms, at least, this strategy was remark-
ably successful. The network of international offices at German universities 
grew rapidly from a handful in 1920 to 23 in 1930 and assumed an ever more 
comprehensive role in organizing international educational relations. By the 
end of the decade, many of them were arranging summer courses for foreign 
students and hosting numerous (usually American) student travel groups, of-
ten in cooperation with international organizations like the League of Nations 
or the International Student Service.133 At Munich University, the director of 
the international office Friedrich (Fritz) Beck used his substantial local and in-
ternational network to systematically develop global student relations.134 In line 
with an international club (also headed by Beck) and an international student 
house, funded by industrialist Carl Duisberg, the Munich office offered a wide 
range of social activities to international students, organized highly successful 
summer courses, and helped to turn Munich into a hub of German cultural 
diplomatic activity in the 1920s.135 The aim of his “concerted hospitality,” Beck 
explained to his benefactors at the Wilhelmstrasse, was “to conduct a German 
cultural propaganda in the very best sense of that word.”136
It is difficult to assess with any certainty how study in Germany affected 
American students. Without access to a large and reliable sample of student 
impressions, no conclusive analysis is possible. Yet, published impressions 
suggest that their experiences were overwhelmingly positive. While German 
efforts never succeeded in creating a tight-knit American college atmosphere, 
a considerable number of American students expressed great enthusiasm for 
131 Sitzung des Vorstandes der Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft, Jan. 1926; All-
gemeiner Bericht Dr. Schairers über seine Amerika-Reise, BArch R 149/235.
132 Reinhold Schairer, Die Studenten im Internationalen Kulturleben. Beiträge zur Frage des 
Studiums in einem Fremden Lande (Münster, 1927), 112.
133 The Munich International Office served as an official branch of the International Student 
Service.
134 On Beck and the early years of the Munich office, see Veronika Diem, “Friedrich Beck 
(1889–1934) und die Gründungsgeschichte des Münchener Studentenwerks,” in Die Universität 
München im Dritten Reich, ed. Elisabeth Kraus, 1:43–71 (Munich, 2006).
135 Duisberg’s involvement in this regard is little researched. Indeed, he sponsored a number of 
such student houses. On the occasion of the 400-year university jubilee in Marburg, for example, 
he donated a Carl Duisberg House to bring together a select group of German and international 
students; on Duisberg’s role in student affairs, see Werner Plumpe, Carl Duisberg, 1861–1935. 
Anatomie eines Industriellen (Munich, 2016), 651–660.
136 Studentenhaus München to AA (Terdenge), Oct. 11, 1927, PA R 64011.
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the independence of the German system. They found Germany clean and or-
derly and appreciated Berlin’s art and music scene as much as quaint univer-
sity towns. Though they were increasingly proud of America’s own traditions, 
American students professed little of the patriotic zeal of their German coun-
terparts. Indeed, while German students in the United States frequently com-
plained about the widespread complacency about international affairs on the 
American campus, Americans were shocked by the politicization of German 
university life. Many left with a much deeper appreciation of the war’s impact 
on Germany, at times taking away just the sort of lessons Germans hoped they 
would: “There is an excellent friendly feeling everywhere for all Americans,” 
one American student wrote to his parents from Berlin in August 1927, “[o]ur 
alliance with France in the war was only temporary and accidental, whereas 
with Germany we have a much closer actual connection and kinship.”137 At 
least in some instances, then, the efforts to geopoliticize the student were quite 
successful.
National Interest and International Understanding(s)
Before we continue to other elements of German academic diplomacy, we must 
emphasize the remarkable and remarkably rapid re-interpretation of interna-
tional students, which made this expansion of student exchanges possible in the 
first place. Within just a very few years, the spies, profiteers, and competitors 
of the early 1920s came to be seen as informal envoys and long-term friends 
of Germany. To be sure, this was a selective, never entirely uncontroversial, 
process. Attitudes toward international students continued to depend on their 
national and increasingly also on their racial background.138 As late as October 
1929, Schairer observed “a seclusion of wide circles of academic life, especially 
of students, from the foreigner.” At the same time, advocates of international 
understanding like himself often found themselves maligned as nationally un-
reliable “pacifists.”139 Still, by the late 1920s, German politicians, professors, and 
137 Quoted in James Colwell, “The American Experience in Berlin during the Weimar Repub-
lic” (PhD Diss., Yale University, 1961), 217; see also the experiences of Shepard Stone in Volker 
Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philan-
thropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, 2001), 8–10.
138 As one liberal German professor remarked with regard to the rampant anti-Semitism at 
German universities: “the entire mentality, if I may use this modern expression, at German uni-
versities does not lend itself to exert any force of attraction to the foreigner”; Julius Michelsohn 
to Dr. Schlink, Jan. 8, 1928, BArch R 8088/810.
139 Tätigkeitsbericht der Deutschen Akademischen Auslandsstelle des Verbandes der 
Deutschen Hochschulen (Feb. 15 to Oct. 1929), BArch R8088/804; student leaders had reacted 
to plans regarding international students by the Hochschulverband in late 1926 with the an-
nouncement that they would respond with “iron opposition”; Schairer to Scheel, Dec. 14, 1926, 
BArch R 8088/799.
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diplomats, sometimes even in conservative circles, had come to accept the in-
ternational student as a national asset, not a liability.140 Even someone as crit-
ical of international reconciliation as Sinologist Otto Franke of the University 
of Berlin, the architect of the Association of German  University’s scientific 
“counter-boycott,” welcomed international students. He later remarked in his 
autobiography, “It is only a small step from studying the language, literature, 
the weltanschauung of a people to a political and economic inclination [toward 
that people]; a step so small that it will always be taken.”141
As Franke’s words illustrate, Germany’s embrace of international students 
aligned international outreach and national ambitions. Whereas German or-
ganizations like the DAAD duly stressed aspects of reconciliation in address-
ing American audiences, they cast their work almost exclusively in terms of na-
tional advantage in a German context.142 In developing a meaningful “cultural 
encounter” between nationally minded elites, the DAAD aimed not at “inter-
national understanding” and the national self-denial this might have entailed, 
but at “international understandings” that could engender mutual recognition 
of national traits and differences.143 For many Germans, in short, the objective 
of international education was not world peace but a just peace for Germany. 
It was Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann – unrivaled in reconciling national 
interest with international understanding – who exemplified this increasingly 
prevalent way of thinking about international students in a 1929 Reichstag 
speech. Countering nationalist criticism that German universities ought to be 
for Germans only, he asserted:
How untrue is the idea that somehow spots are taken from German students! How wrong 
it is not to appropriate the funds, if one can, to give these visiting students comfortable 
gathering places and to make everything easier for them. This will in the end only ben-
efit future German generations. Why are there so many people in the world affectionate 
toward Germany? Because they have been here before, because they have taken in the 
German spirit, because that spirit has tied itself to their soul and because this has created 
an affinity for our country. And thus, no matter how difficult the entire financial situation 
will become, please think of one thing: This [support for international education] is not, 
140 E. g., “Bericht über die fünfte Hauptversammlung der Deutschen Akademie in Berlin,” Mit-
teilungen der Deutschen Akademie 2, no. 5 (Nov. 1930): 277–302, 291; Heinrich Schnee in Ver-
handlungen des Deutschen Reichstags. 185. Sitzung, June 27, 1930, 5912C.
141 Otto Franke, Erinnerungen aus Zwei Welten (Berlin, 1954), 119–120.
142 It was, for example, very specific that it was not a “center for the brotherhood of mankind” 
(a Menschheitsverbrüderungszentrale), quoted in Paul G. Graham, “American German Student 
Exchange,” Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht 20, no. 7 (1928): 218–220, 220.
143 On this doctrine of “cultural encounter,” see Volkhard Laitenberger, “Theorie und Praxis der 
‘Kulturellen Begegnung zwischen den Nationen’ in der deutschen auswärtigen Kulturpolitik der 
30er Jahre,” Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch 31, no. 2 (1981): 196–206.
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy and the United States 248
as one often says in quotation marks, an “internationalizing politics,” this is the best Ger-
man politics, a politics of international understanding in the German interest.144
*
To sum up, the 1920s witnessed a clear trend toward institutionalizing and in-
strumentalizing student migrations. By the late 1920s, a comprehensive sys-
tem of organizations and committees had come to manage crucial parts of in-
ternational education in order to render them politically useful. In carefully 
selecting German students as informal ambassadors and in providing active 
hospitality to American students, these actors had established the major con-
tours of a student-oriented academic diplomacy. In just a few years, interna-
tional educational relations had developed into one of the most dynamic fields 
of German public diplomacy. In the context of Germany’s desire to break the 
inter-Allied hold over the United States, this “geopoliticization” of the student 
played a critical role that is too often neglected in the historical scholarship.
Academic Diplomacy and “Academic Peace” : Transatlantic Network-Building, 
Cultural Demobilization and Diplomacy on Campus, 1924–1930
Students, however, were never the sole target of German academic diplomacy. 
No matter how wise an investment, these programs would not bear political 
fruit for years, even decades to come (if at all). Though international educa-
tion was to provide a basis for future transatlantic influence, German policy-
makers also wished to harness the prestige and contacts of German professors 
and universities for more immediate objectives. Despite the sobering experi-
ences of the postwar years, they never relinquished the notion that German 
academia had an important role to play in reconnecting and representing Ger-
many across the Atlantic. But whereas educational relations were redeveloped 
in an increasingly formalized, institutionalized, and state-organized manner, 
broader academic contacts largely continued to elude systematic manage-
ment.145 Accordingly, German diplomats beat a tactical retreat from an insti-
tutional and multilateral approach toward developing bilateral and informal 
ties with the United States. The larger-scale objective, of course, remained un-
changed: to rebuild academic networks, to demobilize minds, and, ultimately, 
to use Germany’s academic prestige to improve its image and influence abroad.
144 Stresemann in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Bd. 425, June 24, 1929, 2881D.
145 For a glimpse of some of the vitriolic professorial rhetoric prevailing even in the mid-1920s, 
see Georg Karo, “Deutsche Wissenschaft und Ausland,” Mitteilungen der deutschen Akademie 7 
(Sep. 1926): 231–39, 231.
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To this end, Berlin systematically cultivated academic partners on both 
sides of the Atlantic. To be sure, as academic lines of communication and co-
operation were successively reopened in the mid-1920s, there was usually little 
opportunity or need for official involvement. Nevertheless, German ministries 
and semiofficial bodies like the Amerika-Institut became remarkably involved 
in rebuilding transatlantic connections, especially wherever these connections 
promised to generate a broader, quasi-diplomatic impact. Here, too, American 
cultural internationalists were identified as the most important transatlantic 
partners. The international relations round tables, lecture tours, visiting pro-
fessorships, and research programs of organizations like the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the Institute of Politics at Williams College, and the many 
international-minded American universities promised unique access to influ-
ential Americans and a pulpit for Germany’s revisionist message.146
In Germany, official efforts to rebuild transatlantic ties and promote Ger-
man positions also relied on a distinct group of liberal German educators. 
While the German professoriate as a whole only reluctantly lent itself to a Ger-
man policy of reconciliation, the Foreign Ministry found strategic partners in 
men like the Prussian Minister of Culture Carl Heinrich Becker; economists 
like Moritz Julius Bonn (Handelshochschule Berlin), Gerhart von Schul-
ze-Gaevernitz (Freiburg), and Alfred Weber (Heidelberg); theologians like 
Adolf Deissmann (Berlin) and Adolf von Harnack (Berlin); geographers like 
Albrecht Penck (Kiel); Anglicists like Johannes Hoops (Heidelberg); historians 
like Hermann Oncken (Berlin) and Otto Hoetzsch (Berlin); the political scien-
tist Ernst Jäckh (Berlin); legal scholars like Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy 
(Hamburg) and Walther Schüking (Kiel); and scientists like Albert Einstein 
(Berlin), Max Planck (Berlin), Fritz Haber (Berlin), and Arnold Sommerfeld 
(Munich). Collectively, their names feature prominently in the files of the For-
eign Ministry as those to approach when an important article needed to be 
written, an international conference or round table attended, a lecture held, 
a visiting professorship assumed, a position on an international committee 
filled, or a favor (like an honorary degree) secured from a university faculty.147 
Throughout the 1920s, they were the people who could be trusted to use their 
146 The way that German officials thought about U. S. internationalists is exemplified by their 
interest in the Williamstown Conference, an international relations conference held annually at 
the Institute of Politics at Williams College. In 1925, for example, the German embassy attested 
that Williamstown had a “great and steadily growing importance – despite its not always very 
high (intellectual) level – as a means of propaganda.” German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Oct. 
11, 1925, “Diesjährige Tagung des Institute of Politics in Williamstown,” PA R 80297.
147 See, for example: AA to German Embassy, Washington, Feb. 7, 1923, PA R 80295; Sommer-
feld to AA, Report, May 5, 1923, PA R 63383; Einberufung einer Sitzung im AA zur Klärung des 
Verhältnisses zw. deutscher Wissenschaft und Ausland am Feb. 6 1925, PA R 64981; on Einstein 
alone, see PA R 64677 and PA R 64678; on Jäckh, see his files at the Botschaft Washington, 1527; 
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academic authority to articulate German revisionist positions for an American 
public.
These liberal professors epitomized the type of the peaceful revisionist de-
scribed above. For all their individual and professional differences, they shared 
a number of common convictions that set them apart from their professorial 
peers. Ideologically, most of them belonged to what Fritz Ringer has identified 
as the “modernist camp” of German professors, taking a progressive stance on 
domestic and international affairs.148 Though their patriotism and missionary 
self-understanding had prompted many of them to place themselves in the 
service of wartime propaganda after 1914, they had soon begun to clash with 
their “orthodox” peers over German war aims, submarine warfare, and parlia-
mentary reform.149 Few had any special enthusiasm for mass democracy, yet 
they usually belonged, as the historian Herbert Döring has phrased it, to “that 
small minority of German professors who came out publicly in support of the 
Weimar constitution” – and its conciliatory foreign policy.150 The experience 
of 1923, in particular, convinced many of them that the continuation of an in-
transigent policy course – in cultural as in political affairs – was bound only to 
further isolate Germany. Whereas many of their “orthodox” peers now sought 
closer ties to Russia as a counterweight to Western reconciliation, personal, 
professional, and ideological reasons spurred them to support the republic’s 
pro-Western orientation, especially with regard to the United States and Great 
Britain.151 Needless to say, even the most international-minded of them un-
derstood their American networking and lecturing work as a distinct step to-
ward the revision of Versailles. As the economist Schulze-Gaevernitz remarked 
after his American lecture tour in 1924, “after all, I consider the influencing 
of [American] universities – given the lack of any other aristocratic class – a 
more important field for the formation of public opinion in the long run; it is 
likely that from them a reversal in favor of a just reorganization of Europe (in 
terms of the armistice) will emanate and assert itself.”152 Individually, as well as 
German Embassy, Washington, to AA, April 23, 1926, PA R 64709; AA to German Embassy, 
Washington, June 1925, PA R 64266.
148 Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins.
149 Klaus Schwabe, “Zur politischen Haltung der deutschen Professoren im 1. Weltkrieg,” His-
torische Zeitschrift 193 (1961): 601–634.
150 Döring, Der Weimarer Kreis, 6.
151 After the war, to be sure, this longer-standing interest was often reinforced by professional 
ambition: many of them worked in the fledgling fields of international studies and political sci-
ence, which tended to be further developed, more greatly appreciated, and much more richly 
funded in the United States. For close ties of a number of these scholars to the Rockefeller Foun-
dation(s), see Rietzler, “Philanthropy, Peace Research, and Revisionist Politics”; Martin Bulmer 
and Joan Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922–1929,” Minerva 19, no. 3 (1981): 347–407, esp. 388.
152 Letter Schulze-Gaevernitz [1924], PA R 64708. See also the instructive report written by 
Professor Hoetzsch after his lectures at the Williamstown Conference: “Aufzeichnung von Prof. 
Building Alternative Networks: President Butler in Berlin 251
through the handful of internationally oriented institutions many of them were 
connected to – such as Alfred Weber’s Institute for Social and Political Sciences 
(est. 1922) at Heidelberg University or Ernst Jäckh’s Hochschule für Politik in 
Berlin (est. 1920) – they set out to rebuild Germany’s transatlantic academic 
networks.153
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The interplay of private and official German interests in this endeavor is best 
illustrated by the German effort to reconnect with the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (CEIP) in 1925/26. Unlike the Rockefeller Foundation, 
which had begun funding German medical (and later also social science) re-
search from late 1922, the Carnegie Endowment had remained more reserved 
toward Germany.154 At the same time, its heavily publicity-oriented work ap-
pealed particularly to German policymakers with their revisionist objectives. 
True to its mission to “multiply contacts and circulate knowledge,” the CEIP 
funded and organized internationally minded institutes, conferences, lecture 
tours, libraries, and magazines to educate Americans on and connect them to 
foreign affairs. In the aftermath of the war, it also significantly expanded its 
European operations, rebuilding its Paris-based Centre Européen into an in-
fluential transatlantic knowledge hub.155 By fall 1925, Germany’s ambassador 
in Washington, Ago von Maltzan, advocated building closer relations with 
the CEIP because it offered “very remarkable opportunities to influence pub-
lic opinion, especially the intellectual circles, in all countries.” According to 
Maltzan: “We cannot pass up the chance to work toward an attitude favorable 
to Germany.”156
Dr. Otto Hoetzsch, M. d.R über seine Teilnahme am ‘Institute of Politics’ in Williamstown im 
August 1928 und verwandte Fragen (Dec. 1928),” BArch Koblenz, NL Morsbach, 11.
153 These included Bernhard Harms’s Institut für Weltwirtschaft and Seeverkehr (est. 1914) at 
Kiel University, Ernst Jäckh’s Hochschule für Politik (est. 1920) in Berlin, Mendelssohn Bart-
holdy’s Institut für Auswärtige Politik (est. 1923) at Hamburg University, and Alfred Weber’s 
Institute for Social and Political Sciences (est. 1922) at Heidelberg University.
154 On the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation in Germany, see Helke Rausch, “US-ameri-
kanische ‘Scientific Philanthropy’ in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien zwischen den 
Weltkriegen,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 33, no. 1 (2007): 73–98; Rietzler, “Philanthropy, Peace 
Research and Revisionist Politics”; Judith Syga-Dubois, Wissenschaftliche Philanthropie und 
transatlantischer Austausch in der Zwischenkriegszeit. Die sozialwissenschaftlichen Förderpro-
gramme der Rockefeller Stiftungen in Deutschland (Cologne, 2019).
155 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, “Jahresbericht des Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1924,” Apr. 23, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.
156 German Embassy to AA, “Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” Sep. 11, 1925, PA 
Botschaft Washington, 1548.
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At that point, a number of German institutions were already seeking closer 
ties with the Carnegie Endowment. The Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, in 
particular, sought to gain access to Carnegie funds and networks. Founded in 
1920 by a group of liberal professors, publicists, and officials, the reform-ori-
ented Hochschule aimed to educate Germans on democratic government and 
international relations, and by the mid-1920s had also been tasked with training 
the attachés of the German Foreign Service. Its director, journalist-turned-pro-
fessor Ernst Jäckh, had already championed an alternative foreign policy dur-
ing the Wilhelmine Era, and the ineptness of German politics after 1914 had 
only convinced him that Germans needed to be acquainted with foreign, and 
not least American, psychology. After the war, Jäckh, previously an expert on 
the Ottoman Empire, thus turned his attention to the United States. After 1924, 
he went on annual lecture, networking, and fundraising trips across the At-
lantic, where he rigorously promoted a “new Germany” and a cultural alliance 
between the two “sister republics,” quickly establishing a reputation as one of 
the republic’s foremost representatives.157 Appealing masterfully to American 
desires to help a democratic and peaceful Germany, Jäckh ultimately secured 
substantial support for the Hochschule and by 1925 had prepared the ground 
for closer cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment under its new president 
Nicholas Murray Butler.158
The time for closer cooperation seemed to have come in early 1926 when 
Butler announced a visit to Berlin on his European summer tour. The visit was 
not an informal sojourn but a carefully orchestrated affair with the aim of re-
newing Butler’s German contacts (he had not been to Germany since 1912) to 
prepare for the expansion of the Carnegie Endowment’s European program. 
There can be no doubt that both sides had a strong interest in renewed co-
operation. In light of the Locarno treaties and Germany’s impending admis-
sion to the League of Nations, the CEIP’s essentially nonexistent relationship 
with German leaders had become an embarrassment and a hindrance to its 
peace-building agenda.159 Already a year earlier the American trustees had laid 
the foundation for closer relations with Germany when they had tightened 
American control over the Centre Européen in Paris and shifted the focus from 
157 Ernst Jäckh, Amerika und Wir. Amerikanisch-Deutsches Ideenbündnis (Stuttgart, 1929); on 
his reception in the United States, see Rose C. Feld, “New University Trains Germans for Politics; 
Dr. Jäckh, Its President, Comes to Urge Cooperation between Americans and Future Leaders in 
this Country. His Hope Is for Youth,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 1925, XX8.
158 Copy: Ernst Jäckh, American Cooperation for the support of Democratic Organization in 
Germany ca. Dec. 1924, PA 80297; already during the spring of 1926 he went on a Carneg-
ie-sponsored lecture tour through the United States speaking on the Weimar Republic.
159 Jens Wegener, “‘An Organization, European in Character’ – European Agency and Ameri-
can Control at the Centre Européen, 1925–1940,” in American Foundations and the Coproduc-
tion of World Order in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Helke Rausch, 37–60 (Göttin-
gen, 2012), 55–56.
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cooperation with pacifist groups to getting in touch with liberal circles closer 
to European decision-making elites.160 From the official German perspective, 
too, contacts with the CEIP seemed highly desirable, especially since it had 
recently reorganized, providing a promising opportunity to end France’s al-
leged monopolizing of American sympathy and money.161 As Butler was one 
of the most prominent Americans of his time, reintroducing him to postwar 
Germany would contribute greatly toward recalibrating the academic world.162
The entire episode, however, revealed the significant psychological hurdles 
still in place. German officials and professors alike scrutinized Butler’s wartime 
behavior and found it – to put it mildly – wanting. Although Butler, in 1919, had 
declared that he had not forgotten the “amazing self-prostitution” of German 
scholars during the war, his own anti-German pronouncements had not been 
forgotten either. The fact that Butler had been educated in Germany and highly 
honored by the Imperial government rendered his wartime behavior only all 
the more offensive. Even the conciliatory Amerika-Institut had to admit that 
Butler epitomized the “disloyal type.”163 The first letter Butler had addressed to 
Foreign Minister Stresemann in April 1925 had been “purposefully left unan-
swered” (as an internal memorandum made clear) by the Wilhelmstrasse for 
more than six months, and it was only at the repeated instigation of Ambas-
sador Maltzan that it was eventually answered at all.164 The full psychological 
ambivalence of transatlantic relations thus came to the fore in the extensive 
planning that preceded Butler’s visit to Berlin. The treatment of this influential 
but “disloyal” American would be a litmus test for Germany’s willingness to 
subordinate its injured pride to realpolitik.
The vehemence of opposition to Butler’s visit is perhaps best discerned by 
how intensely interested circles pleaded that his wartime behavior should be 
ignored. Shortly before Butler’s visit, the Amerika-Institut, for example, sub-
mitted two long memoranda to the German ministries, essentially asking them 
to overlook his wartime “disloyalty” to make way for a transatlantic intellectual 
rapprochement.165 At that point (mid-1926), the Foreign Ministry had already 
arrived at similar conclusions. Aside from Butler’s recognized importance, two 
160 Wegener, “An Organization, European in Character,” 42–44.
161 Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, first German member of the new European advisory coun-
cil, characterized the American director Dr. Earle Babcock as “personally very pleasant and with 
an appreciable understanding of German interests”; Amerika-Institut to AA, Nov. 14, 1925, PA R 
64999.
162 A detailed description of German aims in Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), June 21, 1926, AA, R 
80299; see also Stresemann to German Embassy, Washington, May 10, 1926; and German Em-
bassy, Washington, to AA, May 18, 1926, in PA Botschaft Washington, 1551.
163 Amerika-Institut [Dr. Bertling] Memorandum II, May 26, 1926, PA R 64909.
164 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Oct. 14, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.
165 K. O. Bertling penned a long memorandum that sought to relativize Butler’s wartime behav-
ior and underline his importance in American education; Amerika-Institut [Dr. Bertling] Mem-
orandum II, May 26, 1926, PA R 64909.
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy and the United States 254
other factors played a decisive role. For one, Butler had provided a token of his 
goodwill by appointing Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron (a brother of the later 
German ambassador to Washington) to the Carnegie Endowment’s European 
advisory board and had sidelined the CEIP’s pacifist “special correspondents,” 
who had always been critical of the German government.166 In addition to this 
behind-the-scenes confidence-building measure, Butler had also grown more 
vocal about his renewed sympathy for Germany and had publicly underlined 
his admiration and appreciation for German learning and culture on several 
occasions during 1925.167 At a time when the political Right was always quick to 
attack German gestures of conciliation as undignified attempts at ingratiation, 
Butler’s gestures cleared the Foreign Ministry of any such motive.168 Weigh-
ing in on Butler’s visit, the America department advised that “given his great 
standing in the United States as well as in Paris and London, we only stand to 
benefit from having good, or at least, normal relations with Dr. Butler. It is thus 
politically important that his upcoming visit to Berlin – where he can expect 
no less and no more than what is commensurate with his standing and impor-
tance – proceed in an entirely harmonious way.”169
Realpolitik gained the upper hand, indeed. The dinners and receptions 
given in Butler’s honor in Berlin in June 1926 brought together the top tier 
of German bureaucracy, business, and science. Stresemann met him for an 
hour-long conversation, which apparently impressed Butler deeply.170 The visit, 
clearly a rather delicate affair for all involved, proved a wise investment because 
it opened the doors of the institutions managed, formally or informally, by the 
Carnegie enterprise, to Germany. In the coming years, the CEIP would intro-
duce author Thomas Mann, Prussian Minister of Culture C. H. Becker, and Re-
ichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht to American audiences and invite groups 
of American journalists and academics to visit Germany. Just one month after 
Butler’s visit, Moritz Julius Bonn, an economics professor and German gov-
ernment advisor on reparations, was added to the CEIP’s European advisory 
board, thus granting Germany the same number of seats as Great Britain.171 
166 AA to German Embassy, Washington, July 27, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.
167 Evidence of Butler’s goodwill was also presented in K. O. Bertling’s memorandum; see 
Amerika-Institut [Dr. Bertling] Memorandum II, May 26, 1926, PA R 64909.
168 Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), June 21, 1926, PA R 80299.
169 Ibid.
170 In 1930, Butler would initiate a Stresemann Memorial, a peace academy in Berlin, in Strese-
mann’s honor; see CEIP, Box 324 Folder Stresemann Memorial, Columbia University, Rare Book 
& Manuscript Library Collections.
171 Statement by the President of the Carnegie Endowment regarding the new work of the En-
dowment in Europe, Aug. 23, 1926, CEIP, 67 Box 97, Report, Butler, Columbia University, Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library Collections. Bonn’s liberal persuasion, pro-American orientation, 
and close ties to Weimar governments made him an attractive choice for both sides. Bonn him-
self experienced his work on the European Advisory Council as “little satisfying”; Bonn, So 
macht man Geschichte, 295–296.
Building Alternative Networks: President Butler in Berlin 255
Back in the United States, Butler also announced the establishment of a Carne-
gie Chair at the Hochschule für Politik, which was to bring American and Eu-
ropean professors to Berlin to lecture on international relations. Only the sec-
ond Carnegie Chair ever to be established, this step symbolized the Carnegie 
Endowment’s new commitment to including Germany in its network-building 
and knowledge-sharing endeavors. As Butler put it, this chair would show that 
“Germany once again has the rightful place in American public life that she has 
had for more than 100 years.”172
The episode illustrates the systematic private and official attempts on the 
part of Germans to reconnect with America; at the same time, it once more 
underlines the often profound obstacles they first had to surmount.173 Butler’s 
visit, despite the prevalent rhetoric of goodwill surrounding it, succeeded pri-
marily in building alternative, at best semi-academic, networks – however in-
fluential they were. It is notable, for example, that Butler’s reception took place 
at the Hochschule für Politik, an institution outside mainstream academia, not 
at the University of Berlin. Butler also gave no academic speeches, nor did he 
receive any particular academic attention, let alone honors. To be sure, this 
had never been his primary intention. He visited Germany not as the president 
of Columbia University but as president of the Carnegie Endowment; not to 
familiarize himself with academics but with Weimar leaders. Yet Butler’s dual 
roles as university president and Carnegie officer were not usually separated 
so very neatly.174 The truth of the matter was that Weimar’s strategy of peaceful 
revisionism, especially when it involved “disloyal types” like Butler, was still 
struggling to find support among the academic establishment. As late as 1929, 
the historian Eduard Meyer (admittedly a particularly irreconcilable charac-
ter) felt America, “with its inner dishonesty and moralistic arrogance” – clearly 
Butler’s America – to be “the most disgusting of our enemies.”175
On the American side, too, distrust concerning the actual degree of 
democratization among German academics remained pronounced.176 It was 
telling that the Carnegie Endowment chose to base its German networks not 
on mainstream universities or even prewar bodies like the Amerika-Institut 
172 Clipping: “Eine Unterredung mit Präsident Butler,” Berliner Tageblatt, June 24, 1926, PA 
Botschaft Washington, 1548.
173 On questions of German psychology and foreign policy toward the United States in the 
1920s more generally, see Berg, Gustav Stresemann, 233–240.
174 Butler was, after all, a man who routinely fashioned himself America’s cultural ambassador 
to Europe and received honorary degrees wherever he went.
175 Alexander Demandt, “Eduard Meyer und Oswald Spengler,” in Eduard Meyer. Leben und 
Leistung eines Universalhistorikers, ed. William M. Calder III and Alexander Demandt, 159–181 
(Leiden, 1990), 169.
176 See Duggan to Nicholas Murray Butler, Oct. 3, 1925, Attachment: Report on European Visit, 
Oct. 1925, CEIP, Box 231 3–5 Folder: Institute of International Education, Columbia University, 
Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
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but on the reformist Hochschule für Politik, one of the Weimar Republic’s typ-
ical “outsider institutions.”177 Although the Hochschule’s agenda and its unique 
access to (future) diplomats rendered it especially suitable for the endowment’s 
plans to reform international politics, America’s cultural internationalists 
doubtlessly preferred to support institutions akin to their own democratizing 
agenda, few of which could be found in the German university landscape.178 
While Butler’s visit can thus be understood as a symbolic step in transatlantic 
“network-building,” it bypassed a considerable part of Germany’s still irrecon-
cilable academic establishment. As a result, this episode tells us a great deal 
about how the Foreign Ministry and its professorial partners rebuilt alternative 
transatlantic ties to loosen the inter-Allied hold on America, yet we need to 
look elsewhere to understand how a broader “academic peace” actually devel-
oped.
Cultural Demobilization and the Academic World
As much as German authorities sought to aid the transatlantic academic rap-
prochement (as evidenced by Butler’s visit), there was an undeniable demo-
bilization of academic minds by the late 1920s. The causes for this ran much 
deeper than any official or private effort.
On the American side, this demobilization first became apparent in the 
context of the Ruhr occupation and accelerated thereafter. Wider political and 
economic developments, including the London Reparations Conference of 
1924, the “spirit of Locarno” of 1925, and Germany’s admission to the League of 
Nations in 1926, certainly had a marked impact on the normalization of sen-
timents toward Germany both in academia and among the general American 
public.179 Yet growing American disenchantment with the outcome of the war 
in general and American involvement in particular, also aided this process. 
Harold Laswell’s groundbreaking 1927 study on wartime propaganda, the pub-
lication of wartime memoirs, and the research of a group of revisionist Amer-
ican historians who challenged common notions of German war guilt all con-
tributed to a re-evaluation of U. S. intervention.180 By the late 1920s, a greater 
number of publicists and academics were beginning to wonder whether Amer-
177 See Peter Gay, Die Republik der Außenseiter. Geist und Kultur in der Weimarer Zeit, 1918–
1933 (Frankfurt, 1970), 63–65.
178 Just two years later the Rockefeller Foundation would go a similar, if decidedly less public, 
way by funding the Lincoln Foundation; Malcolm Richardson, ed., Weimars transatlantischer 
Mäzen: Die Lincoln-Stiftung 1927–1934. Ein Versuch demokratischer Elitenförderung in der Wei-
marer Republik (Essen, 2008).
179 See Müller, Weimar im Blick, 253–275; and Schoenthal, “American Attitudes toward Ger-
many,” 182–215.
180 Adler, “The War Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918–1928,” 1–28.
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ica had not actually been lured into the war, whether its cause had really been 
so noble, and, correspondingly, whether German motives had been so vile. 
According to the German ambassador to Washington, the tenth anniversary 
of America’s entry into the war in April 1927 was marked by “strong disillusion-
ment.”181
These increasing doubts about America’s intervention in and Germany’s 
responsibility for the war mitigated some of the harsher sentiments of the 
postwar years. In some American academic circles, it also set off a process of 
soul-searching concerning their own wartime behavior. Serious German blun-
ders such as the “Manifesto of the 93” lost some of their sting as a younger 
generation of left-leaning American scholars critically analyzed American ac-
ademia’s own wartime overreactions.182 Though the desire for critical self-re-
flection among American academics should not be overstated, the general 
disillusion certainly worked in Germany’s favor. As Americans returned to 
imagining all of Europe as a cesspool of power politics, Germany – in contrast 
to the former Allies – stood only to gain. In this climate, American scholars 
like Butler were given to adopting a more conciliatory stance toward Germany: 
many began to remember their happy student days and encouraged younger 
colleagues to visit.183
On the German side, the process of cultural demobilization proved to be 
considerably more difficult, slower, and more uneven in consequence. German 
academics were regularly confronted with the real and imagined consequences 
of Germany’s defeat, which thwarted them in their efforts to develop a more 
conciliatory attitude. But their resentment clearly began to break down in the 
mid-1920s, especially toward American scholars. While the absence of real po-
litical grievances between the two nations favored this development, Ameri-
can gestures of goodwill proved equally important. For German scholars, who 
carefully registered any international niceties or insults, American postwar aid 
(Chapter 3) had already served to justify closer transatlantic relations. 184 The 
first cohort of German academics to return from visits to the United States also 
reported that their American colleagues overwhelmingly received them in a 
181 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Apr. 7, 1927, “10. Jahrestag des Kriegseintrittes 
Amerikas,” PA R 80141.
182 Charles Angoff, “The Higher Learning Goes to War,” The American Mercury, June 1927; C. 
Hartley Grattan, “The Historians Cut Loose,” American Mercury, Aug. 1927.
183 Prof. Dr. Julius Richter, Bericht über meine Vortragsreise an den Universitäten, Colleges 
und Theologischen Seminaren der Vereinigten Staaten vom 25. Oktober 1924 bis 5 April 1925, 
PA R 64708; on Butler, see Anlage zum Bericht der Botschaft zu Washington vom 18. November 
1925 (Dieckhoff), PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.
184 At a meeting between professors and the Foreign Ministry in February 1925, they agreed to 
pursue closer relations with the United States, in part because American scholars had been par-
ticularly generous and accommodating; Protokoll der Sitzung im Auswärtigen Amt vom 6. Feb-
ruar 1925 betr. Verhalten der deutschen Gelehrtenwelt gegenüber dem Auslande, PA R 64981.
“The Best German Politics”: Academic Diplomacy and the United States 258
friendly and courteous manner. One Königsberg philosopher stated in early 
1925: “I have sensed nothing of boycott tendencies in America […] The respect 
for German Wissenschaft, its prestige and a recognition of its importance for 
the big picture continue unimpaired in the United States, in my opinion, and 
with it the will and desire to develop closer ties. […] I never [encountered] 
any sign of rejection, distrust, hostility or affront.”185 The American debate on 
German war guilt – followed more attentively in Germany than in the United 
States itself – likewise led Germans to believe that American scholars were 
moving decidedly toward a more “objective,” i. e., pro-German, assessment of 
this critical issue.186 Not infrequently, Germans also (mis)interpreted Ameri-
can disillusionment with the war as a sign of remorse or even recognition of 
the injustice done to Germany. 187 It was precisely because German scholars 
thought in binary categories of “friend or foe” that they increasingly perceived 
Americans as on “our side.”188
Arguably the most important factor, however, was American pronounce-
ments of renewed intellectual appreciation and gratitude. All militant rheto-
ric aside, German professors positively ached for international recognition. In 
this context, the role of Jacob Gould Schurman, the U. S. ambassador to Berlin 
from 1925 to 1929, cannot be overemphasized. Schurman was one of those ed-
ucator-diplomats that American history is so rich with. Like the generation 
of ambassadors before him, the Canadian-born philosopher of Dutch descent 
had been educated in Göttingen and Heidelberg before becoming a professor 
and (at age 37) president of Cornell University, a post he held until 1920. At that 
point, his close affiliation with the Republican Party secured his appointment 
as ambassador to China and subsequently his “promotion” to Berlin in 1925. 
The precise reasons for Schurman’s appointment to the important Berlin post 
are not clear. Originally, at least, the Coolidge administration seems to have fa-
vored sending yet another businessman. Perhaps Parker Gilbert, the U. S. agent 
for reparations, and his staff already provided sufficient American economic 
and financial expertise in Berlin; perhaps no suitable candidate was found. 
In any case, there is little to suggest that Washington sent a former univer-
sity president to complement the “economic peace” of 1924 with an “academic 
peace.” But intentions aside, Schurman’s appointment had just that result.
185 Beobachtungen und Erfahrungen während eines Aufenthaltes in den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika, Juni bis Oktober 1924, von Herbert Kraus, PA NL Maltzan, Vol. 47.
186 Günter Moltmann, “Revisionist Historiography in the United States and its Importance for 
German-American Relations in the Weimar Period,” in Deutschland und die USA, 1918–1933, 
ed. Georg Eckert, 89–101 (Braunschweig, 1968).
187 Stresemann strategically used this argument when he tried to secure an honorary degree for 
Schurman; see Stresemann to Johannes Hoops, July 22, 1927, PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 56.
188 Entschließungen des 6. Deutschen Hochschultages vom 7 bis 9. März 1929 in München 
“Zur Kriegsschuldthese,” Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen (1929): 104–
105.
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Indeed, Schurman understood his German appointment as a mission of 
cultural reconciliation.189 Though he, too, had taken a stance against Germany 
during the war, the 71-year-old philosopher was obviously delighted in the 
prospect of settling in Berlin and prepared himself carefully for the post.190 
Once in Germany, Schurman applied all his public relations skills from his 
years as an American university president to launching an unprecedented 
goodwill campaign targeting the German public in general and his academic 
peers in particular.191 Schurman’s regular recourse to the “nonpolitical” field 
of culture is remarkable in this regard. Just as the first postwar ambassadors 
Alanson B. Houghton (director of Corning Glass) and Otto Wiedfeldt (direc-
tor of Krupp) had used their economic backgrounds to “talk business” with 
their German and American peers, so the German-trained professor appealed 
to Germany’s educated elites primarily as a scholar and former German stu-
dent, as part of the universitas litterarum. While his excellent German language 
skills and academic credentials already afforded him unrivaled access to Ger-
man academic life, Schurman combined this advantage of a shared academic 
background with a masterful grasp of German psychology. He instinctively 
understood what Germans craved most: outside recognition.192
From the very first, Schurman flaunted his high regard for German science 
and thought. He cited Goethe, Kant, and Luther with ease, took quasi-pilgrim-
ages to the shrines of German classical culture like Königsberg, and praised 
the profound impact German learning had made on world progress. Above all, 
Schurman was ready to profess his own personal and America’s national debt 
to German education. In speech after speech, he underlined the influence of 
German university training on his own and his country’s national development 
and used it to construct a “special relationship” between the two nations. In 
one of his very first German addresses, which he gave to an American audience 
189 See Detlef Junker, “Jacob Gould Schurman, die Universität Heidelberg und die 
deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” in Semper Apertus. Sechshundert Jahre Rupre-
cht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 1386–1986, ed. Wilhelm Doerr (Berlin, 1985), 3:328–358; see 
also Maynard Moser, “Jacob Gould Schurman” (PhD Diss., University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, 1976).
190 Upon his return from China, for example, he approached the members of Cornell’s German 
department for information and advice on the state of German culture and academia. A. B. Faust 
to Harry Elmer Barnes, Mar. 2, 1926, Albert B. Faust Papers, #14-18-85, Box 4, Correspondence 
1920–26, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
191 His tenure witnessed the first transatlantic radio communication, the first transatlantic air-
plane flight, and the first postwar speed records for Germany’s transatlantic ocean liner.
192 Schurman to Dwight W. Morrow, Oct. 22, 1925, 3/4/6 Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, 
Folder 4.2 Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections: “There is 
another thing to be considered. Nobody since 1914 has shown any gratitude to Germany for 
anything. The German people feel keenly this moral and intellectual isolation. An expression of 
gratitude from the American people for help given them in the greatest crisis in their history by 
the greatest of German philosophers [Kant during the Revolutionary War] will, as Stresemann 
said, produce a quite extraordinary effect upon the mind and feeling of the German people.”
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at the Hotel Adlon in July 1925, he set the tone for the quintessential “Schur-
man speech” of the coming four and a half years. Focusing almost exclusively 
on his happy student days in Germany, Schurman concluded that the German 
people were so talented that they would soon rise to international eminence 
once more. “The war is over!” he closed, “whoever still feels and thinks and 
speaks in terms of war, such a person is an anachronism and has no place in 
the world of today. If there ever were two nations that are destined, nay predes-
tined, to be friends – to be close friends – it surely is the U. S. and Germany.” 
The Foreign Ministry found the speech simply “remarkable.”193
Schurman’s strategy – and a strategy it was194 – proved exceptionally suc-
cessful. Ignoring his long involvement with the Republican Party, German 
scholars chose to see him as an educator who, like themselves, essentially stood 
above party politics. The Prussian Minister of Culture, orientalist C. H. Becker, 
for example, paid tribute to Schurman as a “scholar amongst scholars.”195 By 
the late 1920s, hardly any academic festivity passed without Schurman in the 
front row, and there was scarcely any honor he did not receive.196 In 1929, he 
was made an honorary member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences – only 
the second American ever and the first (enemy) foreigner after the war so hon-
ored.197 As philosophy professor Eugen Kühnemann wrote upon Schurman’s 
return to the United States in December 1929: “You have been the wonderful 
representative of all that is best in the spiritual life of your country and have 
been an ambassador of goodwill and real friendship in our great distress. We 
all know that in you we have gained a friend who understands us and who 
will do all in his power to work for a new world in which mankind will do us 
justice.”198 Reading contemporary files, one is tempted to give in to the impres-
sion that Schurman, more than any other single person, helped to demobilize 
German academics.
193 Aufzeichnung, July 14, 1925, PA R 80136, Hermann Davidsen, a former Cornell professor 
and now a member of the Foreign Ministry’s America division, was more critical in his personal 
assessment: see H. Davidsen to A. B. Faust, July 12, 1925, Albert B. Faust Papers, #14-18-85, Box 
4, Correspondence 1920–26, Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript Col-
lections.
194 Schurman to Dwight W. Morrow, Oct. 22, 1925, 3/4/6 Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, 
Folder 4.2 Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections.
195 American Embassy, Berlin, to State Dept., Aug. 4, 1927, NARA RG 59 Box 1640 [Schurman] 
123/Sch 87/210.
196 At the opening of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft’s Harnack House in 1929, hailed as the 
rebirth of German science, Schurman not only sat in the front row next to Harnack and Strese-
mann but was also the only foreigner to address the audience.
197 See the lists of members in http://www.bbaw.de/MitgliederderVorgaengerakademien/chro-
nologisch.html?zeitraum=1900–1950
198 Eugen Kühnemann to Schurman, Dec. 28, 1929, 3/4/6 Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, Divi-
sion of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
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*
By the late 1920s, informal contacts and public declarations of goodwill had 
gone a long way toward reconciling German scholars with America and vice 
versa. This matters for the subject at hand because this more cordial climate 
increasingly paved the way for academic diplomacy that went beyond individ-
ual students, scholars, and institutes. As a consequence, it also restored a more 
representative, quasi-diplomatic function to German universities that finally 
allowed Weimar to conduct broader academic diplomacy. Nothing illustrates 
this development more than the honorary degrees awarded to Foreign Minis-
ter Stresemann and U. S. Ambassador Schurman in 1928.
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Not surprisingly, German foreign policymakers had always been interested 
in the quasi-diplomatic, representative aspects of academic relations. The 
Foreign Ministry carefully recorded the establishment of international visit-
ing professorships, the bestowal of honorary degrees, and the celebration of 
academic jubilees in its files. As scholars have recently shown – and as 1920s 
diplomats knew well – such academic practices were significant acts of com-
munication and representation, invoking and confirming not only the Welt-
geltung deutscher Wissenschaft (world influence of German science) but also 
serving discrete national interests.200 By showcasing German intellectual tradi-
tions and their international esteem, they advanced Germany’s position in the 
peaceful competition for prestige and influence. But while the Wilhelmstrasse 
never tired of analyzing the political benefits other countries reaped from the 
quasi-diplomatic practices of their universities, Berlin itself had benefited little. 
Professors and students eagerly celebrated the allegedly “apolitical” traditions 
of the Reich (the day of the proclamation of the Wilhelmine Reich, January 18, 
was declared a dies academicus in 1921), yet they decidedly lacked enthusiasm 
for the “political” celebrations of the Weimar Republic and its black-red-gold 
199 I borrow that phrase from Thomas Adam and Charlotte Lerg, “Diplomacy on Campus: The 
Political Dimensions of Academic Exchange in the North Atlantic,” Journal of Transatlantic Stud-
ies 13, no. 4 (2015): 299–310.
200 See Charlotte Lerg, “Die Ehrendoktorwürde im Dienste der transatlantischen Diplomatie. 
Politische Dimensionen einer akademischen Praxis im 20. Jahrhundert,” in Akademische Wissen-
skulturen. Praktiken des Lehrens und Forschens vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne, ed. Martin 
Kintzinger and Sita Seckel, 301–322 (Basel, 2015); Pieter Dhondt, “Introduction. University His-
tory Writing: More than a History of Jubilees?” in University Jubilees and University History Writ-
ing. A Challenging Relationship, ed. Pieter Dhondt, 1–17 (Leiden, 2015), esp. 14.
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colors.201 Although individual professors and institutes would at times coop-
erate, German universities in general rarely lent their cultural capital or even 
their venerable space to republican ambitions.
This was most keenly felt with regard to honorary degrees. Since the re-
public had abolished all state decorations, doctoral degrees seemed to offer one 
of the few truly prestigious instruments available for gaining, rewarding, or 
strengthening international sympathies.202 Efforts in this direction, however, 
often met with the determined opposition of academic circles and, even where 
successful, hardly ever involved a politically desirable public ceremony. Dur-
ing the 1920s, foreigners (from former enemy nations) were rarely honored 
“on campus,” thus depriving the honorees – and German foreign policy – of 
the performative act, which tends to be even more important than the degree 
itself.203 In part, to be sure, this reluctance was due to German academic tra-
dition. Unlike in the United States, where universities had long used honor-
ary doctorates to acknowledge the exemplary public service of domestic and 
foreign statesmen, German universities generally treated them as nonpublic, 
academic acts dependent on scholarly merit.204 While wartime patriotism and 
postwar distress had already undermined this principle, German universities 
were now doubly careful not to “taint” the prestige of their honorary degrees 
further by subjecting them to political (that is, republican) considerations.205 
They also insisted that the honoree have a proven past and present pro-Ger-
man attitude, which seriously limited the political usefulness of this instru-
ment. Here as elsewhere, German universities only reluctantly assumed a con-
structive role in Weimar’s policy of reconciliation with the West.
This changed notably, albeit never entirely, only toward the late 1920s. In 
the transatlantic case, this development found its most remarkable expression 
at the University of Heidelberg, which awarded an honorary doctorate first 
to U. S. Ambassador Schurman, then to Foreign Minister Stresemann, and fi-
nally decided to bestow the degrees in a joint and public ceremony on May 5, 
1928. This extraordinary event provides a unique window onto the increasingly 
201 Observance of republican holidays was so lukewarm and the use of republican colors so 
uncommon that they eventually had to be legislated; Preuss. Minist. für Wissenschaft, Kunst und 
Volksbildung, Zu UI Nr 21895, 1929 Flaggenerlasse, BArch R 8088/662: “On the occasion of all 
university festivities the festival room is to contain a dignified symbol of the Republican form of 
state.”
202 Bonn, So macht man Geschichte, 329–330.
203 Dietmar von Reeken and Malte Thiessen, “Ehrregime. Perspektiven, Potenziale und Be-
funde eines Forschungskonzepts,” in Ehrregime. Akteure, Praktiken und Medien lokaler Ehrrun-
gen in der Moderne, ed. von Reecken and Thiessen, 11–29 (Göttingen, 2016), 25.
204 Lerg, “Die Ehrendoktorwürde,” 305.
205 Reinhold Seeberg, “Der Doktor ehrenhalber und die Ehre der deutschen. Hochschulen,” 
Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen (1930), 177–180; see also the public dis-
cussion of some honorary degrees awarded to benefactors of the university in Anne Nagel, ed., 
Die Philipps-Universität Marburg im Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 2000), 87–93.
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fruitful interplay of academic and political interests and, I would argue, the 
emergence of an “academic peace” in the late 1920s.
The Heidelberg honorary doctorates were a political and diplomatic matter 
from the beginning. Indeed, it was none other than Foreign Minister Strese-
mann who “arranged” Schurman’s honorary degree during the spring of 1927 
in order to recognize and maintain his goodwill and, it seems, demonstrate 
Germany’s pro-American sentiment just as the U. S. Congress was debating the 
release of former German property seized during the war. Despite the decline 
of wartime resentment in Germany, Stresemann fully realized the difficulty 
of the task. A first approach to the University of Göttingen, though carefully 
prepared through informal channels, failed due to faculty reservations. Even 
Stresemann’s strategic emphasis on the liberal degree policies practiced at Al-
lied universities to illustrate “by what means [universities] in other countries 
support the foreign policy of their governments” proved to be of little avail.206 
Though Göttingen officially – and quite ironically – based its rejection on the 
former Cornell University president’s lack of academic merit (thereby also re-
jecting Stresemann’s idea of an honorary degree as a quasi-diplomatic tool), 
it seems that rumors of Schurman’s anti-German utterances during the war 
were actually to blame.207 In his second, successful attempt at the University 
of Heidelberg, Stresemann thus made sure to vouch personally for Schurman’s 
“unconditional friendliness toward Germany.” Attuned to conservative psy-
chology, he also highlighted a recent American honorary degree to German 
ambassador Maltzan as a “sign that insightful American circles are beginning 
not just to forget the war, but to express through such salient honors that we 
are owed amends. We are thus not taking the first step in this direction, but 
are following the United States.”208 Although Stresemann plainly misrepre-
sented American motives here, it seems to have helped convince the remaining 
skeptics at Heidelberg’s Faculty of Philosophy. In late July 1927, Schurman was 
awarded the title of doctor of philosophy in honor of his commitment to trans-
atlantic reconciliation.209 The ambassador himself was delighted, and Strese-
mann anticipated “the very best effect, domestically and internationally, from 
the award ceremony itself.”210
206 Stresemann to Senator Hobelmann, May 24, 1927; Stresemann to Meinardus, May 31, 1927, 
PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 54.
207 Meinardus, Rektor Universität Göttingen to Stresemann, May 14, 1927; Professor Hoops to 
Stresemann, July 15, 1927, PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 54.
208 Stresemann to Johannes Hoops, July 22, 1927, PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 56.
209 The award is cited in Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, B-1523/1a, Verleihung der Ehrendok-
torwürde an Jakob Gould Schurman und Gustav Stresemann.
210 Stresemann to Badensian Minister of Culture, Leers, July 30, 1927, PA NL Stresemann, 
Vol. 56.
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At the time, even Stresemann could not have foreseen just how good this 
“effect” would eventually be. Certainly, the relatively swift award conferred by 
one of Germany’s best-known universities would have constituted a significant 
success in its own right. But a number of Heidelberg professors now took two 
steps that would turn Schurman’s honorary degree into a much larger transat-
lantic affair. First, merely a few months later, Heidelberg’s Institute for Social 
and Political Science, directed by Alfred Weber, awarded an honorary doctor-
ate in political science to Foreign Minister Stresemann for his service to the 
fatherland.211 In addition, the university administration agreed (at the sugges-
tion of the Foreign Ministry, it seems) to confer the two degrees in a joint and 
public ceremony. These actions were remarkably consequential. If we recall just 
how unwilling German universities were to award honorary degrees whenever 
they seemed to serve political (i. e., republican) considerations, Heidelberg – 
honoring the American ambassador for his role in transatlantic reconciliation 
and the republican foreign minister for his national service – was going far 
beyond common academic practice. By holding a joint public ceremony, more-
over, it turned an academic act into what Stresemann rightly identified as “an 
act of international reconciliation politics.”212
This exceptional action was certainly a product of the liberalism of some 
parts of Heidelberg University. The Faculty of Law and Alfred Weber’s Institute 
for Social and Political Sciences (Institut für Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften, 
InSoSta), in particular, were strongholds of democratic thought and Amer-
ican connections in the Weimar years.213 But there is also reason to see the 
ceremony as a marketing coup for Heidelberg on the part of town and gown 
alike. Academic ceremonies, scholars have noted, often aimed to strengthen 
the public role of universities and to establish them as actors in international 
affairs.214 The extraordinary attention the university administration paid to the 
national and international publicity of this event (as reflected in the university 
archives) suggests that it deliberately used the occasion to raise and sharpen 
211 Addresses at the Ceremony of Conferring Honorary degrees upon Dr. Stresemann and Dr. 
Schurman, in the Convocation Hall of Heidelberg University, May 5, 1928, translated from the 
German (Heidelberg, 1928).
212 Stresemann to Rochus von Rheinbaben, Feb. 20, 1928, PA NL Stresemann, Vol. 64.
213 The fact that a small number of left-liberal professors at the InSoSta independently adminis-
tered the political science doctorate enabled them to honor candidates who would have stood 
little chance at other faculties – an advantage they used to the fullest. A Heidelberg University 
statistic showed that its faculties on average awarded 2.3 honorary doctorates a year through the 
1920s, while the InSoSta awarded 4.4; see Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, B-1522, Ehrenpromo-
tionen, Allgemeines, 1918–1949 Ehrenpromotionen in Heidelberg; for a critical appraisal of 
Heidelberg’s alleged liberalism, see Christian Jansen, “Auf dem Mittelweg von rechts. Akademis-
che Ideologie und Politik zwischen 1914 und 1933,” in Auch eine Geschichte der Universität Hei-
delberg, ed. Karin Buselmeier, Dietrich Harth, and Christian Jansen, 163–193 (Mannheim, 
1985), 185–187.
214 Lerg, “Die Ehrendoktorwürde,” 313.
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its public profile in a certain way.215 Whereas the University of Marburg, for 
example, cultivated the image of a distinctly “German” institution during the 
1920s,216 Heidelberg used the ceremony to increase its transatlantic visibility 
and project itself as a haven of liberal cosmopolitanism.217 By linking Germa-
ny’s prestigious academic traditions to republican foreign policy, it deliberately 
made itself a stage for the academic and political rapprochement between the 
United States and Germany.
Fig . 11: Stresemann and Schurman 
receiving honorary doctorates in 
Heidelberg, May 1928, Bundesar-
chiv, Robert Senneck, Bild 146-
1978-029-05 A
The joint ceremony on May 5, 1928, was a diplomatic and academic act of the 
first order, as Heidelberg Rector Martin Dibelius stressed in his opening re-
215 See especially Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, B-1523/2a, Generalia, Feierlichkeiten: Para-
mount News, Bruno Stindt, to University Heidelberg, Mar. 21, 1928; Universität Heidelberg, 
Rektorat an Mitglieder der Akademischen Korporation, Apr. 14, 1928; Reichszentrale für 
deutsche Verkehrswerbung to Prof. Andreas, Apr. 18, 1928.
216 On Marburg’s public profile, see Siebe, Germania Docet, 491; on the increasingly public role 
of universities in the 1920s, see Mathias Kotowski, Die öffentliche Universität. Veranstaltungskul-
tur der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen in der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart, 1999).
217 Concerning questions of war guilt, Heidelberg University was just as “national” as other 
universities. Just one month after the award ceremony, American professor and CEIP director 
James Brown Scott was disinvited from a lecture in Heidelberg when he failed to guarantee not 
to repeat the idea of German war guilt; Wegener, “‘An Organization, European in Character,’” 37.
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marks.218 The idyllic Heidelberg setting, the quality of the speeches, and the 
phenomenal media interest (including an American newsreel team and more 
than a dozen American news correspondents) set the stage for a ceremony that 
combined the pomp of academic tradition with the urgency of international 
politics. Schurman was in his element. In a particularly exuberant version of 
the “Schurman speech,” he used his reminiscences of his Heidelberg student 
days (underlined by his own English-language rendition of the poem “Old 
Heidelberg”) to proclaim a cultural alliance between Germany and the United 
States. Based on “the similarity of the fundamental international ideals of the 
Governments and peoples of our countries,” he saw, “Germany and the United 
States […] marching forward in a great and noble adventure in the cause of hu-
man civilization.”219 Stresemann, in contrast, used the significant national and 
international attention to lay out the tenets of German foreign policy. Coming 
on the eve of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to outlaw war and on the heels of a Re-
ichstag debate in which his accommodating foreign policy had been bitterly 
attacked for its lack of results, Stresemann’s “grand speech,” as Detlef Junker 
called it, underlined Germany’s commitment to reconciliation but also empha-
sized its dependence on revisionist concessions in front of a world audience.220 
At the same time, Stresemann cautioned the student body “not to get carried 
away by old rallying cries. The maintenance of peace and efforts to this end are 
not cowardice, are not weakness; they are the true political recognition of our 
own national interests.”221
This moment of “Weltpolitik in Heidelberg,” as the liberal Vossische Zei-
tung termed it, made headlines in all the major German and a significant num-
ber of international newspapers.222 It was not that declarations of transatlantic 
friendship had been absent from public debate. Yet since 1914, no American 
ambassador had championed intellectual cooperation between the two nations 
so warmly – nor had one so clearly challenged the war’s recalibration of ac-
ademic relations. And rarely, indeed, did a German university seem to have 
taken such a clear stance in support of republican foreign policy, as contem-
218 On the speeches, see Reden bei dem Akt der Ehrenpromotion des Reichsministers Stresemann 
und des Botschafter der Vereinigten Staaten Dr. Schurman, in der Aula der Universität Heidelberg, 
5. Mai 1928 (Heidelberg, 1928); this publication was arranged and paid for by the German For-
eign Ministry – as was the English translation: Addresses at the Ceremony of Conferring Honorary 
Degrees upon Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Schurman.
219 American Embassy, Berlin, to State Dept., May 8, 1928, NARA RG 59 Box 1640 [Schur-
man]123/Sch 87/229.
220 Junker, “Jacob Gould Schurman, die Universität Heidelberg und die deutsch-amerikanis-
chen Beziehungen,” 328–358.
221 Reden bei dem Akt der Ehrenpromotion.
222 “Weltpolitik in Heidelberg,” May 6, 1928, Nr. 108, Vossische Zeitung (Beilage); see the col-
lected clippings in Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, B-1523/2a–e, Ehrenpromotionen Strese-
mann-Schurman Zeitungsberichte, 1928.
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poraries pointed out.223 These same contemporaries felt the ceremony was a 
symbolic departure from wartime cultural alliances toward a closer political 
and academic partnership between Germany and America. Not surprisingly, 
the enthusiasm of the liberal German press was matched only by French dis-
may.224 Doubtlessly, the Heidelberg ceremony revealed an increasingly fruitful 
interplay of academic and political interests in the late 1920s and underscored 
German academia’s reconciliation with both Berlin and the United States dur-
ing the period of relative stabilization, however selective that reconciliation 
may have been. Looking back a few years later, the German ambassador to 
Washington Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron considered the Heidelberg 
ceremony to have been of “symbolic significance for the entire second phase of 
German-American relations after the war.”225
Toward an Academic Peace?
It was arguably with regard to academic relations, not international politics, 
that the ceremony’s most positive effect unfolded. This was true for Heidelberg 
itself, which re-established itself as a mecca for international and especially 
American attention. American newspapers and newsreels alike praised the 
unique charm of Germany’s oldest and – as many now held – foremost univer-
sity.226 Moreover, Schurman’s honorary degree enjoyed a stunning aftermath 
as the American ambassador expressed his gratitude by raising the enormous 
sum of $500,000 for a new university hall in the heart of the city. This gener-
ous American gift not only allowed the university to open a grand modern 
building in the midst of the Great Depression but yielded yet another string of 
heavily publicized, quasi-diplomatic celebrations of transatlantic “friendship” 
223 See especially Dr. E. C., “Die Heidelberger Ehrenpromotion,” Vossische Zeitung, May 6, 
1928, 2. According to the Vossische Zeitung, the true historical significance of the award cere-
mony lay not in Stresemann’s and Schurman’s commitment to peace but the fact that “finally a 
German university has the courage to commit itself to (sich bekennen) the state, as it is.”
224 Temps and Figaro reminded Schurman that Americans had not yet forgotten the sinking of 
the Lusitania or the occupation of Belgium; Clipping: “Die Heidelberger Reden Stresemann und 
Schurmans. Französische Pressestimmen,” Frankfurter Zeitung, May 7, 1928, Universitätsarchiv 
Heidelberg, B-1523/2e.
225 Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, “Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten 
seit dem Weltkrieg,” 20.
226 As Lincoln Eyre of the New York Times realized, Heidelberg profited greatly from the honor-
ary degrees: “This ‘intellectual sister act’ as an irreverent onlooker dubbed the impressive cere-
mony, not only added to Heidelberg’s cultural renown but was also mighty good publicity for the 
city’s claim to be the hub of the touristic cycle in Southern and Western Germany. The states-
men’s visit, Heidelbergers affirm, is bound to stimulate international interest in a spot already 
famed for its historical treasures and educational eminence”; Lincoln Eyre, “Germans Allure 
American Tourists,” New York Times, May 13, 1929, 47.
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over the next two years.227 Even more remarkable was that this set off a kind of 
chain reaction, leading other German universities to orient themselves toward 
the United States, too. The University of Munich, for instance, established a 
chair in American History and Culture in 1928 and initiated an American “Jun-
ior Year in Munich” shortly thereafter. By the late 1920s, interuniversity rivalry 
for American connections and funds led German universities – not “outsider 
institutions” like the Hochschule für Politik – to actively cultivate transatlantic 
relations once more.
Importantly, similar trends were visible across the Atlantic. Harvard Uni-
versity established the Kuno Francke-Professorship in German Language 
and Culture in 1927 and concurrently worked toward resuming its professo-
rial exchange with German universities. This effectively rekindled the pre-
war competition for German connections.228 Columbia’s Nicholas Murray 
Butler responded to Harvard’s actions almost immediately. In January 1929, 
he welcomed the German ambassador von Prittwitz und Gaffron on campus, 
where the two men jointly reopened the Deutsches Haus (closed in 1917) in 
yet another quasi-diplomatic act.229 Shortly thereafter, Butler took an even 
more monumental step: he re-established the Roosevelt Professorship at the 
University of Berlin after a 15-year hiatus. These highly symbolic actions not 
only restored the institutional infrastructure of prewar days; they also reflected 
renewed interuniversity competition on the American side as well. German 
academic contacts were considered “valuable” once again, just as German aca-
demics sought to reconnect with Americans. Arguably, it was this resumption 
of the dynamics of competition for transatlantic contacts both in Germany 
and the United States that marked the true return to academic normalcy. Even 
though German scholars never joined the scientific “boycott organizations,” 
the bilateral strategy pursued by German diplomats, students and professors 
had to some degree overturned the recalibration of the academic world. By 
October 1929, Ambassador Prittwitz concluded that “German science is once 
more accorded the position within American universities it intellectually de-
serves.”230 In the transatlantic context, the long-awaited “academic peace” 
seemed to have arrived at last.
227 See Junker, “Jacob Gould Schurman, die Universität Heidelberg und die deutsch-amerika-
nischen Beziehungen,” 328–358.
228 This time it strove to establish the exchange with the liberal University of Hamburg and 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy; Aufzeichnung, zu VI W 6046, July 18, 1928, PA R 64079.
229 The Foreign Ministry helped the Haus secure a significant part of its library as well as a large 
number of welcome telegrams by prominent Germans. (Heuser) Deutsches Haus Columbia Uni-
versity to AA (Freytag), Oct. 1928; and Erich von Prittwitz u. Gaffron to AA (Terdenge), Jan. 8, 
1929, “Gründung des ‘Deutschen Hauses’ in New York,” PA R 64080.
230 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 4, 1929, “175jährige Jubiläumsfeier der Univer-
sität Columbia in New York,” BArch R8088/147. A similar assessment can be found in Stephen P. 
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Despite these developments, it would be naive to interpret German efforts as 
wholly successful. To be sure, substantial strides had been made compared to 
1919. After 1924, transatlantic academic relations resumed at an astonishing 
pace. Especially where student relations were concerned, the following five 
years created institutional structures that outlasted the twentieth century. While 
most initiatives certainly unfolded without any official involvement, many did 
profit from the new interest that German foreign policymakers and America’s 
cultural internationalists took in international education. As the climate grew 
less poisonous in the late 1920s, transatlantic academic and diplomatic inter-
ests were able to align once more. By that point, inter-Allied academic relations 
had quite clearly become international academic relations again.
It is tempting to see this development as a promising trajectory that could 
have restored German academic prestige and influence had it not been for the 
transatlantic estrangement following 1933. But this was not how German con-
temporaries perceived the situation. Although transatlantic relations had come 
a long way since the war, we must not lose sight of the fact that contemporaries 
measured their successes not against 1919, but 1913. German aspirations – be 
they political, economical, or cultural – aimed at the status quo ante. From this 
perspective, the outcomes of this decade-long effort in international education 
were unsatisfactory to say the least. The global expansion of study abroad in 
the 1920s had largely passed Germany by. Of the 70,000 international students 
worldwide in 1930, only every tenth decided to study in Germany, a number 
hardly commensurate with the reputation German science still enjoyed. And 
while France and the United States registered a steadily rising share of interna-
tional students among their student bodies, in Germany these relative num-
bers kept falling, too.231 Of the 130,000 students at Germany’s universities, only 
7,600, or about 5 percent, hailed from beyond its borders, and of those about 
half were ethnic Germans.232 While more international students had sought 
to study in the German educational system than anywhere else in the world 
in 1900, three decades later, France and the United States had both overtaken 
Germany.
In the United States, in particular, the focal point of Germany’s high hopes 
and efforts, it had not even remotely recovered its prewar position. While ex-
change programs and summer courses brought a significant number of Amer-
icans to German universities, regular enrollment did not keep pace. By 1929 
Duggan, “Der deutsche Einfluss auf die amerikanische Erziehung,” Hochschule und Ausland 9, 
no. 1 (Jan. 1931): 7.
231 Beck, “Ausländerstudium im Ausland und in Deutschland,” 248.
232 Reinhold Schairer, “Ausländische Studenten an deutschen Hochschulen,” in Das Akademis-
che Deutschland III, ed. Doeberl et al., 525–542 (Berlin, 1930), 526.
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only about 260 of America’s more than half a million students were regular 
degree students at German universities (by contrast, 360 of Germany’s 130,000 
students were enrolled at American universities).233 The reservoir of Ameri-
can cultural affinity left over from a generation of German-trained American 
scholars would predictably run dry in the very near future; men like Butler 
or Schurman were already of retirement age, and Germany had not managed 
to produce a new cohort of Germanophile academics to take their place. Pre-
war warnings about the decline of German influence in American education 
seemed to have come true. These developments were readily apparent to con-
temporaries, and, after 1928, sparked concerned debate in the press, university 
halls, and the Reichstag.234 Different political camps agreed that international 
enrollment fell far short of German scientific Weltgeltung and there were many 
calls “that Germany can by no means resign itself to the standstill, if not the 
decline of international students at German universities.”235 The situation was 
deeply frustrating, especially to those most committed to international edu-
cation. By 1930, Reinhold Schairer felt that Germany had fallen so far behind 
other countries and considered “its foreign policy implications” so grave that 
he resigned from the directorship of the International Academic Office.236
The reasons German universities had lost international favor are multifac-
eted and difficult to pinpoint. But even contemporaries realized that placing 
all the blame on the war was only a convenient answer to a more complex and 
partly homemade problem. Some scholars have evoked Germany’s relatively 
strict admissions and equivalency standards to explain this decline, yet this 
was only a minor factor in the American case.237 More important, it seems, was 
the fact that Germans remained vested in the ideal of the Wissenschaft-driven 
degree student instead of refocusing on “cultural students,” who were far 
greater in number. They failed to recognize that, a few exceptions aside, the 
American graduate student no longer had much reason to study in Germany 
while the freedom of the German system did not meet many an undergradu-
ate’s need for college “credit.” The rapid growth of summer courses in the late 
1920s illustrated just how receptive American students were to more flexible, 
culturally oriented German programs.238 Ministerial turf battles also stalled a 
233 Christian Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen. Zur Erfindung der empirischen Sozial-
forschung (Berlin, 2007), 92.
234 Isaac Marcosson, “The New Germany,” Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 16, 1929.
235 Beck, “Ausländerstudium im Ausland und in Deutschland,” 250.
236 Schairer to Prof. Dr. Tillmann, Mar. 4, 1930, BArch 8088/804.
237 For the argument of strict equivalencies as restricting international student numbers, see 
Peter Drewek, “Limits of Educational Internationalism – Foreign Students at German Universi-
ties between 1890 and 1930,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 27 (2000): 39–63.
238 Alexander David Tutt, “Ausländerbetreuung an der Universität Heidelberg, 1928–1938. Das 
Akademische Auslandsamt und die Vergangenheit” (BA Thesis, University of Heidelberg, 2012), 
22.
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more concerted German academic campaign because the Foreign Ministry, 
in particular, was clearly willing to sacrifice short-term expansion for long-
term control.239 But this alone does not fully account for the frustrations many 
Germans felt, particularly with regard to the United States. Here, the failure to 
raise student numbers revealed a deeper and more troubling transformation of 
transatlantic (academic) relations.
*
This can be shown with regard to German efforts to raise the number of Amer-
ican students, especially the hand-picked American exchange students. Appar-
ently, this had been foremost on the agenda of German academic diplomacy 
since 1925. And while the number of American exchange students did increase 
continuously through the 1920s (up to 50 in 1929), Germans always believed 
that a more concerted effort to win additional fellowships for Germans at 
American universities (and then subsequently to increase the fellowships for 
Americans at German universities) could easily raise that number by several 
hundred. These German ambitions, however, were hampered by the institu-
tional cooperations Germany had entered in the United States in the early 
1920s. In particular, Germans felt that their American partner institution, the 
Institute of International Education (IIE), was inefficient. Although Germans 
greatly appreciated the IIE’s director Stephen P. Duggan, who had supported 
Germany soon after the war, the IIE’s staff seemed to lack the competence and 
interest to advertise German universities more forcefully. In fact, managing 
America’s educational relations with foreign countries from Hungary to China, 
the IIE often answered American inquiries about Germany unsatisfactorily 
and, Germans felt, directed U. S. attention to more familiar and better-ad-
vertised French and British universities.240 That France operated its very own 
French Universities Bureau in New York City only heightened Germans’ frus-
tration with the IIE’s apparent priorities. Compared to the skillful efforts of its 
rivals, Adolf Morsbach of the AAD felt, “Germany lack[ed] any opportunity to 
239 This policy was clearly very frustrating for those most interested in the field, like Reinhold 
Schairer, who resigned in March 1930. In a letter to the president of the Hochschulverband, he 
noted, “It is my duty (… again) to point to the world political implications of the problem of in-
ternational student migrations. Other countries are paying ever more heed to these implications 
by ever new measures and programs. Every month that passes increases only the advance these 
countries have over the German measures and programs and makes it ever harder for us to catch 
up. The cultural political and foreign policy impact of these developments are so serious that I 
can no longer stand for them.” Schairer to Prof. Dr. Tillmann, Mar. 4, 1930, BArch 8088/804.
240 Bericht des Oberregierungsrat a. D. Dr. Morsbach über seine Reisen nach Amerika Januar–
Mai 1929; März–Juli 1930, PA R 64236.
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deepen American universities’ strong and steadily rising interest and to guide 
it into the right sort of channels.”241
Morsbach visited the United States twice, in 1929 and 1930, respectively, 
for a 5-month period to resolve this situation. Traveling throughout the United 
States, he sought not only to increase the number of fellowships for German 
students at American universities but also to improve the administration of 
the student exchange in the United States. His plan was twofold: first, to place 
a German secretary at the IIE, then to establish a German University Office 
in New York City to systematically advertise German universities, assist with 
matters of admission and accreditation, and systematically expand student and 
professorial exchanges.242 This office was supposed to be similar to the AAD’s 
bureaus in London (est. 1926) and Paris (est. 1929) in some ways, yet it was to 
operate on a much grander scale befitting the more developed nature of aca-
demic exchanges with the United States. Funded and run exclusively by Berlin, 
this “educational embassy” would pursue German interests in the United States 
more rigorously, while an Anglo-American board of trustees under Duggan 
would shield it from accusations of engaging in “German propaganda.”243
In the end, however, nothing ever came of the plan. Though Duggan ini-
tially supported the idea of appointing a German secretary, the IIE’s trustees 
balked at the idea of setting such an unwelcome precedent for the many other 
nationalities the IIE represented. Germans, in turn, shrank from severing all 
ties with the IIE for fear of alienating Duggan and the Anglo-American sup-
port they needed.244 The outcome of this episode, which effectively stunted 
more forceful academic diplomacy in the United States, revealed the deeper 
contradiction between German and American ambitions. Whereas Germany 
had always treated its transatlantic relations as a lever to advance its interest 
vis-à-vis its European rivals, American cultural internationalists cultivated re-
lations to Germany (alongside relations to a host of other countries) to pacify 
and consolidate Europe. Although they supported German recovery, academic 
or otherwise, they would not do so at the marked expense of other countries. 
In this way – at least this was how Germany began to see it – they effectively 
perpetuated the status quo post bellum.
241 Foreign Ministry to Embassy, Washington, Nov. 18, 1929, Attachment: Morsbach, Abschrift 
zu VI W 9136 (Nov. 1929), PA R 64081.
242 Morsbach to AA, Mar. 5, 1930; and Morsbach, Meine zweite Reise in die Vereinigten Staaten 
Mai bis Juli 1930, PA R 64236; on his personal thoughts and experiences, see Bundesarchiv Ko-
blenz, NL Morsbach, Boxes 11 and 12.
243 Foreign Ministry to Embassy, Washington, Nov. 18, 1929, Attachment: Morsbach, Abschrift 
zu VI W 9136 (Nov 1929), PA R 64081.
244 Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Kuratoriums und der Mitgliederversammlung des Akad-
emischen Austauschdienstes am 24. Februar 1931 in Berlin; this meeting once more reiterated 
the entire development and its major setbacks and defined the founding of an independent Ger-
man University Office in New York as a long-term goal; PA R 64223.
German Universities and the American Century 273
In consequence, by 1930 Germany’s cooperation with U. S. cultural interna-
tionalists had, at least in some respects, outlived its initial usefulness. A major 
asset as long as Germany was devoid of support and influence, by the late 1920s 
it had begun to constrain the country’s larger ambitions. As in transatlantic re-
lations in general, the early 1930s would bring underlying differences to the fore 
as Germany’s demand for peaceful revision began to outpace America’s com-
mitment to peaceful change.245 Ultimately, the situation was part and parcel of 
a larger shift in transatlantic relations, which all appeals to friendship or intel-
lectual gratitude could never entirely mask. There could simply be no return to 
the status quo ante – not politically, economically, or culturally – because the 
war had changed the texture of transatlantic power and shifted it dramatically 
in America’s favor. And for all the support American foundations and universi-
ties provided, they had no desire to restore Germany to its earlier position. On 
the contrary, international student numbers already foreshadowed the coming 
inversion of academic and scientific fortune that both American and German 
observers – hidden behind almost ritualistic expressions of intellectual grati-
tude on the one side and cultural arrogance on the other – were growing more 
and more aware of.246 As Charles Thwing, the former president of Western 
Reserve University, concluded in a 1928 study, Germany’s dominant influence 
in education had passed irrevocably, but science and learning, now carried by 
other countries (not least the United States), would “go forward and upward.” 
247 As the German century in education was drawing to a close, the American 
century was just beginning.
245 Heinrich Schnee and Hans Draeger, eds., Zehn Jahre Versailles (Berlin, 1929), 1:viii.
246 As Ludwig Stein of the Vossische Zeitung had written already in 1924: “We have to get used 
to reminting our academic coins. In academic things, too, we will have to relinquish some of 
German leadership to maiden America. Especially the hard sciences, which rely on laboratories 
and observatories, and demand enormous funds, will with time emigrate from the old world to 
the new. […] The American universities are beginning to export technology, science and art to 
the old world”; Clipping: Ludwig Stein. “Amerikanische Universitäten” (1924) Nicholas Murray 
Butler Papers, Box 394/Stein, Ludwig, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library 
Collections; also Prof. Fuelleborn, “Der Wiederaufbau und die deutsche Wissenschaft,” Beilage 
zu den Mitteilungen des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen (ca. 1924): 15.
247 See Charles Franklin Thwing, The American and the German University: One Hundred Years 
of History (New York, 1928), 228.

Chapter 6 
“Germany Invites You!”: Tourism Promotion as 
Public Diplomacy
“You didn’t go to Berlin? Why everybody goes to Berlin now. Only tourists go to Paris any 
more.” The returning vacationists speak thus enthusiastically of the new Welthauptstadt. Gayer, 
brighter, faster, more cosmopolitan and cheaper – Berlin, the throbbing city an der Spree has 
suddenly supplanted Paris in the affection of the Americans.1
These words from a 1931 article in Vanity Fair praised Berlin – and Ger-many more generally – as the new European darling of America’s trav-eling upper crust. The piece is emblematic of a large number of articles 
in American society and travel magazines in the late 1920s and early 1930s that 
described Germany’s growing popularity among America’s traveling and trav-
el-minded public. Few would have been able to predict this development a dec-
ade earlier. After the war, the idea of vacationing in Germany would have ap-
peared quite absurd to many of Vanity Fair’s readers. Ten years later, however, 
the picture had changed dramatically. While Germany was establishing itself as 
America’s “junior partner” in Europe, it had also re-emerged as a major tourist 
destination. But how did this happen? And was there a connection between the 
broader transatlantic rapprochement and Germany’s rehabilitation as a tourist 
destination?
This chapter will focus on one aspect of German-American relations that 
has received scant scholarly attention thus far: transatlantic travel. It will trace 
Weimar’s efforts to promote Germany as a travel destination in the United 
States and try to assess whether and how increased transatlantic travel affected 
Germany’s image in the 1920s. Tourism promotion, the chapter will show, of-
ten doubled as public diplomacy, and by the end of the decade was seen as a 
legitimate instrument of Weimar foreign policy. While previous chapters have 
highlighted two fields with a relatively long tradition in German Amerikapoli-
tik – ethnic politics and academic diplomacy – the “management” of American 
1 “Berlin – A French Artist looks at a rival capital,” Vanity Fair (Sep. 1931).
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tourism was genuinely new to the 1920s. In the decade after World War I, a field 
that had long remained outside of foreign policy considerations turned into 
an increasingly accepted and, indeed, central image-building tool. Advancing 
chronologically, the chapter explores why Germans came to identify tourism as 
a potential foreign policy tool, how they tried to attract American tourists to 
Germany, and, at least tentatively, it suggests what effects this had on transat-
lantic relations. As it turns out, Germany’s popularity was neither as “sudden” 
as Vanity Fair would have it, nor was it entirely devoid of state calculation.
“A Country Worth Knowing – Despite It All!” : 
Tourism Promotion and Public Diplomacy in the Wake of Versailles, 1919–1921
Whatever isolationism existed in America in the 1920s was not evident in 
American travel patterns. The 1920s became the first era of American mass 
tourism, and Europe was its major overseas destination. Between 1924 and 
1930, the number of Americans crossing the Atlantic annually doubled.2 By the 
end of the decade, it had reached 300,000 – a volume not reached again un-
til the 1950s. This increase continued a long-standing trend. Tourist numbers 
had risen steadily throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, but after 
World War I new leisure and consumption patterns propelled these numbers 
further upward. The increasing commodification of travel through package 
tours, traveler’s checks, and travel bureaus and the heightened speed and safety 
of transatlantic voyages made European trips ever more convenient. Ameri-
can postwar affluence gave greater numbers of white-collar workers access to 
paid vacations and raised disposable incomes at the same time that favorable 
exchange rates rendered Europe more affordable. After the introduction of 
“Tourist Third Class” on transatlantic liners in 1923, round-trip fares went for 
as little as $180 (at a time when the average American earned $1303 a year), 
making a journey to Europe more accessible to members of America’s bur-
geoning middle classes in search of adventure and cultural distinction.3 These 
individuals joined recent immigrants to America reuniting with their families, 
affluent Americans returning to vacationing “normalcy,” and businessmen get-
2 U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Oversea Travel 
and Travel Expenditures in the Balance of International Payments of the United States, 1919–38. 
(Washington, 1939).
3 For the average income of an American, see https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/
roaring-twenties/resources/american-economy-during-1920s; of course, a transatlantic journey 
remained expensive: by comparison a Model T at the same time cost $280. On Tourist Third, see 
“The White Collar Goes Abroad,” American Review of Reviews (Apr. 1929): 145–146. Popular 
travel books offered to take Americans through Europe on just two dollars a day; see Frank 
Schoonmaker, Through Europe on Two Dollars a Day (New York, 1927).
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ting back into the European market.4 As the United States officially withdrew 
from Europe after the Great War, the “great tourist invasion” began.5
From the first, the German tourist trade was determined to profit eco-
nomically and politically from this “invasion.” Tourism promoters agreed that 
Americans, who had made up a rising share of visitors to Germany before the 
war, needed to come and spend their dollars in the Reich once more. Dur-
ing the war, rationing measures, the general shortage of transportation, special 
taxes, and patriotic self-restraint had weighed heavily on the German tour-
ist industry, while the postwar impoverishment of the German middle classes 
left little hope for a swift recovery. The North German Lloyd (Norddeutscher 
Lloyd, NDL) and the HAPAG, previously the largest shipping lines in the 
world, had lost almost their entire fleets in the peace treaty and were struggling 
to rebuild transatlantic business at a time of ailing commerce and (after the 
introduction of American immigration quotas) flagging business from emi-
grants. In this situation, the prosperous American tourist seemed a solution to 
the woes of the German tourist trade, as Hugo Stangen (“the German Thomas 
Cook”) summed up in a memorandum shortly after the war:
in the United States in particular, we have yet to develop an appropriate propaganda to 
rekindle the interest of the American traveling public in Germany, an interest that previ-
ously was so very great. American tourists in particular were an important factor in our 
travel business before the war, and for the hotel business were at times of nearly indispen-
sable importance; to win them back has to be our keenest desire.6
These salient commercial agendas dovetailed with larger national interests. 
Winning back the American tourist, the German tourist industry argued, 
would also serve Germany’s foreign policy needs. As early as February 1919, the 
League of German Tourism Associations (Bund deutscher Verkehrsvereine, 
est. 1902), the largest German tourist body, had submitted a strategy paper to 
the Foreign Ministry, underlining tourism promotion as a valuable comple-
ment to Germany’s political and economic propaganda.7 By presenting a co-
herent and attractive national image, tourism promotion could not only draw 
tourists once more but overcome German isolation. While this insistence on 
the foreign policy benefits of tourism primarily aimed to elicit financial sup-
port from German ministries, it still had a point. Exposure to German cul-
4 Between 1920 and 1922, American travel numbers rose proportionally to a greater extent than 
thereafter; U. S. Department of Commerce, Oversea Travel and Travel Expenditures, 20.
5 Daniel Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York, 1962), 90.
6 Hugo Stangen was a long-time director of Stangen’s travel agency, which became the travel 
agency of the HAPAG after 1905; Hugo Stangen, “Die Wiederherstellung des Fremdenverkehrs 
nach dem Kriege,” 9, BArch R5/6481.
7 Bund deutscher Verkehrsvereine to AA, Feb. 10, 1919, “Vorschläge für die Zusammenarbeit 
des Auswärtigen Amtes mit dem Bund Deutscher Verkehrs-Vereine,” BArch R 901/801.
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ture and lifestyles, to Germany’s hardworking, hospitable, and clean people, 
it was hoped, would engender a more nuanced understanding of its postwar 
situation, eradicate misperceptions, and cast doubt on the veracity of wartime 
atrocity stories. As Maximillian Kraus, the publicity director of the German 
Tourism Promotion Bureau (Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung, 
RDV, est. 1920), noted in 1921:
if we could with one stroke guide 100,000 educated and attentive foreigners through our 
Germany, show them our people at work, invite them from time to time to a friendly 
and contemplative stay, and if they then were to return home with lively memories, with 
memories of a country that looks so completely different than Northcliffe [Britain’s chief 
propagandist] made it look, we could, through this process, do more for the revision of 
Versailles than all the diplomats in the world.8
The obstacles, however, appeared formidable. Regular passports to Germany 
were not even issued until November 1919, and, thereafter, rationing measures, 
economic chaos, and social upheaval made for less than ideal touring condi-
tions. Besides, many Americans balked at the idea of taking a German ship, 
let alone vacationing among the erstwhile enemy, especially as long as the two 
countries were not yet officially at peace. European competition for American 
tourists, moreover, would be stiff, and German tourist bodies had no doubt 
that other countries would seize on postwar US sentiment to crowd Germany 
out of the market. As the German Hotel League informed the Foreign Ministry 
a few months after the armistice: “our enemies [plan] to cut Germany off from 
world travel” and “annihilate” the German tourist trade.9 If Germany were to 
profit from the American tourist invasion at all, whether economically or polit-
ically, its tourist trade would have to adopt decisive countermeasures.
The German tourist trade’s lobby efforts to this end were partly successful. 
While substantial state subsidies – such as those received by the French Of-
fice National du Tourisme (est. 1910) – never materialized, longer-standing de-
mands for a national tourism body were finally heeded. On February 20, 1920, 
the German Tourism Promotion Bureau (Reichszentrale für Deutsche Ver-
kehrswerbung, RDV) was founded at an interministerial conference. Though 
officially under the auspices of the German Ministry of Transportation, the 
RDV brought together federal and state ministries, the Foreign Ministry among 
8 Maximilian Kraus, Die zukünftigen Aufgaben der deutschen Verkehrswerbung im In- und Aus-
lande (Berlin: RDV, 1921), 10.
9 French spas, the German Hotel League noted, were trying to replace the superior international 
position of German “world spas,” which had generated revenues of 800 million marks before the 
war; Verband der Hotelbesitzervereins Deutschlands to AA, Mar. 13, 1919, “Wiederaufrichtung 
des Fremdenverkehrs,” BArch R 901/801. This observation was well-founded: see Harvey Leven-
stein, Seductive Journey: American Tourists in France from Jefferson to the Jazz Age (Chicago, 
1998), 217.
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them, and a wide array of interest groups including the German Municipal 
League (Städtetag), the League of German Spas (Deutscher Bäderverband), the 
German Railways (Reichsbahn), the shipping lines, and regional tourist associ-
ations.10 By pooling the resources of all interested parties, it hoped to initiate a 
concerted campaign to “sell” Germany abroad.11
Circumstances indicate that the Foreign Ministry broadly agreed with the 
economic and political desirability of international tourism. It was a founding 
member of the RDV, made modest annual contributions, and distributed some 
of the RDV’s promotional materials abroad.12 But its involvement ended there. 
It clearly had neither the funds nor the intention to subsidize the economic 
self-interest of hotels, spas, and shipping lines, and there is little to suggest that 
it developed a more comprehensive understanding of tourism’s role in German 
foreign affairs. Although the Wilhelmstrasse briefly contemplated establishing 
a tourism desk in 1919, it did not do so; moreover, it was represented on the 
RDV’s board only by the politically marginal passport division. Of course, such 
unprecedented official involvement did not appear necessary at first because 
it seemed likely that transatlantic travel, driven as it was by salient business 
interests, would normalize by itself. Subscribing to a classic understanding 
of diplomacy as “high politics,” Germany’s traditionalist foreign service only 
slowly took on responsibility for allegedly mundane aspects of modern life like 
tourism. It was only during the early 1920s that its benign disinterest gave way 
to more substantial engagement with matters of tourism.
While the immediate reason for this shift will be discussed below, we must 
keep two overarching factors in mind that played an important role in this 
process throughout the 1920s. The first was French competition. In the imme-
diate postwar years, France emerged as Germany’s main rival for American 
diplomatic support and capital; the ensuing “Franco-German struggle for the 
affections of Americans” that Robert Young observed played out in the field 
of tourism.13 As in other fields of competition, France enjoyed a highly ad-
vantageous position. Not only had it long been America’s favorite overseas 
destination, but its promotional efforts were far better organized. Almost as 
soon as the war was over, the Office National du Tourisme, alongside French 
companies and tourist associations, began to convert America’s wartime sym-
pathies into tourist revenue and political capital at Germany’s economic and 
10 Reichszentrale für deutsche Verkehrswerbung to AA, Mar. 14, 1924, PA R 121352.
11 Christine Keitz, Reisen als Leitbild. Die Entstehung des modernen Massentourismus in 
Deutschland (Munich, 1997), 59–60.
12 Note (Sievers), Mar. 1919, BArch R 901/801; for examples of cooperation, see RDV to AA, 
Sep. 15, 1921, PA R 65088; Reichszentrale für deutsche Verkehrswerbung to AA, Mar. 14, 1924, 
PA R 121352.
13 Young, Marketing Marianne, xviii.
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political expense.14 Trips to the battlefields and the destroyed provinces (the 
major tourist attraction of the interwar years) provided a particularly powerful 
instrument for perpetuating anti-German sentiment. By mid-1919, the Guide 
Michelin had already published a three-volume battlefield guidebook devoted 
to “Americans in the Great War,” and Thomas Cook & Son offered near daily 
outings to the major sites of destruction, which were generally presented as 
proof of “Teutonic aggression.”15 The German embassy in Paris lamented that 
American visitors were not only showered with attention in Paris but were 
also “invariably” taken to the battlefields.16 The scenes of destruction they en-
countered often had a pronounced impact.17 Prominent American travel writer 
Clara Laughlin, for instance, left the devastated regions with a feeling of admi-
ration for the French and a “black blinding rage against the barbarism of the 
bestial invaders.” “We came back,” she recounted in a letter, “feeling that there 
is but one transcendent virtue … killing Germans! Ridding the world of their 
noxious presence.”18 In part, the strong French bid for American tourists and 
the political implications thereof pushed the Foreign Ministry into taking a 
more active interest in this question.
Two other closely connected factors also came to suggest tourism promo-
tion as a suitable public diplomacy instrument. First, the American traveling 
public belonged qua wealth or social position to just the kind of opinion-shap-
ing segment Germany was most eagerly and often unsuccessfully trying to 
reach. The fact that transatlantic travel became accessible to larger parts of 
American society in the 1920s did not fundamentally alter the exclusive na-
ture of transatlantic tourism. Although contemporaries vocally bemoaned 
the social decline (or hailed the democratization) of transatlantic travel, a trip 
14 Patrick Young, “‘A Place Like Any Other?’: Publicity, Hotels and the Search for a French Path 
to Tourism,” in Touring Beyond the Nation: A Transnational Approach to European Tourism His-
tory, ed. Eric Zuelow, 127–149 (London, 2011), 137. By the end of the war, more than two mil-
lion American soldiers had been stationed in France, and though their presence had aroused ill 
feelings on both sides, it had once more whetted American tastes for France as a touring destina-
tion. As American troops waited to return across the Atlantic, their strong presence in France 
sowed seeds of discord. American drunkenness, French lack of hygiene, and price-gouging came 
under increased scrutiny in this long waiting period. Many American doughboys came away 
from France with unfavorable attitudes – and certainly did not leave a stellar impression on their 
hosts, either. Officers stationed in Paris, especially found that their stay had reaffirmed the no-
tion that Paris, indeed, was the ‘pleasure capital of the world’; Levenstein, Seductive Journey, 
217 ff..
15 “The world must see what the German did,” was how one newspaper article explained why 
American visitors had to see the battlefields; quoted in Levenstein, Seductive Journey, 225.
16 German Embassy, Paris, to AA, Aug. 19, 1924, PA R 60447; Karl Remme and Margarete Esch, 
Die Französische Kulturpropaganda. Auf der Grundlage französischen Quellenmaterials und eige-
ner Beobachtungen im Ausland (Berlin, 1927), 5.
17 See, for example, Hughes Black, “Peace and Pessimism,” The Atlantic Monthly (Feb. 1921): 
261–267.
18 Cited in Levenstein, Seductive Journey, 228.
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to Europe was never readily available to the vast majority of Americans with 
middling incomes. Even at the interwar height of transatlantic travel, only a 
little more than 0.2 percent of the American population traveled to Europe.19 
Rather than making transatlantic travel available to most Americans, the in-
terwar period gave the educated middle classes access to what formerly had 
been the privilege of America’s moneyed elite. College professors and teachers, 
the editors of small-town journals and newspapers, church, professional, and 
women’s groups all discovered Europe in the 1920s. While these groups were 
less affluent than prewar tourists, they were people of local prominence and 
likely–perhaps more likely even–to communicate their experiences through 
church journals, regional newspapers, or school and college events. Even if 
they did not constitute America’s upper crust, they were undoubtedly valuable 
multipliers with an impact on American public opinion.
Tourism, moreover–and this would become successively clearer–provided 
access to an American society that was otherwise growing weary and suspi-
cious of Europe. While Europe’s economic and political situation might meet 
with only limited interest, travel books, travel talks, and travel magazines found 
a rapidly growing American audience.20 Tourism promotion, moreover, was 
able to develop in the United States without encountering strong opposition. 
Although fears of allegedly ubiquitous “German propaganda” hampered most 
German efforts at public diplomacy, Americans generally considered tourism 
advertising an unobjectionable business proposition.21 As Maximilian Kraus, 
the RDV’s publicity director, laid out in a programmatic speech of 1921, “espe-
cially tourism promotion abroad can, in the least conspicuous way, say what 
has to be said in the near future, and said again and again, namely: that Ger-
many is a country of ancient Kultur that is worth knowing – despite it all!”22 It 
was in the unpolitical field of travel that influential Americans – otherwise so 
disinterested in European affairs – could be won for Germany.
Alongside these overarching considerations, the experience of the early 
1920s imbued tourism promotion with a larger, political meaning. Indeed, de-
spite prominent postwar plans, broader tourism advertising did not commence 
until the mid-1920s. The conditions of inflation, as we have already seen in 
Chapter 3, were conducive neither to organized promotion of tourism nor to 
more hospitable treatment of American visitors. Rising consumer prices and 
fears of a “sell-out” (Ausverkauf) of Germany induced restrictive customs reg-
ulations, extra taxes, and dual price scales that resulted in a wave of unfavora-
19 There were 280,000 American tourists to Europe in 1930 out of a population of 123 million.
20 On the rise of the travel magazine and travel advertising, see Richard K. Popp, The Holiday 
Makers: Magazines, Advertising and Mass Tourism (Baton Rouge, LA, 2012).
21 Bund deutscher Verkehrsvereine to AA, Feb. 10, 1919, “Vorschläge für die Zusammenarbeit 
des Auswärtigen Amtes mit dem Bund Deutscher Verkehrs-Vereine,” BArch R 901/801.
22 Kraus, Die zukünftigen Aufgaben der deutschen Verkehrswerbung im In- und Auslande, 14.
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ble American newspaper reporting about German extortion and harassment. 
Rather than improving the German image, American tourism in the early 
1920s largely reinforced negative stereotypes. The onset of hyperinflation only 
made matters worse. In February 1923, the U. S. Department of State issued an 
official warning about German practices, and by June 1923, it advised against 
visits to Germany altogether – advice that American tourists mostly heeded.23 
Germany, the New York Times drily remarked in June 1923, had killed “her 
Golden Goose.”24 Inflation, in short, provided neither the psychological nor 
the financial foundations to enable German diplomats to successfully utilize 
tourism.
However, it was precisely this situation that helped transform German for-
eign policymakers’ notions about American travel. As Germany’s treatment of 
American tourists soured transatlantic relations and undermined talks on rep-
arations, the Foreign Ministry decided it needed to become more actively in-
volved in the field. Beginning in 1922, it reprimanded customs officials, coaxed 
local and regional tourist bodies to abandon extra fees, and convinced them 
to publicly condemn discriminatory practices.25 Although every new burst 
of inflation immediately reversed all painstakingly negotiated improvements, 
the postwar years transformed the very idea of the American tourist. Because 
tourist experiences had such detrimental repercussions on American pub-
lished opinion, German officials began to recognize the American tourist as 
a unique asset whose personal impressions informed American opinion more 
than any German propaganda ever could. By 1923, they had become convinced 
that they needed to facilitate American travel by any and all means.26 “It is the 
aim of the Entente,” Ambassador Wiedfeldt summed up in early 1923, “to keep 
[American] travelers from Germany, because most of those that return are no 
longer friends of the Entente. For this political reason, we should do everything 
23 From February 1923, the U. S. Department of State attached a note to the passport applica-
tions of potential travelers to Germany, which informed them “that travelers to Germany are 
subjected in many cases to especially high charges by hotels, theatres, shops etc, and that at 
Frankfort they are subjected to a visitor’s tax of from 15–40 percent of the price charged Ger-
mans from rooms in hotels and inns.” Department of State, Division of Passport Control, Con-
cerning the Use of Passports, Feb. 21, 1923, BArch R 901/25905.
24 See T. R. Ybarra, “Germany Kills Her Golden Goose: Dismay in the Fatherland Because the 
Postwar Grouch Has Driven Away American Travel,” New York Times, June 10, 1923, SM 5.
25 Circular, AA to foreign missions, July 31, 1922, BArch R 901/25904.
26 German Embassy, Washington, to Consulate General, San Francisco, Mar. 29, 1923, Attach-
ment: AA, V Pa 1330/2590 Mar. 31, 1923, PA Botschaft Washington, 1493. See, for example, the 
entire series of reports by Frank C. Carpenter presented in his Carpenter’s World Travels during 
1923. Spending weeks in Germany, he detailed conditions as he saw them, concluding, “there is 
one truth, however, that stands out like a boil on one’s nose and this is that these Germans are in 
a terrible condition. A very few of the people may be making money, but tens of millions have 
lost every cent of their savings, millions have not enough to buy a scrap of new clothing, and 
hundreds of thousands in every district are practically on the edge of starvation”; see Carpenter, 
“The Truth about Germany,” Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1923, XI 6.
Marketing Germany in the United States, 1924–1930 283
in our power to attract foreigners.”27 During 1922/23, American officials’ con-
stant complaints, the notable impact on American published opinion, and 
the admonitions of the otherwise propaganda-averse German ambassador in 
Washington went a long way toward establishing tourism as a legitimate field 
for state monitoring and intervention. By the mid-1920s, the Foreign Ministry’s 
benign disinterest of 1920 had given way to manifest involvement. From this 
time onward, it saw American tourism as a field of foreign relations in dire 
need of tighter official “management” once conditions allowed.
Marketing Germany in the United States, 1924–1930
This was increasingly the case after mid-1924. Once the German currency 
had been stabilized, Germany was ready and able to launch a concerted effort 
to promote tourism. But in a striking reversal of its earlier role, the Foreign 
Ministry now took the lead.28 Within just a year, it had removed most of the 
bureaucratic hurdles that war and inflation had created, particularly wherever 
they pertained to coveted American visitors.29 Border searches were aban-
doned, customs formalities and visa applications simplified, and cumbersome 
foreigner registrations transferred from police stations to hotel desks. Visa fees 
were first substantially reduced and soon discarded altogether. These deter-
mined steps, widely publicized at the time,30 illustrated that the Foreign Min-
istry had come to a more comprehensive understanding of American tourists’ 
role in restoring transatlantic contact, trust, and cooperation. As the Foreign 
Ministry’s Press Department declared programmatically in October 1924, “all 
questions pertaining to tourism promotion have more or less the character of 
foreign policy.”31
Importantly, too, these official German efforts tied in with the ideas of 
American officials and reformers who encouraged American tourism to Eu-
rope as an informal aid and goodwill program. Herbert Hoover’s Department 
of Commerce realized even before the Europeans did that the hundreds of 
27 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 11, 1923, “Fremdenbesteuerung in Deutschland,” 
PA Botschaft Washington 1493. A few months later the German embassy in Paris concurred: 
“almost in all cases, where an Englishman or an American has traveled to Germany and received 
opportunity to get to know conditions in Germany as they really are, we have won friends … 
[these visitors] return home with a friendly attitude toward Germany and anti-French.” Letter 
Dufour-Feronce, Dec. 19, 1923, quoted in Müller, Auswärtige Pressepolitik, 98.
28 Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Verwaltungsrats der Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehr-
swerbung, Feb. 15, 1924, BArch R 901/25905.
29 See, for example, Reichskanzler to Ambassador Houghton, Apr. 1925, PA R 246958.
30 Consulate General, New York, to AA, Mar. 24, 1924, PA R 121327; Stresemann to Reichsver-
band der deutschen Hotels, Restaurants und verwandter Betriebe e. V., July 1925, BArch R 
901/25656.
31 Aufzeichnung, Oct. 25, 1924, PA R 121262.
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millions of dollars American tourists spent overseas each summer were cru-
cial to transatlantic financial flows and allowed Americans to pacify Europe – 
and solve its balance-of-payments problem – without lowering tariffs.32 In 
France, for instance, the $137 million American tourists spent in 1929 went a 
long way toward paying French debt interest. While travel to Germany was less 
fiscally vital, it nevertheless promised, as the U. S. government put it, a “nor-
mal resumption of relations” between the two countries.33 Indeed, much of 
American public debate linked international travel to the cause of peace, with 
travel promoters and internationalists alike depicting it as the surest path to 
international understanding.34 In mid-1924, the Department of State removed 
the official warning about travel to Germany from passport applications, and 
American ambassadors to Germany repeatedly championed transatlantic tour-
ism.35 In early 1925, U. S. Ambassador Alanson B. Houghton, for example, ex-
pressed his hope that Americans might once more visit Germany to “realize for 
themselves what a hearty, generous welcome awaits them at the hands of the 
German people.”36
Even with American support, however, re-establishing Germany as a tour-
ist destination would prove no easy feat. Rumors about the nation’s hostile 
treatment of foreigners and price-gouging practices subsided only slowly and 
were often, German officials believed, kept alive by political and commercial 
rivals.37 And while the currency stabilization created a more favorable psy-
chological climate for welcoming foreigners, it also made Germany a relatively 
expensive travel destination.38 For the first time since the war, Germany had 
to compete under normal market conditions – a situation for which it was not 
particularly well prepared. Not only had the conditions of the postwar years 
stunted more comprehensive promotional efforts, but by 1924, the consider-
able rivalry between German cities, spas, and regions had also impeded joint 
action. Instead of banding together to advertise in the quality and quantity 
the American market demanded, individual hotels and spas liked to take out 
32 For an exceptional account of the economic and political role of the American tourist, see 
Hiram Motherwell, “The American Tourist Makes History,” Harper’s Magazine (Dec. 1929): 70–
76.
33 Quoted in Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 173.
34 “The Tourist Season Begins,” Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1928, 18.
35 Statement Wiedfeldt, K. Nr. 581, June 16, 1924, BArch R 901/25905.
36 T. R. Ybarra, “Houghton Praises New German Envoy,” New York Times, Jan. 30, 1925, 4.
37 Circular AA to German missions in the United States, June 30, 1924, BArch R 901/25905. 
Travel bureaus in the American West, the German Consul General in New York reported, still 
advised against a trip to Germany as “unsafe and partly dangerous.” See Consulate General, New 
York, to AA, Mar. 24, 1924, PA R 121327.
38 “Foreigners Shun German High Prices,” New York Times, Aug. 6, 1924, 14; Report Wiedfeldt, 
Mar. 1924, “Reisen von Amerika nach Deutschland”; BArch R 901/25905.
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(naturally smaller and less widely circulated) advertisements of their own.39 
The result was a considerable lapse in tourist numbers.40 By 1924 only 40,000 
Americans visited Germany.
Thus, German officials and tourist boosters would have to complement the 
removal of inconveniences – that is, passive tourism promotion – with an ac-
tive advertising campaign. Following Ambassador Wiedfeldt’s lead, the Foreign 
Ministry impressed German tourist bodies with the need to raise the number 
of American visitors and join in a coordinated push for their hearts, minds, 
and pocketbooks.41 In particular, it urged them to follow the French and Swiss 
example by adopting more sophisticated American marketing techniques and 
establishing a promotional office in America’s business and advertising capital, 
New York City. At least in the case of the German Tourism Promotion Bureau 
(RDV) these suggestions fell on fertile ground: eight months later, it opened 
its first overseas bureau, the German Tourist Information Office, in New York 
City.
The German Tourist Information Office in New York
The opening of the German Tourist Information Office (GTIO) on June 16, 
1925, heralded a second and considerably more productive phase of German 
tourism promotion. Located in beautiful rooms on New York’s Fifth Avenue – 
close to major travel agencies – its main mandate was to advertise an attractive 
image of Germany that would draw Americans to the fatherland once more. 
This task was far from easy. Though anti-German sentiment was clearly on the 
wane by 1925, Germany had only a rudimentary advertising infrastructure. 
Unlike France, for example, it had never operated a tourist office in the United 
States before and had made few inroads since the war as a travel destination. 
In the summer of 1925, Bennett’s Tours, one of America’s largest travel compa-
nies, offered 24 package tours to Europe, but only 3 of them toured Germany 
whereas all of them toured France.42 In travel and society magazines, Germany 
39 As long as such “shortsighted parochialism” prevailed, Ambassador Wiedfeldt concluded in 
August 1924, there would be no use complaining about a lack of American tourists. Wiedfeldt, 
Aug. 1924, “Reklame zur Hebung des deutschen Reiseverkehrs,” BArch R 901/25905.
40 As late as March 1924, the North German Lloyd reported that some of its ships were only 
25 % booked for the coming travel season; North German Lloyd to AA, Mar. 10, 1924, PA R 
121327.
41 III A 1393, Circular, Oct. 15, 1924, PA R 246898.
42 See the advertisement in Journeys Beautiful (May 1925); Bennett’s did, however, offer two 
extension tours to Germany; Cook’s tours was very similar; for the entire early 1920s they scru-
pulously avoided the word “German” in their advertisements. While they did go to “Oberam-
mergau (Bavaria)” and “the Rhine,” Germany was not mentioned in any advertisements until 
December 1922; even by 1924 only 1 in 30 of Cook’s tours visited Germany; by 1925, however, 
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was a nonentity. As late as March 1927, three elite magazines important to travel 
promotion (Spur, Vogue and Harper’s Bazaar) featured 117 international hotel 
advertisements, of which 61 were Italian, 32 French, 24 Swiss, and 3 German. 
To make matters worse, these three were directly translated from German and 
had little appeal to the marketing-savvy American tourist-consumer. The last 
comprehensive travel guidebook on Germany had appeared in 1912, placing 
Germany behind Tibet, Siam and Persia in terms of available travel literature.43 
As a modern travel destination, well-known travel writer Medill McBride con-
cluded, Germany was almost terra incognita to the American tourist.44
Fig . 12: Interior of the German Tourist Information Office in New York City, ca . 1931, NARA RG 
131/65, Folder 131-GR-273 Window Displays
Nevertheless, the prospects for systematic tourism promotion in the United 
States were not altogether discouraging. The Dawes reparations settlement 
about 50 % did; see the advertisements in The American Traveller’s Gazette: An Illustrated Journal 
Devoted to Travel (published monthly by Thos. Cook & Son in New York from 1920 to 1925).
43 RDV, Werbemaßnahmen der Reichsbahnzentrale für den Deutschen Reiseverkehr. Januar bis 
September 1928, 17, Entry UD 338, Printed Material Concerning German Technology Seized 
from the German Railroad Information Office, 1927–41, Box 3, Folder: Industry and Technol-
ogy: General.
44 Robert McBride, Towns and People of Modern Germany (New York, 1927), vii.
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(1924), the Locarno Treaties (1925) and Germany’s admission to the League 
of Nations (1926) readied many Americans for a return to transatlantic nor-
malcy. Not strong antipathy but a lack of information, the GTIO concluded, 
was keeping Americans from visiting Germany. A skillful marketing campaign 
thus stood some chance of success. In this regard, Ernst Schmitz, the found-
ing director of the New York office, was German tourism’s single greatest asset 
in the United States. As the former Berlin correspondent of the New Yorker 
Staatszeitung, the most prestigious German-language newspaper in the United 
States, Schmitz had an equally excellent command of English and German and 
a sound grasp of American psychology, unlike most German contemporaries. 
As a newspaperman, he also understood the tenets of the American advertis-
ing business and embraced his role as an advertiser. Schmitz was a member of 
various professional advertising organizations and advocated the adoption of 
modern marketing techniques tailored to the mentality and predilections of 
American audiences.45 Indeed, Schmitz proved to be so skillful (and ideolog-
ically flexible) in his publicity work that he retained his New York post until 
June 1941, when the Roosevelt administration shut down all German propa-
ganda offices in America.46
Beginning in 1925, the GTIO’s concerted campaign reintroduced Germany 
to the American travel market with astonishing swiftness. Over the following 
years, it systematically created suitable promotional materials, developed a 
widespread distribution network in the United States, and built up up-to-date 
travel literature on Germany by subsidizing, covertly hiring, or simply inviting 
American travel writers to enjoy lavish trips there. One can gauge the extent of 
the GTIO’s promotional work from the example of the 1928 season:47 in the first 
nine months of that year, the New York office distributed 200,000 of its own 
German Guide Books, 160,000 booklets by German spas, hotel, and cities, and 
gave away more than 42,000 leaflets and 6,000 posters. It placed more than 241 
English-language and 297 German-language articles in American print media 
and provided publications with more than 1,100 images. Its almost daily news 
releases resulted in at least 1,416 English-language and 333 German-language 
news items. A staggered advertising campaign in 45 upper-class magazines, 30 
daily papers, and 100 German-language publications encouraged Americans to 
visit Germany. A new travel film on Germany was shown in American movie 
45 On Schmitz’s memberships, see NARA Entry# UD 336, General Administrative Records 
Seized from the GTIO 1926–41, Box 2, Folder 1.
46 This occurred due to repeated congressional investigations of the Tourism Office as a part of 
the German propaganda infrastructure in the United States. When the offices were closed, their 
records were seized by the United States. Together with the records of a number of other German 
and German-American bodies, they are today part of the Records of the Office of Alien Property 
at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
47 See RDV, Werbemaßnahmen der Reichsbahnzentrale für den Deutschen Reiseverkehr. Januar 
bis September 1928.
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theaters, and, in the run-up to the travel season, almost 40 American travel 
agencies highlighted Germany in their window displays (which included, for 
example, large-scale reproductions of Neuschwanstein Castle). An agreement 
between the GTIO and Thomas Cook & Son made sure that 61 of its 76 pack-
age tours to Europe that summer included Germany. Meanwhile, reputable 
travel speaker John Bucher (hired by the German embassy) portrayed Ger-
many to 30,000 Americans in some 40 cities, and revered travel writer E. M. 
Newman had just – following a contract with the RDV – traveled the Reich in 
preparation for a new book on Germany to be published by the prestigious and 
reputedly still anti-German publishing house of Funk & Wagnalls. In fact, the 
postwar travel literature on Germany grew from zero books in 1925 to more 
than a dozen just five years later. By tapping into the entire marketing reper-
toire of its time, the GTIO successfully re-established a German presence in 
American journals, newspapers, package tours, bookstores, radio broadcasts, 
lecture halls, and movie theaters across the country.
Fig . 13: Window Display of Neuschwanstein Castle at Whitcomb Travel Agency in New York, 
NARA, RG 131, Box 65, Folder 131-GR-273, Window Displays
The GTIO owed its success to a number of factors. First, Schmitz understood 
the workings of the American travel market. He recognized that effective pro-
motion depended on the support of American travel agencies, which gladly 
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accepted well-designed and informative promotional materials from an ad-
vertising bureau but would have rejected them from a commercial rival. This 
was why the GTIO always remained purely a promotional office, despite the 
obvious commercial interests involved. All its materials were free of charge, 
and, as Schmitz once put it, there was nothing at all for sale at its office. The 
second, equally important precondition was its willingness to adopt sophis-
ticated American marketing practices. The GTIO readily embraced concepts 
of market research, target audiences, and consumer psychology that were al-
ready entrenched in the American market but only just beginning to gain a 
foothold in Europe.48 Within a year of embarking on its transatlantic activity, 
for example, the GTIO no longer distributed materials that were created indis-
criminately for the entire English-speaking world but catered to predilections 
and cultural understandings believed to be distinctly American. As a result, 
brochures began to feature catchy slogans, avoid unnecessary detail, include 
brilliant images, and explain the German land and people in ways deemed in-
telligible to Americans. The 1931 brochure Germany – Visit the Heart of Europe 
is a case in point. Designed and written solely for the U. S. market, it explained 
Germany’s size and geography in terms of American states (“Germany is about 
the size of California”), illustrated Germany’s beauty using quotes from well-
known American authors (Mark Twain, Walt Whitman), and highlighted 
the famous Americans who had once attended various German universities 
to point to their renown.49 Finally, the RDV not only rigorously applied these 
standards to its own work but imposed them on all its member organizations.50 
As it refused to forward any material that failed to meet its strict advertising 
guidelines, only a fraction of German materials ever qualified for the American 
market. This generated both considerable resentment among regional tourism 
bodies and coherent and well-designed German tourism propaganda.51
48 See Alexander Schug, “Missionare der globalen Konsumkultur. Corporate Identity und Ab-
satzstrategien amerikanischer Unternehmen in Deutschland im frühen 20. Jahrhundert,” in Poli-
tische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1939, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig, 307–339, 
(Göttingen, 2005).
49 RDV, Germany: Visit the Heart of Europe, 1931.
50 On the RDV’s guidelines, see Ernst Schmitz, Werbespiegel. Increasing competition within 
Germany led many municipalities, hotels, and touring associations to adopt their own publicity 
plans. Between 1908 and 1928, the average advertising funds of German cities rose from an an-
nual 2,000 marks to 19,000 marks. By the late 1920s there was hardly a German city that did not 
advertise itself as a tourist destination. The city of Berchtesgaden alone raised the number of city 
brochures it printed from 20,000 to 160,000 after the war. See Christine Keitz, “Grundzüge einer 
Sozialgeschichte des Tourismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Reisekultur in Deutschland. Von 
der Weimarer Republik zum ‘Dritten Reich’, ed. Peter Brenner, 49–71 (Tübingen, 1997), 68.
51 While almost 20 % of the RDV’s own brochures were sent across the Atlantic, only 10 % of 
those of its member associations were deemed good enough for the American market; see RDV, 
Werbemaßnahmen der Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung April bis Dezember 1927, PA 
R 121266.
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Fig . 14: Streamlining German Tourism Advertising – Before and After: Ernst Schmitz, Werbe-
spiegel, 1926, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, R 65090
Importantly, too, the RDV appealed to American tourists around the world. 
Much of its marketing budget – which increased dramatically from 178,000 
marks in 1924 to 2.8 million marks in 1927 – went toward establishing a net-
work of international offices in Zurich, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Paris, and Lon-
don, not least to reach American tourists.52 The RDV’s Parisian office on the 
Champs-Élysées, for instance, catered predominantly (70 %) to an American 
clientele, working diligently to reroute the stream of American tourists from 
France to Germany.53 In the same vein, the RDV opened its second overseas 
bureau in Havana in 1929 not to appeal to Cubans but to American vacation-
ers. The RDV’s ambition to reach solvent and politically influential American 
tourists wherever they roamed was largely what gave rise to an international 
infrastructure of German promotional offices over the course of the 1920s.
52 Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Verwaltungsrats der Reichszentrale für deutsche Verkehr-
swerbung, Berlin, June 12, 1925, BArch R 8132/13; Jahresrechnung Reichszentrale für Deutsche 
Verkehrswerbung, 1927, PA R 246900; the exchange rate was fixed at one dollar to 4.2 Re-
ichsmarks.
53 RDV, Werbemaßnahmen der Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung April bis Dezember 
1927, 18.
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With German tourism promotion swiftly establishing a foothold in the United 
States, what image of Germany did it advertise, and how, if at all, did it serve 
larger national interests?
It is important to note that the very premise of the GTIO’s advertising was 
selling all of “Germany.” Whereas German health resorts, for instance, sought 
to promote the curative effects of a certain German spa, or German shipping 
lines sought to sell a trip to Europe on a German carrier, the GTIO operated 
under one slogan only: Germany. Its advertising lines ran: Germany wants to 
see you! – Germany invites you! – See Germany next! – Going to Europe means 
going to Germany! All of its travel booklets, posters, and brochures, regardless 
of the region, city or event they advertised, invariably featured “Germany” on 
their title page; no promotional materials designed by cities, spas, or trade fairs 
had a hope of being distributed in the United States if they did not adhere to 
this principle. As Schmitz explained to the representatives of German tourist 
organizations, “the promotion of Germany in America has to be not only ac-
tive but aggressive. It has to struggle and fight, has to be taken onto the streets 
and to the people, and again and again in spoken and written word, on images 
and posters, in brochures and lectures it has to proclaim but a single word, a 
single name, and this name is: Germany.”54
This broad publicity for Germany evolved from a combination of structural 
and political factors. Representing a wide array of organizations and funded 
primarily by the German Railroads, the RDV was invested in promoting all 
of Germany as a travel destination rather than focusing on a certain city or 
region. This broader publicity, in part, also reflected the significant European 
competition for American tourists. Competing with equally broad French, 
Swiss, and Italian publicity, only such general promotion of Germany would 
have enough of a “ring” to draw larger tourist numbers. Americans, the RDV 
realized, did not travel halfway around the world to visit Bordeaux, Genoa or 
Bayreuth, nor were they lured by the Nouvelle-Aquitaine, Liguria or Bavaria; 
their desire was to see France, Italy, or Germany as a whole. As all advertising 
experts and the embassy in Washington repeatedly imparted to disgruntled 
regional tourist bodies, advertising a single city or region was simply doomed 
to failure.55 This premise also arose from the pragmatic insight that Ameri-
cans had relatively limited geographic knowledge. Schmitz often encountered 
American customers who, planning to travel from Cologne to Düsseldorf (a 
54 Amerika-Propaganda und amerikanischer Reiseverkehr (Schmitz, 1926), 6, NARA Entry 
UD 328: Seized Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–1941, 
Box 36, Folder: Tourism: Promotion.
55 III A 1393, Circular by the AA (to all bodies interested in American tourism), Oct. 15, 1924, 
PA R 246898.
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12-mile trip), wanted to stop over in Venice or Budapest. Despite such gaps in 
Americans’ knowledge of Europe, Schmitz noted that “there is one thing that 
the American knows all too well; that there is a Germany in Europe. Therefore 
everyone who wants to promote a single German city or region in the United 
States, again and again has to advertise Germany. The name ‘Germany’ will be 
his best advertising slogan and only with this slogan will he prevail.”56 Lastly, 
political considerations played into these commercial reasons. If travel adver-
tisements were to improve Germany’s transatlantic standing, then a focus on 
“Germany” was an essential prerequisite. Advertisers like Schmitz and diplo-
mats like Ambassador Prittwitz concurred that “Germany” itself was the very 
brand name they were seeking to re-establish among the American public.
Still the RDV advertisements catered first and foremost to the demands of 
the American tourist, emphasizing the convenience, value, and hospitality of 
travel in Germany. They depicted Germany as a country where customs for-
malities were negligible, the train system punctual, the cities safe and impec-
cably kept – a place where, due to the variety of German landscapes, customs, 
and history, money traveled further and a friendly, hospitable population wel-
comed Americans. In fact, a significant proportion of German advertisements 
emphasized the absence of hard feelings, and even Germany’s great apprecia-
tion for its former enemy.57 While such depictions are the stock-in-trade of 
all modern tourism promotion, they took on added meaning against the back-
drop of the war. Cultural representations of German hospitality and docility 
deliberately countered wartime images of German aggression and frequently 
played out directly vis-à-vis Germany’s European rivals. Germany’s oft-cited 
cleanliness, for example, was more or less a direct stab at France’s alleged lack 
thereof; it was likely no coincidence that advertising pro-American feeling in 
Germany peaked just as reporting on anti-American feeling in France soared 
after 1926. All in all, the picture of the clean, hardworking, efficient and hospi-
table German (who allegedly loved to speak English and appreciated Ameri-
cans for more than just their dollars) aimed to whittle away at prevalent enemy 
images.
Naturally, the GTIO did not sell the same image of Germany to everyone 
and its advertisements diversified noticeably over time. For example, it empha-
sized a nostalgic, romantic version of Germany to German Americans.58 So-
56 Amerika-Propaganda und amerikanischer Reiseverkehr (Schmitz, ca. 1926), NARA Entry 
UD 328: Seized Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–1941, 
Box 36, Folder: Tourism: Promotion.
57 Donald Douglas, “Travel, New Style: Recipes, from a Modern Traveler, on How to Discover 
Germany and Have a Mighty Good Time Doing It,” Nomad (March 1929), NARA Entry UD 328, 
Box 9, Germany: General I.
58 Originally, it seems the GTIO did not set out to promote tourism among German Americans 
because if they traveled to Europe, they made sure to visit Germany anyway. Moreover, 98 % of 
all travel agencies were owned by Anglo-Americans, and the RDV saw little use in German-lan-
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called Heimatbilder (“images of the homeland”), vignettes of certain regions 
or folk traditions, struck an emotional tone and offered idealized pictures of 
quaint German towns. Another highly coveted target audience was universi-
ties, to which the GTIO emphasized Germany as a land of culture with special 
brochures on German universities, Goethe, and music; Schmitz fostered this 
effort by maintaining a mailing list with the addresses of more than 800 pro-
fessors and teachers with an interest in Germany.59 In this context, the GTIO 
also supplied hundreds of classrooms with splendid posters of Germany and 
provided its brochures and popular films as classroom materials to German 
teachers free of charge. Finally, it sold Germany to affluent Anglo-Americans 
as a convenient, well-kept, and hospitable country inhabited by slender, allur-
ing Fräuleins, chic boutiques, technological marvels, sublime music, and high- 
(and low-)brow entertainment. In the very late 1920s in particular, trips to Ger-
many were packaged as part of an upper-class lifestyle, with poster campaigns 
featuring beautiful people engaged in leisure pursuits.60
guage materials. See “Vertraulich! Tätigkeits-Bericht der German Railroads Information Office 
New York. Vom 15. Juni–15. Dezember 1925,” PA R 65090.
59 RDV, Werbemaßnahmen der Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung April bis Dezember 
1927, PA R 121266; this reached a high point during the 1932 Goethe celebrations, which will be 
covered in more detail in Chapter 7.
60 See, for example, the advertisement: “Germany: Land of Beauty and Sports,” Travel (Mar. 
1930): 3; Henry Albert Phillips, “Winter Sports in the Bavarian Alps,” Travel (Jan. 1932): 14–17; 
RDV, Germany: Land of Varied Attractions (brochure), 1931.
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Fig . 15: Ludwig Hohlwein, “Summer 
in Germany,” Poster, German Tourism 
Promotion Office, 1928
These advertisements served Germany’s quest for cultural rehabilitation in a 
dual sense. For one, promotional materials re-established Germany as a land 
of ancient and enthralling history, a land (to echo one of Schmitz’s favorite 
phrases) that “was old when Columbus discovered America.” Showcasing its 
rich cultural heritage and its prominent position in the worlds of classical mu-
sic and higher education, this campaign reclaimed Germany’s status as a civi-
lized nation. At the same time, however, its strong focus on German modernity 
signaled a clear break with the days of old. It presented Germany as the most 
modern and advanced nation in Europe, replete with technological ingenuity, 
modern industry, and contemporary architecture. “Our modern age,” wrote 
Schmitz (posing as an American observer) in obvious hyperbole,
has created the most impressive achievements in Germany. Let a traveler see the spar-
kling great cities with their stirring business, spotless cleanliness and efficient adminis-
tration. Let him wonder at the modern architecture and city planning in the suburb and 
small city and let him visit the roaring workshops of industry. He will then experience the 
marvel of German invention and German technology, learn the great projects of recovery 
and business and acknowledge without envy the rightful eminence of the German people 
as the most progressive and modern in Europe.61
61 Schmitz, The Land of Wanderlust, ca. 1932, NARA Entry UD 336, Box 2, Folder: Ernst 
Schmitz Personal Papers. Writings on German travel, n. d.
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The RDV visualizations of Germany often emphasized the traditional and 
modern aspects of Germany side by side (e. g., by depicting a car in front of 
a cathedral), arguably reminding viewers of Germany’s rich contributions to 
civilization while distancing it from its suspect Wilhelmine past.
Fig . 16: Jupp Wiertz, “Germany Wants 
to See You,” Poster, German Tourism 
Promotion Office, ca . 1926
Such advertisements quite deliberately suggested that Germany was not simply 
the most modern but also the most American country in Europe – terms, to 
be sure, that Europeans used virtually interchangeably at the time. Many of 
the advertisements sought to establish a specific likeness between Germany 
and America or at least emphasize Germany’s particular affinity for the United 
States. Schmitz, for example, often highlighted that American developments 
and mass culture generated a broad interest in Germany and, passing as an im-
partial American observer in a travel magazine, he hailed Germany as the “new 
old world” replete not only with old-world charms but a new-world mindset.62 
Strikingly, these visions of an “Americanized” Germany remained mostly apo-
litical. Germany’s modernity and affinity for America were expressed through 
62 E. S. Crayfield (= Ernst Schmitz from Krefeld), “The New and the Old in Germany,” Nomad 
3/4 (Mar. 1927).
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shared leisure pursuits, sanitary conditions, and technological achievements, 
not the fact that both countries were republics.63 While the RDV’s emphasis on 
a “modern Germany” seemed to signal a clear break from its monarchical past, 
it did not mean an emphatic embrace of the republican present. Consequently, 
Nazi Germany was able to almost seamlessly adopt the touristic images and 
slogans developed during the 1920s after 1933.
Fig . 17: Willi Dzubas, “Germany,” Poster, 
German Tourism Promotion Office, 
ca . 1930
Nevertheless, tourism promotion tied in closely with Weimar’s foreign policy 
objectives at the time, becoming a legitimate, even coveted, part of German 
public diplomacy over the course of the 1920s. German diplomats at home and 
abroad recognized its unrivaled potential to revise Germany’s “distorted im-
age” while at the same time avoiding accusations of “German propaganda.”64 
63 An exception is the March 1927 issue of Nomad, a travel journal, whose editorial seems to 
have been penned by Ernst Schmitz; he surmised that there was no reason “the Republic of Ger-
many should not become even more popular among American travelers than was the German 
Empire”; see Anon., “The Contributing Editors Keyboard,” Nomad (Mar. 1927): 5
64 Travel advertisements, the German consul general in New York judged, were “beyond their 
actual objective, valuable general advertising media for Germany [and …] the beneficial side ef-
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The GTIO worked closely with German representatives in the United States, 
submitting regular circulars on its undertakings, sharing information on 
prominent visitors to Germany, and usually accommodating official sugges-
tions concerning the content or distribution of its materials.65 In 1932, when 
the Foreign Ministry commissioned reports on the effectiveness and suitability 
of German tourism promotion abroad, German missions in the U. S. offered 
an overwhelmingly positive assessment, commending the GTIO’s work as “ex-
traordinarily skillful und effective” (Chicago), “well-rounded and suited to na-
tional conditions and […] target audiences” (New York), and even altogether 
“exemplary” (St. Louis).66 Importantly, as the New York Consulate stressed, 
Americans, who were “generally highly trained in advertising matters,” widely 
shared this impression.67 The German Consulate in St. Louis praised the GTIO 
highly, explicitly connecting its work to the consulate’s own:
[… the GTIO’s] advertising work guarantees something much greater [than tourist rev-
enue], namely, depending on the individual, the awakening, strengthening or deepening 
of interest, of understanding and of recognition of German cultural values. Its advertising 
work offers an entirely indispensable support and resource for the consulate’s cultural 
political work.68
German tourism promotion in the United States, then, clearly doubled as pub-
lic diplomacy. Its depictions of Germany sought to free the nation’s history and 
culture from wartime misrepresentations and strengthened its claims to a great 
and powerful status based on its sophisticated past and accomplished present. 
American tourism featured prominently in Germany’s pursuit of a transatlan-
tic partnership as the GTIO portrayed it as a stable, peaceful, and productive 
region of Europe, extending a warm welcome to American visitors and inves-
tors alike. As Weimar’s single largest advertising endeavor in the United States 
(and indeed the world), tourism promotion played a key role in reshaping Ger-
many’s image in line with its strategic interests. Representations of Germany 
and the ensuing trips they prompted, theoretically at least, were well suited to 
evoking new interest, sympathy, and respect – but did they actually do so?
fects of tourism promotion are to be evaluated as pretty high.” German Consulate General, New 
York, to AA, Mar. 23, 1932, “Fremdenverkehrswerbung,” PA R 246918.
65 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Apr. 27, 1928, “Vortragstätigkeit Mr. Buchers,” PA R 
80300.
66 Reports in PA R 246918; these files also hold a very interesting survey of German missions 
worldwide: “Beobachtungen der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen über die im Ausland betrie-
bene deutsche Fremdenverkehrswerbung und Anregungen für ihre Ausgestaltung.”
67 German Consulate General, New York, to AA, Mar. 23, 1932, “Fremdenverkehrswerbung,” 
PA R 246918.
68 German Consulate, St. Louis, to AA, Mar. 14, 1932, “Fremdenverkehrswerbung im Ausland,” 
PA R 246919.
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American Travelers in Weimar Germany
Without a doubt, international travel affected how elite Americans imagined 
and discussed world affairs and their own nation’s role in them. As scholars 
have shown, it was often through impressions gained abroad that Americans 
“articulated visions of how the United States and its citizens should behave 
in the world.”69 Even tourism, long dismissed as a particularly trivial form of 
travel, is now increasingly recognized as a “communication between Self and 
Other,”70 as a modern practice that produced “images not only of tourists, 
but of the nations tourists consumed.”71 Importantly, I would posit, this was 
to some degree true even of those many travel-minded Americans who never 
left North America. Travel, one should recall, was everywhere in 1920s Amer-
ica: travel magazines and talks, travel editorials and advertisements, travel ac-
counts and books all enjoyed unprecedented popularity during this decade. 
Newspapers informed their readers of who had arrived from or departed for 
Europe, colorful tourism advertisements adorned train stations and shop win-
dows across the country, and fashion and lifestyle magazines – as well as novels 
and short stories, of course – covered the splendid outings of America’s rich 
and famous extensively.72 Collectively, all these images generated a mental map 
of the world not just for the actual but for the potential, or vicarious, traveling 
public.73 Whereas interest in foreign politics proper was at a low ebb, interest 
in travel was at high tide. This is not to suggest that Americans uncritically 
believed travel accounts, let alone advertisements, nor that travelers (armchair 
or actual) arrived at similar conclusions.74 Travel to Europe could enthrall or 
repel; it could heighten or deflate notions of American exceptionalism; or it 
could suggest isolation or intervention, and everything in between. But it did 
have an impact.
69 Endy, “Travel and Power,” 590–575.
70 Rudy Koshar, “‘What Ought to Be Seen’: Tourists’ Guidebooks and National Identities in 
Modern Germany and Europe,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 3 (1998): 323–340, 329.
71 Koshar, “‘What Ought to be Seen,’” 339; this is certainly most pronounced with regard to the 
attacks on tourists in France in 1926. For a brief description of the general climate in which these 
attacks took place, see Brooke Blower, Becoming Americans in Paris. Transatlantic Politics and 
Culture between the World Wars (New York, 2011), 69–70.
72 Many of them even ran their own international travel bureaus for the convenience of their 
travel-minded readership. For example, Vanity Fair’s International Travel Bureau advertised that 
“No matter where you want to go, the Travel Bureau will tell you how to get there, what to see 
and when to see it”; see Vanity Fair (Jan. 1921): 12.
73 Scholars have long drawn on travel literature to explain the cognitive and discursive con-
struction, the “mental mapping,” of the “Orient,” the “West,” or the British Empire; see Robert F. 
Hunter, “’Tourism Empire’: The Thomas Cook & Son Enterprise on the Nile, 1868–1914,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 40, no. 5 (2004): 28–54.
74 Frank Schoonmaker ridiculed tourism advertisements as “obvious hyperbole,” but felt them 
to be “very effective. To laugh at it is to laugh at the whole principle of advertising.” See Frank 
Schoonmaker, “The Tourist’s Dollar,” Outlook and Independent (July 23, 1930): 460–61.
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Before we can assess this impact for the case of Germany, however, we 
must first explore American travel patterns to Germany. This is seriously com-
plicated by a lack of comprehensive and reliable statistics.75 That American 
travel to Europe grew significantly during the 1920s is abundantly clear: the 
American statistics on American travel and overseas expenditure, compiled af-
ter 1922 by the U. S. Department of Commerce, show that American tourism 
doubled from 60,000 in 1919 to 125,000 in 1920 and again to 245,000 in 1927 
before reaching an all-time high in 1930, when about 280,000 Americans trav-
eled to Europe. After this, numbers dropped rapidly, reaching a low of 144,000 
in 1933.76 It is more difficult to find out how many of these Americans went to 
Germany, however. Only in 1935 did American statistics begin to specify exact 
European destinations.77 German statistics, too, are problematic, as national 
tourism statistics were only introduced in the early 1930s, and the municipal 
data available for the 1920s neither followed standardized guidelines nor cov-
ered all (or even all larger) German cities.78
As a result, estimates varied dramatically. For instance, while the RDV 
estimated that 185,000 Americans had visited Germany in 1929, the Foreign 
Ministry estimated that as few as 70,000 had done so.79 Neither of these esti-
mates, however, seems very reliable. While the RDV systematically overstated 
the number of American visitors to highlight the effectiveness of its work, the 
Foreign Ministry (at this point engulfed in a power struggle with the RDV, 
described later in this chapter) aimed to depreciate these numbers to underline 
the need for a tourism reform under its aegis. Similar problems apply to Amer-
ican tourist expenditure. According to American statistics, American expend-
iture in Europe peaked at $303 million in 1929, with Americans spending $137 
million in France, $45 million in Germany, and $40 million in Great Britain.80 
75 Also useful for data on the long-term rise of American travel to Europe is Dupont, Ghandi 
and Weiss, “The American Invasion of Europe: The Long Term Rise in Overseas Travel, 1820–
2000,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13977 www.nber.org/papers/
w13977. Looking at a period of 180 years, the authors explain the long-term rise of American 
tourism to Europe primarily through two factors: population growth and GDP/capita, though 
they, of course, recognize that travel patterns have been affected by a multitude of other, less 
measurable, factors.
76 The progression was as follows: 1919: 60,000; 1920: 125,000; 1921: 150,000; 1922: 160,000; 
1923: 140,000; 1924: 170,000; 1925: 205,000; 1926: 215,000; 1927: 245,000; 1928: 260,000; 1929: 
265,000; 1930: 279,000; 1931: 220,000; 1932: 211,000; 1933: 144,000.
77 However, they do allow interesting insights into why Americans traveled to Europe: a 1929 
study by the U. S. Dept of Commerce found that almost 50 % traveled for pleasure, while the 
second largest group (35 %) cited family affairs, 7 % educational, and 8 % commercial reasons for 
going overseas. Department of Commerce, Oversea Travel and Expenditures 47, Table 24.
78 Some cities asked travelers to list their country of origin; others simply their home continent.
79 Davidsen, “Schätzung der Ausgaben amerikanischer Reisender in Deutschland” (ca. 1932), 
PA R 105542; GTIO to German Embassy, Washington, Apr. 1930, PA R 246905.
80 Total expenditures by U. S. citizens visiting Europe and the Mediterranean in millions of dol-
lars amounted to 59 in 1919, 122.9 in 1920, 148.2 in 1921, 180.4 in 1922, 171.1 in 1923, 195.4 in 
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But since it was believed that the U. S. Department of Commerce inflated these 
numbers to appease Europeans complaining about U. S. tariffs, the Foreign 
Ministry adjusted them downward to only $20 million in 1928.81
Bearing these distortions – and their self-serving motivations – in mind, 
we may still arrive at more reliable estimates. One way to do so is to deduce 
the figures for the 1920s from the destination information available in U. S. sta-
tistics from the 1930s. According to the U. S. Department of Commerce, 38 % 
of all U. S. citizens going to Europe visited Germany in 1935 and 48 % did so in 
1936. During the same time, 51 % and 40 %, respectively, visited France, while 
57 % and 52 % visited Great Britain. While these numbers were clearly affected 
by the 1935 Crown Jubilee in England and the 1936 German Olympics, they 
average out to 43 % for Germany, 55 % for Britain (where transatlantic liners 
docked), and 46 % for France. Assuming that Nazi Germany was neither less 
nor more attractive to American visitors than the Weimar Republic, it is fair to 
conclude that 110,000 Americans at the very least visited Germany in 1930. The 
130,000 visas that German missions issued to Americans in the United States 
and Europe during that year roughly corroborate this number.82
If we assume that only 40,000 Americans visited Germany in 1924, then 
American travel to Germany did not just keep pace with but outperformed 
overall European increases, especially after 1928. While general travel to Eu-
rope stagnated during that year, American visitors to Germany seem to have 
increased by about 15–20 %.83 Certainly, the relative impact of American tour-
ism was pronounced in terms of numbers and expenditure. In German cities 
for which data is available, Americans were the single largest – and the single 
most profitable – group of foreign tourists.84 And even if we accept the Foreign 
Ministry’s lowered estimate of American expenditure at $20 million in 1928, 
this still amounted to half of all revenue generated by international tourism in 
the German balance of payments.85 Even though there is a lack of precise data, 
1924, 227.1 in 1925, 237.3 in 1926, 262.4 in 1927, 287 in 1928, 302.9 in 1929, 283.8 in 1930, 
174.7 in 1931, 127.3 in 1932, and 91.5 in 1933; see Historical Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 404; U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Trade 
Promotion Series – No. 113, “The Promotion of Tourist Travel by Foreign Countries” (Washing-
ton, 1931), 2; copy in Folder: Tourism: Promotion, NARA Entry UD 328: Seized Promotional 
Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–1941 Box 36.
81 Davidsen, “Der ausländische Fremdenverkehr in Deutschland,” 1929, PA R 246903.
82 AA to Reichsbahnzentrale für den deutschen Reiseverkehr, Apr. 22 1931, PA R 246917.
83 RDV, Werbemaßnahmen der Reichsbahnzentrale für den Deutschen Reiseverkehr. Januar bis 
September 1928, 18.
84 12.3 % of all tourists in ten German cities were American. Davidsen, “Der ausländische 
Fremdenverkehr in Deutschland,” PA R 246903.
85 Länderrat des Amerikanischen Besatzungsgebiets, Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 
1928–1944 (Munich, 1949), 602–603; the assets from international tourism stood at 180 million 
marks in 1929; the liabilities (created by Germans traveling abroad) at 300 million marks.
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American tourist numbers and expenditure rose very significantly through the 
1920s, both in absolute and relative terms.
To be sure, this development was hardly due to German efforts alone. In 
part, it resulted from tourists resuming earlier travel patterns as the war faded 
into memory and Germany re-entered the family of nations. It also stemmed 
from developments in competing tourist destinations, especially the emer-
gence of hostility toward American tourists in France in 1926, which was heav-
ily publicized at the time, as well as the strengthening of the franc the following 
year. Tellingly, Paris had its worst postwar season in 1929, just as Germany had 
its best.86 Still, we cannot dismiss German efforts, either. If we recall Germa-
ny’s near absence from contemporary materials, magazine advertisements, and 
package tours as late as 1925, we can reasonably assume that the German gov-
ernment’s incentives (waiving visa fees and abandoning customs regulations), 
combined with the GTIO’s extensive promotional efforts, accelerated this pro-
cess. Many German, American, and French contemporaries, at least, attributed 
the rise of Germany in American tourist favor to its marketing offensive.87 One 
decade after the war, Germany had, indeed, recaptured a considerable segment 
of the American travel market.
*
It is also fair to assume that rising tourist numbers themselves expressed a 
normalization of American sentiment toward Germany. But it is considera-
bly more challenging to assess precisely how American travelers experienced 
Germany and what they took away from a trip there. Since it is impossible to 
create a truly representative sample of tourist impressions, any assessment has 
to rely on published accounts, especially in travel-oriented, upper-class Amer-
ican magazines.88 Using published over archival material allows us to follow 
a broader public debate, yet it also poses distinct methodological challenges. 
For one, we have to distinguish actual travel accounts from the widespread 
(and unlabeled) “advertorials.” In other words, we have to distinguish how 
Americans saw Germany from how Germany wanted to be seen. Moreover, 
articulate published accounts are not likely to reflect the opinion of the average 
American “tourist.” While little can be done about this latter fact, the following 
discussion excludes all placed articles as far as possible, even if they were not 
86 Clipping: “Tourists Snub Paris and Its Leaping prices,“ Daily News, Aug. 7 1929, PA R 246903.
87 “Dark Horse in the Tourist Trade,” The Atlanta Constitution, June 29, 1930.
88 These included Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s Monthly, Literary Digest, North American Review, 
Outlook, Scribner’s Magazine, World’s Work, Literary Digest, Saturday Evening Post, National 
Travel Club, Travel, Travel Talks, National Geographic, Journeys Beautiful, Town and Country, The 
Spur, Current History, Business Survey, Railway Life, Cook’s American Traveler’s Gazette, Cook’s 
Excursionist and Tourist Adviser, Ladies’ Home Journal, Paris Tribune, Variety, New York Times 
Magazine, New Republic, and The Nation.
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readily recognizable as such to contemporary readers. On this basis, it tries to 
show how American travel shaped discussions on Germany.
Two more general observations are in order at this point. The first concerns 
the frequency of American travel reporting on Germany. As American tour-
ism to Germany rose, so did coverage of Germany in American publications. 
While American reporting on Germany in the postwar years had concentrated 
on economic or political factors, the later 1920s saw a notable increase in trav-
el-related matters. Still, German observers perceived a slight, but significant, 
time lag between American tourists’ return to Germany and any correspond-
ing public discussion. For example, by 1927 the German consul general in San 
Francisco regularly provided upper-class American families with summer visas 
to Germany and recommendations for German schools only to find that these 
families, in their official travel announcements in the newspapers, admitted 
only to staying in Paris, the South of France, “perhaps even Italy or Egypt, but 
never Germany.”89 Even though Americans were once more interested in vis-
iting Germany, the consul concluded, they were  – “under the spell of French 
society” – not yet ready to admit to traveling in Germany.90 This changed no-
ticeably after about 1928, however, when prominent magazines such as Town 
and Country, Good Housekeeping, the Living Age, Vogue, Harper’s Bazaar, and 
Vanity Fair opened their pages first to large-scale German travel advertise-
ments, then to more detailed articles. As part of this trend, the consciously 
elitist Town and Country reintroduced a regular “Berlin Letter” (in addition 
to a “London Letter” and a “Paris Letter”) by correspondent Lilian T. Mowrer, 
which chronicled modern German design, carnival celebrations, and Berlin 
nightlife, often employing the “breathless,” exuberant tone otherwise reserved 
for Paris.91 Since the prestige of elite journals depended partly on what they 
chose to market, their successively greater willingness to associate themselves 
with “Germany” as a product indicates the country’s more positive public as-
sociations. At the same time, such coverage helped Germany recover an attrac-
tive, lighter image in public discussion.
A second general observation is that American travel impressions need to 
be understood in light of preconceived notions about Germany. For one, Amer-
icans approached their trip with a cache of distinct images and expectations of 
what postwar Germany would look like. Tourists measured the country and 
its people against common notions of, for example, retrenched monarchism 
or economic prostration. Their impressions, moreover, were strongly compar-
89 Consulate General, San Francisco [Wiehl], to AA, Dec. 6, 1927, “Französische Kulturpro-
paganda in San Francisco,” PA R 61130.
90 Ibid.
91 See, for example, “Modern Houses as Germany Builds Them,” American Vogue (Aug. 3, 1929): 
62–63; Lilian Mowrer, “Our Berlin Letter,” May 1928 on the Bauhaus; Ernst Schmitz, “Neue amer-
ikanische Reise- und Lehrbücher über Deutschland,” PA Botschaft Washington, 1497.
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ative. In particular, they perceived their erstwhile enemy alongside their erst-
while allies, primarily France. Finally, many Americans crossed into Germany 
with exceptional curiosity about the state of mind of its people, their feelings 
toward Americans, and the nature of its transition from a monarchy to a re-
public: how reconstructed were the German people, had they truly disavowed 
their militarist past, and could the Kaiser ever return? In light of the country’s 
postwar transformations, a trip to Germany seemed to many an educated trav-
eler half vacation, half expedition. “It is this mystery, this shadow, this enigma 
[of its recent transformation],” bestselling travel author Frank Schoonmaker 
noted in 1930, “which makes Germany more than ever attractive to the travel-
ers of to-day.”92
Given this surfeit of expectations, American travelers commented more on 
their impression of the astonishing degree to which Germany had recovered 
than on anything else. Postwar reporting had conjured up visions of an impov-
erished and prostrate land, but traveling abroad presented an altogether differ-
ent picture. As tourists were uniquely preoccupied with matters of transporta-
tion, it was usually in this field rather than, say, the Ruhr’s smoking chimneys, 
that they noticed German recovery. For example, they frequently understood 
the resurgence of German transatlantic liners as a resurgence of Germany 
more generally. Despite having lost almost their entire fleet after the war, the 
NDL and the HAPAG had recaptured about 25 % of American passenger busi-
ness to Europe by 1930; moreover, the NDL’s Europa and Bremen (launched in 
May 1928) were the world’s fastest and most modern ships, conveying German 
recovery even to American tourists who disembarked in England or France.93 
92 Frank Schoonmaker, Come with Me through Germany (New York, 1930), 5; for an earlier ex-
ample of this inquiring mentality, see Louis Graves, “The American Soldier and the German 
Mind,” Atlantic Monthly (June 1919): 811–817, 811.
93 Though British lines by 1931 still held the largest market segment, the two German lines 
came in a very close second. The NDL, in particular, experienced a steep increase, making it the 
leading line in all passenger categories in American westbound business by 1930. If only 4.5 of 
American transatlantic travelers took a NDL liner in 1927, 17 % percent did four years later. Even 
more astounding were the gains in the luxury segment of the market, where the share of Ameri-
can first-class passengers rose from 4.5 % to 20 % in only three years. Where every tenth sec-
ond-class passenger had taken the NDL, nearly every third did three years later. See Nord-
deutscher Lloyd (Stadtländer) to Davidsen, “Anteil der deutschen Reedereien am 
Nordamerika-Verkehr,” Sep. 18, 1931, PA R 246918; the NDL was also especially successful in 
repositioning itself in the deluxe class of liners; according to contemporaries, there were only 
three ships in this category: the Bremen, the Europa, and the Ile de France; see Howard Sternau, 
“Problems in the Transatlantic Passenger Service,” Harvard Business Review (1930): 359–365, 
359; for American reporting, see “What Makes the Bremen Speedy,” American Review of Reviews 
(Dec. 1929), Clipping: T. R. Ybarra, “Europa (or Bremen) Ueber Alles!,” Outlook and Independent 
(Apr. 30, 1930), Entry UD 328: Seized Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Informa-
tion Office, 1932–1941, Box 32, Folder: Opinions on Germany. It is important to note that for 
Americans the tangible European experience usually began when they set foot on one of these 
“floating palaces”; in terms of cultural exposure, it mattered a great deal whether one took the 
White Star Line, the French Line, or the North German Lloyd; see Mark Rennella and Whitney 
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In Germany itself, Lufthansa, with its extensive and competitively priced net-
work of commercial flights and aircraft, left a similar impression, engendering 
respect for the technological strides that the defeated nation had made in just 
a few years’ time.94 By 1929, too, the heavily publicized launching of a German 
airship service that could cross the Atlantic in just over two days, captivated 
America’s travel-minded public.95 Collectively, these observations, clearly 
shaped by a traveler’s lens, suggested one thing: at a time when Americans of-
ten saw Europe as teeming with resentment and self-pity, they saw Germany as 
pulling itself up by its bootstraps.96
Technological advances aside, American travelers by the later 1920s found 
what they felt to be an increasingly contented and reconstructed Germany. 
Indeed, many emphasized how little in Germany still reminded them of the 
war. The absence of battlefields, which had worked to Germany’s detriment in 
the early 1920s, increasingly helped German image-building efforts because it 
disassociated it from the war experience that many Americans were trying to 
leave behind. American travelers would visit Germany – perhaps with initial 
trepidation – only to find a people largely uninterested in the war. Whereas 
mentioning the war had still precipitated considerable, and usually uncon-
genial, debate in the early 1920s, a few years later it usually prompted a mere 
shrugging of shoulders and a determined statement to close the discussion: 
“the war is over.”97 The German people, many found, were not looking for a 
war of revenge but for entertainment. As one American visitor reported, “if 
you talk about the past war or the chance for a new war they find you a terrible 
bore and go on drinking beer and listening to Strauss waltzes.”98 After visiting 
in 1926, American journalist Frank H. Simonds felt that “more than any Eu-
Walton, “Planned Serendipity: American Travelers and the Transatlantic Voyage in the Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Centuries,” Journal of Social History 38, no. 2 (2004): 365–383, 366 ff..
94 The Lufthansa operated the most comprehensive passenger service in the world at the time, 
with prices so competitive that many Americans took their very first flight when visiting Ger-
many.
95 Lady Drummond-Hay, “Gossip of the World,” World Traveler (Nov. 1928): 20–21, 40 [her 
account of the maiden voyage of the transatlantic Zeppelin service]; “Count Zeppelin’s Succes-
sor,” American Review of Reviews (Oct. 1929): 142.
96 Basil Woon, “The Story of Hapag,” World Traveler (Feb. 1929), 17–19, 19: “When the war 
took away from the Hamburg-American Line its biggest, finest vessels they did not sit down 
under the blow and cry their woes to the world. I think the story of the Hamburg-American 
Line’s extraordinary ten-year comeback is the finest episode of business sportsmanship I have 
ever investigated.”
97 Donald Douglas, “Germany at Peace: War is Out – Down and Out – in Germany,” New York 
Tribune, Sep. 16, 1928; Oswald Garrison Villard, “Germany Revisited,” Nation 123, no. 32 (Nov. 
3, 1926): 447–449.
98 Douglas, “Germany at Peace.”
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ropean country which I have visited, Germany seems to have liquidated the 
war.”99
In this regard, Berlin, the heart of the empire and the seat of the Hohen-
zollerns, was always subject to special scrutiny. “Most Americans,” Frank 
Schoonmaker remarked in his 1927 guidebook, “prefer to think of Berlin rather 
as the city of Wilhelm II than as the city of von Hindenburg and Stresemann.”100 
A fleeting visit did little to change that. Baedeker and Cook’s tours continued 
to center on imperial Berlin, leaving the tourist with the impression of a city 
replete with the sights of the Hohenzollerns, not the republic. But those who 
stayed longer or strayed from the main sights soon learned that Berliners 
mocked the pomposity of the Wilhelmine monuments and dispensed with 
stiff formality in their city’s nightlife. The modern architectural boom was also 
widely interpreted as a deliberate ideological departure from the bombast of 
old, while the widely noted absence of uniforms in German public life and the 
courteous, “democratic” demeanor of its police officers led many Americans to 
conclude that German militarism was gone for good.101 By the late 1920s, Berlin 
epitomized the transition from empire to republic for many Americans.102 The 
empty royal castles, they now concluded, were waiting not for the return of 
their former owners, but for the next tourist bus.
Perhaps most surprisingly, American tourists usually found Germans to be 
particularly friendly and hospitable toward them, especially when compared to 
their erstwhile allies.103 The highly volatile relations between the United States 
and France, in particular, affected American impressions of Germany. From 
their high point in 1919, Franco-American relations had steadily deteriorated, 
reaching a low point after the Dawes reparations settlement because Amer-
ica seemed to have relieved Germany of much of the payments due to France 
while simultaneously insisting on full repayment of the French debt. Resent-
ment against the U. S. (“Uncle Shylock”) erupted in a number of sensational 
attacks on American tourists in the summer of 1926 and 1927, seriously impact-
99 Frank H. Simonds, “New Germany, in New Europe,” American Review of Reviews (Nov. 
1926): 491–495, 493.
100 Schoonmaker, “Come with Me through Germany,” 8.
101 Modern German architecture was featured relatively widely toward the late 1920s; see, for 
example, Robert Allerton Parker, “Seeing a New Europe,” Travel (Oct. 1928): 7–12; Lawrence 
Gilman, “Poundergood Visits Berlin,” New York Herold Tribune, Sep. 30, 1928; Lincoln Eyre, 
“Renascent Germany,” National Geographic (Dec. 1928): 639–718, 644–645; such an image of 
Germany was also systematically promoted by the GTIO; see E. S. Crayfield (Ernst Schmitz), 
“The City of Never-Ending Day” (on Berlin), Nomad (Mar. 1928).
102 Sydney A. Clark, “The New Spirit in Germany’s Capital: How Republican Berlin Faces the 
Future – Some Achievements of Democracy – Aspects of Europe’s Greatest City,” Travel (Oct. 
1930): 12–16, 54 cont.
103 Raoul Martini, “A Picture of Present-Day Germany,” Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 22, 
1925, 18; Bruce Reynolds, “A Warm Welcome and a Cold Drink Await – in Berlin,” Nomad (Mar. 
1929).
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ing France’s image and balance of payments.104 Conversely, Germany benefited 
morally and economically from this anti-French sentiment. Frank Schoon-
maker, for example, found Germans “friendly, not with the surface courtesy 
of the French, but with a true hospitality that asks nothing in return.”105 In the 
field of tourism, too, wartime alliances were slowly being recalibrated.
Finally, Americans experienced Germany and Germans as particularly 
familiar. To be sure, Bavarian peasant dresses, folk celebrations, and me-
dieval myths “exoticized” Germans to a degree, but this was not the general 
trend. Rather, American travelers observed Germans’ enthusiasm for Amer-
ican forms of leisure, including the wide popularity of American sports, jazz, 
and movies,106 and often felt Germans to be most “like us” – an observation 
they applied to everything from dating practices and drinking preferences to 
physique. German youths, one American visitor noted, had substituted beer 
with cocktails, and the stout German girl of prewar days had given way to the 
slender “American” type.107 Such observations not only helped overcome the 
distance between Germans and Americans – that “Otherness” the war had at-
tached to Germans – but also, since Americans understood their own forms of 
leisure as deeply democratic, reinforced the notion of Germany’s democratic 
conversion. By the mid-1920s, repeat visitors, in particular, believed they could 
discern the contours of a truly new, “spiritually disarmed” Germany.108 As one 
of them remarked in 1925: “The Germany through which I traveled in 1913 was 
impressively militaristic. The Germany I saw three years ago was a people in 
social, political and mental chaos. The Germany of today is neither chauvinis-
tic nor helplessly befuddled. It is a Germany chastened in spirit, democratically 
inclined, thinking clearly and constructively.”109 American tourists, it seemed, 
were taking away just the impressions Germany had hoped they would.
104 Clipping: “If France Wants Tourists,” New York Evening Post, Mar. 5, 1930. Already in 1928, 
American tourists had spent a whopping $40 million less in France than in the previous year. 
This was not primarily the result of rival tourist efforts but French prices; France, as American 
newspapers noted, had simply become too expensive for the standards it provided, PA R 246905; 
Davidsen, Entscheidende Ereignisse in der Organisation des frz. Fremdenverkehrs, PA R 105542.
105 Schoonmaker, Through Europe on Two Dollars a Day, 140.
106 Donald Douglas, “Travel, New Style: Recipes, from a Modern Traveler, on How to Discover 
Germany and Have a Mighty Good Time Doing It,” Nomad (March 1929); Grace Z. Brown, 
“ Neoteric Germany,” Nomad (Mar. 1930): 13; NARA Entry UD 328, Box 9, Germany: General I.
107 Lawrence Gilman, “Poundergood Visits Berlin”; see especially Frank H. Simonds, “New 
Germany, in New Europe,” American Review of Reviews (Nov. 1926): 491–495, 494.
108 Villard, “Germany Revisited.”
109 Martini,”A Picture of Present-Day Germany.”
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That such impressions aligned closely with German hopes was due, to some 
extent, to the increasing attention Germany itself had begun to pay to visitor 
hospitality. While enticing Americans to return to Germany was an impor-
tant step, making sure that their impressions would be commercially and po-
litically useful was yet another. This seemed especially necessary because the 
large number of leisure tourists were ever less likely to study the country they 
visited in any depth and proved “only all too ready,” as one German observer 
remarked, to draw broad, general conclusions about Germany from chance en-
counters.110 It was precisely because American impressions hinged on all sorts 
of vagaries that German officials and private groups increasingly turned their 
attention to the American experience in Germany. The ultimate value of Amer-
ican travel, German tourism promoters and diplomats agreed, depended on 
turning the American visitor into “a friend of Germany and a living propagan-
dist” for its cause, as Schmitz put it.111 “If [American visitors] are welcomed in 
a friendly manner and receive a favorable impression of the land and people,” 
echoed the German consul in Boston, “a more just and sympathetic assessment 
of our country cannot fail to take root here, too.”112
To this end, the Foreign Ministry began to support a hospitality infrastruc-
ture for American travelers in the 1920s. The idea, of course, was not entirely 
new. Bodies like the Amerika-Institut had long hosted select groups of Ameri-
can visitors, especially academics. But after the war a much more comprehen-
sive hospitality framework evolved. As early as 1922, the Krupp Iron Works had 
funded the “Economic Policy Association” (Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft, 
WPG) to guide anglophone visitors through the Ruhr district and improve 
British and American opinions on Germany. After 1924, the WPG moved 
closer to the Foreign Ministry and engaged in a concerted program of revision-
ist hospitality work by introducing visitors to Germany’s “bleeding borders” in 
the East. After 1926, the Foreign Ministry also supported the Vereinigung Carl 
Schurz and a number of social hospitality organizations that were modeled on 
110 Fritz Gerathewohl, “Münchner Deutschkurse für Ausländer,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen 
Akademie 23 (Oct./Nov. 1928) 1101–1105, 1102.
111 Amerika-Propaganda und amerikanischer Reiseverkehr (Schmitz, ca. 1926), 28, NARA En-
try UD 328: Seized Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–
1941, Box 36, Folder: Tourism: Promotion; “The Foreigner, especially the American,” added the 
director of the Reichsbahn, Dorpmueller, “who has been in Berlin and has been satisfied with his 
visit, will always return and successfully promote us in his home country.” Clipping: “Germany 
Wants to See You.” Berliner Tageblatt, Dec. 15, 1928, PA R 246900.
112 German Consulate, Boston, to AA, Aug. 18 1927, PA R 80299.
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the French Société Bienvenue.113 All these organizations formed an interlocked, 
fairly sophisticated hospitality system: the New York tourist office, consulates, 
shipping lines, and individual hotels would inform the Foreign Ministry about 
prominent visitors, and the ministry, in turn, passed the information on to 
the pertinent organization: American scholars to the Amerika-Institut, Ger-
man Americans to the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, and those with an interest 
in territorial or economic aspects of the peace treaty to the WPG and a num-
ber of other organizations.114 By the late 1920s, there was a relatively tight-knit, 
government-sponsored network of German hospitality organizations to wine, 
dine, and unobtrusively cultivate American visitors.
Importantly, German hospitality infrastructure followed the French model, 
not the Soviet one.115 Even during the Nazi period, social hosting remained 
an offer that American visitors could, but did not have to, avail themselves of. 
Aiming to convey a politically and economically desirable image of Germany 
to visitors, hospitality organizations relied on social attention and information, 
not outright propagandizing. Breakfasts, teas, and banquets were intended pri-
marily to provide the opportunity for a “real encounter with Germans” and lay 
the foundation for a deeper understanding of Germany. Even organizations 
with a relatively narrow revisionist purpose, such as the WPG, aimed to per-
suade, not preach. By taking Americans to see the idiosyncrasies of the Eastern 
borders for themselves, the WPG aspired, as its long-time director Margarete 
Gärtner explained, to open Germany “like a book” for foreign visitors to “read 
in and study its problems.”116
Though German attention could at times feel overwhelming for American 
visitors, it arguably still paid its dividends. During these visits, Germany was 
able to secure substantial – and usually favorable – American news coverage.117 
In the case of the American Seminar, a YMCA-organized annual study tour of 
150 journalists, clerical social reformers, and college professors who all enjoyed 
113 These included the Deutsche Willkommensgesellschaft (German Welcome Society), di-
rected by Ada Schnee, the wife of former Colonial Minister Heinrich Schnee, and the Willkom-
mensclub (Welcome Club) under Anna Schultze-Fryhse.
114 On the agreement between the GTIO and the AA, see German Embassy, Washington, to all 
German Missions in the United States, Aug. 4, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, Nr. 1500 V 6d; 
The division of labor between these various organizations is explained in Margarete Gärtner, 
Botschafterin des Guten Willens, 135.
115 On the Soviet model, see Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural 
Diplomacy and Western Visitors to Soviet Russia, 1921–1941 (New York, 2011), esp. chapter 3, 
98–141.
116 Gärtner, Botschafterin des Guten Willens, 73.
117 The Foreign Ministry sought to multiply information via the press coverage of events; im-
portant speeches, such as those the German chancellor gave before the American Seminar on 
July 29, 1925, were forwarded by the press department to all major American newspapers. Sher-
wood Eddy Party, July 25–31, 1925, PA R 121327; for the American response, see “Hindenburg 
Smiled at Yankee German,” New York Times, Aug. 2, 1925.
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the special attention of the German government, the participants themselves 
later commented on their German impressions in numerous interviews, lec-
tures, and articles.118 In light of their hospitable welcome, they often felt obliged 
to emphasize the positive aspects of their stay. Having just been wined and 
dined by a group of obviously well-meaning Germans, they felt it would have 
been impolite to voice excessive criticism.119 The Boston consul was thus opti-
mistic that tourist impressions “may, if repeatedly won and confirmed, play no 
insignificant role in restoring Germany’s old standing.”120 Some tourists, he was 
confident, could indeed be turned into ambassadors.
*
The history of American tourism in Germany in the 1920s provides an in-
triguing window onto transatlantic normalization. The very fact that Amer-
icans were traveling to Germany again and that American magazines were 
featuring their experiences already indicates as much. Moreover, the image of 
a democratically chastened and industrious Germany tied in well with ideas 
of transatlantic partnership. Germany’s obvious recovery and the democratic 
conversion many Americans believed they had witnessed strengthened Ameri-
ca’s commitment to the Weimar Republic. Still, it should be acknowledged that 
the generally positive assessment of German developments hinged primarily 
on Germany’s continued willingness and ability to play its role in the cycle of 
war debts and reparations, its democratic sentiment, and its peaceable foreign 
policy. It takes little imagination to predict that Germany’s impressive recovery, 
inspiring respect and goodwill when it seemed to serve European stability and 
peace, would awaken suspicion, even resentment, once this was no longer the 
case. As the 1930s would show, in a changed global political context, it would 
be but a small step from praising German efficiency to fearing it.
Tourism Promotion and its Discontents
Let us briefly return to official involvement in tourism promotion. As we 
have already seen, the postwar years inspired ever greater official interest in 
118 In 1925, for example, Sherwood Eddy published an article in the Christian Century on con-
temporary Germany: WPG to AA, Oct. 3, 1925, PA R 122406. The Chicago consulate reported 
on a very pro-German lecture given by one of the 1930 group, German Consulate General, Chi-
cago, to AA, Nov. 19, 1930, “Vortragsabend des Rev. MacPherson in Joliet,” PA R 80303.
119 Brantz, “German-American Friendship,” 247.
120 German Consulate, Boston, to AA, Aug. 18, 1927, PA R 80299; Ambassador Prittwitz later 
attributed much of American sympathy for Germany to the fact that American travelers had 
come in regular contact with Germans and realized that they were not “Huns”; Prittwitz to v. 
Bülow, Dec. 27, 1930, PA NL von Prittwitz u. Gaffron, Vol. 4.
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this field, which had long lain outside of ministerial competence and concern. 
Throughout the 1920s, German diplomats had cooperated in a fruitful and 
mutually beneficial way with the German Tourism Promotion Bureau (RDV). 
However, the increasing attention the Foreign Ministry paid to “hospitality” al-
ready signaled its ambition to use tourism to facilitate a deeper understanding 
of Germany’s history, culture, and people – with a clearly revisionist spin – and 
to take this new field of public diplomacy under its own wing. This desire elic-
ited increasing conflicts with the RDV and inspired official efforts to establish 
considerably greater control over the field. While these efforts would not be 
successful until after 1931, they illustrate the larger significance that tourism 
management had acquired within foreign policy and, as will be shown, laid 
bare some of the underlying frictions between diplomats and tourist boosters.
Irrespective of the RDV’s many merits, its tourism promotion did not meet 
with blanket acclaim in Germany. In fact, in the later 1920s serious grievances 
about national representation emerged, both between the RDV and other tour-
ist bodies and between the RDV and the Foreign Ministry. Questions about 
what kind of Germany should be advertised abroad lay at the heart of these 
disputes.
Criticism of the RDV’s work initially came from German tourist associa-
tions, which felt that it only inadequately represented their interests. Though 
the founding of the RDV as a promotional office in 1920 had been a marked 
step toward centralizing the German tourism industry, the balance of different 
economic and political, regional and national interests grew more difficult to 
maintain. As the RDV tightened its hold on German tourism promotion after 
1925, regional businesses and touring associations began to object to its broad 
“Germany advertising,” feeling that individual cities or regions were not adver-
tised in accordance with their perceived cultural importance.121 These griev-
ances were exacerbated by the fact that the RDV betrayed its original purpose 
as an umbrella organization to serve the interests of its single largest stake-
holder: the Reichsbahn. Contributing more than 90 % of the RDV’s funds by 
1927, the Reichsbahn was not particularly inclined to mollify regional tourist 
bodies, which, in turn, came to question the RDV’s very legitimacy in repre-
senting German tourist interests.122 The immediate consequence was that tour-
ist promotion efforts once again became fragmented. In 1927, the disgruntled 
tourist bodies broke away from the RDV and founded the Working Association 
for German Tourism Promotion (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für deutsche Verkehrs-
förderung). The Reichsbahn, too, abandoned all pretense and re-established 
121 The Leipzig Trade Fair, for example, generally agreed with the need to centralize all German 
tourist promotion in one place, but at the same time demanded that it should enjoy preeminence 
over the fairs held in Frankfurt or Cologne.
122 RDV, Der Ausbau der Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung, Berlin, 1927, PA R 
65090.
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the RDV, with all its holdings, as a company-run advertising branch, in April 
1928. That its aims, offices, and advertising remained essentially unchanged 
only illustrates the degree to which the Reichsbahn had already dominated 
the endeavor. Meanwhile, long-standing industry groups like the League of 
German Spas (Deutscher Bäderverband) and the League of German Tourism 
Associations (Bund deutscher Verkehrsvereine) lobbied for a new “National 
Tourism Council” (“Reichsausschuss für Fremdenverkehr”), where heavier fi-
nancial state involvement was to help mutualize the Reichsbahn’s considerable 
resources while curtailing its influence.
The idea fell on fertile ground at the Foreign Ministry, which by then was 
entertaining its own grievances over the RDV’s work and attitude – grievances 
that illustrate a larger rift between public diplomacy and tourism promotion. 
The immediate occasion of the conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the 
RDV was their different assessment of the work of the Terramare Office (T. O.), 
a small publishing bureau founded in 1924 on the private initiative of Berlin 
lawyer Karl Kiesel. Its primary objective was to improve relations with the 
United States by helping Americans to understand Germany better principally 
through (rather text-heavy) publications on Germany distributed to American 
visitors. According to the T. O., its mission was “to arouse and deepen interest 
and understanding for German living conditions and the German character 
and to overcome all prejudices against Germany in the Anglo-Saxon world in 
North America, in England and wherever English is spoken.”123 Beginning in 
1924 and annually thereafter, the T. O. published Passing through Germany, a 
collection of essays on German life, cultural achievements, and history, as well 
as recent social and cultural developments.124 While its director Karl Kiesel had 
run the T. O. as something of a hobby, rising circulation numbers prompted 
him to turn to the Foreign Ministry for financial support in 1926. There, re-
sponses were widely positive. Ambassador Maltzan emphatically declared 
Passing through Germany an “excellent” publication, deserving of much wider 
distribution in the United States.125 The Wilhelmstrasse’s America Department 
seconded this assessment and felt that tourism promotion, “if carried out in 
the form of Herr Kiesel’s work, is of great cultural propagandist importance.”126
The RDV and its New York office, however, were of a fundamentally dif-
ferent opinion. In fact, the GTIO’s assessment of Passing through Germany was 
123 Terramare Office (Résumé of Purpose) 1930, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc. Re-
cords, Series 1 General Historical and Office Materials Box 44 Folder 2, HSP.
124 The first two editions actually went under the name “In Honour of our American Guests.” 
Passing through Germany was published annually until 1936.
125 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Aug. 31, 1926, “Verbreitung der deutschen Werbes-
chrift ‘Passing through Germany’,” PA R 65090.
126 Aufzeichnung, Aug. 19, 1927, PA R 65090; this was repeatedly voiced, for example, in 
Aufzeichnung betr. Terramare-Office, Feb. 7, 1929, PA R 246901; and emphatically in AA to 
Ministry of the Interior, Aug. 13, 1928, PA R 246899.
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nothing short of devastating. Schmitz deemed the booklet suitable neither as 
promotional material nor as a guidebook, dismissing its treatment of Germany 
as incoherent and impressionistic. Some of the major tourist attractions like 
the Rhine or Nuremberg were not even featured in its pages. Moreover, “who-
ever glances through this brochure must get the impression that Germany has 
no East, no Baltic Sea area, no spas at all, because there is little or no mention 
of these things.” All in all, Schmitz failed to understand what “the actual objec-
tive of such a sort of booklet should even be.” Accordingly, the RDV refused to 
help fund or distribute Terramare products, treating it as it did all publications 
it deemed subpar. A meeting in late February of 1927 between representatives 
of the Foreign Ministry, the RDV, and the Terramare Office did little to clear 
the air. Rather, the RDV once more refused to cooperate, deprecated Passing 
through Germany, and doubted the competence of the German ambassador 
who had recommended it so emphatically. To the representative of the Foreign 
Ministry, this was final proof of “the narrow-minded and autocratic operations 
of this organization.” As a consequence, it cut its modest subsidies to the RDV, 
channeling them into the Terramare Office instead.127
On the most basic level, this episode amounted to a struggle over authority 
with regard to foreign representation. The Foreign Ministry had, indeed, ap-
proached the meeting as a testing ground for the RDV’s general willingness to 
support outside work and, more importantly, to “comply with the suggestions 
of the Foreign Ministry.”128 Seeing itself as superordinate in all foreign affairs, 
the Wilhelmstrasse interpreted the RDV’s unwillingness to accommodate its 
suggestions as nothing short of an impudent challenge to its authority. This was 
especially the case because Ambassador Ago von Maltzan, the career diplomat 
and former state secretary whose competence the RDV had openly questioned, 
was the very embodiment of the German Foreign Service. Accusing him of 
poor judgment was tantamount to deriding the Foreign Ministry in general; 
hence, it incited determined reactions. Not only was the RDV deprived of For-
eign Ministry subsidies; it was also asked to submit an official apology to the 
ambassador. In addition, the Foreign Ministry henceforth threw its weight be-
hind reorganizing tourist interests in a way that would effectively rein in the 
Reichsbahn.
While this power struggle itself testifies to Germany’s growing official in-
terest in international tourism, the diametrically opposed assessments of the 
work of the T. O. reflect a more fundamental conceptual disagreement over the 
means and ends of German tourism promotion. As shown above, the RDV 
did understand its work as a form of national service, or at least advertised it 
127 Aufzeichnung (Schmidt-Rolke), Mar. 9, 1927, PA R 65090.
128 Memorandum Davidsen, Nov. 16, 1926, PA R 65090.
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as such.129 It agreed with the Foreign Ministry that a greater number of Amer-
icans had to visit Germany and worked tirelessly to project an attractive image 
of Germany in the United States. Still, the two bodies’ ultimate motivations 
differed. The GTIO was willing enough to accommodate diplomatic interests 
as far as they fit into its general framework, yet it was, after all, a business op-
eration. Its primary aim was to “sell” its image of Germany abroad, even if this 
meant peddling a more trivial form of national representation. It operated on 
the premise that has guided tourism promotion ever since, namely, that Ger-
man realities and traditions first and foremost have to meet tourist desires and 
occasionally have to be repackaged, even reinvented, for the tourist gaze.130 In 
other words, the degree of “marketability,” not the degree of authenticity, deter-
mined how it represented Germany.
This commodification of the German experience, however, clashed with 
the Foreign Ministry’s own emerging ideal of “intellectual tourism” (“vergeis-
tigte Touristik”), which aimed to facilitate foreign elites experiencing a mean-
ingful intellectual encounter and engender in them a deeper understanding 
of German Kultur, heritage, and history. The official primarily responsible for 
this conceptual elaboration was Hermann Davidsen, who had taught German 
at Cornell University for more than a decade. Having returned to Germany 
in 1919 and originally recruited as the Foreign Ministry’s advisor on German 
Americans, he had taken charge of all tourist matters in 1924. In this role, he 
established himself as an expert on tourism and foreign policy not only in 
lengthy internal memoranda, but in public lectures, articles, and radio inter-
views.131 Though Davidsen, a former professor, was also among the very first 
to underline the macroeconomic impact of international tourism, the more 
profound value of travel always remained educational for him. It was during 
the general meeting of the League of German Tourism Associations in August 
1928 that Davidsen articulated the Foreign Ministry’s first coherent theory of 
tourism’s foreign policy function.132 His speech forcefully underscored tour-
ism as a foreign policy question that belonged within the purview of the For-
eign Ministry. A foreigner seeing Germany for himself, he stated,
129 Dorpmüller in Clipping: “Germany Wants to See You.”
130 When meeting with German journalists, Schmitz instructed them and local tourist bodies 
on the picture material to be taken. Many of the pictures he received, for example, he saw as unfit 
to advertise Germany abroad. Pictures of traditional folk festivals, he noted, frequently captured 
an old toothless woman sporting the most traditional of dirndls – an image little suited to selling 
Germany abroad. Instead, Schmitz noted, photographs primarily had to “capture (Germany’s) 
flourishing youth,” even if the costumes were less authentic; “Werbe-Spiegel aufgestellt in der 
Ersten und Zweiten verkehrspolitischen Konferenz von der RDV,” NARA Entry UD 328: Seized 
Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–1941 Box 36 Folder: 
Tourism: Promotion.
131 See Davidsen’s reference files in PA R 105542.
132 Hermann Davidsen, “Fremdenverkehr und Außenpolitik,” Monatliche Mitteilung des Bun-
des deutscher Verkehrsvereine (Nov. 1928), PA R 246900.
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will then find – and thousands have done so since the war – that the aspects that united us 
are stronger than those that divide us, and he will happily correct the image of Germany 
he has formed as a result of the insufficient or even deliberately misguiding reporting of 
his press. The misunderstandings that cloud the relations of nations, this much should be 
clear, rest not on an actual clash of economic or political interests, but to a large part on 
ignorance of the facts […] and every foreigner who travels Germany with open eyes and 
ears and an honest will to see the things as they are will return home a small advertising 
center from which the […] truth about Germany will radiate.133
While he acknowledged that various organizations were already working to 
create that “favorable atmosphere and good weather” between Germany and 
the United States, he stated that the greatest “cultural diplomatic importance” 
lay in an “intellectual tourism” that neither overaccommodated American 
tastes (such as offering golf courses) nor staged traditions (like folk dances) 
solely for tourists’ sake; rather, it offered an “authentic” presentation of German 
life, “revealing the connection between Kulturvolk and landscape.” “Whatever 
is not real has not grown in Germany,” Davidsen asserted, “will not have an ef-
fect [on the foreigner] in the long run.” In other words, tourism should not offer 
American tourists whatever sold best, as the RDV did, but whatever was most 
representative of German culture. Once the tourist trade had been reunited, 
Davidsen noted, a general meeting, involving not just the tourist trade but 
“artists, scholars and politicians” would have to develop “large, well-thought-
out, general guidelines for tourism promotion” to forge a truly representative 
cultural image of Germany. As Davidsen summed up the Foreign Ministry’s 
conclusions: “tourism promotion has to be pursued as cultural promotion.”134
On a deeper level, Davidsen, with his ideal of “intellectual tourism,” was 
giving expression to contemporary unease with mass tourism increasingly 
aimed at recreation, not education. Davidsen, like many of his class and edu-
cation, clearly yearned for an allegedly older kind of tourism that had aimed 
at gratifying intellectual curiosity, not consumer desires.135 Based on the com-
mon notion that American-style advertising somehow corrupted German Kul-
tur, this group found the commodification of national representation deeply 
disquieting. By the same token, they regarded shallow, easily comprehensible 
slogans and attractive images as singularly ill-equipped to convey the depth of 
German “national character.” Even though the GTIO’s Americanized image of 
Germany admittedly helped the government to achieve foreign policy goals, 
it still contradicted educated bourgeois notions of how Germany ought to be 
represented. This was the deeper significance of Davidsen’s telling remark that 
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 On the changed nature of tourism in the 1920s, see Levenstein, Seductive Journey, 233–244.
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the RDV’s criticism of Passing through Germany relied on altogether “faulty 
premises.” Schmitz’s failure to comprehend the function of a publication like 
Passing through Germany, Davidsen felt, spoke not to the booklet’s inadequacy 
for tourism promotion but to “how little Schmitz is suited for his post.”136 If 
Passing through Germany was a profound introduction to contemporary Ger-
man issues, then the GTIO efforts to “sell” Germany at all cost threatened to 
turn a profound Kultur into a soulless product.
But the episode was about more than the offended sensibilities of the Bil-
dungsbürgertum. Rather, it also expressed the government’s prevalent desire to 
wield tourism promotion as a foreign policy tool just as international com-
petition for American tourists was noticeably increasing once more. Not only 
had most major European countries established tourist bureaus in New York 
by 1928, but France had also initiated a major campaign to defend its once un-
disputed position as America’s preferred vacation spot.137 Responding to the 
alleged “German threat” in the United States, the French parliament had allo-
cated 30 million francs to the Office National du Tourisme in 1929, appointing 
an undersecretary for tourism a year later.138 The very same year, the Maison 
de France, a central tourist information bureau, opened its doors in Paris,139 
and the German embassy in Paris reported on plans to establish a massive 
Palais de France in New York City to house touristic, cultural propaganda and 
business offices. Designed from top to bottom to recapture French prestige vis-
à-vis German efforts, it was to be a celebration of French tastes, with every 
floor named after a famous Great War battle. The German embassy was unable 
to hide its admiration in the face of this new example of France’s sweeping cul-
tural diplomatic vision, stating: “tourism promotion through brochures is as 
far from this form of advertisement as a primitive cart from the most modern 
of Mercedes cars or as an oil lamp from the sea of electronic light in a modern 
metropolis.”140 In light of these developments, German tourism promotion 
136 Memorandum Davidsen, Nov. 16, 1926, PA R 65090.
137 By April 1927, New York City boasted British, Swiss, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, Italian, 
French, Spanish, Austrian, and German tourist offices. Für die Direktion der Reichszentrale für 
Deutsche Verkehrswerbung, Berlin zusammengestellt von der German Railroads Information 
Office in New York, April 1927, Entry UD 336 General Administrative Records Seized from the 
German Railroad Information Office, 1926–41 Folder: RDV Travel Statistics, 1927–38; for Ger-
man observations, see German Embassy, Paris, to AA, Oct. 15, 1929, “Bestrebungen zur Erweit-
erung der französischen Verkehrswerbung,” PA R 246903; Hermann Davidsen, “Französische 
Verkehrspropaganda. Abwehr und Angriff,” 1930, PA R 105542; Hermann Davidsen, “Franzö-
sische Sorgen” (1931/32), PA R 105542; in general, see Young, “A Place Like Any Other?,” 139.
138 German Embassy, Paris, to AA, Jan. 18, 1929, “Fremdenverkehrsförderung in Frankreich,” 
PA R 246901.
139 German Embassy, Paris, to AA, Dec. 27, 1928, “Bestrebungen zur Hebung des Fremdenver-
kehrs in Frankreich,” PA R 246900.
140 III A 5328 (Embassy Paris), “La Maison de France in Paris und Le Palais de France in New 
York,” Dec. 18, 1929, PA R 246904. The Palais de France eventually became the Maison Française 
at the Rockefeller Center.
“Germany Invites You!”: Tourism Promotion as Public Diplomacy 316
that was generic and inauthentic was not only intellectually unsatisfying; it was 
also unable to compete.
Above all, the conflict with the RDV signaled the Foreign Ministry’s de-
termination to use tourism promotion as an instrument of foreign policy. It 
clearly conceived the need for a governmental tourism strategy to reconcile 
modern marketing with cultural distinctiveness or whatever else was politi-
cally opportune. This was nowhere clearer than in the founding of the Foreign 
Ministry’s first ever tourism desk, headed by Davidsen, in January 1928. While 
its attachment to the America Department attests to the undisputed primacy 
of American tourists, that it was realized at all underlines the Foreign Min-
istry’s desire to subject international tourism to official policy formation.141 
Henceforth, German missions abroad were asked to report regularly on the 
development of international tourism, and Berlin energetically pushed to in-
crease its own influence on the newly founded German Tourism Council.142 
It did not achieve its objective until 1931, and then only incompletely, yet the 
determination with which it championed the reorganization of this council ac-
cording to the French (state-governed) model signaled its new understanding 
of international travel as a policy field. The 1920s, in short, had alerted German 
foreign policymakers to the considerable political and economic possibilities 
of international tourism.
*
By 1930, tourism promotion and hospitality had emerged as a legitimate and 
quite successful field of German public diplomacy, and German efforts argu-
ably paid off in terms of revenue and goodwill. They helped to entrench the 
image of a stable, peaceful, and hardworking Germany, a country most “like 
us” to Americans, which was important for attracting loans and gaining po-
litical concessions alike. It is, therefore, fair to assume that tourism was part 
and parcel of the German-American rapprochement in the postwar decade. 
The abundant funds provided by the Reichsbahn and its early adoption of 
American marketing techniques contributed greatly to this success and nota-
bly strengthened the German position vis-à-vis its main competitor, France. 
This said, this analysis of German tourism promotion also indicates some of 
the shortcomings of German efforts. Most notably, neither German officials 
nor tourism organizations ever used tourism promotion to advertise Germany 
141 As de Haas, the head of the America Department, explained, this was especially “to draw a 
greater amount of the about $700 million, which American tourists (according to official Amer-
ican statements) expend every year abroad, to Germany.” VIII A Nr 631/28, Jan. 1928 (de Haas), 
PA R 246898; the decision was made official in February 1928: I A 280 Internal Circular, Feb. 22, 
1928, PA R 246898.
142 AA to German missions in the United States, June 4, 1928, PA R 246899.
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as a republic. The Foreign Ministry’s criticism that the GTIO “sold” a rather 
nondescript version of Germany was true in so far as the GTIO advertised a 
timeless, albeit modern, Germany, not the Weimar Republic. At the same time, 
this lack of focus on the form of government, as such, was never the reason for 
official criticism. When German officials pondered ways to integrate tourism 
promotion into larger policy agendas, they aimed to open it up to revisionist 
agitation and broader cultural promotion, not representations of the republic. 
As we shall see, it was precisely this state of affairs that would facilitate an al-
most seamless transition from Weimar to Nazi tourism promotion after 1933.

Reflections: German Cultural Diplomacy and the Transatlantic Rapprochement, 
1924–1929
During the years of Weimar’s “relative stabilization” (1924–1929), its public di-
plomacy grew by leaps and bounds. The half decade after 1924 saw the prolifer-
ation of organizations, committees, and programs directed toward cultivating 
public and cultural relations with the United States. These included transat-
lantic friendship and intermediary organizations like the Vereinigung Carl 
Schurz (Chapter 4) and the German Academic Exchange Service (Chapter 5), 
as well as promotional bureaus like the German Tourist Information Office in 
New York (Chapter 6). Although the Foreign Ministry subsidized all of these – 
and many smaller ones – they relied on the initiative of a group of peaceful 
revisionists, including parliamentarians like Anton Erkelenz (founder of the 
Vereinigung Carl Schurz), tourist promoters like Ernst Schmitz (director of the 
German Tourist Information Office), professors like Ernst Jäckh (head of the 
Hochschule für Politik) and Alfred Weber (founder of the Academic Exchange 
Service), as well as education managers like Reinhold Schairer (of the America 
Work Student Service), Adolf Morsbach (of the Academic Exchange Service) 
and Fritz Beck (of the Munich International Student House). Convinced that 
Germany’s “distorted image” was partly to blame for its postwar predicament, 
this group of men (and a few women) sought to rebuild ties with the United 
States and thus opportunities to get to know the “real” Germany.
This dimension of Weimar’s Amerikapolitik, it stands to argue, had a dis-
tinct impact on the transatlantic rapprochement of the 1920s. At this point, it 
seems apt to recall once more the tremendous change that German-American 
relations underwent in the 1920s. Following World War I, relations between 
the two countries were clearly at a low point. Although the conflict had not 
affected many Americans as immediately as other belligerents, they had devel-
oped a strongly anti-German sentiment and rhetoric during the war. This had 
emerged from their nation’s dual need to mobilize a reluctant society for war 
and to police a large German-American population, which the government 
identified as a potential “enemy within.” Although U. S. opinions on Germany 
diversified after the armistice and the peace treaty, anti-German attitudes re-
mained common. In the early 1920s, even an action as seemingly inoffensive as 
aiding German children could easily draw public criticism. Contacts between 
German and American society remained fairly scarce until the mid-1920s and, 
wherever they existed, they were often complicated by memories of wartime 
“offenses” and postwar grievances. Five years after the war, a mix of indiffer-
ence, antipathy, and caution still characterized U. S. attitudes towards Germany.
This changed profoundly in the years after 1924. By the late 1920s, journal-
ists, academics, and diplomats celebrated a new-found transatlantic friendship. 
U.S. Ambassador Schurman, for example, even saw the two nations “marching 
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forward in a great and noble adventure in the cause of human civilization.”1 
And while official statements of this sort must be taken with a grain of salt, the 
preceding three chapters of the present volume clearly documented the nor-
malization of German-American relations. By the end of the decade, German 
Americans (whose standing was often closely bound to the state of transat-
lantic relations) once more enjoyed a respected presence in the United States, 
and their endeavors, such as the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, gained the 
support of prominent Anglo-Americans. The number of American students in 
Germany, especially those taking holiday courses, had also risen notably, and 
events like the joint honorary degree ceremony for U. S. Ambassador Schur-
man and foreign minister Stresemann at Heidelberg or the re-opening of the 
Deutsches Haus at Columbia University expressed the amiable societal con-
tacts that had once more developed. Moreover, these symbolic acts were but an 
outward expression of the cultural demobilization of German and American 
elites like Nicholas Murray Butler (see Chapter 5), who once again worked to 
renew and strengthen connections between the two countries. The ever greater 
number of U. S. tourists traveling to Germany, which peaked at about 110,000 
in 1930, as well as the increasingly positive presentation of Germany in U. S. pe-
riodicals, were two further tangible indicators of how far U. S. attitudes toward 
Germany had improved. Considering the vitality and cordiality of the Ger-
man-American relationship in the late 1920s, one is tempted to agree with Am-
bassador Prittwitz’s contention that German-American relations had “never 
been better.”2
Yet, this renewal of cultural entanglements across the Atlantic not only ex-
pressed but also shaped the German-American rapprochement. This is not to 
say, of course, that the normalization of German-American relations was solely 
or even primarily due to either German (or American) public diplomacy. Many 
of the previously discussed initiatives were never designed to have immediate 
results.3 In addition, as historians have shown, the transatlantic rapproche-
ment was influenced by a wide range of factors that, more often than not, fell 
well beyond the reach of official policies. For one, the postwar situation itself 
favored the rapprochement of the two countries, which, by virtue of wartime 
and postwar constellations, had no real territorial, financial, commercial, or 
military disputes with one another. The United States intervention in the repa-
1 See the translation of Schurman’s Heidelberg speech, which he submitted to the State Depart-
ment: American Embassy, Berlin to State Dept, May 8, 1928, NARA RG 59 Box 1640 [Schur-
man] 123/Sch 87/229.
2 Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten seit 
dem Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1934), 25.
3 With regard to student exchanges, for example, contemporaries recognized that even if they 
ultimately succeeded in fostering pro-German (or pro-American) sentiments, it would be at 
least a decade until the former exchange students reached the sort of professional positions from 
which they could hope to influence transatlantic relations.
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rations settlement in 1924 and its subsequent $3 billion financial investment in 
Germany also underwrote this process of reconciliation. Moreover, rising U. S. 
tensions with France and Great Britain in the later 1920s suggested Germany, 
now stabilized and peaceful, as a more reliable and like-minded partner across 
the Atlantic. Finally, growing disillusionment among Americans with the na-
tion’s participation in World War I was perhaps the single most powerful factor 
in American cultural demobilization. As Americans began to question the mo-
tives of their involvement and as they grew ever more aware and resentful of 
the role that Allied propaganda had allegedly played in the U. S. entry into the 
war, they began to call old “truths” about German “war guilt” and atrocities in 
Belgium into question.4
But one cannot dismiss the impact of German public diplomacy altogether. 
Although it is notoriously difficult to establish “influence,” especially when it 
concerns as intangible a concept as public sentiment, chapters 4, 5, and 6 of-
fered some evidence to that effect. This is perhaps most notable with regard 
to German efforts to facilitate the visits of tourists and students. Their stay in 
Germany, as chapters 5 and 6 showed, often forced them to correct precon-
ceived notions about Germany and led them to develop a generally positive 
attitude towards the hospitable, docile, and, in many respects, “Americanized” 
Germans they encountered. At least some of these American visitors came 
away with the idea that Germany was much more like them than the former 
Allies. One American student, for example, wrote from Berlin in 1927 that “[o]
ur alliance with France in the war was only temporary and accidental, whereas 
with Germany we have a much closer actual connection and kinship.”5 In the 
United States, too, the carefully selected German exchange students often left 
a positive impression, entirely at odds with the propaganda depictions of the 
Great War. Whereas their numbers remained relatively small, their presence 
on campus had a disproportionately large impact, precisely because they were 
often the first German visitors Americans had experienced in over a decade. 
Encounters with likeable, modest and considerate German students must have 
gone a long way toward undermining prevalent enemy images.6 In this way, 
German efforts at tourism promotion and academic exchange aided the pro-
cess of transatlantic cultural demobilization.
4 See Adler, “The War Guilt Question”; and Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914, 366–
367.
5 Quoted in James Colwell, “The American Experience in Berlin during the Weimar Republic” 
(PhD diss., Yale University, 1961), 217; see also the experiences of Shepard Stone in Volker 
Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philan-
thropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, 2001), 8–10.
6 This is even true for the late 1930s; see, for example, Rockefeller Archives Center, IIE Records, 
Alumni and Historical Files, RG 1, Reel 6 HF, Side 2 # 19, Comment on German Students, 1936–
38.
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In fact, these examples point to a key feature of cultural diplomacy: the 
power of the personal encounter. As John Horne has noted, the most difficult 
aspect of cultural demobilization was “the personal encounter, the finding 
of gestures, words and practices of reconciliation;”7 and it was precisely such 
“personal encounters” that German public diplomats systematically facilitated. 
Whether in tourism advertisements, in reminding Americans of their happy 
student days, or in hosting American visitors, they always sought to overcome 
the “Otherness” that the war had attached to Germany and to generate situa-
tions that would allow for such “gestures, words and practices of reconcilia-
tion.” For German (public) diplomats, this commitment to personal encoun-
ters sometimes involved considerable personal discomfort (as when they had 
to welcome Nicholas Murray Butler to Berlin in 1926). That they ultimately 
maintained this commitment speaks to the significance they attached to it. 
While the surviving records do not allow us to quantify the myriad individual 
experiences on both sides of the Atlantic, they nonetheless suggest that such 
personal encounters had a particularly marked influence in the 1920s because 
(i) the German image had been so extremely “distorted” during the war, and 
(ii) the experience of wartime propaganda had prompted Americans to valor-
ize their personal observations. More than anything else, Ambassador Prittwitz 
concluded, it was their sojourn across the Atlantic that had finally convinced 
Americans that Germans were not “Huns” after all.8
For an assessment of the influence of German cultural diplomacy it is also 
helpful to entertain for a moment a counterfactual scenario, i. e., to ponder 
what might have happened had German cultural diplomats not taken such 
prevalent interest in improving relations with the United States. Arguably, the 
discriminatory practices against foreign tourists and students (such as extra 
fees and bureacratic red tape) that had existed in the early 1920s would not 
have been removed as quickly and would have continued to cause considera-
ble transatlantic ill-will. A significant number of Americans might never have 
visited Germany. Certainly, some of the most celebrated transatlantic events, 
such as the Schurman/Stresemann honorary degree ceremony at Heidelberg, 
would never have taken place. Even if the passing of time and financial en-
tanglements alone likely would still have normalized transatlantic relations, 
the process of cultural demobilization would have been slower still. Above all, 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Germany would have once more 
committed the types of blunders that had always marred Wilhelmine Ameri-
kapolitik. Nowhere is this more visible than in Berlin’s clear policy of restraint 
toward German Americans. It was only because German cultural diplomats 
7 John Horne, “Kulturelle Demobilmachung 1919–1939. Ein sinnvoller historischer Begriff?,” in 
Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1939, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig, 129–150 
(Göttingen, 2005), 142.
8 Prittwitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1930, PA NL von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Vol. 4.
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abstained from political agitation among German Americans that a reconcil-
iation with “Anglo-Americans” became possible. Certainly, an active German 
Volkstumspolitik would have become a most serious liability to transatlantic re-
lations, as it did before 1917 and again after 1933. Consequently, the determined 
cultural diplomacy of Weimar, both in the things it did and those it did not do, 
contributed to the U. S.-German rapprochement of the 1920s.
This said, it is important to note that these cultural initiatives were only 
part of much broader German efforts at public diplomacy. As Carmen Müller 
has shown, the Foreign Ministry went to considerable lengths to cultivate the 
goodwill of American news correspondents in Berlin. Not only did it try to 
minimize their personal discomfort (i. e., by helping them with accommoda-
tion and police registration), but it also sought to develop closer relations with 
them so that it could call in a favor from time to time.9 Whenever possible, 
the Foreign Ministry’s press department also sought to preempt any overly an-
ti-American reporting in the German press.10 In Washington, too, as Chap-
ter 4 showed, ambassadors like Ago von Maltzan pursued a proactive press 
policy. Still, the most effective part of German public diplomacy lay in Stre-
semann’s weekly international news conferences (and his general availability 
to U. S. news correspondents), which allowed him to build relations with the 
correspondents and to clarify the German position on important international 
developments. American journalists themselves credited Weimar’s successes in 
the United States to Stresemann’s abundant public relations skills. In his obit-
uary of the German foreign minister, U. S. journalist Frank H. Simonds felt 
that “certainly no American official from the President down to the last cabinet 
minister of the present day meets the press as Stresemann did. And as a result 
not only did the foreign secretary have a “good press,” but his country’s politics, 
purposes and interests were always certain of accurate and friendly presenta-
tion.”11 Unlike in the Wilhelmine era, then, public diplomacy was not at the 
margins but at the center of Weimar’s foreign policy towards the United States.
9 Müller, Weimar im Blick, esp. chapter 3; as she notes, Berlin’s main line during the 1920s was 
“tactical caution within the United States one the one hand and privileged treatment of Ameri-
can news correspondents in Berlin on the other hand,” 102.
10 However, given the different social worlds that German diplomats and U. S. journalists inhab-
ited, as well as the stark polarization of Weimar politics, these efforts were often not very success-
ful. As Dominik Geppert and others have shown, German press policy was always hampered by 
the limited social interaction between diplomats and journalists; see Dominik Geppert, Presse-
kriege: Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen (Munich, 2007); and 
Andreas Rose, “Der politische Raum Londons und die öffentlichen Beziehungen zwischen Eng-
land und Deutschland vor 1914,” in Außenpolitik im Medienzeitalter, ed. Bösch and Hoeres, 95–
123.
11 Frank H. Simonds, “Stresemann’s Death,” American Review of Reviews, Nov. 1929, 71; in his 
biography of Stresemann, Kurt Koszyk notes that “Stresemann was in his habitus and in his 
thinking a journalist and a publicist, whose expertise was economic questions and who […] be-
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Ultimately, German public diplomacy’s positive impact derived from its 
close alignment with a much larger accommodationist Amerikapolitik. Unlike 
in the Wilhelmine period, when Germany’s disregard for the Monroe Doctrine 
had made its public diplomacy appear to be little more than empty “gifts and 
gestures,” Weimar’s public campaign was an integral part of its overall policy. 
After 1924, at least, German policy decisions, whether large or small, obviously 
reflected deference to perceived American wishes and general consideration 
of the “optics” of German actions in the United States. For example, Germany 
ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact extremely rapidly in 1928, it diligently avoided 
the appearance of forming part of a debtors’ coalition against the United States, 
and even chose not to appoint a naval attaché to the embassy in Washington, 
all with an eye to how the American public would react.12 As Lord d’Abernon, 
the British ambassador to Germany, noted in 1929, “in all the more impor-
tant developments in Germany during the post-war years, American influence 
has been decisive. Eliminate action taken on American advice, or in assumed 
agreement with American opinion, or in anticipation of American approval, 
and the whole course of policy would be altered.”13 More than anything else, 
this steady consideration of American psychology was what fundamentally 
distinguished Weimar’s Amerikapolitik from its Wilhelmine predecessor.14 
Only in this much larger context of accommodating U. S. sentiments did Wei-
mar’s much narrower public diplomacy attain its significance.
Importantly for Weimar Germany, this strategic orientation toward the 
United States – while not unanimously supported – had proven rewarding. 
From the perspective of 1919, indeed, Germany had fared rather well as Amer-
ica’s “junior partner” in Europe. By late 1929, modest prosperity had been re-
stored, the Young reparations plan (lowering German payments) had just been 
accepted, and the French had agreed to evacuate the Rhineland by mid-1930, 
five years ahead of schedule. A dispassionate stocktaking would have con-
firmed what Bernstorff, the former ambassador to Washington, had predicted 
in 1918: that it was with American support that Germany would recapture its 
place in the world.15
came a foreign policymaker”; see Kurt Koszyk, Gustav Stresemann. Der kaisertreue Demokrat. 
Eine Biographie (Cologne, 1989), 17.
12 On this issue, see German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Feb. 19 1926, PA R 28491; in the 
case of the decision not to send a naval attaché, the embassy had noted that America’s positive 
opinion of Germany depended on “Germany’s unwavering peacefulness”; for further examples, 
see Jonas, The United States and Germany, 166.
13 Edgar Vincent d’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace (London, 1929), 1:18.
14 One of the only exceptions happened upon Wilson’s death; on this episode, see Berg, Gustav 
Stresemann, 237–240.
15 “Aufzeichnung des Leiters der vorbereitenden Maßnahmen für die Friedensverhandlungen 
Graf von Bernstorff,” Nov. 24, 1918, ADAP Series A, Vol. 1, no. 36, p. 55.
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But the late 1920s were not a dispassionate time. After all, many Germans 
measured foreign policy “success” not in relation to 1919 but to 1914. From that 
perspective, they seemed unsatisfactory to say the least: ten years after the war, 
Germany had failed to truly gain any economic, military, or territorial revision 
and the German public was growing frustrated with a policy of reconciliation 
that bore fruit too slowly.16 Rightwing parties campaigned increasingly vigor-
ously against a policy that seemed to demand constant German concessions 
for little in return. Restraining such calls for a more assertive foreign policy 
required extraordinary political skill. From his deathbed, Foreign Minister 
Stresemann saw the Young Reparations Plan of 1929 through the Reichstag, 
and it already faced a vicious protest campaign spearheaded by the National 
Socialists. His death in October 1929 was, as U. S. journalist Simonds presci-
ently noted, “nothing less than a disaster” for Europe.17 When the American 
stock market crashed just weeks later, perceptive observers on both sides of the 
Atlantic were already able to see the fissures in German-American relations, 
with Germany’s desire for revision beginning to outpace America’s desire for 
peaceful change. In the early 1930s, this constellation would profoundly affect 
the much lauded “transatlantic friendship” and bring longer-standing griev-
ances to the fore.
16 This was even frustrating to the left liberal DDP; see Heβ, “Das ganze Deutschland soll es 
sein,” 174.
17 Simonds, “Stresemann’s Death,” 71.

Part III  
Maintaining Transatlantic “Friendship”?,  
1930–1937

Chapter 7  
Public Diplomacy, the Great Depression, and the 
Intrusion of German Politics, 1930–1932
The onset of the Great Depression dealt a heavy blow to the cordial trans-atlantic relations that had emerged in the 1920s. It undercut concrete initiatives, drained budgets, and deflated notions of American prosper-
ity, which had defined German attitudes toward America. Because Germany’s 
relationship with the United States was heavily financial in nature, the Depres-
sion transformed it more than its relationships toward other countries. As Ger-
many grew more politically radicalized and began to campaign more forcefully 
for revision, the mutuality of interest that had underpinned the transatlantic 
relationship was increasingly strained. In this situation, public diplomacy of-
fered a chance to counteract Germany’s deteriorating image and obscure the 
profound changes that were actually taking place in German-American rela-
tions. This chapter will explore a number of heavily publicized transatlantic 
celebrations in the early 1930s to illustrate German attempts to maintain a Ger-
man-American “friendship” at a time when the political, economic, and social 
fabric of the Weimar Republic was beginning to unravel.
The Impact of the Depression on Cultural Diplomacy and Transatlantic 
Relations
The beginning of the Depression dealt an undeniable blow to transatlantic 
cultural relations. Funds available for cultural and public relations dwindled 
in both the United States and Germany. Within a year, the Foreign Ministry’s 
cultural affairs budget dropped by 17 %, prompting keenly felt cuts in a field 
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that had just begun to expand in previous years.1 The semi-official Vereinigung 
Carl Schurz, for example, saw its budget shrivel from 85,000 marks in 1928 
to 25,000 marks four years later. If the Depression seriously affected German 
activities around the world, it doubly affected transatlantic programs because 
they often relied on American generosity. A number of projected undertak-
ings – such as the Carnegie Endowment’s idea of establishing a Stresemann 
Memorial/Peace Academy in Berlin – had to be shelved for lack of funds. Even 
relatively well-entrenched initiatives, such as the America Work Student Ser-
vice (AWD, est. 1925) collapsed early on. Already on February 19, 1930, the De-
partment of Labor informed the AWD that the economic crisis had forced it to 
terminate the program. While the German embassy was able to postpone im-
plementation, by November 1931, the department ultimately determined that 
most of the German trainees were “holding drafting jobs in this country which 
could be very properly filled by American employees.”2 The end of the AWD 
illustrates that for U. S. industry and authorities, the generous programs of the 
mid-1920s had outlived their usefulness.
At the same time, many initiatives of the 1920s continued nearly unaffected 
or came to fruition in the early 1930s. The Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation 
(CMSF), which Germans and German Americans had been planning since 
1928, for instance, took up its work only in 1930. A year later, Gustav Oberlae-
nder, a German-born self-made millionaire, endowed it with a $1 million trust 
to support the study trips of Anglo-American “multipliers” to Germany.3 
Working closely with German officials, the CSMF would facilitate the trans-
atlantic visits of several hundred American journalists, educators, and social 
reformers as Oberlaender Fellows in the coming decade, as well as maintain 
and even expand German-American academic exchanges, with its financial re-
sources.4 In 1930, too, the University of Munich welcomed the first cohort of 
1 Überblick über die Kürzungen der kulturpolitischen Fonds des Auswärtigen Amts, PA R 
61125; Pöppinghaus, Moralische Eroberungen, 121.
2 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Carr), Nov. 12, 1931, FRUS 1931, Vol. 2, 
333–334; on the German Embassy’s repeated interventions, see German Embassy to the Depart-
ment of State, Jan. 30, 1931, FRUS 1931, Vol. 2, 329–330; German Embassy to the Department of 
State, Memorandum, June 28, 1930, FRUS 1930, 112–113; Secretary of State to the German Am-
bassador (von Prittwitz), Mar. 26, 1931, FRUS 1931, Vol. 2.
3 On Oberlaender and his philanthropic endeavors, see Gregory Kupsky, “Gustav Oberlaender,” 
in Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-American Business Biographies, 1720 to the Present, 
Vol. 4, 1918–1945: The Age of the World Wars, ed. Jeffrey Fear, available online at German Histor-
ical Institute, http://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/entry.php?rec=56; see also Clipping: 
“Gustav Oberländer, ein deutsch-amerikanischer Mäzen,” Germania, May 2, 1931, PA R 80304.
4 While they carefully avoided any public involvement, German officials informally cooperated 
with the foundation from the very beginning. During the fundraising process, they offered ad-
vice on potential donors and, later on, suggested German lecturers. In 1931, German diplomats 
also precluded independent CSMF representation in Berlin, which would have weakened Ger-
man influence and convinced the foundation to employ two German representatives with excep-
tionally close ties to German officialdom: Karl von Lewinski (a former German consul general in 
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American participants to the Junior Year in Munich; not until mid-1931 did the 
University of Heidelberg open its new, American-donated building, and only 
shortly thereafter did the first postwar “Roosevelt Professor” hold his inaugural 
lecture in Berlin. In this respect, many of the efforts and initiatives of the 1920s 
clearly paid their dividends long past Black Tuesday.
And still, the Depression doubtlessly eroded transatlantic contacts on a 
deeper and often less visible level, as the example of tourism may illustrate. 
American tourism to Europe reached its interwar peak at 300,000 in the sum-
mer of 1930 only to plummet to 130,000 in 1933. It would be more than two 
decades before American transatlantic travel would recover to its 1930 volume. 
In the 1930s, a powerful “See America first” campaign suited both economic re-
alities and national sentiment. Importantly, however, even Americans who still 
ventured overseas now saw Germany with different, decidedly less benevolent 
eyes. For example, whereas they had often understood modern German ar-
chitecture as a symbol of Germany’s democratic conversion in the prosperous 
1920s, they now viewed it with some skepticism, raising unpleasant questions 
about German municipal spending habits. Given the billion-dollar US loans to 
German cities, a 1931 article in the widely read Saturday Evening Post was not 
alone in wondering whether German cities had not been squandering “other 
people’s money” on modern architecture.5 In light of these developments, the 
embassy even asked German tourism promoters to pull the tourism brochure 
“Modern Style” devoted to modern German architecture from the American 
market.6 As these and other instances show, American generosity – long a 
foundation of transatlantic relations – had run dry. Ambassador Prittwitz drily 
analyzed the situation in December 1930, noting that in times of crisis, “charity 
begins at home.”7
These developments were only part and parcel of a deeper estrangement 
between the two countries. Though reparations and disarmament conferences 
repeatedly brought European issues into sharp relief, many Americans were 
preoccupied with the unprecedented crisis unfolding at home. Europe’s repu-
diation of war debt payments in 1932 only strengthened powerful isolation-
New York) and Georg Kartzke (a former director of the Amerika-Institut). On the strategic dis-
tance that German officials kept from the CSMF, see German Embassy, Washington, to consu-
lates, Jan. 3, 1929, “Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation,” PA Konsulat New Orleans, Paket 24. One 
of the CSMF’s concrete measures was defraying the annual administrative costs of the Ger-
man-American student exchange at the Institute of International Education ($10,000) after 
1930, thus allowing the student exchanges to continue during the Depression; German Embassy, 
Washington, to AA, May 20, 1930, “Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation,” PA R 64173.
5 See Garet Garret, “The Rescue of Germany”; and “As Noble Lenders,” Sep. 26 and Oct. 17, 
1931, Saturday Evening Post; reprinted in Garet Garret, Other People’s Money (New York, 1932).
6 See German Consulate General, New York, to AA, Mar. 23, 1932, “Fremdenverkehrswerbung,” 
PA R 246919.
7 Prittwitz to Arnold Brecht, Dec. 12, 1930, PA NL von Prittwitz u. Gaffron, Vol. 4.
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ist currents in US society.8 In Germany, too, the extremely lively debate on 
Amerika and Amerikanisierung lost much of its vigor. Though American music 
and movies remained widely popular in the Weimar Republic, the Great De-
pression removed an important basis of Germans’ fascination with America: its 
prosperity.9 As the United States deflated as an industrial and social model, 
its influence and prestige notably declined in the early 1930s.10 The restrictive 
Smoot-Hawley tariff of June 1930 only exacerbated America’s loss of impor-
tance in the commercial sector. In December 1930, when the German consul 
in St. Louis, Georg Ahrens, was back in Berlin for the first time in two years, 
he was struck by “how little one talks in Germany of America when compared 
to two years ago. In my opinion this is a very bad sign.”11 Though cultural 
contacts and initiatives continued, the overall atmosphere and quality of trans-
atlantic relations changed after 1930. The two countries grew apart.
Consolidating Germany’s Cultural Amerikapolitik
Politically and financially, of course, the United States at first remained im-
portant. During the early 1930s, German attention turned once more to the 
reparations question. The right-centrist minority cabinet under Chancellor 
Heinrich Brüning, which succeeded Weimar’s last majority cabinet in March 
1930, adopted a more assertive revisionist policy, with finding a solution to 
the reparations question being its absolute priority.12 The objective, to be sure, 
was not to broker yet another modification of the recently adopted Young Plan 
but to use the German crisis to shake off reparation payments once and for 
all.13 Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s deflationary policies of the coming years 
brought Germany to the brink of economic and political collapse – not least to 
demonstrate its inability to pay.14 Once relieved of its financial burden, Brüning 
anticipated, the government could more actively pursue the military and terri-
torial revisions of the peace treaty. The French withdrawal from the Rhineland 
in June 1930 sparked a wave of German nationalist sentiment and launched 
8 According to Selig Adler, the Depression gave rise to an “isolationist tornado”; Adler, The Iso-
lationist Impulse, 219.
9 Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, 315.
10 Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 228; and Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 78; this is not to say 
that Germany did not observe and learn from American practices in the 1930s and vice versa; 
see, for example, Kiran Patel, Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal 
America, 1933–1945 (New York, 2005).
11 Ahrens to Charles Nagel, Dec. 18, 1930, PA NL Georg Ahrens, Package 1/Correspondence 
Nagel.
12 Kolb, Weimarer Republik, 262.
13 Hermann Graml, Bernhard von Bülow und die deutsche Außenpolitik (Munich, 2012), 82.
14 Kolb, Weimarer Republik, 261.
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the Brüning government on its more confrontational course. At the Wilhelm-
strasse, this reorientation found expression in an important shift as State Sec-
retary Carl von Schubert, the co-architect of Stresemann’s policy of reconcili-
ation, was replaced with his long-time critic, Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow.15 
Though historians continue to debate the nature of the caesura, they uniformly 
emphasize the substantial transformation of German foreign policy after 1930. 
As Peter Krüger concluded, “the Locarno policy, a policy of constant efforts at 
reconciliation and closer international cooperation and entanglements, gave 
way to a great-power politics of the ‘free hand,’ avoiding or casting off interna-
tional shackles. Thus ended in March 1930 a ‘Weimar foreign policy’ in the real 
sense of the word.”16
At the time, this reorientation was not immediately apparent abroad. In-
deed, the German government tried hard to hide it. This was especially true in 
the United States, on which German revisionist politics, especially in the rep-
arations and armament question, still depended.17 While Brüning identified 
America’s $3 billion in German investments and its fears of political radicaliza-
tion (and subsequent debt refutation) as a discrete German asset early on, the 
importance of concerted public diplomacy only increased.18 In light of the 
anticipated renegotiations of reparations, the United States not only had to be 
convinced of the impossibility of German payments but also had to retain its 
basic trust in German intentions.19 Since the Brüning government was aware 
that only a relatively stable and peaceable Germany could count on American 
support, it had to publicly emphasize continuity, common ideals, and peace-
ful intentions to ameliorate the impact of its more assertive policy. Above all, 
this was the case because Germany’s political radicalization, in particular, the 
landslide gains of the National Socialists from 12 to 107 seats in the September 
1930 Reichstag elections, shook American business and political confidence in 
Germany and occasioned a withdrawal of American loans.20 With rising na-
tionalist sentiment at home leaving little room for concessions abroad (a fact 
the German government made sure to emphasize in conversation with their 
American partners), efforts to improve the transatlantic climate by means of 
15 Graml, Bernhard von Bülow, 85.
16 Krüger, “Struktur, Organisation und außenpolitische Wirkungsmöglichkeiten,” 158; also 
Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar, 521–522.
17 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 494.
18 In Berlin, the new American ambassador, businessman Frederic Sackett, left no doubt that 
America would support the Brüning government to avoid either a Bolshevist experiment or a 
right-wing coup, and the financial chaos either might cause; Bernard Burke, Ambassador Frederic 
Sackett and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 1930–33: The United States and Hitler’s Rise to 
Power (New York, 1995).
19 Graml, Zwischen Stresemann und Hitler, 126.
20 Prittwitz to Arnold Brecht, Dec. 12, 1930, PA NL von Prittwitz u. Gaffron, Vol. 4.
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public relations measures appeared all the more necessary.21 As Ambassador 
Prittwitz concluded after the Reichstag elections, “if we do not squander Amer-
ican sympathy by political or diplomatic adventures and if we show our good 
will in accordance with the government’s program, the American support of 
past years will surely not be missing in critical moments in the future.”22 Fore-
shadowing the post-1933 period, public diplomacy after 1930/31 would serve 
not least to obscure the profound changes taking place in Germany. In this 
respect, the years 1930–1932 already differed markedly from the mid-1920s.
*
In the early 1930s, German public diplomacy took a wide variety of forms. In 
keeping with practices developed during the 1920s, Berlin made routine use 
of the quasi-official news agency, the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau, and worked 
hard to keep American press correspondents informed and happy. In moments 
of crisis, like the National Socialist electoral gains of September 1930 or the 
dissolution of the Reichstag, interviews with Reich President Hindenburg and 
Chancellor Brüning were readily arranged and, as scholars have shown, had 
a decidedly positive effect. In the American mind, the two men appeared to 
be stalwarts of republican stability.23 Stresemann’s successor, Foreign Minis-
ter Julius Curtius, too, maintained the regular international press conferences 
introduced in 1923 and used new opportunities to address Americans directly 
via radio.24 In addition, German official representatives like Reichsbank Pres-
ident Hjalmar Schacht, former Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann, and, 
after his dismissal in October 1931, Curtius himself went on lecture tours in 
the United States, where they stressed the stability of the current government, 
Allied responsibility for German problems, and the need for revision.25 On 
a diplomatic level, Berlin avidly cultivated the trust and sympathy of the new 
American ambassador to Germany, businessman Frederic Sackett, and encour-
aged his tours of Germany, especially to the Eastern borders – with appreciable 
results. Like his predecessors Alanson B. Houghton and Jacob G. Schurman, 
21 Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar, 517.
22 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 3, 1930, PA R 80149.
23 Müller, Weimar im Blick, 350.
24 A transatlantic radio address Curtius gave in June 1930 was reprinted in the Congressional 
Record; see Congressional Record, Seventy-First Congress, Third Session, Dec. 4, 1930, “Our 
Relations with Germany: Address by Dr. Julius Curtius and Letter of Nicholas Murray Butler,” 
PA R 80304.
25 On Curtius’s account of his American tour, see Julius Curtius, Sechs Jahre Minister der 
deutschen Republik (Heidelberg, 1947), 249–256. In mid-1931, the cabinet also raised the For-
eign Ministry’s secret funds to initiate a press campaign for a revision of the reparations ques-
tions; see Graml, Zwischen Stresemann und Hitler, 126.
Consolidating Germany’s Cultural Amerikapolitik 335
Sackett soon emerged as a valuable champion of German positions in Ameri-
can government and public circles.26
In addition, Berlin continued its cultural course of action to mollify linger-
ing differences, allay growing distrust, and rival French forays.27 Indeed, the 
financial distress of the early 1930s resulted in a rather beneficial consolidation 
and centralization of the many overlapping and competing initiatives created 
in previous years. In January 1931, different academic exchange, fellowship, and 
hospitality programs were merged in the German Academic Exchange Service 
(Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD). This established the For-
eign Ministry’s predominance in matters of international education and gave it 
control over one of the best-endowed and best-connected cultural diplomacy 
instruments of its time.28 Moreover, in late 1930 a National Tourism Council 
was finally established, which provided some of the greater coordination and 
diplomatic influence that the Foreign Ministry had sought since 1928.29 Fi-
nally, financial duress forced the various America organizations (there were 
six in Berlin alone) to coordinate their work and align themselves more closely 
with official directives. The Vereinigung Carl Schurz in Berlin and the increas-
ingly active Deutsche Akademie in Munich (the forerunner of the Goethe-In-
stitut) provided the Foreign Ministry with nationwide support for its cultural 
Amerikapolitik.30 By the early 1930s, longer-standing official efforts and finan-
cial pressures conspired to concentrate the comparatively loose public-private 
cooperation of the 1920s into centralized, state-driven cultural diplomacy. 
The Foreign Ministry’s self-definition as a “guiding hand” in cultural matters 
turned increasingly from theory into practice. In contrast to other fields of 
foreign policy, its responsibilities and influence expanded in matters of public 
diplomacy in the early 1930s.
26 Burke, Ambassador Frederic Sackett, passim.
27 On January 2, 1930, Foreign Minister Curtius asked German missions to submit a detailed 
“cultural policy plan” for the coming year and assured them that “questions regarding effective 
and systematic cultural diplomacy are to be accorded special attention also this coming year”; 
Curtius to all missions, Jan. 2, 1930, PA R 76922.
28 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 309; at that point the 
DAAD had a budget of 300,000 marks and a network of 23 domestic and 12 international offices.
29 It was through a smaller excecutive council that the Foreign Ministry gained at least some 
advisory influence on the Reichbahn’s annual advertising plan. AA [Dieckhoff] to all missions 
abroad, June 16, 1931, “Reichsausschuss und Hauptausschuss für Fremdenverkehr,” PA R 61125.
30 The Deutsche Akademie established a Committee on Cultural Relations between Germany 
and America in 1931. Headed by Camillo von Klenze, a Germanist who had long taught in the 
United States, it included (by 1933) a number of German and American professors including 
Harry Garfield, Frederick Heuser, William F. Ros, William Sheperd, and William Alpha Cooper, 
as well as, Moritz Julius Bonn, Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Carl Duisberg, and former Am-
bassador Schurman. Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R51 Deutsche Akademie, 51/14 (Junior Year Abroad); 
on the ongoing differences with the VCS, see Aufzeichnung betr. Die Vereinigung Carl Schurz, 
zu III A 656 (Fuehr, Feb. 18, 1931), PA R 80327.
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Importantly, this consolidating process also went hand in hand with a con-
servative reorientation that matched the general trend in German foreign pol-
icy. The DAAD, for instance, was centralized under the leadership of “young 
conservative” Adolf Morsbach, not the left-liberal Reinhold Schairer, whom 
the Foreign Ministry had always treated with some reserve.31 In the same vein, 
the founder of the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, left-liberal parliamentarian Anton 
Erkelenz, was replaced by Hans Draeger, the long-time director of the Foreign 
Ministry’s war-guilt campaign, in early 1930. While Erkelenz’s failing health 
was one factor in this shift, his political reorientation from the left-liberal Ger-
man Democratic Party to the Social Democrats in 1930 – a party not in high 
standing with the Vereinigung’s diplomatic and industrial backers – was yet 
another. The more conservative Draeger, by contrast, had long been a reliable 
partner in the fight against Versailles and could be trusted to steer the Verein-
igung in closer cooperation with the Foreign Ministry.32 In the coming years, 
Draeger would notably broaden the Vereinigung’s base of support to the right 
of the political spectrum and harness its networks for more overtly revision-
ist agitation.33 In all, the concurrent shifts from Erkelenz to Draeger and from 
Schairer to Morsbach signaled a conservative and more assertively revisionist 
turn in Germany’s cultural Amerikapolitik.
Performing “Transatlantic Friendship”
In the early 1930s, this consolidated cultural-diplomacy apparatus pivoted on 
transatlantic celebrations. A rapid succession of prominent anniversaries, in-
cluding the 100th birthday of Carl Schurz (1929), the 200th birthday of General 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (1930), as well as the bi-centennial of the birth 
of George Washington along with the centenary of the death of Johann Wolf-
gang von Goethe (1932), provided visible and cost-effective opportunities to 
communicate cultural affinity, construct a useable transatlantic past, and cele-
brate German-American friendship.
Festivities had long held a central place in transatlantic public diplomacy. 
Quite apart from the extraordinarily rich festive culture of German Americans 
in the nineteenth century, transatlantic banquets and celebrations had been a 
prevalent part of Germany’s prewar policy of “gifts and gestures.” It was precisely 
31 Aufzeichnung AA (Zimmermann), ca. July 1926, PA R 64793.
32 On the Foreign Ministry’s payroll since 1922, Draeger joined the ministry in 1933 as a “spe-
cial advisor” on how to counter “anti-German” propaganda; on how close relations were, see PA 
Personalakte Draeger, 2955, esp. Aufzeichnung, Geh I 138g, June 17, 1936; Draeger also sought 
to involve the VCS more in the fight against the “war guilt lie”; see Arbeitsausschuss deutscher 
Verbände (Draeger) to AA, Feb. 12, 1931, PA R 26206.
33 Brantz, “German-American Friendship,” 240.
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this tradition, however, that fostered German reluctance in this regard in the 
1920s. Although German clubs in the United States routinely commemorated 
the birthdays of Schiller, Goethe, and Beethoven, these occasions received no 
significant attention from Berlin.34 It was only the Steuben celebration of De-
cember of 1927 that seems to have reminded German officials of how effectively 
they could use such events for transatlantic communication. The Steuben So-
ciety organized this event in honor of the 150th anniversary of Steuben’s arrival 
in the United States, scheduling speeches by American Ambassador Schurman 
in New York City and Foreign Minister Stresemann in Berlin. These speeches, 
as the German embassy repeatedly emphasized, had “an extraordinarily great 
impact.”35 As a consequence, the festivities in honor of the 100th birthday of 
Carl Schurz on March 2, 1929, were already much more comprehensively or-
ganized.36 The Vereinigung Carl Schurz staged a number of celebrations in 
Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, and Liblar (Schurz’s hometown) with sig-
nificant official and scholarly involvement.37 All of them used the occasion to 
stress German contributions to American history, celebrate the two nations’ 
shared ideals, and honor a man who had faithfully served America without 
forgetting his cultural ties to Germany.38 This set a pattern that would define 
German cultural diplomacy in the early 1930s, as can be seen from the transat-
lantic celebrations of Steuben, Washington, and Goethe.
34 Despite the high regard for German music in the United States, the 100th anniversary of Bee-
thoven’s death in 1927 seems to have gone largely unnoticed. See, for example, German Consu-
late General, Chicago, to AA, Nov. 14, 1927, “Vortrag von Herrn Generalkonsul Dr. Simon vor 
der Deutschen Gesellschaft der Northwestern University in Evanston,” PA R 80299.
35 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 2, 1928, PA R 80288; German Embassy, Wash-
ington, to AA, Dec. 8, 1927, “Steubenfeier,” PA R 80299.
36 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 2, 1928, PA R 80288.
37 The Reichstag celebration took place on March 3 and was attended by German dignitaries 
like Reichstag president Paul Löbe, historian Hermann Oncken, American historian A. B. Faust, 
and Ambassador Schurman to commemorate Schurz’s life in front of packed ranks. Clipping: 
“Carl Schurz-Feier im Reichstags-Gebäude,” New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, Mar. 18, 1929, Series 1, 
General Historical and Office Materials Box 27 Folder 9, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., 
Records (Collection Mss 176) HSP; the proceedings were later published with a foreword by 
Foreign Minister Stresemann and Ambassador Prittwitz; see Anton Erkelenz and Franz Mittel-
mann, eds., Carl Schurz, der Deutsche und der Amerikaner (Berlin, 1929).
38 See Hermann Oncken in his Reichstag speech, “Zum Gedächtnis von Carl Schurz. Rede bei 
der von der Deutschen Akademie und der Carl-Schurz-Vereinigung im Deutschen Reichstag am 
3. März veranstalteten Feier,” Mitteilungen der Akademie zur Wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und 
zur Pflege des Deutschtums/Deutsche Akademie 2, no. 3 (May/June 1929): 199–208; on Schurz as 
a model for German Americans, see Retterath, “Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke,” 
350.
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The Steuben Celebration
Almost immediately on the heels of the Schurz celebrations of 1929, the Verein-
igung Carl Schurz spearheaded preparations for the 1930 commemoration of 
the 200th birthday of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, the Prussian general who 
had helped fight and win the American War of Independence. From March 
1930 onward, it presided over an organizational committee made up of myriad 
Germandom and America organizations from Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart and 
Hamburg. Together, they coordinated a series of Germany-wide celebrations, 
including a joint event at the Reichstag. For the first time, the planners also 
established an honorary committee that included Foreign Minister Curtius, 
U. S. Ambassador Frederic Sackett, President of the Reichstag Paul Löbe, and 
President Hindenburg.39
The special prominence the Steuben celebrations enjoyed was due to a 
number of factors. First and foremost, the Prussian general appealed to con-
servative elements, including President Hindenburg, whose patronage, in turn, 
greatly enhanced the attractiveness and visibility of the festivities. More impor-
tantly, the historical figure of von Steuben allowed Germans to insert them-
selves into a seminal moment of American history. According to the German 
version, Steuben’s reorganization of George Washington’s desolate army at Val-
ley Forge had been indispensable to America’s victory.40 This narrative that 
the American Revolution had hinged on the devotion, skill, and discipline of 
a single German was highly welcome as it seemed to rehabilitate not only cer-
tain German character traits (“diligence, industriousness, honesty”41) but also 
Prussia’s much-maligned “militarism.”42 In particular, Steuben’s story gave 
Germany a convenient opportunity to challenge the unique role traditionally 
assigned to the Marquis de Lafayette and thereby also France’s narrative of the 
two “sister republics.”43 In light of the renewed Franco-German battle for 
American affections in the context of the reparations and rearmament debates 
of the early 1930s, the Foreign Ministry had a very strong interest in heighten-
ing Steuben’s stature.44 Behind the scenes, it went to considerable lengths to 
39 Vereinigung Carl Schurz to AA, Mar. 25, 1930, PA R 80147.
40 Walter Bloem, “Das Steuben-Jahr,” Hochschule und Ausland (April 1930): 7–10.
41 Kühnemann in Vereinigung Carl Schurz, Zum zweihundertsten Geburtstag von Friedrich Wil-
helm von Steuben (Berlin, 1930), 16.
42 See, for example, Rudolf Cronau, The Army of the American Revolution and Its Organizer 
(New York, 1923).
43 See also Retterath, “Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke,” 359.
44 As early as January 1930, Ambassador Prittwitz had reported that “the more Germany’s polit-
ical and cultural position in the United States is re-won, the more intense grow third-party ef-
forts to influence American sentiment and make sure that the peace will continue to be inter-
preted according to the one-sided sense of the victors; German Embassy, Washington, to AA, 
Jan. 27, 1930, “Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen,” PA R 80146.
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maintain the name and reputation of a man it characterized as a distinct “asset 
to our Amerikapolitik.”45
Above all, the Steuben celebrations appealed to German Americans. While 
Steuben was not well known among the broader public, German Americans 
had discovered him as a forgotten “cultural hero” at about the turn of the cen-
tury.46 From 1900 onward, celebrations of Steuben had helped them lay claim 
to the most significant event in American history, thereby underlining their 
status as an “old” immigrant group. Berlin celebrated Steuben not least to sup-
port this German-American agenda. To be sure, this ethnic dimension also 
complicated the Steuben celebrations. In particular, the New York-based Steu-
ben Society’s decision to organize a “Steuben pilgrimage” to Germany during 
the summer months of 1930 gave German officials numerous headaches. While 
they had always kept their distance from the political Steuben Society, they 
clearly recognized the need to receive the 300 Steubenites in a suitable manner. 
It was highly characteristic of the German government that it sought to solve 
this dilemma with recourse to semi-official organizations. It quietly tasked the 
Vereinigung Carl Schurz and the Deutsche Akademie with arranging a set of 
special courtesies, ceremonies, and receptions for the group that would signal 
German appreciation to German Americans without implicating German of-
ficials or arousing (Anglo-)American suspicion. Just how much the Foreign 
Ministry appreciated this informal set-up became evident shortly thereafter 
when it emphatically disapproved of the Vereinigung Carl Schurz’s desire to 
change its name to Steuben. As the Wilhelmstrasse made clear, it had no use 
for a German organization that signaled any closer association with the politi-
cal Steuben Society.47 For political – if not ideological – reasons, the Foreign 
Ministry preferred for the organization to be named after a German revolu-
tionary, not a Prussian general.
No such political scruples applied to the public Steuben celebration in the 
Reichstag on October 19, 1930. With American diplomats in attendance, the 
celebration offered only a welcome occasion to propound German-American 
friendship and stimulate positive press coverage of Germany shortly after the 
disconcerting results of the September elections.48 French expressions of dis-
may about such celebrations are perhaps the best indicators that they were at 
45 Such efforts included pressure on historians and archivists who questioned Steuben’s heroic 
narrative or his aristrocratic background; see AA to Reichsarchivrat Schäfer, Nov. 1931, PA R 
80168.
46 “Steuben: An Address by Hon. Richard Bartholdt, Delivered at Chicago (1927),” Ger-
man-American Historical Review 30 (Dec. 1930): 16–27, 24.
47 Aufzeichnung zu III A 787 (Fuehr), March 12, 1931, PA R 80327.
48 See the proceedings of the celebration in Vereinigung Carl Schurz, Zum zweihundertsten Ge-
burtstag von Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (Berlin, 1930). In its official press declaration, the 
Vereinigung Carl Schurz emphasized its purpose was “[to] highlight […] the part the German 
element played in the becoming and prospering of the United States to strengthen cordial rela-
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least partially successful in this. When a representative of the Steuben family 
was invited to attend the official Yorktown Sesquicentennial in 1931 (the French 
sent an entire military delegation under Marshal Philippe Pétain), the Jour-
nal des Débats dismissed Steuben as little more than an elaborate German fic-
tion invented as propaganda to soil the unique role that France had played 
in the American Revolution.49 For German diplomats, such French reactions 
were as worrying as they were gratifying. France’s long-standing monopoly on 
transatlantic celebrations, they felt, was rapidly coming to an end.
Washington and Goethe, 1932
The set of transatlantic festivities reached its climax in 1932 when the two coun-
tries concurrently celebrated two towering historical figures: George Washing-
ton and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
German planning for the Washington celebrations began early. Already 
in February 1931, Ambassador Prittwitz reported on the large-scale American 
preparations for the Washington Bi-Centennial. As early as 1924, Congress had 
appointed an official Bi-Centennial Commission chaired by US Representa-
tive Sol Bloom, a former entertainment entrepreneur and a “public relations 
genius.”50 Bloom planned a host of pageants, parades, and every other con-
ceivable form of publicity to fuel a year-long celebration.51 For Germany, the 
importance of the bicentennial was two-fold. For one, it was yet another op-
portunity to honor General Steuben because the Bi-Cenntenial Commission 
had expressed its desire to celebrate Washington’s “foreign partners” in order 
to strengthen the bicentennial’s appeal to ethnic groups. In addition, the bicen-
tennial’s observance was a major national event so that, as Ambassador Prit-
twitz noted, suitable German participation in it provided a “good opportunity 
to revive [America’s] friendly feelings for Germany.”52
When the ambassador wrote his initial report in February 1931, he could 
not have anticipated how much such a show of Germany’s good faith would be 
needed a year later. The Washington celebrations, indeed, came on the heels 
tions between Germany and the United States.” Vereinigung Carl Schurz, Oct. 8, 1930, PA R 
121330.
49 German Embassy, Paris, to AA, “Steuben und die Steuben-Gesellschaft,” Apr. 17, 1931; Clip-
ping: General du Cugnac, “La legende Steuben aux États-Unis,” Journal des Débats, Apr. 10, 1931, 
PA R 80168.
50 On Bloom, see Karal Ann Marling, George Washington Slept Here: Colonial Revivals and 
American Culture, 1876–1986 (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 325–326.
51 Some aspects of this publicity are described in Marling, George Washington Slept Here, 325–
364.
52 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Feb. 5, 1931, “Washington Bicentennial 1932,” PA R 
80167.
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of a tumultuous year that witnessed not only President Herbert Hoover’s one-
year moratorium on the payment of war debts and reparations but also in-
creasing American annoyance with the Brüning government, which, hoping 
to terminate rather than pause reparations payments, cooperated only reluc-
tantly. In this situation, the German celebration of Washington seemed to be 
an economically and politically affordable gesture that could express German 
appreciation for American support and help maintain American goodwill for 
the summer of 1932, when the Brüning government hoped to shake off repa-
rations and armament restrictions once and for all. These immediate political 
ambitions explain the Foreign Ministry’s repeated interventions in the bicen-
tennial planning process, which it had once more entrusted to the Vereinigung 
Carl Schurz: For example, the Foreign Ministry insisted that Washington and 
Goethe be celebrated separately (not in a joint event) so as not to reduce the 
diplomatic impact of either jubilee. Moreover, it pushed for one visible and 
well-organized German celebration in Berlin rather than a number of smaller 
celebrations like the Steuben year had had. Finally, it convinced President Hin-
denburg to assume the honorary presidency of the German Bi-Centennial 
Committee and even to attend the event at the Reichstag in order to “make the 
celebration as impressive as possible.”53
Fig . 18: The Reichstag draped in American and German flags during the Washington Bi-Cennte-
nial, 1932, Bundesarchiv, Georg Pahl, Bild-102–13208 A
53 AA to Büro des Reichspräsidenten (zu III A 1673), June 23, 1931, PA R 80167.
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The celebrations themselves also unfolded with significant official involve-
ment. At the U. S. embassy’s banquet on February 22, 1932, Berlin authorities 
were heavily represented and the addresses by Ambassador Sackett, “Roosevelt 
Professor” Frederick Woodbridge (1931–1932), and German economist Moritz 
Julius Bonn were broadcast via radio to the United States. The Foreign Min-
istry also used the media attention for a number of well-timed goodwill ges-
tures including the christening of a “Washington-Platz” in downtown Berlin 
(which still exists in front of Berlin Central Station) and the announcement of 
an honorary doctorate from the University of Tübingen for the American am-
bassador.54 At the German-organized celebration two weeks later, Chancellor 
Brüning’s address at the Reichstag adorned with American and German flags 
emphasized Washington’s universal acclaim and the historical roots of Ger-
man-American friendship.55 In Bremen, Breslau, Cologne, Dresden, Frank-
furt, Hamburg, Munich, Leipzig, and Stuttgart, the American consulates and 
colonies organized celebrations, often with substantial support from German 
organizations. The Deutsche Akademie in Munich, for example, invited the 
German-American historian Carl Wittke to hold a series of lectures on “Wash-
ington and his time,” which greatly enhanced the intellectual quality of these 
events.56 Throughout, all leading German newspapers honored George Wash-
ington’s memory with detailed portraits and – against the backdrop of the up-
coming German presidential election – often drew parallels between Washing-
ton and von Hindenburg. Both of these men, they argued, had been “the first in 
war, the first in peace, the first in the hearts of [their] countrymen.”57
This is not to say that German celebrations were particularly exceptional 
on the world stage. The American Bi-Centennial Commission made sure that 
the celebrations would be observed internationally, and Washington events 
were thus held in 259 cities in 81 countries around the world. Yet this lack of ex-
ceptionality was precisely what made these German celebrations remarkable. 
Even if German celebrations might not have matched the vigor and elegance of 
similar British or French events, special inter-Allied ties were no longer in evi-
dence. The official American report on the international Washington festivities 
gave no less room to German celebrations than to those in France. On a world 
map of Washington observances prepared by the Bi-Centennial Commission, 
Germany even came in first with 16 separate events, whereas France had 11 
54 Some files on this honorary doctorate can be found in BArch R 43-I/99; see also Kotowski, 
Die öffentliche Universität, 149; the degree was publicly bestowed on Sackett on April 25, 1932, 
but seems to have evoked no response similar to that of the degrees for Schurman and Strese-
mann in 1928.
55 See Eugen Kühnemann, George Washington. Sein Leben und Werk (Bremen, 1932).
56 See Carl F. Wittke, George Washington und seine Zeit (Bremen/Leipzig, 1933).
57 See the clippings in PA R 80167.
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and England 10.58 Clearly satisfied with the international response to the Wash-
ington Year, the Bi-Centennial Commission declared that “never before did a 
foreign hero receive such universal and enthusiastic acclaim. To judge by the 
spirit of the bicentennial ceremonies which took place in all parts of Germany, 
Washington is a name which is cherished and revered by the German people.”59 
The German celebrations, in short, had left just the desired impression.
Understandably, in Germany preparations for this American celebration 
paled in comparison to what Germans considered the real event of 1932: the 
Goethe Year. Planning for the occasion had begun in the late 1920s and in-
volved a wide cast of actors including the (rivaling) cities of Frankfurt and 
Weimar, tourist offices, state ministries, and the Reichskunstwart (the office in 
charge of state representation in the Weimar Republic). Though the publicity 
for Goethe celebrations was hardly as comprehensively organized as the U. S. 
Washington events, such festivities took place in nearly every German town, 
university, museum, and theater. Official German planners were able to utilize 
these occasions to appeal to German unity, underline a cosmopolitan German 
tradition, and bolster the government’s prestige at a time of political street 
fighting and unprecedented economic distress.60 The official “Reich Goethe 
Week,” which took place in Weimar in March of 1932, had many of the highest 
government representatives in attendance; and the week-long Goethe celebra-
tions in Frankfurt in August of 1932 pivoted around the republican constitution 
day at the Paulskirche, the seat of the first German parliament in 1848. Quite 
obviously, the Goethe Year, as scholars have concluded, was “the last great 
self-presentation of the Weimar Republic before its demise.”61
If the domestic organization of the Goethe commemorations is relatively 
well known, its international arrangement has garnered less attention; and 
while scholars attribute the global resonance of the Goethe Year to local initia-
tive and enthusiasm, this was only part of the story. Indeed, just as the Ameri-
can government did with celebrations of Washington, the German government 
clearly encouraged the worldwide observance of the Goethe Year. In December 
1931, the Foreign Ministry informed its foreign missions of the official schedule 
of events in Germany and suggested that celebrations be arranged in all larger 
cities in their districts via German clubs, schools, or university departments. To 
this end, the ministry spurred the missions to spend their entire 1932 cultural 
diplomacy funds on the Goethe Centenary. To simplify the task, Berlin sent a 
58 For the global observance and corresponding maps of the bicenntenial, see History of the 
George Washington Bicentennial Celebration, Vol 4: Foreign Participation (Washington, 1932).
59 Ibid., 114.
60 On efforts to celebrate Goethe as a cosmopolitan and the limits thereof, see Christian Welz-
bacher, Edwin Redslob. Biografie eines unverbesserlichen Idealisten (Berlin, 2009), 222.
61 Joachim Seng, “Das Goethe-Jahr 1932,” in Der Reichskunstwart. Kulturpolitik und Staat-
sinszenierung in der Weimarer Republik 1918–1933, ed. Christian Welzbacher, 196–216 (Weimar, 
2010), 214.
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number of attachments, including a blueprint on how to organize a successful 
Goethe celebration, a template of a suitable Goethe speech, and a list of Ger-
man professors and authors who could be “booked” for the occasion.62 As the 
Foreign Ministry explained, the “festivities at home and abroad are primarily 
to express the cultural affinities between all Germans, even those living beyond 
the Reich’s border; but it is also to encourage all foreign populations to take 
part.”63 A few weeks later, the German government invited foreign dignitaries 
and “Germandom leaders” to attend the official celebration in Weimar.64
At that point, the Goethe Year in the United States was already fully 
planned. While official records on the Goethe commemorations in the United 
States have not survived, there can be no doubt that the official preparations 
were substantial. In particular, German officials supported the Carl Schurz Me-
morial Foundation, the Goethe Society of America (founded by educator-dip-
lomats like Nicholas Murray Butler and Jacob Gould Schurman) and a large 
number of German departments at U. S. universities in preparing banquets, 
lecture tours, publications, and German-language essay contests.65 The Ger-
man Tourist Information Office (GTIO) in New York City unleashed a veri-
table flood of Goethe publicity (including Goethe films) through commercial 
and educational channels.66 The consulate in St. Louis, for example, could 
not praise the GTIO’s Goethe campaign enough. Its English-language Goethe 
pamphlet, the consulate reported, was “the delight of all university professors, 
and, indeed, all educated circles that it reached. It thereby creates an intellec-
tual atmosphere in which alone friendship between the best of both peoples 
can grow.”67
Based on these preparations, early 1932 witnessed a string of Goethe cere-
monies at the U. S. House of Representatives, Carnegie Hall, the Waldorf Asto-
ria in New York, and innumerable German clubs, classrooms, and university 
auditoriums across the country. What gave the American Goethe Year special 
flair was the visit of German dramatist and Nobel laureate Gerhart Haupt-
mann. Not only was Hauptmann one of Germany’s most revered authors, but 
he was also, nearing his seventieth birthday, said to bear a striking resemblance 
62 AA Circular, Dec. 22, 1931, PA RAV Bukarest – Gesandtschaft Bukarest, 147 Goethejahr.
63 Ibid.
64 AA Circular, Jan. 15, 1932, PA RAV Bukarest – Gesandtschaft Bukarest, 147 Goethejahr.
65 E. g., the Goethe Society published “Goethe in Amerika,” the University of Wisconsin pub-
lished a Goethe memorial volume, the Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht published a special 
Goethe issue, and the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation initiated a Goethe essay contest.
66 The GTIO lent out a Goethe film series to German clubs and teachers at low cost and with 
great success; it included Germany in the Goethe Year 1932 (1 reel), Goethe and Frankfurt (1 reel), 
Goethe and Weimar (1 reel), and Creative Hands (1 reel).
67 German Consulate, St. Louis, to AA, Mar. 14, 1932, “Fremdenverkehrswerbung im Ausland,” 
PA R 246919.
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to Goethe himself.68 Though Hauptmann’s visit, arranged by Columbia Ger-
manist Frederick Heuser and the Carnegie Endowment, included only a hand-
ful of German-language lectures at prestigious universities, his fame generated 
abundant American press coverage.69 The coordinated character of the Goethe 
campaign in the United States is suggested by the actions of Ambassador Prit-
twitz, who balanced out Hauptmann’s focus on the Northeast by personally 
attending the large Goethe celebration at the University of Wisconsin. The 
Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, too, flanked Hauptmann’s exclusive tour 
by sending none other than Eugen Kühnemann (former Wilhelmine exchange 
professor and wartime propagandist) on a five-month tour across the United 
States, during which he gave almost one hundred Goethe speeches.70 Still the 
cultural missionary of earlier days, Kühnemann felt elated by the task and re-
peatedly emphasized the stroke of fate that Germany and the United States 
would be celebrating their greatest historical figures (Washington and Goethe) 
within just a month of each other. “In their great memorial days,” Kühnemann 
imagined, “the two nations, America and Germany, have come as close to each 
other as if they were called to a new spiritual community.”71
*
A review of the rapid succession of transatlantic celebrations after 1929 evokes 
a number of observations. For one, the celebrations throw light on the transat-
lantic cultural infrastructure that had developed after the war. The events com-
memorating Schurz, Steuben, and Washington involved about a dozen inter-
mediary organizations interested in transatlantic cultural relations, including 
the Amerika-Institut, the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, the Society of Friends of 
the USA (Hamburg), the Deutsche Akademie (Munich), and the Deutsches 
Ausland-Institut (Stuttgart).72 These organizations allowed the Foreign Min-
68 On the organization of Hauptmann’s visit and general impressions, see the personal report by 
Frederick Heuser, Heuser Papers, Box 2: Misc. Correspondence, Manuscript Collections, Co-
lumbia University Libraries.
69 To Ambassador Prittwitz, Hauptmann “was the best ‘good will ambassador’ his country 
could have sent across the ocean for that occasion”; Prittwitz, Zwischen Petersburg und Washing-
ton, 180; Nicholas Murray Butler also found that “Dr. Hauptmann’s visit which comes to an end 
today has been remarkable, and his reception most enthusiastic. His oration of Goethe on Tues-
day last was one of the finest things of the kind I have ever heard”; Butler to Woodbridge, Mar. 3, 
1932, Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge Papers, Box 1, Correspondence, Folder: Butler/
Woodbridge, 1931, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
70 For a list of American ceremonies, see Mitteilungen der Deutschen Akademie (Dec. 1932).
71 Eugen Kühnemann, “Auf Goethefahrt in Amerika (Eindrücke meiner letzten Amerikareise),” 
6, NL Eugen Kühnemann, Box 2, Universitätsbibliothek Marburg.
72 The Washington banquet, for example, was hosted by the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, the 
Amerika-Institut, and the Gesellschaft der Freunde der USA (Hamburg), as well as Germandom 
organizations, including the Bund der Auslandsdeutschen, the Deutsche Akademie, the 
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istry to conduct highly coordinated but unobtrusive cultural diplomacy, of 
which transatlantic celebrations were but one element. The Goethe Year, too, 
illustrated how effectively Germany could mount a significant cultural cam-
paign across the Atlantic by 1932. In particular, it showed the astonishing de-
gree to which Germany had restored reliable partnerships with American uni-
versities, German Americans and cultural internationalist groups like the Car-
negie Endowment. Compared to the near complete absence of such connec-
tions as late as 1923 (Chapter 3), this abundance of cooperation speaks clearly 
to the effectiveness of Germany’s network- and sympathy-building efforts in 
the 1920s. The transatlantic celebrations in the early 1930s only deepened the 
ties and coordination among and between cultural diplomats on both sides of 
the Atlantic.
Secondly, the introduction of the Goethe medal in the context of the 
Goethe Year in 1932 finally resolved one of the gravest problems of Weimar 
public diplomacy: a lack of state honorary decorations.73 Throughout the 
1920s, Weimar’s constitutional ban on official decorations had frustrated Ger-
man diplomats, who felt deprived of a key foreign policy tool. While German-
dom organizations, the German Red Cross, and German universities offered 
some alternative decorations, they lacked the wide applicability and/or the 
prestige of state medals.74 Given the widely accepted (and expected) function 
of decorations in expressing appreciation and allocating prestige, they were, 
as the Kulturabteilung noted in 1932, “urgently necessary” as an instrument 
for maintaining goodwill abroad, not least in the United States.75 As early as 
1923, the German ambassador to Washington, Otto Wiedfeldt, had pointed out 
that “one can hardly overestimate the craving for medals in this democratic 
country; by abolishing any decorations […] we have deliberately deprived our-
selves of an effective tool abroad.”76 President Hindenburg’s introduction of 
the Goethe Medal for Art and Science in 1932, then, at least partly addressed 
these concerns. The three Americans who received the Goethe Medal in 1932 
also once more underlined Germany’s most important bases of support in the 
United States: German Americans (Gustav Oberlaender), cultural internation-
Deutsches Ausland-Institut, and the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland; see “Feier des 200. 
Geburtstages von George Washington 1932,” PA R 60108.
73 On Hindenburg’s initial response to the suggestion of the Reichskunstwart, see Edwin Red-
slob, Von Weimar nach Europa, 206–207.
74 In October 1930, the Deutsche Akademie introduced three awards to be given to individuals 
who had increased German prestige in the world and improved its international cultural rela-
tions: the Großes Ehrenzeichen, the Ehrenzeichen, and the Silberne Medaille. The first recipient 
of the most prestigious category was President von Hindenburg.
75 VI W 9956 Aufzeichnung, Nov. 17, 1932, PA R 61125.
76 Wiedfeldt to AA, July 20, 1923, “Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten,” ADAP, Serie A, 
Vol. 8, No. 76, 183–196.
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alists (Nicholas Murray Butler), and American professors of German (Freder-
ick Heuser).
Finally, the remarkable international resonance of the Goethe Year (the 
list of global Goethe celebrations prepared by the Deutsche Akademie filled 
34 pages in very small print) was widely felt to have finally redressed the cul-
tural losses of the Great War. Such feelings were as prevalent among German 
Americans as they were among parts of the German Bildungsbürgertum.77 As 
Frank Thierfelder, the executive secretary of the Deutsche Akademie, noted, 
the Goethe celebrations “meant that the disparagement of the German name 
during the war has been rescinded in a form that will make it easier for us to 
forget some things … for stronger than the loss of two million on the battle-
fields, stronger than the losses in land and property, stronger than the name-
less plight of the postwar period, the German people have suffered from the 
soiling of their honor.”78 In his opinion, the “Goethe World Festival” had thus 
“broken a spell that has weighed on us like a nightmare.”79 To Thierfelder and 
many of his peers, the Goethe Year had finally rehabilitated Germany in the 
world.
German Politics and Transatlantic Relations
Still, the impact of these celebrations on transatlantic relations themselves 
must not be overstated. If diplomats like Ambassador Prittwitz naturally 
hailed the wide participation in these events as evidence of transatlantic “rap-
prochement,” few of these celebrations were of a truly popular nature.80 The 
commemoration of Carl Schurz in 1929 had already suffered from widespread 
disinterest on both sides of the Atlantic, and even the “promotional extrava-
ganza” that preceded the Washington Bi-Centennial had been no guarantee 
for public enthusiasm in dire times.81 The repeated Steuben festivities, for their 
part, left hardly any impression on a larger American audience, with Steuben 
remaining even afterward a little known and little appreciated historical figure 
77 Kazal, “Becoming ‘Old Stock’,” 486.
78 Franz Thierfelder, “Die Goethe-Welt-Feier 1932,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Akademie 3, 
no. 1 (April 1933): 21–59, 21.
79 Ibid., 23.
80 Prittwitz, “Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten seit dem Weltkrieg,” 22.
81 In New York, Carnegie Hall was not sold out, and in Stuttgart and San Francisco, “disinterest 
and weather” resulted in a relatively meager turnout; see the respective clippings “Ein letzter 
Appell zur Schurz-Feier,” New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, Mar. 20, 1929; and “Schurz-Feier im 
Deutschen Ausland-Institut, Stuttgart,” New Yorker Herold, Mar. 15, 1929, both in National Carl 
Schurz Association, Inc., Records, Series 1 General Historical and Office Materials Box 27 Folder 
9, HSP.
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in comparison to the Marquis de Lafayette.82 Moreover, as much as the United 
States and Germany liked to attribute honoring their historical icons to honest 
appreciation and spontaneous enthusiasm, they were – more often than not – 
carefully orchestrated products of transatlantic cultural politics. The American 
Germanist Camillo von Klenze cautioned against placing too much store in 
these events as indicators of true cultural awareness:
all this wonderful evidence of an honest Goethe interest [in the United States in 1932] 
should not blind us to the fact that Goethe is nearly exclusively known to the literary 
educated in America – a circle that is much smaller in a young country than in an old 
cultural nation like Germany – [and] that the wider public knows almost nothing of him, 
and that there is absolutely no appreciable influence of Goethe on American literature to 
speak of.83
More serious than the limited impact these celebrations had was the notable 
tendency for entirely different versions of these “heroes” to be on display at 
the various events This was already in evidence with the Carl Schurz events. 
Whereas democrats like Ambassador Prittwitz celebrated Schurz as the epitome 
of the German republican tradition and a man who had “fought for the same 
ideals on both continents,”84 Germandom organizations honored the 1848 
revolutionary as a virtuous German man with “conservative common sense 
and a great respect for law and order.”85 And while Americans lauded Schurz’s 
American sense of civic duty, some German circles considered him “Germany’s 
greatest gift to America.” In the same vein, when Americans thought of Steu-
ben at all, it was as one among George Washington’s Polish, French, Irish, and 
Jewish “helpers,” yet German rhetoric cast him as the father of the U. S. Army 
and the real savior of the American Revolution.86 Finally, one cannot help no-
ticing that many Germans, in their embrace of George Washington, were cel-
ebrating not the American hero and first president of the American republic 
but the idealized version of a strong leader whom they themselves longed for 
in the early 1930s. To be sure, such diverging interpretations are common to all 
celebrations at all times; nevertheless, they still laid bare the underlying fault 
lines of German-American relations.
82 Outside of German-America, his name seems to have been mostly unknown. A 1927 bibliog-
raphy on Steuben reveals hardly any literature outside of German-American publications; Heinz 
Kloss, “Friedrich Wilhelm von Steubens Bedeutung,” Der Auslanddeutsche 10, no. 23 (Dec. 
1927): 788–789.
83 Camillo von Klenze, “Das amerikanische Goethebild,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Akademie 
(July 1933): 184–210, 210.
84 Prittwitz, Zwischen Petersburg und Washington, 214.
85 “Carl-Schurz-Feiern der Deutschen Akademie in Berlin und München,” Mitteilungen der 
Deutschen Akademie (May/Jun 1929): 240–242.
86 Bloem, “Das Steuben-Jahr,” 7–10.
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Indeed, as Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh remarked in another 
context, “symbolic celebrations generally conceal problem areas,”87 and there 
was no shortage of these in the early 1930s. Despite the prevalent rhetoric of 
transatlantic friendship, these years did not mark a high point of transatlantic 
amity. In hindsight, Ambassador Prittwitz identified an “atmospheric” shift in 
German-American relations in 1931, when German revisionist demands be-
gan to alienate and concern an increasing number of Americans.88 In fact, 
all gestures of goodwill aside, the Brüning cabinet had already moved a long 
way from the deference, accommodation, and proactive communication that 
had built transatlantic trust during the Stresemann years.89 Instead, Germa-
ny’s foreign policy began to be characterized once more by rash, isolated, and 
impatient actions and more or less openly used Germany’s political instability 
and financial debt to blackmail the United States into supporting its revision-
ist demands. That Germany would stress its dire financial straits at every turn 
but insist, for instance, on building new armored cruisers irritated American 
diplomats and an attentive public alike.90 Above all, such actions signaled Ger-
mans’ withering regard for American psychology, which had so clearly distin-
guished Weimar from Wilhelmine foreign policy. “The Germans,” American 
economic advisor Herbert Feis presciently noted in mid-June 1932, “grow more 
and more hysterically conscious of their own grievances and less and less aware 
of the judgment of the rest of the world.”91 From this perspective, the trans-
atlantic celebrations looked suspiciously like a return to the prewar policy of 
“gifts and gestures.”
Ultimately, these differences only reflected how increasingly radicalized 
domestic politics intruded ever more forcefully into transatlantic relations. 
From mid-1932 onward, the U. S. State Department received complaints about 
German exchange students in the United States engaging in Nazi propa-
ganda, while American tourists of Jewish faith reported instances of harass-
ment in Germany.92 At that point, German students had already radicalized 
87 Trommler and McVeigh, “Introduction,” in America and the Germans, ed. Trommler and 
McVeigh, 2:xi.
88 Prittwitz, Zwischen Petersburg und Washington, 195–196.
89 For an example of the change in transatlantic relations, see Burke, Ambassador Frederic Sack-
ett, 134–137; in general on this, see Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar, 514–515.
90 Burke, Ambassador Frederic Sackett, 146.
91 Feis, quoted in Burke, Ambassador Frederic Sackett, 238.
92 On the experiences of allegedly “Jewish looking” American students in Germany in the sum-
mer of 1932, see Edward Murrow to Professor G. R. Walther Thomas, Nov. 29, 1933, Roll 7, 
Rockefeller Archives Center, IIE Records, Grantee Files. “The closer the 30th of January 1933 
came,” remembered Ambassador Prittwitz, “the more often the propagandistic emissaries of the 
Völkische Beobachter [the Nazi paper] showed themselves.” Prittwitz, Zwischen Petersburg und 
Washington, 221.
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and turned German universities into National Socialist strongholds.93 When 
in mid-1931 Ambassador Schurman returned to Heidelberg to open the new 
university building, which he and American friends had endowed in 1928, the 
“liberal Heidelberg” of Weimar days had already crumbled under right-wing 
agitation.94 The National Socialist student organization greeted the universi-
ty’s distinguished alumni, generous benefactor, and honorary doctor in its very 
own way: with anti-Semitic and anti-American slurs.95 Perhaps no one saw 
more clearly than Germany’s democratic ambassador in Washington just how 
profoundly Germany’s domestic radicalization would come to alienate Amer-
icans. In numerous reports and private correspondence, Prittwitz stressed the 
grave danger to Germany of straying too far from its reliable peaceful policy.96 
American goodwill, he warned Berlin, depended “to a great extent on the trust 
in the basic direction of German domestic and foreign policy.”97
93 Long before the National Socialists’ general political success, a majority of the German stu-
dent body voted for them. In the student elections of January 1932, the National Socialist group 
received almost two-thirds of all votes at the University of Berlin. Michael Grüttner, “Studenten-
schaft in Demokratie und Diktatur,” in Geschichte der Universität unter den Linden, ed. Grüttner 
et al., 2:187–294 (Berlin, 2012), 220; on Berlin University as an ideological battleground, see 
ibid., 239–249.
94 The subsequent student campaign against one well-known pacifist professor was so vicious 
that one German magazine concluded in July 1932 that “liberal Heidelberg has thus opened the 
era of the Third Reich in the sphere of academia!” Quoted in Steven P. Remy, “‘We Are No Longer 
the University of the Liberal Age’: The Humanities and National Socialism in Heidelberg,” in 
Nazi Germany and the Humanities: How German Academics Embraced Nazism, ed. Wolfgang 
Bialas and Anson Rabinbach, 21–49, 23.
95 Buselmeier, Harth, and Jansen, eds., Auch eine Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, 155.
96 See, for example, Prittwitz’s letter to Bülow, reprinted in Prittwitz, Zwischen Petersburg und 
Washington, 219–221.
97 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, May 9, 1931, PA R 80150.
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Fig . 19: National Socialist Student 
Organization, “Die Juden bringen 
den lebendigen Geist [The Jews 
bring the living spirit],” Pamphlet 
circulated upon the opening of the 
American-financed new university 
building, June 1931, Heidelberg 
University Archive, B-5135/7
With the privilege of hindsight, then, the Goethe commemorations of 1932 
appear only as a stage on which the agony of Germany’s first republic played 
out. Taking place in the critical weeks of the German presidential election, the 
celebrations were pervaded by political strife: Gerhart Hauptmann and Eu-
gen Kühnemann, for example, used their American sojourns to champion the 
candidates for Reich president, Hindenburg and Hitler, respectively;98 and the 
German commemorations of Goethe were characterized by a widespread ide-
ological clash between “Goethe as a […] cosmopolitan” and “Goethe as a Ger-
man.”99 The momentum was certainly on the side of the latter interpretation, 
however. If the official festivities at Weimar, held in March 1932, had already 
been disturbed by parading Brownshirts, by the time of the official Frankfurt 
98 On Hauptmann, see George Sylvester Viereck, “Gerhart Hauptmann, Deutschlands berühm-
tester lebender Dramatiker und Literat, Gewinner des Nobelpreises 1912, in einem Gespräch,” 
Detroit Sunday Times, Mar. 20, 1932, reprinted in H. D. Tschörtner, Gespräche und Interviews mit 
Gerhart Hauptmann (1894–1946) (Berlin, 1994), 137–139; on Kühnemann and his endorsement 
of Hitler, see Kühnemann, Interview with Harvard Crimson, Feb. 10, 1932, NL Eugen Kühne-
mann, Box 6, Universitätsbibliothek Marburg.
99 Welzbacher, Edwin Redslob, 220.
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event five months later, the Nazis were the strongest party in the Reichstag.100 
When a depressed-looking Brüning led the black-clad official delegation to 
Goethe’s grave, one onlooker could not shake the premonition that “we are 
burying the Republic.”101
*
For German-American relations, June 1932 proved a turning point.102 Hinden-
burg’s dismissal of Chancellor Brüning came as a shock to Americans, who 
had come to regard both Hindenburg and Brüning as stalwarts of republican 
stability. The appointment of Brüning’s successor, Franz von Papen, and his 
aristocratic “monocle cabinet” was widely considered a reactionary takeover. 
Given Papen’s notorious American past (the former military attaché in Wash-
ington had been forced to leave the United States in 1915 on espionage and sab-
otage charges), the appointment clearly undermined US confidence and trust 
in Germany.103 As if to prove Americans’ fears correct, German representatives 
walked out of the world disarmament conference in Geneva shortly thereaf-
ter. Though the United States continued to support Germany in casting off its 
reparations burden (July 1932) and attaining armament equality (December 
1932), there was no denying the qualitative change in the relationship between 
the two countries. No transatlantic celebration could long hide what many 
American observers, including Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, deemed 
a “reawakening of the Prussian spirit.”104 As Ambassador Prittwitz once more 
reminded Berlin in November 1932, the crux of transatlantic relations lay not 
in Germany’s foreign but in its domestic politics.105
100 Manfred Müller, “Nationalsozialistische Einflüsse auf die Vorbereitung und den Ablauf der 
Reichsgedächtnisfeier für Goethe 1932 in Weimar,” Zeitschrift für Germanistik 14, no. 3 (2004): 
608–613.
101 Redslob, Von Weimar nach Europa, 207; less involved observers, like Roosevelt Professor 
Woodbridge, however, remarked that “the ceremony at the time when the wreaths were laid 
upon Goethe’s tomb was particularly impressive”; see Woodbridge to Butler, Apr. 14, 1932, Fred-
erick James Eugene Woodbridge Papers, Box 1, Correspondence, Folder: Butler/Woodbridge, 
1931, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
102 Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 523.
103 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, June 6, 1932, “Deutscher Kabinettswechsel,” PA R 
80151; Prittwitz analyzed the situation as follows: “Generally, the Americans do not care in what 
way other peoples want to pursue their happiness or damnation. But they do have a certain fun-
damental attitude that could be best summarized as an aversion to radicalism, on the one hand, 
and a disdain for military preponderance in politics, on the other hand.”
104 Link, Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 531.
105 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Nov. 10, 1932, “Stand der deutsch-amerikanischen 
Beziehungen,” PA R 80151.
Chapter 8 
“Submerged Under a Nazi Wave”? Continuity and 
Change in German Public Diplomacy, 1933–1937
The Nazi Party’s rise to power transformed German-American relations. While American officials refrained from public criticism of Germany’s domestic politics, the American public registered and at times pro-
tested the changes taking place overseas. Germany reacted to these challenges 
with new efforts to ease American apprehensions, not always successfully. Al-
ternately heeding or ignoring the lessons of previous decades, public diplomats 
would continue to play a discrete, if ambivalent, role in transatlantic relations. 
While the historiography on Nazi public diplomacy and propaganda is volumi-
nous, the following chapter briefly traces developments after 1933 with special 
attention to continuities and ruptures in the fields of action explored in the 
previous chapters. In so doing, it illuminates some of the unique strengths and 
shortcomings of Weimar’s public relations.
*
Americans followed the Nazis’ rise to power apprehensively, if not usually very 
closely. Beginning in mid-1932, discerning American news correspondents in 
Berlin like Edgar Ansel Mowrer had sought to alert the American public to 
the dangers of National Socialist agitation and Germany’s attempt, as Mowrer’s 
book title called it, to “put the clock back.”1 Still, relatively few Americans paid 
significant attention to such journalistic predictions. More than the appoint-
ment of the Hitler cabinet itself, the establishment of dictatorial controls over 
1 Edgar Ansel Mowrer. Germany Puts the Clock Back (New York, 1933).
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legislative and executive powers and the accompanying violence and suspen-
sion of civil liberties in February and March was what first caused American 
alarm. The critical reports of American journalists on these events impressively 
confirmed many an American’s lingering suspicions about the depth of Ger-
many’s democratic conversion.2 Even before the Reichstag self-abdicated by 
passing the “Enabling Act” on March 23, American Ambassador Sackett re-
ported that “[d]emocracy in Germany has received a blow from which it may 
never recover. Germany has been submerged under a huge Nazi wave. The 
much heralded Third Reich has become a reality.”3
Throughout the spring of 1933, anti-Semitic outbursts in Germany fed 
American concern and indignation. The official German boycott of Jewish 
businesses (April 1), the dismissal of Jewish and left-leaning civil servants, in-
cluding world-famous scientists like Albert Einstein (April 7), and the nation-
wide book burnings one month later evoked strong American reactions.4 As 
the persistent and state-driven nature of discrimination and terror in Germany 
became apparent, American protest, too, settled into more organized forms. 
With some Catholic and Protestant support, Jewish groups in the United States 
mounted large-scale protest rallies and called for a boycott of German prod-
ucts, tourist destinations, and universities. American diplomats frequently 
warned their German interlocutors of the adverse effects of antisemitism on 
U. S. opinion.5 Although many Americans long remained remarkably ambiv-
alent about the nature of Nazi rule, the degree of its popular support and its 
ultimate intentions, disdain for, and suspicion of Nazi Germany never entirely 
subsided during the 1930s.6 After January 1933, American attitudes toward 
Germany took a decided turn for the worse.7
German observers were clearly distressed by American responses and be-
gan to focus their attention on American public opinion more than they had in 
nearly a decade. From March 1933 onward, the Foreign Ministry was inundated 
2 Müller, Weimar im Blick, 374. For a consular report on the similarities between the Italian 
fascist takeover and National Socialism, see Consul General at Stuttgart (Dominian) to the Sec-
retary of State, Feb. 21, 1933, FRUS, Vol. II 1933, 193–198.
3 The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State, Mar. 9, 1933, FRUS, Vol. II 
1933, 206–209, 209.
4 See the reports in PA R 80152 and R 80153.
5 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the German Ambassador (Lu-
ther), May 3, 1933, FRUS 1933, Vol. II, 352–354.
6 On this ambivalence, see Hoenicke-Moore, Know Your Enemy, esp. Chapter 2, 41–77. Offner 
notes that “the boycott probably made its greatest impact in 1933–34, when Germany’s exports 
to the United States declined proportionately over twice as much as its exports to the rest of the 
world.” See Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 
1933–1938 (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 63.
7 In a frank report in 1935, Ambassador Luther characterized the United States as “one of the 
main centres of anti-German agitation”; The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry, June 28, 1935, DGFP, Series C/Vol. 4, Document No. 184.
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with diplomatic, commercial, academic, and press accounts commenting on 
the depth and extent of American indignation. German shipping lines, export 
companies, and the tourist trade feared the American boycott movement for 
the impact it could have on commerce, while diplomats and German Amer-
icans dreaded its implications for Germany’s standing in the United States.8 
Indeed, a vast number of German and German-American observers were re-
minded of 1914 and voiced their concerns that antisemitism could turn into 
a new public relations disaster, a “new Belgium.” George Sylvester Viereck 
warned that Germany might once more “find herself morally isolated as she 
did in the World War,” unless decisive countermeasures were adopted.9 A 
cable the German Tourist Information Office in New York sent Germany in 
late March 1933 gave concise expression to these fears, along with recommen-
dations for immediate action:
flood of agitation grows especially in the churches of all confessions, reminds of 1914 
atrocity propaganda but much more comprehensively organized – stop – Hearst press, 
even [New Yorker] Staats-Zeitung, agitate, which were neutral or sympathizing then – 
stop […] most forceful intervention necessary (interviews with church leaders etc) […] 
flood of anti-German material floods all press outlets here[.] Counter-flood has to be set 
in motion there immediately.10
Before we turn to the contours of this German “counter-flood,” it must be ac-
knowledged that despite the constant invocations of 1914, the United States 
was not nearly as crucial to German foreign policy in 1933 as it had been then. 
The final settlement of the reparations question in November 1932, Germany’s 
unilateral withdrawal from the disarmament talks in late 1933, and manifest 
US political isolationism – underlined by the neutrality legislation of the mid-
1930s – further decreased American weight in Berlin. In contrast to Great Brit-
ain or France, the United States posed no serious (i. e., military) threat to Nazi 
Germany’s revisionist course and, thus, played no important role in Hitler’s 
immediate foreign policy conceptions.11 For much of the 1930s, Detlef Junker 
has noted, Hitler would consider “American good will […] useful but relatively 
8 See Max Ilgner to AA, Mar. 29, 1933, PA R 80152; Meeting, Mar. 30, 1933, PA R 80152.
9 George Sylvester Viereck to AA (Dieckhoff), Mar. 16, 1933, PA R 80153.
10 Telegram (GTIO), Mar. 23, 1933, PA R 246920.
11 There is some disagreement about how important the United States was to Germany. 
Hans-Jürgen Schröder emphasizes that the United States was not at all a “quantité negligeable” 
for Hitler’s foreign policy and that especially during the first few years after 1933, he accommo-
dated the United States in a number of ways; see Hans-Jürgen Schröder, “Das Dritte Reich und 
die USA,” in Die USA und Deutschland, 1918–1975, ed. Knapp et al., 107–152 (Munich, 1978), 
115.
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insignificant.”12 Nevertheless, it was clearly in Germany’s interest to maintain 
basically friendly relations with the United States. Not only did the foreign cur-
rency-starved Reich wish to maintain American trade and tourism; it had no 
desire to further increase American suspicions. As it did elsewhere, Germany 
would, hence, try to obscure its forceful revisionist and, ultimately, expansion-
ist agenda by emphasizing its peaceful intentions and the continuity of earlier 
foreign policy aspirations.13 In its basic intention then – to camouflage the 
changes taking place in Germany – the “Third Reich” in its public diplomacy 
had more in common with the policies of Germany’s presidential cabinets 
from 1930 to 1932 than it did with those of the mid-1920s.
Like Nazi rule more generally, German public diplomacy after 1933 was 
characterized by a strong duality of traditional and revolutionary elements. 
Long-standing, conservative state bureaucracies like the Foreign Ministry in-
creasingly competed with a host of party offices.14 The result of this polycratic 
structure was notorious infighting that made for the unique dynamism – and 
unique problems – of the Nazi state. In questions of public diplomacy, as in for-
eign relations overall, German diplomats by and large maintained the caution 
of the previous decade.15 While American opposition to the new government 
prompted it to immediately increase publicity efforts, this was more a change in 
pace than in basic direction. For example, O. C. Kiep, the German consul gen-
eral in New York, decided to hire World War I propagandist George Sylvester 
Viereck as the consulate’s press liaison in 1933 – a move that might suggest a 
German “relapse” to the policies of 1914 – but Kiep’s most ambitious project, a 
book with portraits of Nazi leaders published by an American publisher, was 
far from radical.16 The American public relations firms German companies 
like the chemical trust IG Farben hired to help them improve Germany’s image 
only seconded this cautious approach: They advised the German companies to 
(i) engage in a policy of “come and see” that would beckon Americans to visit 
the new Germany, and (ii) pay more attention to American news correspond-
12 Detlef Junker, “Continuity of Ambivalence: German Views of America,” in Transatlantic Im-
ages and Perceptions, ed. Barclay and Glaser, 243–263, 244.
13 Herbert Sirois, Zwischen Illusion und Krieg. Deutschland und die USA 1933–1941 (Paderborn, 
2000), 45; a prime example of this strategy is the German proclamation on leaving the disarma-
ment conference and the League of Nations; see Proclamation of the German Government to the 
German Nation, Oct. 14, 1933, DGFP, Series C, Vol. 2, Document No. 1.
14 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 1933–38 (Frankfurt, 1968).
15 Already on January 30, 1933, the Foreign Ministry had issued a circular to its missions to 
calm fears about the Hitler cabinet by stressing its continuity in personnel. Circular of the State 
Secretary, Jan. 30, 1933, DGFP Series C, Vol. 1, Document No. 1.
16 German Embassy, Washington, to AA, Mar. 29, 1933, “Antideutsche Stimmung in den 
Vereinigten Staaten,” PA R 80153.
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ents in Berlin, essentially reiterating policies Germany had already practiced 
for a decade.17
But already during the spring of 1933, new party-affiliated offices began to 
challenge more traditional ministerial conceptions of public diplomacy. Ger-
mandom policies and political propaganda, in particular, enjoyed great at-
tention among Nazi Party leaders.18 Hitler himself, whose understanding of 
propaganda had been shaped by his experience of the world war, was deeply 
interested in this field and would remain so up to 1945. Still, his ideas on the 
subject stood out not for their originality – Mein Kampf only repeated the 
widely held assumption that skillful British agitation had precipitated German 
defeat – but for their radical conclusions:19 Already in the early 1920s, the 
National Socialists had developed a “propaganda doctrine,” according to which 
repetitive, catchword-oriented mass agitation, especially when coupled with 
violence, could have almost unlimited influence on people.20 In the coming 
years, the Nazis substituted propaganda for politics, stabilizing their rule once 
they came into power using ideological appeals to the Volksgemeinschaft and 
attacks against outside enemies (Jews, Bolsheviks). The party’s long preoccupa-
tion with the subject logically resulted in the establishment of the Ministry of 
Propaganda (Ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) under Joseph 
Goebbels on March 13, 1933.
Although the Ministry of Propaganda initially focused on domestic mat-
ters, it soon relieved the Foreign Ministry of much of its authority over rep-
resenting Germany to the world. In an inter-ministerial meeting of May 24, 
1933, Hitler underlined the importance of a forceful, well-funded campaign 
to overcome Germany’s international isolation.21 To this end, the Ministry of 
Propaganda was to take over all official instruments suitable for more “active” 
and “aggressive propaganda,” leaving the Foreign Ministry with only a small 
press division to tend to routine, official information work. The Foreign Min-
istry weakly protested that public diplomacy must not be regarded (nor openly 
identified) as propaganda and ought to be closely coordinated with foreign pol-
17 On the hiring process, see Max Ilgner to Ivy Lee, Mar. 29, 1933, PA R 80152; Investigation of 
Nazi propaganda activities and investigation of certain other propaganda activities, Public Hear-
ings before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Seven-
ty-Third Congress, Second Session (Washington DC, 1934–35), 178.
18 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 38.
19 Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg. Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter 
Ribbentrop (Munich, 1987), 60.
20 Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 71–72; for a brief introduction, see David Welch, “Intro-
duction,” in Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations, ed. David Welch, 1–9 (Totowa, NJ, 
1983).
21 Minutes of the Conference of Heads of Departments, May 24, 1933, “Propaganda Abroad,” 
DGFP, Series C, Vol. 1, Document No. 261.
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icy, but this proved of little avail.22 By the summer of 1933, Goebbels’s ministry 
had gained control over the bulk of political, economic, commercial, and tour-
ist propaganda as well as matters pertaining to exhibitions, film, sports, and 
fairs.23 Abroad, Goebbels appointed and deployed a network of press attachés 
at German missions, which allowed him to use traditional infrastructures (and 
diplomatic immunity) while largely cutting the Foreign Ministry out of fields it 
had previously managed.
Similar challenges to the Wilhelmstrasse’s authority arose in the field of 
Germandom policies, which was similarly embedded in Nazi ideology. No-
tions of the Volksgemeinschaft, albeit racially rather than culturally defined, 
shaped the Nazi Party’s domestic and international politics. In this context, Na-
zis regarded Germans abroad (Auslandsdeutsche) – whether citizens or not – 
increasingly as targets, conduits, and fertile ground for spreading National So-
cialist ideals or, at the very least, creating a favorable climate of opinion toward 
the Third Reich. Alongside a number of other offices, the National Socialist 
Party’s Foreign Section (Auslandsorganisation/AO) devoted itself to these mat-
ters. Founded in 1931 to collect dues and keep in touch with the growing num-
ber of National Socialist Party members abroad, it sought to wrest the wider 
field of Germandom work from the allegedly lackluster, ideologically unreli-
able older Germandom organizations and the Foreign Ministry after 1933.24 
While it did not immediately succeed, its leader Ernst Wilhelm Bohle tapped 
into the international network of Nazi enthusiasts to try and turn Germans 
abroad into a distinct asset for the new Germany.25
In both cases – political propaganda and Volkstumspolitik – this reorgan-
ization of international representation ultimately undermined the Foreign 
Ministry’s policy of caution in the United States. Indeed, these new offices, 
which entertained – like Hitler himself – a notoriously low opinion of diplo-
mats, brushed aside diplomatic warnings about the ill effects of forceful agita-
tion in the United States.26 This is not to suggest that the cautious traditional 
diplomats and assertive National Socialists were always at odds – doubtlessly, 
22 Memorandum/Sievers about work of VI C, Feb. 24, 1933; and Memorandum “Kulturpolitik,” 
Mar. 1, 1933, PA R 60798.
23 Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere (New Haven, 1967), 21: “For the 
next six years this divorce of foreign propaganda from the control of the Foreign Ministry and its 
officers in other countries worked havoc with the efficient functioning of the Reich’s official for-
eign service.”
24 Traditional Germandom organizations retained a certain degree of autonomy until 1937; see 
Frank-Rutger Hausmann, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle. Gauleiter im Dienst von Partei und Staat (Berlin, 
2009), 54; on the competition between traditional and National Socialist Germandom work, see 
Tammo Luther, Volkstumspolitik des deutschen Reiches, 1933–38. Die Auslandsdeutschen im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten (Stuttgart, 2004).
25 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Arthur L. Smith, The Nazi Party and the Foreign Office (New York, 
2007), 34.
26 Hausmann, Ernst Wilhlem Bohle, 57.
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Hitler excelled at peaceable posturing – but to emphasize that the Foreign 
Ministry’s loss of influence left Germany’s Amerikapolitik in the hands of men 
with limited knowledge of the United States once again.27 Hitler himself had 
never been to an English-speaking country, and most of his ambivalent and 
inconsistent assumptions about the United States derived from popular Amer-
ikaliteratur, which was notoriously distorted.28 In general, he tended to pre-
fer unreliable, but ideologically compatible, accounts of the United States over 
cautious diplomatic reports.29 As a result, the Nazi government generally (i) 
blamed American opposition to National Socialism only on Jewish influences, 
and (ii) misinterpreted German Americans as a readily accessible asset.30 
Whereas German diplomats generally held on to the basic lessons of the previ-
ous decades, Nazi offices tended at first to fall back–with different ideological 
emphases, to be sure–on the notions of 1914.
Boggling Its Propaganda Again: Nazi Germany and the Case of Volkstumspolitik
This was nowhere clearer than in Nazi Germany’s approaches to German 
Americans, a subject that has received bountiful scholarly attention.31 Already 
by the summer of 1933, both the Ministry of Propaganda and the Ausland-
sorganisation had departed notably from the caution that had characterized 
Weimar policies toward German Americans. Instead, they sought to activate 
this ethnic group for German interests and use them to spread National So-
cialist ideas abroad. Their main partners in this agitation were not traditional 
German-American Vereine but a number of Nazi groups that had developed 
in the United States since 1924 with memberships comprised largely of post-
war German immigrants. Many in this cadre of about 600,000 immigrants 
27 Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 329, labeled Hitler’s talent “grandiose Selbstver-
harmlosung” (grandiose playing down of his true intentions).
28 While Hitler admired America’s rigid racial hierarchies, business efficiency, and territorial 
expansion (which fueled his own dreams of autarky and Lebensraum), he despised its alleged 
material excesses and undue Jewish influences. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the 
United States,” American Historical Review 69, no. 4 (1964): 1006–1021.
29 Sirois, Zwischen Illusion und Krieg, 144.
30 Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 199–208.
31 Arthur L. Smith, The Deutschtum of Nazi Germany and the United States (The Hague, 1965); 
Cornelia Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein. Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA 
(Stuttgart, 1998); Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 528–549; G. H. W. Graessner, 
“Deutschland und die Nationalsozialisten in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 1933 bis 
1939. Ein Beitrag zur Deutschtumspolitik des Dritten Reiches” (PhD Diss. Universität Bonn, 
1973); Klaus Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten 1933–1941 (Heidelberg, 
1971); Joachim Remak, “‘Friends of the New Germany’: The Bund and German-American Rela-
tions,” Journal of Modern History 29, no. 1 (1957): 38–41; a concise overview of the American 
situation is offered in Jacobsen and Smith, The Nazi Party and the Foreign Office, 119–128.
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were unable to identify with U. S. society or traditional ethnic associations.32 
From about 1931 the Auslandsorganisation maintained closer contact with Nazi 
activists in the United States and encouraged them to found the Friends of 
the New Germany as the National Socialist organization in North America in 
July 1933.33 This organization, which originally included party members and 
sympathizers, as well as German and American citizens, soon coordinated its 
operations along German lines: it divided North America into four Gaue (Nazi 
administrative regions), founded an equivalent to the storm troopers and Nazi 
youth organizations, and adopted somewhat similar uniforms. Set up in this 
way, the Friends of the New Germany aimed to unite all “Germans” in North 
America around National Socialist ideals, to fight the “distortions” of the Jew-
ish press, and to enlighten Americans about the “real” Third Reich.34 Fairly 
close ties to the Auslandsorganisation, the Ministry of Propaganda, and the 
embassy’s propaganda attaché facilitated its agitation.
While this attempt to organize German Americans clearly broke with the 
official practices of the 1920s, German diplomats remained remarkably consist-
ent in their assessment. As their predecessors had during the 1920s, the Ger-
man ambassadors to Washington Hans Luther (1933–1937) and Hans-Heinrich 
Dieckhoff (1937–1938) deemed aggressive and visible agitation among German 
Americans to be only counterproductive. Not only was it extremely unlikely 
to meet its objective, but it was also bound to provoke resolute American op-
position because it would give the impression of a foreign government organ-
izing a political movement on American soil.35 Unlike in the 1920s, however, 
when widespread disinterest in German Americans had facilitated such re-
straint, the newfound enthusiasm for (and among) German Americans and 
the “polycratic” structures of Germandom work rendered caution impossible. 
Even as American protests repeatedly led party offices to deny, loosen, or shift 
their contacts with American Nazis, they never entirely broke off relations with 
them.36 Moreover, American Nazis themselves regularly undermined Ger-
many’s efforts to distance itself from these groups because they liked to boast 
of their access and ties to Nazi leaders.37 Despite their small numbers (they 
32 Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein, 23.
33 Ibid., 47.
34 Ibid., 63.
35 Offner, American Appeasement, 86.
36 American criticism led the Auslandsorganisation to forbid party members to proselytize 
among Americans or to belong to “American organizations” like the Friends of the New Ger-
many in February 1934; Director of Department III to the Embassy in the United States, Feb. 16, 
1934, DGFP, Series C, Vol. 2, Document No. 259; relations were often kept up informally; see 
Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 543.
37 Jacobsen and Smith, The Nazi Party and the Foreign Office, 125.
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probably never had more than 20,000 members), Nazi groups in the United 
States eventually became a serious liability for transatlantic relations.38
Indeed, as German diplomats had predicted, Nazi agitation almost imme-
diately alienated Americans and gave them a welcome opportunity to indict 
the “new Germany.” By late 1933, American district attorneys were investigat-
ing the Friends’ leaders, customs authorities were searching German ships for 
propaganda literature, and U. S. politicians were calling for a congressional “In-
vestigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities.” Launched in early 1934, this long, 
drawn-out investigation ultimately had little legal consequence, having found 
little evidence of a larger subversive German plot, but it generated plentiful 
adverse publicity.39 Like its 1919 forerunner, the congressional investigation 
left many Americans with the impression that their country was crawling with 
German agents.40 As the historian Charles A. Beard concluded in December 
1933: “The Germans horribly boggled their propaganda during the World War 
and they are in a fair way to do it again.”41 It was in American reactions after 
1933, then, that the wisdom of Weimar’s policy of restraint was fully borne out.
“There is nothing disconcerting at all […] going on in Germany” – 
Cultural Diplomacy and the Projection of Normality
Still, in retelling this familiar story of Nazi blunders, we must not lose sight of 
the fact that some elements of the German campaign were successful, having 
built skillfully on Weimar-era approaches and achievements. Indeed, one de-
fining characteristic of Nazi foreign policy was its careful attention to the pub-
lic image of the Nazi regime, and despite all of its preference for an “active” and 
“aggressive” propaganda, it also engaged in decidedly less controversial means 
of promoting the nation.42 In early July 1933, for example, the Ministry of Prop-
38 Scholars have noted that American reactions to pro-Nazi groups in the United States were 
entirely “unrelated to the small size of these formations. The repercussions of a movement look-
ing to foreign political models on a country of immigrants would be hard to exaggerate”; see 
Gerhard L. Weinberg, “From Confrontation to Cooperation: Germany and the United States, 
1933,” in America and the Germans, ed. Trommler and McVeigh, 2:45–58, 46.
39 Director of Division III to the Embassy in the United States, Feb. 16, 1934, DGFP, Series C, 
Vol. 2, Document No. 259; Investigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities and Investigation of Cer-
tain Other Propaganda Activities: Public Hearings before the Special Committee on Un-American 
Activities, House of Representatives, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session (Washington, DC, 
1934–35).
40 Memorandum by an Official of Department III, DGFP, Series C, Vol. 2, Document No. 139, 
DGFP, Series C, Vol. 2, Document No. 337.
41 Charles A. Beard, “Spooks – Made in Germany,” New Republic 77 (Dec. 16, 1933), 97, cited in 
Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda, 200.
42 Friedrich Kießling, “Zur Einführung: Nationalsozialistische Außendarstellung und der 
fremde Blick. Die internationale Dimension der Reichsparteitage,” in Bilder für die Welt. Die 
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aganda instructed the coordinated German press to abstain from “attacks on 
America, the government of the United States and President Roosevelt at all 
costs.”43 The government also made notable efforts to maintain Weimar-era 
cultural programs, leading to numerous deliberate continuities. For Nazi Ger-
many, educational exchanges and tourism promotion became convenient ways 
to normalize and trivialize the nature of the Third Reich abroad.
As the U. S. reacted adversely to Germany’s renewed forceful activities in 
1933/34, in particular, Nazi Germany, in close analogy to the developments af-
ter World War I, once more focused attention on subtler means of influence. 
Ambassador Luther commented in great detail on the shape and pace of “Ger-
man cultural policy in the United States.”44 Repeating entrenched ideas about 
the United States as a culture in the making, he felt a non-political, broadly cul-
tural campaign was best suited to winning American sympathy and preventing 
Great War configurations from recurring: “Apart from the growing respect for 
Germany’s recovering health and strength, cultural ways and means are prac-
tically all that remains open to us. Therefore, increased cultural work in the 
United States is imperative in view of the peculiar political situation prevailing 
at the moment.”45 Even the propaganda attaché at the Washington embassy 
(appointed against the will of the Foreign Ministry) concluded in August 1934 
that a non-political and non-ethnic approach was probably Germany’s best op-
tion in the United States. Moving away from a focus on German Americans, he 
explained, “we can only hope to overcome propaganda carried on against us 
by Jewry infiltrated with the international Spirit if we succeed in establishing 
clear relations of mutual esteem and respect with the mass of patriotic Amer-
icans.”46
In this endeavor, Nazi Germany controlled cultural efforts to a far greater 
degree than a pluralistic democracy like Weimar ever could have. The Nazifi-
cation and coordination (Gleichschaltung) of German cultural life had set in al-
most immediately upon the Nazis’ rise to power. Many Jewish and left-leaning 
professors were dismissed from universities, and German students, teachers, 
professors, artists, and writers were organized into professional, National So-
cialist organizations. Newly established Kulturkammern began to coordinate 
Reichsparteitage der NSDAP im Spiegel der ausländischen Presse, ed. Friedrich Kießling and Gre-
gor Schöllgen, 1–23 (Cologne, 2006), 7.
43 Hans-Jürgen Schröder, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten, 1933–1939. Wirtschaft und 
Politik in der Entwicklung des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Gegensatzes (Wiesbaden, 1970), 95.
44 Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry, June 28, 1935, DGFP Series C/
Vol. 4, Document No. 184.
45 The ambassador noted that “A young nation of more or less recent immigrants, the United 
States possess a culture of their own only in embryonic form […] in terms of culture the United 
States are still substantially a colony of Europe”; ibid.
46 An Official of the Embassy (Sallet) in the United States to the Ministry of Propaganda, Aug. 
3, 1934, DGFP (Series C) Vol. 3, Document No. 569.
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the German press, art, music, and literature following the directives of the 
Ministry of Propaganda and other offices.47 These chambers of culture, in con-
cert with festivities, mass rallies, and social programs, were intended to help 
structure German society around the key propagandist concept of the time, 
the Volksgemeinschaft.48 All of this cultural organization also impacted the 
way Germany presented itself to the wider world. The more than two dozen 
international offices at German universities were swiftly Nazified;49 the Ger-
man Tourism Council was subordinated to the Ministry of Propaganda; and 
the German Academic Exchange Service’s (DAAD) advisory board was packed 
with party members.50
That such a process of Gleichschaltung proceeded rapidly and smoothly 
was due to the accommodation and “self-coordination” of a large number of 
Germany’s cultural, business, and diplomatic elites. If conservatives found the 
transition easier on account of their widespread illiberalism and anti-republi-
can feeling, many liberals, too, had been losing confidence in democratic gov-
ernance because of their experiences since 1930.51 Historians have underlined 
the “partial identity of interests” between Nazis and traditional elites, particu-
larly with regard to more assertive foreign policy. Especially during the first 
few months of Nazi rule, even a number of those who opposed the Nazis felt no 
need to threaten their life’s work to take a principled stance against a govern-
ment that might prove as short-lived as its many Weimar predecessors. Con-
trary to his later depictions, the publicist, educator, and champion of demo-
cratic Germany in the 1920s, Ernst Jäckh, for example, initially accommodated 
the new rulers to such an extent that the Rockefeller Foundation marveled at 
his “extraordinary capacity of adaptation.”52 For Germany’s professional pub-
47 Trommler, Kulturmacht ohne Kompass, 439–441; on the broader European conception of 
Nazi cultural order, see Benjamin Martin, The Nazi-Facist New Order for European Culture 
(Cambridge, MA, 2016).
48 On the Volksgemeinschaft and propaganda, see Bernd Sösemann, Propaganda. Medien und 
Öffentlichkeit in der NS-Diktatur (Stuttgart, 2011), li–lvii.
49 Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Acting Secretary of State, Dec. 4, 1933, FRUS (1933) 
Vol. II, 268–269, provides one American diplomatic report on this: “through this control over all 
culture in Germany, the Minister for Propaganda will be able to regiment and mold public opin-
ion to an extent inconceivable in the United States and many other countries. That the effect will 
be stimulating to the artist, the author or the composer seems extremely doubtful.”
50 Adolf Morsbach of the DAAD, for example, strategically recruited (moderate) National So-
cialist supporters to serve on its board to shield it from the influence of the (much more radical) 
National Socialist Student Body. Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kultur-
politik, 54–55.
51 Christian Jansen, “Auf dem Mittelweg von rechts. Akademische Ideologie und Politik zwis-
chen 1914 und 1933,” in Auch eine Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, ed. Karin Buselmeier, 
Dietrich Harth, and Christian Jansen, 163–193 (Mannheim, 1985), 187; Jansen speaks of a 
“breakdown of liberalism” among German professors in the crisis years of the early 1930s.
52 Steven D. Korenblat, “A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1920–1933” Central European History 39 (2006): 394–430, 
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lic diplomats – men like Adolf Morsbach of the DAAD, Karl Oscar Bertling 
of the Amerika-Institut, and Hans Draeger of the Vereinigung Carl Schurz – 
pre-emptive self-coordination also promised to give them an opportunity to 
realize longer-standing ambitions.53 After a meeting with Nazi representatives 
in mid-May 1933, the notoriously disgruntled Bertling felt that “the new gen-
tlemen have a way of doing business that allows me, the outsider, to hope once 
more for an appreciation of the Amerika-Institut’s work.”54
While such hopes were not always fulfilled, the new government did have 
the momentum, interest, funds, and, not least, repressive instruments to cen-
tralize cultural activities, as many of these cultural diplomats had long desired. 
In December 1933, all organizations cultivating cultural relations with the 
United States were brought together into an informal “America Committee” 
(Deutscher Amerikaausschuß), which was to formulate and coordinate a joint 
cultural Amerikapolitik. From March 1934 onward, the representatives of the 
Amerika-Institut, the Terramare Office, the Former America Work Students 
(an alumni organization of the America Work Student Service, AWD), the 
American Committee of the Deutsche Akademie, the DAAD, the German 
Tourism Council, and others were organized into four sub-committees dealing 
respectively with (1) scientific and academic questions, (2) travel and tourism, 
(3) publications, and (4) economic matters.55 The leadership and official rep-
resentation of Nazi Germany’s cultural relations with the United States fell to 
the Vereinigung Carl Schurz. That its director Hans Draeger had never visited 
the United States and apparently spoke little English mattered less than his long 
involvement in revisionist propaganda and his outspoken allegiance to the new 
regime.56 The opening of the Vereinigung Carl Schurz’s Carl Schurz Haus, an 
industry-financed mansion in Berlin’s posh Tiergarten neighborhood, ended 
the first phase of restructuring in May 1934.
412; on a similarly “adaptive” response at Heidelberg’s famously ”liberal” Institut für Sozial- und 
Staatswissenschaft (InSoSta), see Carsten Klingemann, “Das ‘Institut für Sozial- und Staatswis-
senschaften’ an der Universität Heidelberg zum Ende der Weimarer Republik und während des 
Nationalsozialismus,” Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte (1990): 79–120.
53 Through 1933–1934, almost all of these individuals advocated a wide-ranging restructuring 
of German cultural diplomacy under their own leadership. The DAAD’s restructuring plan 
would have transferred the academic programs of the Deutsche Akademie, the Amerika-Institut, 
the Vereinigung Carl Schurz, and even the Prussian Ministry of Culture to the DAAD, making it 
a comprehensive center for Germany’s academic-scientific relations with the world; see Adolf 
Morsbach, “Aufzeichnung über die Neorganisation der dt. Kulturpolitik nach dem Auslande,” 
Mar. 1933, BArch Koblenz, NL Morsbach/14.
54 Amerika-Institut to Schmidt-Ott, May 23, 1933, NL Schmidt-Ott/540, GSPK.
55 Freitag, Die Entwicklung der Amerikastudien in Berlin, 159.
56 His lack of English fluency is noted in Brantz, “German-American Friendship,” 237. During 
the first meeting of the America Committee, Draeger emphatically proclaimed that all private 
organizations “serve the will of the Führer.” Erste Sitzung des Deutschen Amerika-Ausschusses, 
Dec. 4, 1933, PA R 803278; on Draeger’s close relationship with the Foreign Ministry, see his 
personal file, PA Personalakte 2955 Hans Draeger, esp. Aufzeichnung, Geh I 138g, June 17, 1936.
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This restructuring doubtlessly affected the ideological tenets of Germany’s cul-
tural Amerikapolitik. As Waldemar Hartmann, the America Committee’s party 
liaison, explained in late 1933, the only remedy for Germany’s distorted image 
abroad was to continue earlier “personal intercourse and reciprocal cultural 
exchange,” albeit on very different terms. Contacts with American pacifist cir-
cles such as YMCA Secretary Sherwood Eddy (long courted by the Weimar 
Republic) were to be abandoned in favor of facilitating an encounter between 
Germans and Americans who were “truly representative, both in blood and 
spirit.”57 The field of international education, especially, was quickly trans-
formed along these lines because the DAAD’s principle of “cultural encoun-
ter” between national(ist) elites proved readily adaptable to National Socialist 
ideology.58 Already by late 1933, potential exchange students were asked for 
evidence of Aryan descent and commitment to the National Socialist state.59 
Publicly, too, Adolf Morsbach, the director of the DAAD since 1927, sought vig-
orously to distance the organization from its very recent past. Only ten months 
after Weimar’s demise, he saw the need to blame the “current misunderstand-
ings” between Germany and the United States on the republic. According to 
Morsbach, Weimar (which he characterized as “deeply un-German”) had sys-
tematically misled Americans into believing in a mutuality of republican com-
mitment and “forcefully veiled” the German people’s actual attitude toward 
“democracy, which has been forced upon it.”60 Once the German people had 
been able to return to their true nature in January 1933, he said, Americans had 
simply not known what to make of it. In short, if Americans were opposed to 
Nazi Germany, this was due not least to Weimar’s strategic misrepresentations. 
Such statements reveal not only the new direction of Nazi cultural diplomacy; 
they also highlight the lack of deeper democratic commitment among some of 
the men who had been responsible for representing Weimar Germany abroad.
Despite such real and rhetorical departures, there were, nevertheless, 
plenty of undeniable personal and institutional continuities between Weimar 
and Nazi cultural diplomacy. To be sure, Weimar’s hard-core peaceful revision-
ists were forced into early retirement or exile, but professional public diplomats 
stayed on and often even remained wedded to the concepts they had devel-
oped in previous decades:61 the German Tourist Information Office in New 
57 Waldemar Hartmann, “Deutschland und die USA. Wege zu gegenseitigem Verstehen,” Na-
tionalsozialistische Monatshefte 44 (Nov. 1933): 2.
58 Adolf Morsbach, “Die kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und 
Deutschland,” Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte 44 (Nov. 1933): 30.
59 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 196.
60 Morsbach, “Die kulturellen Beziehungen,” 32.
61 E. g., Amerika-Institut [Grossmann], Dec. 1934, “Gedanken zu dem Problem gemeinsamer 
Amerika-Arbeit, Amerika-Institut Files [1910–1946], Freie Universität Berlin.
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York City continued under the directorship of Ernst Schmitz (1925–1941), the 
DAAD under Adolf Morsbach (1927–1934), the Vereinigung Carl Schurz un-
der Hans Draeger (1930–1942), the Amerika-Institut under Karl Oscar Bertling 
(1911–1945), and the Wirtschaftspolitische Vereinigung under Margarete Gärt-
ner (1922–1945). This was doubtlessly a strategy. Indeed, as in foreign relations 
more generally, Nazi leaders appreciated the mollifying qualities of continuities 
in personnel.62 For example, long after the actual leadership of the Amerika-In-
stitut had passed into the hands of men closer to National Socialism, Bertling 
outwardly remained its director. His transatlantic networks, knowledge, and, 
above all, bourgeois respectability were simply too valuable to dispense with.63 
While Nazi Germany’s attention to German Americans signaled a discon-
certing departure from Weimar traditions, the following pages will show that 
many of its cultural representations – especially with regard to tourism and 
international education – displayed a reassuring (and deliberate) continuity. 
They were, as Kristin Semmens has noted, a “crucial part of the attempt to 
convince other nations of the supposed normality of life in the Third Reich.”64
It is important to remember that this strategy of sugarcoating German de-
velopments had already begun before Hitler ever came to power. For example, 
as street violence and antisemitic assaults had awakened American concerns 
during 1932, the German Tourist Information Office (GTIO) in New York had 
taken discrete publicity steps to allay American fears.65 After 1933, it vastly ex-
panded these efforts. Following its conversations with American public rela-
tions specialists, the GTIO pursued a proactive course: its summer 1933 adver-
62 See Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 38. In 1933 Hitler 
also expressed satisfaction at having Neurath stay on, judging that it was “his benevolent appear-
ance that is of most use to me. You can’t imagine a man like that going in for a revolutionary 
policy”; quoted in Offner, American Appeasement, 30. Offner takes this Hermann Rauschning’s 
Conversations with Hitler, which have to be approached with caution.
63 The same holds true for Margarete Gärtner, the director of the Wirtschaftspolitische Ge-
sellschaft, who had a wide and valuable network of contacts. Through the 1930s, both Bertling 
and Gärtner were sent on repeated goodwill tours to the United States; as late as 1939/40, they 
still tried to explain German positions; see K. O. Bertling, Amerika-Institut, to Nicholas Murray 
Butler, Oct. 30, 1939, CEIP Box 222, Folder 9 Amerika-Institut, Columbia University, Rare Book 
& Manuscript Library Collections.
64 Kristin Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany: Tourism in the Third Reich (Houndmills, 2005), 
131.
65 The German Tourism Promotion Office had asked the American journalist Miles Bouton, 
one of its contributors, to send a cable to the United States that reported “All Quiet in Germany” 
and quoted a prominent American claiming that everything was calm and pleasant in Bad Nau-
heim, “tranquil and peaceful as it was two years ago … no tenseness of public feeling … no 
slightest indication that there is danger of any such eventuality in the future”; see RDV to AA, 
Aug. 9, 1932, R 246920; on the mid-1932 situation in general, see German Consulate General, 
New York, to AA, Aug. 26, 1932, “Beunruhigung amerikanischer Reisender durch innenpoli-
tische Vorgänge in Deutschland,” R 246920.
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tising campaign sold the “national revolution” as the not-to-be-missed event 
of the season:
to all of Germany’s famous tourist attractions there is now added the fascinating specta-
cle of the rebirth of a nation. Germany bids you welcome to the land, which now even 
more wins the distinction of being Europe’s most interesting country … perfect order is 
continuously maintained, assuring security and comfort. Germany, this summer, is again 
the center of Europe’s music and art … The thrill of traveling in this new-born land gives 
you undying memories endlessly renewed to imperishable beauty.
Finally, the advertisement concluded that there was “nothing disconcerting at 
all … going on in Germany.”66
This, indeed, would become the main argument of Germany’s public di-
plomacy efforts. Throughout the 1930s, the GTIO in New York would play a 
paramount role in “normalizing” the Third Reich. With its budget rising from 
$153,000 in 1933 to at the least $208,000 in 1936, it used its wide marketing rep-
ertoire of films, brochures, posters, radio shows, and news releases to advertise 
Germany’s eternal beauty and its new government’s accomplishments alike.67 
It skillfully marketed specific events, such as the 1934 Oberammergau Passion 
Play and the 1936 Olympics, just as it used its inconspicuous advertising struc-
tures to present a (visually) attractive Germany. Whereas American newspaper 
audiences read about a repressive and xenophobic regime, the GTIO portrayed 
a contented, healthy, and smiling nation, ready to welcome Americans. Above 
all, it beckoned Americans to “come and see” for themselves, a strategy that 
proved especially attuned to postwar Americans’ notorious suspicion of atroc-
ity stories and their correspondingly high regard for firsthand knowledge and 
eyewitness accounts. The GTIO’s strategy was soon echoed in the highest levels 
of government. In July 1933, Propaganda Minister Goebbels, with the United 
States and Great Britain in mind, invited “the people of all nations to come and 
convince themselves of the untruth” being spread about Germans’ treatment of 
foreigners.68
The DAAD, too, sought to maintain its American connections and coun-
ter the precipitous drop in student enrollment and fellowship numbers in 
66 Clipping: NY Herald Tribune, GTIO Advertisement, Apr. 28, 1933, “Witness the Rebirth of a 
Nation – New Germany,” PA R 246920.
67 Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Special Committee on 
Un-American Activities, House of Representatives Seventy-Sixth Congress, Third Session on 
H. R. 282 Appendix-Par II (Washington, 1940), 1060–1061.
68 Clipping: Roanoke News, July 4, 1933, “Germany to Try to Lure Tourists,” NARA Entry UD 
328: Seized Promotional Materials of the German Railroad Information Office, 1932–1941 Box 
36 Folder: Tourism: Promotion.
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1933.69 In the spring of 1933, its director Adolf Morsbach wrote personally to 
his American acquaintances to calm prevalent safety concerns, while the Ger-
man embassy issued a public statement to the same effect.70 With its budget 
doubled from 1933/34 to 1934/35, the DAAD entered upon a broader campaign, 
developing branch offices in Madrid, Barcelona, and Budapest and restructur-
ing those in London and Paris into “cultural embassies.”71 In the United States, 
it continued to partner with the Institute of International Education (IIE), pro-
vided new fellowships for the Junior Year in Munich, and advertised German 
universities and their summer courses. Its efforts to bring American academics 
over to Germany, if only for a shorter period of time, was greatly aided by new 
initiatives like the Vereinigung Carl Schurz’s Carl Schurz tour, which offered a 
four-week trip to Germany to one hundred American professors and students 
annually beginning in 1934. German universities, too, sought to maintain their 
international contacts and lent their prestige to the “new Germany.” Heidel-
berg’s 550-year university jubilee in 1936 was even declared a “reichswichtig” 
event (important for the Reich), with the Ministry of Propaganda managing 
its entire organization.72 As Heidelberg Rector Wilhelm Groh wrote, “since the 
National Socialist Revolution, no German university has had the opportunity 
to conduct such effective propaganda for the prestige of German scholarship 
in the world, nor can any be as certain as Heidelberg that the intellectual world 
will truly send its prominent representatives.”73 German universities, which 
had generally kept their distance from the republic, placed themselves readily, 
if not always enthusiastically, “at the service of the regime.”74
Importantly, the German campaign in the United States allowed plenty of 
room for ideological leeway. Antisemitic polemics and symbols of Nazism were 
notably absent from German tourist advertising.75 Similarly, while German 
exchange students going abroad were screened for their National Socialist con-
victions after 1933, they were still instructed to be courteous and tactful and 
not to propagandize but to offer explanations when asked.76 For all the DAAD’s 
desire to send those who were “representative in blood and spirit” abroad, it re-
69 For example, offering five fellowships to Junior Year in Munich students in July 1933 kept the 
incipient program from collapse. DAAD to AA, June 19, 1933, “Erlass VI W 4294/33 vom 27. 
5.33,” PA R 64237.
70 German Consulate General, New York, to AA, Apr. 22, 1933, “Rückwirkungen der anti-sem-
itischen Bewegung in Deutschland auf kulturellem Gebiet,” PA R 64237.
71 Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 72.
72 Meinhold Lurz, “Die 550 Jahrfeier der Universität Heidelberg als nationalsozialistische 
Selbst darstellung von Reich und Universität,” Ruperto Carola 57 (1976): 35–41, 35.
73 Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 195.
74 Stephen P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German Uni-
versity (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 3.
75 Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany, 145.
76 On the changes after 1933, see Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und Auswärtige Kultur-
politik, 193–203.
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alized that ideological zealots were more likely to discredit the “new Germany” 
than to advertise it.77 Indeed, even though Americans often accused German 
exchange students of being Nazi propagandists or spies, a confidential 1938 
survey undertaken by the IIE found that most of them behaved just like all 
other exchange students.78 In Germany, too, the German campaign remained 
relatively subtle: American tourists were always able to avail themselves of the 
many “hospitality” measures offered by local tourist bureaus (now controlled 
by the Ministry of Propaganda), but they never had to.79 Even Americans who 
visited Germany on a sponsored tour were often allowed to set out on their 
own for a while.80 Nazi organizers realized that it was far more valuable for 
them to forego making any discrete ideological points and allow Americans to 
have a generally pleasant time, gaining firsthand impressions of German clean-
liness, orderliness, and relative freedom. After all, Nazi Germany was not try-
ing to convert Americans but to convince them of its peaceable intentions. As 
such, American travel and study in Germany during this period must be seen 
as prime examples of Nazi Germany’s “managed normality.”81
If student and tourist numbers are any indication, this policy was remarka-
bly successful. In hindsight, the degree to which Americans continued to study 
and vacation in the Third Reich is nothing short of astonishing. After an ini-
tial drop in 1933/34, student and tourist numbers rose steadily through 1936/37. 
Between 1934 and 1937, American overnight visits doubled and American at-
tendance at German university summer courses rose steeply.82 At Heidelberg 
alone the number of American attendees rose from 31 in 1933 to 161 in 1936. 
This development was certainly due to more comprehensive advertising strat-
77 One such case was a German student in Cincinnati who was called to the dean’s office and 
asked to abstain from any public talks; DAAD to Members of Präsidium, Jan. 24, 1934, PA R 
64237. Discontent about the strongly revisionist orientation of German exchange students had 
been brewing since the early 1930s; see the letters by Albert Gerberich to Assistant Secretary of 
State Wilbur Carr through 1932 and 1933 in NARA RG 59, General Records of the Department 
of State; Visa Division. General Visa Correspondence 1914–1940, Box 13 Folder: Colleges 62, 
811.111.
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any other exchange students, while 8 others qualified their replies. See IIE, Annual Report, 1938, 
28; Frank-Rutger Hausmann, Anglistik und Amerikanistik im Dritten Reich (Frankfurt, 2003), 
192.
79 Der Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda to Reichspropagandaämter, July 
16, 1938, “Ausländerbetreuung”; Attachment: Deutscher-Ausländerdienst e. V. BayHStA, MHIG 
9244.
80 K. O. Bertling, Amerika-Institut, to Henry S. Haskell, Carnegie Endowment, Division of In-
tercourse and Education, May 17, 1934, Box 222, Folder 9, Amerika-Institut, CEIP, Columbia 
University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.
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egies, but there is no denying that all these initiatives profited tremendously 
from the transatlantic networks, expertise, and goodwill that Weimar had 
painstakingly (re-)built. In particular, they continued to rely on longer-stand-
ing partners in the United States, including the IIE, the Carl Schurz Memo-
rial Foundation (CSMF), and many individual universities and ethnic organ-
izations. But why did these Americans cooperate so willingly? Why did they 
seemingly lend themselves to a German dictatorship as readily as they had to 
the Weimar Republic?
The Attitude of American Partners
Despite clear American disdain for the illiberalism of the German government, 
the two countries maintained cultural interactions and programs to an impres-
sive degree. Just as tens of thousands of Americans individually continued to 
vacation and study in the Third Reich, American universities, as well as tradi-
tional ethnic and educational organizations, accommodated the new Germa-
ny.83 Most of the presidents and professors of America’s leading Northeastern 
universities not only failed to join student protests against the Third Reich but 
also welcomed and honored its unofficial and official representatives on cam-
pus, continued German student exchanges, attended German university jubi-
lees, and continued to travel on German ships flying the swastika flag.84 By the 
same token, the CSMF continued to send its influential “Oberlaender fellows” 
to study and write about Nazi Germany.
This accommodation was not due to ignorance about the repressive na-
ture of Nazi rule. The regime’s brutality and the lack of academic and personal 
freedom were well known.85 To explain these lukewarm responses to Nazism, 
it is certainly correct to point to widespread American antisemitism, as Nor-
wood has done. Indeed, in the organizations that debated their position toward 
Germany most intensively, like the CSMF, the fault lines usually ran between 
Jewish and Gentile members.86 But this alone is a reductive explanation of 
Americans’ complex responses to Nazism. Americans like Nicholas Murray 
Butler, Frederick Heuser, Wilbur K. Thomas, and Stephen P. Duggan pondered 
83 AA to Hauptausschuss für Fremdenverkehr, Aug. 4, 1932, PA R 246920.
84 See the substantial evidence in Stephen H. Norwood, The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: 
Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses (New York, 2009), passim.
85 Norwood, Third Reich in the Ivory Tower, 79.
86 Speyer to Thun, Dec. 13, 1933, Mss 176, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., Records, 
Series 1, Box 23/3, HSP; see also Dodd to Charles R. Crane, Sep. 16, 1933, Dodd Papers, Box 40, 
1933, LoC: “the Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their 
numbers or their talents entitled them to. This cannot be corrected, however in the way that Mr. 
Goebbels recommends.”
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various possible responses to Nazism critically and repeatedly.87 Although 
they ultimately settled on a policy of accommodation, this derived from factors 
other than antisemitism alone: Apart from their often plentiful professional 
reasons to maintain transatlantic programs, it was simply not clear at first 
whether the Nazi government would stay in power. Considering the short lives 
of many Weimar governments, it seemed ill-advised to sacrifice successful and 
hard-won projects on the spur of the moment. Moreover, for all their disdain 
for Nazism, many Americans had come to sympathize with the German situ-
ation by the early 1930s and were likely to attribute German developments, at 
least in part, to Allied mistakes at Versailles.88 The former Secretary of War and 
well-known internationalist Newton D. Baker, for example, expressed this view 
dramatically in a letter to the U. S. ambassador to Germany, William Dodd, in 
June 1933:
Germany has seemed to me to have a certain pathetic dignity as she has waded her way 
through tragedy since 1918 and while she has done much to forfeit the respect of the 
world by her book burning and other incantations, I am not very sure that I would not 
have burned all the books I could have laid my hands on, including the Bible, if I had 
been ground under the heel of adverse fate to the extent she has.89
Moreover, cutting all ties with Germany would have contradicted the very 
principles of cultural internationalism that these connections had been built 
on during the 1920s. If elite contacts were the best guarantee for peace, were 
they not more needed than ever?90 As Stephen Duggan, the IIE  director, 
wrote  Henry Pritchett, a Carnegie trustee, in late 1933, “I am wholly  opposed to 
 isolating Germany. On the contrary I believe the Germans are now in particu-
lar need of contact, and personal contact, of the right kind.”91 The longer Nazi 
rule lasted, the more such thinking was complemented by the idea that one 
could perhaps exert a moderating influence on Germany or provide encour-
agement to remaining liberal circles by maintaining relations.92 In the case 
87 The correspondence of Chicago historian and America’s newly appointed Ambassador in 
Berlin, William Dodd with Nicholas Murray Butler and Stephen P. Duggan, for example, sug-
gests that these men repeatedly and critically considered the questions at stake.
88 Raymond Leslie Buell (Foreign Policy Association) to Dodd, July 27, 1933, Dodd Papers, Box 
40, 1933, LoC.
89 Newton D. Baker to Dodd, June 30, 1933, Dodd Papers, Box 40, 1933, LoC.
90 See, “Extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Carl Schurz 
Memorial Foundation of May 6, 1933,” Mss 176, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., Records, 
Series 1 General Historical and Office Materials Box 23/3, HSP.
91 Duggan to Pritchett, Nov. 20, 1933, quoted in Halpern, “The Institute of International Educa-
tion,” 156.
92 See the considerations of the Rockefeller Foundation in Malcolm Richardson, “Philanthropy 
and the Internationality of Learning: The Rockefeller Foundation and National Socialist Ger-
many,” Minerva 28 (1990): 21–58, 39.
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of student exchanges, one also saw continued academic relations with Nazi 
Germany as a way to provide an experience of American freedom to German 
youth growing up under a dictatorship.93
Finally, men like Butler, Duggan, and Thomas had no desire to repeat the 
rift of World War I. Historians have failed to adequately appreciate the extent to 
which these men’s decisions were informed by what they now regarded as the 
mistakes of 1914. But men like Butler, who had spent the entire 1920s painstak-
ingly mending the divisions of 1914, were determined to avoid such disruptions 
in the future. Even as the permanence of the Nazi regime became clear, Amer-
ican academics and moderate German-American organizations like the CSMF 
tried to stay above political controversy lest cultural relations be once more 
tainted by politics. Their position, not least, helped them shape an “American 
debate on Nazism” that diligently distinguished Nazis from Germans and Ger-
man culture from politics.94 And it was precisely in this context that personal 
continuities in Germany played a paramount role. The fact that their long-
term German partners, educated bourgeois men like themselves, would serve 
Nazi Germany as they had the republic was often crucial to their decision to 
maintain relations, if only after bitter debate.95 As a consequence, the German 
Consulate General in New York City noted in July 1933 that Stephen Duggan 
and Wilbur Thomas had an “utterly objective stance toward the German poli-
tics of today, entirely unaffected by pro-Semitic tendencies … Rather, they see 
it as their task to step up their mediating capacity in this time when relations 
are tarnished by polemics and to maintain the valuable institutions of cultural 
exchange throughout this crisis.”96
To be sure, their positions were not as sympathetic as the consulate made 
them out to be. In reality, organizations like the CSMF or the IIE pursued a 
dual strategy from the very beginning: while they withstood pressure to dis-
continue and denounce their connections to Germany, they likewise engaged 
in tremendous efforts to aid displaced German scholars.97 Rather than aim-
93 IIE, Annual Report 1938, 9; see also Duggan, Professor at Large, 177.
94 As Arnold Offner has noted, “The Third Reich’s domestic and foreign policies often horrified 
Americans, but they retained basic respect for German (as distinct from Nazi) culture and pro-
ductive capacities”; Arnold A. Offner, “The United States and National Socialist Germany,” in 
The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kette-
nacker, 413–427 (London, 1983), 414; ironically, this development was aided by German emi-
grants, like Thomas Mann and Albert Einstein, who perpetuated notions of an “other Germany.”
95 On the debate within the CSMF, see Gregory Kupsky, “‘The True Spirit of the German Peo-
ple’: German Americans and National Socialism, 1919–1955” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 
2010), 203–221.
96 German Consulate General, New York, to AA, June 15, 1933, “Kulturpolitische Rückwirkun-
gen der Vorgänge in Deutschland,” PA R 64237.
97 Beginning in mid-1933, both the CSMF and Stephen Duggan’s Emergency Committee in Aid 
of Displaced Scholars would count among America’s most significant refugee aid organizations. 
The CSMF, for example, provided shorter-term grants to almost 300 refugees from Germany and 
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ing to support Nazi Germany, then, these organizations attempted quite de-
liberately to keep in touch with German culture as they steered clear of Nazi 
politics.98 After the purges of June 30, 1934 – which led to the imprisonment 
of DAAD director Adolf Morsbach and the murder of Fritz Beck, the well-
known head of the Munich International House – such convictions developed 
a logic of their own. While these violent events were indeed a breaking point 
for many, the IIE, the CSMF, and many American universities upheld their 
German contacts.99 Personal conversations with trusted Germans proved to 
be one factor in this decision, but the belief that it would be possible – and 
even necessary – to ignore a country’s current political state to keep “in touch 
with the more permanent cultural achievement of a nation and a people” was 
yet another.100 In defending its acceptance of the invitation to Heidelberg’s 
1936 jubilee, Harvard University, for example, asserted, “that the ancient ties 
by which the universities of the world are united […] are independent of the 
political conditions existing in a country at any particular time.”101 For U. S. 
cultural internationalists like Butler, such arguments were not just a conven-
ient answer to a moral dilemma; they were the hard-won lessons of the Great 
War era.102 Only slowly did it dawn on them that culture and politics could not 
be so neatly separated in a totalitarian regime.
Austria just as it funded German lecturers, who, like K. O. Bertling in 1937, were clearly traveling 
on behalf of their government; “List of Grants made by the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation to 
Institutions,” Mss 176, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., Records, Series 1 Box 23/3, HSP.
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invited to his banquet. “Tea for former Ambassador Jacob Gould Schurman, Thursday, October 
24, 1935 (List of Persons invited),” Dodd Papers, Box 60/Reception and Dinner Lists, 1934 + 35, 
LoC.
99 “Fritz Beck, Familiar Figure to American Students at Munich. ‘Clean Up’ Victim,” New York 
Tribune, July 4, 1934; “Killing of Beck, Academic Foreign Bureau Head, Attributed to ‘Terrible 
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ler or any National Socialist Government.” Oswald Garrison Villard to CSMF, July 11, 1934, Mss 
176, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., Records, Series 1 Box 2/11, HSP.
100 After conversing with DAAD representative Gerhard Neumann in London, Duggan was 
sufficiently convinced of German stability to continue the student exchange; see Gerhard Neu-
mann, Anglo-German Academic Bureau, London to Ewald von Massow, DAAD, July 20, 1934, 
“Deutsch-Amerikanischer Austausch,” PA R 64236; CSMF, Circular, Aug. 20, 1934, Mss 176, 
National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., Records, Series 4 Box 218, HSP.
101 Quoted in Norwood, Third Reich in the Ivory Tower, 94; the original statement was issued by 
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American accommodation doubtlessly helped normalize and legitimize Nazi 
Germany. If not all American tourists or students returned from their trip 
more sympathetic to Germany, their visit itself provided the currency of inter-
national legitimacy to the Third Reich. American attendance at Heidelberg’s 
550th jubilee in June 1936 and at the Berlin Olympics one month later lent these 
events a coveted international flair, which first and foremost bolstered the re-
gime’s prestige at home.103 At the same time, American participation, as Nor-
wood has noted, helped “Nazi Germany present itself to the American public 
as a civilized nation, unfairly maligned in the press.”104 Moreover, these Nazi 
self-presentations were often echoed by American tourists and students, who 
commented favorably on the clean, orderly, not at all unpleasant impression 
they had gained of German life, particularly when compared to the preva-
lent American news coverage of Germany.105 Their reports resonated with a 
wider American public, who in the 1930s, as Michaela Hoenicke-Moore has 
shown, often “more readily trusted [tourist impressions] than the professional 
pessimists in the press and diplomatic community.”106 In 1935, one Ameri-
can Oberlaender fellow found Munich “filled with young Americans. All the 
girls in dirndl dresses and the boys in leather shorts. All adore Germany and 
when they get a little older and have something to say, there won’t be much 
of a Deutschfeind attitude left in America.”107 These American descriptions 
certainly gave the impression that there was “nothing disconcerting going on” 
in Germany.
Such impressions arguably affected transatlantic relations at large. Even as 
American press coverage was usually critical, the State Department remained 
reluctant to get involved in German domestic politics and never openly con-
demned the suspension of civil liberties. Apart from general diplomatic cour-
tesy, this “American appeasement” (Offner) expressed widespread uncertainty 
about the National Socialists’ nature and intentions.108 Government officials 
long believed that the Nazi government was basically animated by the same 
revisionist objectives – and would adopt the same peaceful means – as its We-
imar predecessors. In any case, they regarded the German people as basically 
103 On efforts Germany adopted with regard to American participation in the Olympics and the 
Heidelberg ceremony, see Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 189–198.
104 Norwood, Third Reich in the Ivory Tower, 34.
105 “Regular tourists, there for a week or two at most, usually returned only with positive im-
pressions of a peaceful, pleasant land”; see Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany, 151.
106 Hoenicke-Moore, Know Your Enemy, 71–72.
107 Appleton Read to Dr. Thomas, late 1935, Mss 176, National Carl Schurz Association, Inc., 
Records, Series 1 Box 23/3, HSP.
108 Offner, American Appeasement.
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peaceful.109 This assessment was clearly strengthened by tourist and educa-
tional contacts, which did not give the impression of a country radically differ-
ent from the 1920s. It was precisely because Nazi Germany’s broader cultural 
campaign built on Weimar’s longer-standing initiatives that it was relatively 
successful. Ironically, Weimar’s stringent efforts to rewin American hearts and 
minds in the 1920s paid their dividends long past 1933.
Alienation
But even if Nazi Germany profited greatly from Weimar’s efforts and there were 
numerous continuities in methods, infrastructure, and personnel, there was 
no denying the deeper transformation of German Amerikapolitik and trans-
atlantic relations. In spite of the carefully maintained veneer of normality, this 
change became ever more visible. It is difficult to determine a particular mo-
ment or reason for alienation between the two nations. What can be said with 
relative certainty – thanks to the introduction of the Gallup poll in 1935 – is that 
Americans were largely not in sympathy with Nazi Germany after the mid-
1930s.110 As could be expected, German antisemitism figured prominently in 
this. In fact, the only time German representatives recorded an improvement 
in American sentiment in the 1930s – in June of 1935, following the Anglo-Ger-
man naval accord – this gain was almost immediately undone by antisemitic 
outbursts in Germany, which even sparked rumors of an imminent break in 
diplomatic relations.111 The pogroms of November 1938 then marked a caesura: 
the Roosevelt administration recalled Ambassador Hugh Wilson to Washing-
ton for “talks,” and Ambassador Dieckhoff went back to Berlin soon thereafter. 
Neither of them would return to his post.
But a look at contemporary transatlantic cultural relations also suggests 
that 1937 was already a turning point. Notably, the American universities that 
had still accepted the invitation to the University of Heidelberg’s jubilee in 1936 
declined that of the University of Göttingen one year later.112 The number of 
American students at German universities, which had been steadily rising for 
years, dropped off.113 Even the CSMF, having continued its German activities 
seemingly unfazed by internal and external criticism, had “essentially ceas[ed] 
109 Ibid., 58.
110 See the overview of Gallup data on Germany in Detlef Junker, Kampf um die Weltmacht. Die 
USA und das Dritte Reich, 1933–1945 (Düsseldorf, 1988), 70–78.
111 The Charge d’Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry, July 31, 1935, DGFP 
 Series C/Vol. 4, Document No. 237.
112 See Stephen H. Norwood, “Legitimating Nazism: Harvard University and the Hitler  Regime, 
1933–1937,” American Jewish History 92, no. 2 (2004): 189–223, 220.
113 Tutt, “Ausländerbetreuung an der Universität Heidelberg,” 22.
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international work” by 1937.114 In September 1937, Nicholas Murray Butler 
opened Columbia University’s academic year by condemning “the three mil-
itary dictatorships of Japan, Italy and Germany” as a serious threat to world 
peace.115 Just one month later, President Roosevelt famously echoed this sen-
timent in his “quarantine speech.” At the same time, Germany’s coordinated 
press moved from “skeptical ambivalence” to “open hostility” in its reporting 
on the United States.116
To be sure, suspicion about Germany’s course in Europe had been present 
since 1933, but German rearmament, and especially the announcement of the 
Four-Year Plan, seems to have truly changed American sentiment.117 As Ger-
man Ambassador Luther summed up in early 1937, “it must regrettably be said 
that [the possibility of a German war of aggression] is not only a matter of press 
and public opinion but that authoritative quarters […] also doubt the Fuehr-
er’s desire for peace.”118 Perhaps, too, American observers finally realized that 
the substance and function of Nazi cultural diplomacy differed fundamentally 
from its Weimar predecessor, despite the similarities in form. While the latter 
had been embedded in a larger accommodationist Amerikapolitik, there was 
no such thing in the 1930s. Certainly, the days when there had been a genu-
ine desire for an “alliance of ideas” between Germany and the United States 
had long since passed: its most sincere advocates had been dismissed, retired, 
or exiled.119 Instead, the long-standing champions of an anti-Western, Ger-
man-dominated “new order for Europe” – an order without and in fact against 
the United States – had been elevated to positions of influence.120 In the end, 
there appeared to be no possibility of reconciliation between the two nations, 
as the head of the Foreign Ministry’s America Department Hans-Heinrich 
Dieckhoff argued in late 1936: “the fundamental antithesis between the two 
[German and American] ideologies seems to be unbridgeable.”121
All in all, the 1930s brought the much longer-standing rivalry between the 
two countries to the fore. Their increasingly divergent trade policies, especially 
the sharp opposition between Germany’s autarky-focused, bilateral approach 
and America’s multilateral, open door policy, spurred sharp competition. In 
Latin America, in particular, Nazi Germany directly challenged America’s 
114 Kupsky, “The True Spirit,” 210.
115 Norwood, Third Reich in the Ivory Tower, 101.
116 Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 247.
117 Offner, “The United States and National Socialist Germany,” 417; see Stephen P. Duggan 
(IIE) to Dodd, Jan. 8, 1937, Dodd Papers, Box 44, LoC.
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Vol. 6, Document No. 207.
119 This is true for Jäckh, Bonn, Prittwitz, Weber, and others.
120 See the career of Karl Kerkhof in Martin, The Nazi-Facist New Order, 158–159.
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open-door empire with an aggressive, decidedly anti-American, and relatively 
successful trade and propaganda campaign.122 As trade competition thus wid-
ened into a more fundamental ideological conflict, Germany was increasingly 
perceived as a hemispheric threat to the United States – a development that 
gave rise, not least, to America’s own, state-sponsored public diplomacy.123 In 
light of these developments, German diplomats in the United States warned 
Berlin ever more frequently about the possibility that the constellations of 1917 
could recur. In case of war, they held, America would not remain aloof – for all 
its neutralist convictions. Such diplomatic warnings, however, went unheard 
and unheeded.
122 On this competition, see Schröder, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten, 203–261. This 
competition had already begun in the 1920s; see Rinke, Der letzte freie Kontinent, 2:419.
123 Sirois, Zwischen Illusion und Krieg, 98; on the ideological dimensions of America’s idea of an 
“open door empire” and tensions with Germany, see also Detlef Junker, Der unteilbare Welt-
markt. Das ökonomische Interesse in der Außenpolitik der USA 1933–1941 (Stuttgart, 1975), esp. 
93–104; on the emergence of U. S. public diplomacy as a response to the Nazi threat, see Justin 
Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. Foreign 
Policy (New York, 2013), 21.

Conclusions  
German Public Diplomacy and the United States
In analyzing German Amerikapolitik in the 1920s, many scholars have emphasized economic and financial matters. They have shown that the United States – emerging from World War I as the world’s creditor and, 
as contemporary sources put it, as “world victor” – stood at the center of Ger-
many’s efforts to undo the Versailles Treaty by way of its economic recovery. In 
trying to secure America’s political and financial support, Germany appealed 
strategically and successfully to American interests in a stable and prosperous 
Germany as both a bulwark against Bolshevism and a market for American 
goods. This study has complemented this predominantly economic perspec-
tive with a focus on German public diplomacy in the postwar United States. 
It has shown that the management of cultural relations, in particular, became 
a legitimate field of Amerikapolitik with its own discrete infrastructures, strat-
egies, and funds. Whereas abrasive campaigns like the agitation against the 
“Black Horror” (the stationing of North African troops in the French-occu-
pied Rhineland) still dominate our perception of German “propaganda” in 
the 1920s, there was also a much subtler approach to re-establishing trust and 
sympathy in the newly important United States. Germany launched systematic 
cultural appeals alongside its economic appeals to rebuild an economically and 
politically desirable “friendship” across the Atlantic.
After World War I, this approach played out in three phases. The first 
phase, 1919–1924, was characterized by limited activity. Though the experi-
ences of the Great War had convinced Weimar Germany of the need for a far 
more comprehensive public diplomacy, financial troubles, lack of expertise, 
and German isolation and self-isolation precluded any active or effective out-
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reach. At the same time, the distinct frustrations of the postwar years shifted 
official attention from the war’s fruitless propagandist concepts onto fields such 
as international education or tourism that had long lain outside the purview 
of traditional foreign policy. The breakdown of American resentments toward 
Germany during and after the Ruhr crisis in 1923 made way for a much more 
constructive second phase of German public diplomacy.
This second phase, 1924–1929, was in many regards the founders’ period of 
German public diplomacy. It led to a comparatively sophisticated public-pri-
vate infrastructure of committees, organizations, and programs devoted to cul-
tivating American trust and sympathy. During this time, the Foreign Ministry’s 
policy of reconciliation with the West found unique support among a group 
of peaceful revisionists whose professional, political, or commercial interests 
focused their attention across the Atlantic. Together, they systematically rebuilt 
relations with Americans of German descent, with American academics, and 
with American tourists. What they shared was a desire to correct the “distorted 
image” of Germany that the war had created, and, ultimately, to secure Ameri-
can financial and moral support in overturning the provisions of the Versailles 
peace treaty. It was in the mid-1920s that public diplomacy truly became a dis-
tinct part of German Amerikapolitik.
A third phase after 1930 consolidated and further politicized these struc-
tures. The establishment of large-scale national organizations, such as the 
German Academic Exchange Service (1931) and the German Tourism Coun-
cil (1931), considerably increased the influence of the German Foreign Minis-
try in these fields and aligned them more closely with an assertive revisionist 
foreign policy. The aim of German public diplomacy during this period was 
to convince Americans that the transatlantic “friendship” still existed even as 
tensions between the United States and Germany, now increasingly radical-
ized, became ever more visible. After 1933, the Nazi government adopted and 
coopted many of the programs and organizations created in the 1920s, often 
deliberately and, for a time, quite successfully cultivating these continuities 
to veil the profound changes taking place in Germany. In the following years, 
it also applied many of the programs and measures initially designed for the 
United States to other countries.
German Cultural Diplomacy in the United States: the European Context
It seems apt at this point to reflect on German public diplomacy in the United 
States in a wider European context. This involves two related questions: First, 
how did Germany’s cultural diplomacy toward the United States differ from its 
cultural diplomacy toward other countries? And, second, how did it differ from 
the cultural diplomacy pursued by other countries? In combination, the an-
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swers elucidate the role that the United States played in the making of German 
and European public diplomacy.
First, we must acknowledge that German public diplomacy toward the 
United States was part and parcel of a much larger reorientation of German 
and European diplomatic practice from about the 1890s to the 1930s. The new 
public dimension of foreign policy was a reaction to an increasingly connected 
and democratic world that diplomats became ever more aware of from the late 
nineteenth century. While public opinion had long played a prominent role in 
foreign relations, the rise of the mass press, the ever faster and cheaper dissem-
ination of (international) news, the greater affordability of international travel, 
and the concurrent rise of mass politics gave it a more significant place than 
ever before.1 Spurred by Germany’s worldwide commercial ambitions, the 
idea that successful foreign policy required effective communication not only 
with ministers and princes but also with a global public gained traction around 
the turn of the century. By adopting more concerted press, information, and 
cultural policies, German foreign policymakers tried to adapt traditional state-
craft to the exigencies of a new major factor in international relations.2 But 
it was World War I and its outcome that truly illustrated the power of public 
sentiment and subsequently transformed German diplomatic practice. Based 
on the belief that deficient public diplomacy was at least partly responsible for 
Germany’s defeat, the Foreign Ministry reforms of 1919/1920 sought to adjust 
German foreign policy to the necessities of the modern age and German defeat 
alike. As a consequence, the 1920s witnessed not only the establishment of a 
great array of private and semi-official organizations committed to public out-
reach but also the substantial expansion of official interest and competence in 
this field. The creation of the Foreign Ministry’s Kulturabteilung in 1919/20, the 
founding of a separate academic diplomacy section in 1926, and of a tourism 
desk within the America Department in 1928 signal its embrace of new policy 
fields. As the previous chapters have shown, it was in the 1920s that groups 
like ethnic Germans, students, and tourists were first systematically “geopoliti-
cized.” If by 1900 few diplomats had thought of them as discrete political assets, 
by 1930 they thought of them as little else.
This development shaped German foreign policy in many countries, not 
just in the United States. All over the world, Germany began to pay attention to 
public diplomacy around the turn of the century, accelerated this development 
during the war, and usually expanded and professionalized it in the 1920s. As 
Kurt Düwell has shown, the idea that German culture could be a “substitute” 
1 A good summary can be found in Frank Bösch and Peter Hoeres, “Im Bann der Öffentlich-
keit? Der Wandel der Außenpolitik im Medienzeitalter,” in Außenpolitik im Medienzeitalter, ed. 
Bösch and Hoeres, 7–35.
2 On the development of German information policy at the time, see Heidi Tworek, News from 
Germany: The Competition to Control World Communications (Cambridge, MA, 2019).
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for lost hard power provided a key impetus for cultural diplomacy in the 1920s. 
In the postwar decade, the Kulturabteilung’s budget nearly tripled from less 
than 3 million marks in 1924 to 8,250,000 marks in 1929 – funds that were 
sometimes spent quite successfully. The system of German schools abroad, for 
example, recovered and even expanded from 853 schools with 48,000 students 
in 1913 to 1,600 schools with 80,000 students in 1933.3 In Latin America and 
southeastern Europe, especially, Germany systematically employed cultural 
means to facilitate its commercial expansion.4 At the same time, cultural 
diplomacy also began to play a greater role in repairing relations with great 
powers like France, Great Britain, and even Soviet Russia. Much as it did in 
the United States, for example, Berlin began to appeal strategically to British 
tourists and students in the mid-1920s.5 With regard to France, too, cultural 
interchange proved to be a powerful tool for bridging the two countries’ differ-
ences and allowing German and French youth, in particular, to develop a more 
cordial relationship.6 In short, in trying to find new avenues for establishing 
German influence abroad as well as for reconciling with former enemies, or 
at least finding a modus vivendi, Weimar Germany increasingly harnessed its 
remaining soft power and cultural capital.
Even though the cultural focus on the United States is not extraordinary in 
itself, it still stands out in a number of respects. For one, the attention Germany 
paid to the United States was particularly strong in the 1920s. By the end of the 
decade, there were six organizations that were exclusively or predominantly 
committed to cultivating cultural relations with the United States in Berlin 
alone – more than toward any other country. More notably still, Germany first 
pioneered methods and concepts now among its standard repertoire of soft 
power approaches in relation to the United States: it was in the United States 
that Germany first installed professorial exchanges (1905), founded one of the 
first semi-official intercultural institutes (Amerika-Institut, 1910), and intro-
3 See Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 150.
4 On Latin America, for example, see Rinke, Der Letzte Freie Kontinent; and Michael Goebel, 
“Decentering the German Spirit: The Weimar Republic’s Cultural Relations with Latin America,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 44, no. 2 (2009): 221–245, since Spain was often seen as a 
“springboard” to Latin America; see also Pöppinghaus, Moralische Eroberungen. In southeastern 
Europe, for example, interwar Germany used trade fairs, German language training, and ethnic 
networks to establish an informal “export empire”; see Gross, Export Empire; on the early days of 
the Goethe-Institut and its focus on southeastern Europe, see Eckard Michels, “Deutsch als 
Weltsprache? Franz Thierfelder, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich and the Promotion of the 
German Language Abroad, 1923–1945,” German History 22, no. 2 (2004): 206–228.
5 Tara Windsor, “Rekindling Contact: Anglo-German Academic Exchange after the First World 
War,” in Anglo-German Scholarly Networks in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Heather Ellis and 
Ulrike Kirchberger, 212–231 (Leiden, 2014); and Angela Schwarz, Die Reise ins Dritte Reich. 
Britische Augenzeugen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (1933–39) (Göttingen, 1993).
6 Hans Manfred Bock, ed., Französische Kultur im Berlin der Weimarer Republik. Kultureller 
Austausch und diplomatische Beziehungen (Tübingen, 2005).
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duced large-scale student exchanges (1924), an international trainee program 
(1925), and systematic, state-supported tourism promotion (1925). The U. S. – a 
country with a sizeable “German” population – was also where Weimar dip-
lomats first abandoned their focus on ethnic audiences in favor of a general 
appeal to elites. Finally, it was also in the United States that Germany began in 
the 1920s to consider the “optics” of its actions abroad carefully and to elevate 
cultural politics (alongside economic relations) to a central place in its foreign 
policy. It may have been a “coincidence,” as Laitenberger holds, that student 
exchanges initially began with the United States, but their almost immediate 
conversion into large-scale, semi-official organizations was not. Rather, these 
developments show that Germany’s cultural initiatives in the United States – 
perhaps more so than in any other Western country – became part of its larger 
foreign policy agenda. There is no denying it: the United States was one crucial 
place where modern German public diplomacy was made.
This study has offered several explanations for this development. Certainly, 
it was at least partly the product of historical timing, i. e., Germany’s new focus 
on public diplomacy coincided with the U. S. rise to international importance. 
And yet, German public diplomacy was shaped less by the fact that the United 
States became a great power than by the fact that it became (or at least con-
sidered itself) an unorthodox great power. German observers were well aware 
that the United States, a country that refused to play by traditional European 
rules, required a different and more public-oriented foreign policy approach. 
Already before the war, many German officials harbored the belief that public 
opinion was more powerful in the United States than anywhere else, due to 
America’s democratic politics and its sensational, mass-circulated press. That 
many Germans in the 1920s attributed the U. S. entry into World War I to Brit-
ish propaganda successes – and German propaganda failures – further elevated 
American public opinion to a position of unique prominence. The innovative 
character of Germany’s public diplomacy toward the United States, then, was, 
in part, a response to the extraordinary influence it attributed to the American 
public.
Even more interesting, however, is the fact that cultural diplomacy, i. e., 
the cultural variant of public diplomacy, was especially prominent in the 
United States. This derived from a number of particularly instructive factors. 
First, Germans held long-standing and enduring assumptions about the lack 
of American (high) culture and its corresponding openness to European in-
fluences. In 1914, Ambassador Bernstorff concluded that “today an American 
culture does not yet exist. After a short acquaintance with any American, it is 
soon clear whether his culture is of English, German or French origin.”7 More 
7 Abschrift A 1380 Imperial German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, PA Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff.
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than twenty years later, and despite the phenomenal strides the United States 
had made in the meantime, Ambassador Luther once again regretted that the 
United States “possesses a culture of its own only in embryonic form … in 
terms of culture the United States is still substantially a colony of Europe.”8 
Such cultural conceits, coupled with a belief in the unique qualities of German 
culture, explain why Germany pursued a policy toward the United States that it 
otherwise pursued most avidly in semi-colonial and allegedly backward zones 
of influence. The idea that Americans were particularly susceptible to, and in 
dire need of, European high culture proved remarkably durable from 1890 to 
1940 – and beyond.
Yet Germany’s cultural diplomacy toward America was also due to specific 
interwar constellations. The fact that postwar Germany understood cultural 
capital as a substitute for its lost hard power rendered cultural diplomacy es-
pecially prominent in German foreign policy, and all the more so in relation 
to newly important United States. French competition strongly reinforced 
this trend. The two rivaling countries competed in a great number of differ-
ent fields: as tourist and student destinations, in terms of high school language 
enrollment, and regarding the celebrations of “national heroes” such of Steu-
ben and LaFayette. More often than not, French actions determined German 
approaches to the United States, and vice versa. The French Tourism Office 
in New York City served as a model for the German Tourist Information Of-
fice in the same city; and the opening of the Cité Universitaire in Paris in 1925 
prompted Germany’s interest in establishing international houses at its own 
universities. As Holger Impekoven has rightly noted, the interwar Franco-Ger-
man competition for American favor offers a perfect example of the cultural 
transfers and dynamics that arise from “learning from the enemy.”9 That 
cultural diplomats in both countries tended to exaggerate the malice, danger, 
and success of the other’s efforts partly explains the vitality of the field.10 And 
yet, while French mastery in the field of cultural diplomacy informed German 
approaches, German diplomats also recognized that a cultural course was sim-
ply the only viable option with regard to the United States. In fact, America’s 
prevalent fears of any “political propaganda” severely limited Germany’s pol-
icy alternatives. This affected previous allies like France and Great Britain, but 
8 The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry, June 28, 1935 (DGFP), Series C, 
Vol. 4, Document No. 184.
9 The concept of “learning through emnity” is explored in Martin Aust and Daniel Schönpflug, 
eds., Vom Gegner Lernen: Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhun-
derts (Frankfurt, 2007); for its use regarding Weimar cultural diplomacy, see Impekoven, Die 
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, 156.
10 For a more systematic analysis of this Franco-German competition for favor in the United 
States, see Elisabeth Piller, “The Transatlantic Dynamics of European Cultural Diplomacy: Ger-
many, France and the Battle for U. S. Affections in the 1920s,” Contemporary European History, 
forthcoming 2021.
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it applied especially to Germany and its allegedly ubiquitous “German prop-
aganda.” In the 1920s, Americans objected strongly to many real and even 
more imagined efforts to shape how they thought and felt about the world. 
As a consequence, German Ambassador Wiedfeldt recognized early on that 
propaganda was harmful rather than beneficial in America.11 For all of these 
reasons, Germany’s seemingly unobtrusive cultivation of cultural relations en-
joyed much greater attention in the United States than in other Western coun-
tries.
The final factor in Germany’s cultural choice was the notable economic and 
cultural presence of the United States in postwar Europe just as the nation’s 
politics grew increasingly isolationist. In fact, many Americans were oblivi-
ous to political developments in interwar Europe, yet they devoured travel lit-
erature, adored European art and music, or dreamt of a Junior Year Abroad. 
Moreover, while U. S. Congress and the State Department had to maintain ut-
most caution in their dealings with Europe, U. S. internationalists poured their 
enthusiasm and considerable resources into cultural interchange with Europe; 
whatever isolationism there was in the 1920s, it was not manifest in U. S. tour-
ism, or in study abroad, or in the many transatlantic programs pioneered by 
U. S. foundations. Quite the contrary, the allegedly isolationist 1920s arguably 
witnessed upper- and middle-class Americans engaging more extensively with 
Europe than they ever had before. As a consequence, educational exchanges, 
tourism, and other cultural initiatives first emerged as legitimate policy fields 
because they offered a rare chance to reach a politically withdrawn and sus-
picious American public. In other words, the American disdain for, and Ger-
man lack of, hard power conspired to make soft power, both in its cultural and 
economic variants, a particularly vital field of transatlantic interaction in the 
1920s.
Importantly, these factors shaped not only German but also European cul-
tural diplomacy. In the 1920s, the United States – courted across Europe for 
its (continued) financial support – evolved into a major target of European, 
often state-sponsored, cultural diplomacy. Between the wars, European coun-
tries opened “libraries of information,” sent a never-ending stream of “infor-
mal ambassadors” (from professors and artists to generals) across the Atlantic, 
established academic exchange programs, and, where possible, cultivated close 
relations with U. S. bilateral and ethnic organizations. This manifest enthusi-
asm for transatlantic cultural exchange expressed European countries’ desire 
to shape American opinions and the imperative to do so in the least offensive 
way. Moreover, this cultural courtship of the United States was by no means 
limited to European great powers. Just like Spain, Germany, and Great Britain, 
the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Romanian governments, too, competed for 
11 See Chapter 3.
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U. S. sympathy and support, as Zsolt Nagy has shown.12 Europe’s widespread 
interest speaks clearly to the new position the United States occupied in the 
postwar world. To be sure, the considerable activities and funds of U. S. cul-
tural internationalists only intensified this European interest. The international 
relations think tanks that the Rockefeller Foundation established across Eu-
rope – from Paris and Geneva to Oslo and Berlin – were many things at once: a 
welcome opportunity for transatlantic intellectual dialogue, an avenue of U. S. 
influence in Europe, and a chance for European cultural diplomats to culti-
vate U. S. attention and affinity. In the interwar period, the United States was as 
much a partner as it was a target of European cultural diplomacy.
In all, I would argue that this competition for American hearts and minds 
was one factor that led European countries to adopt a set of new and fairly 
uniform tools and approaches in the 1920s. For example, while only two Euro-
pean countries, France and Switzerland, had maintained a government-funded 
tourist information office in New York City in 1920, more than a dozen did a 
decade later.13 By the same token, a large number of European countries had 
developed a student exchange with the United States by 1930, often the first in 
their history.14 Indeed, while the establishment of such cultural diplomacy pro-
grams was clearly part of a broader development – one also visible in relation 
to other European and Commonwealth countries – European activities were 
often particularly early and extensive in the United States for all of the reasons 
mentioned above. In this and many other ways, the role of the U. S. as an elu-
sive great power contributed to the “transformation of diplomacy” across Eu-
rope in the decades after 1900.15 Quite apart from the well-researched activities 
of America’s own cultural diplomats and from President Woodrow Wilson’s 
call for a “new diplomacy,” the politically withdrawn and culturally involved 
United States hastened Europe’s embrace of public diplomacy as a legitimate 
field of foreign policy.
German Public Diplomacy and German-American Relations
This cultural Amerikapolitik also played a distinct role in German-American 
relations. During the 1920s, as previous chapters detailed, it contributed to 
the remarkably swift rapprochement between the two countries. This is not 
12 Zsolt Nagy, “National Identities for Export: East European Cultural Diplomacy in Inter-War 
Pittsburgh,” Contemporary European History 20, no. 4 (2011): 435–453.
13 U. S. Department of Commerce, The Promotion of Tourist Travel by Foreign Countries U. S. 
Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series – No. 113 (Washington, DC, 1931), 63.
14 See, for example, Institute of International Education, Annual Report 1935, 20.
15 Zara Steiner, “Foreign Ministries Old and New,” International Journal 37, no. 3 (1982): 349–
377, 351.
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to suggest that Weimar public diplomacy made Germany uniquely popular 
with Americans. American society as a whole paid relatively little attention 
to Germany during the 1920s; those interested in Europe typically preferred 
France and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain for traveling, studying, and shop-
ping abroad, or simply boasting about back home. Clearly, Americans never 
came close to paying as much attention to German culture in the United 
States as Germans did to American lifestyles and mass cultural products in 
Germany. Nevertheless, Germany made substantial relative gains and reestab-
lished American networks, interest, and sympathy to an astonishing degree. 
If the early 1920s had effectively undermined the cultural blockade, the later 
1920s rapidly turned inter-Allied into international cultural relations again – at 
least as far as the United States was concerned. To be fair, American cultural 
internationalists, in their search for a stable and peaceful world order, tremen-
dously aided Germany’s peaceful revisionists. Often acting in accordance with 
or in lieu of U.S. administrations, organizations like the Institute of Interna-
tional Education and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace con-
tributed greatly to reintegrating and rehabilitating Germany. While Germany’s 
ambition for a revision of the peace treaty soon outpaced America’s desire for 
change, their mutual interest in peacefully transforming the status quo gener-
ated a unique dynamic in German-American relations in the 1920s – both in 
the cultural and the economic field.
In the long run, the cultural diplomatic programs begun in the 1920s had 
a significant legacy in German-American relations. For one, there were myr-
iad organizational continuities. After the Second World War, the Institute of 
International Education and the (refounded) German Academic Exchange 
Service organized and facilitated the two countries’ academic relations once 
again – and on a much grander scale. Modeled on interwar student programs, 
they have since brought about the exchange of tens of thousands of students. 
Moreover, some of Weimar’s cultural diplomats who had emigrated to the 
United States, including Ernst Jäckh, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Werner Richter, 
and Reinhold Schairer, used their Weimar-era expertise to help build Cold War 
Atlanticism after 1945. Recently, Udi Greenberg spoke of a “Weimar Century” 
– i. e., the long shadow of the lessons learned from Weimar – with the trans-
atlantic careers of Weimar intellectuals (like Friedrich) in mind; this certainly 
holds true for transatlantic cultural diplomacy as well. But the legacies of in-
terwar initiatives extend far beyond those relatively few cultural diplomats. In 
fact, many of the interwar exchange students and trainees seem to have de-
veloped an enduring affinity for the other country. In 1949, one of the former 
America work students – at that point a manager in West Germany – admit-
ted that “when I have beautiful dreams, I always dream of my time in Ameri-
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ka.”16 Alongside other former America work students, he helped reestablish a 
German-American trainee program in the late 1940s and 1950s. In a similar 
vein, Shepard Stone, who received his PhD in Berlin in 1932, after 1945 became 
one of the major architects of German-American cultural relations, in particu-
lar, and the cultural cold war, in general, first as an officer of the U. S. High 
Commissioner in Germany, then of the Ford Foundation.17 In this way, the cul-
tural initiatives of the 1920s formed a part of the much longer arc of what Mary 
Nolan called the “transatlantic century.”18
In the short run, to be sure, Weimar-era programs primarily benefited Nazi 
Germany. In fact, post-1933 developments clearly show how much Americans 
had come to sympathize with the German position. Although Germans liked 
to equate their isolation in 1933 with that of 1914, Americans actually under-
stood (or made an effort to understand) German grievances far more at the 
later date than they had in 1914. Weimar’s efforts at sympathy-gathering and 
network-building certainly deserve some credit for this development. In fact, 
as Michaela Hoenicke-Moore has shown, Americans who saw Nazi Germany 
as a threat in the 1930s struggled to convince the larger American public of 
their fears as so many had grown accustomed to thinking of Germans as es-
sentially “like us” once more.19 Ironically, it was the Nazi government that 
profited most immediately from Weimar’s untiring revisionist advocacy across 
the Atlantic.
Continuity and Discontinuity: Republican Foreign Policy?
This brings us to a question that has long preoccupied scholars of German 
history: the question of foreign policy continuity from Wilhelmine to Nazi 
Germany. Flipped on its head, the question boils down to whether Weimar’s 
foreign policy actually was unique. Did the Weimar Republic, as Peter Krüger 
holds, develop a “republican foreign policy” (republikanische Außenpolitik) 
that truly differed from Wilhelmine approaches, not just in its necessarily dif-
ferent means but also in its ultimate ends?20
I would, indeed, argue that it did. From about 1923 to 1930, Weimar’s Amer-
ikapolitik did differ fundamentally from that of Wilhelmine Germany. For one, 
the systematic attention the republic paid to public diplomacy – alongside eco-
nomic relations – in the 1920s already constituted a marked departure from 
16 “Ehemalige AWD-ler erinnern sich” (ca. 1949), Abt. 352 Carl Duisberg-Gesellschaft, 352–
14–26, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv.
17 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe.
18 Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010 (New York, 2012).
19 Hoenicke-Moore, Know Your Enemy, 8.
20 Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar, 43.
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pre-1914 efforts, even if it was, admittedly, often applied toward relatively tradi-
tional ends. The true difference, however, lay in the fact that public diplomacy 
was embedded in a larger accommodationist and realistic policy toward the 
United States. Unlike in the Wilhelmine period, when Germany’s disregard for 
the Monroe Doctrine had made its public diplomacy appear to be little more 
than an empty gesture, Weimar’s public campaign was closely aligned with 
its overall policy. At least after 1924, German policy decisions, both large and 
small, readily reflected deference to American wishes and general considera-
tion of the “optics” of German actions in the United States. Several factors – the 
profound learning processes of World War I, the much greater international 
weight of the United States, and the presence of a group of bourgeois “Amer-
ica experts” in the Foreign Ministry – combined to generate a better Amerika-
politik and ensured that Weimar that would not suffer from the problems of 
its predecessors, namely, a dissonance between its words and deeds. The de-
cision not to mobilize German Americans (Chapter 4) exemplifies Weimar’s 
much more considerate and realistic approach. More than anything else, it was 
this steady consideration of American psychology that fundamentally distin-
guished Weimar’s foreign policy toward the United States from that of both 
Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany.
Still, one should not unduly romanticize these developments. German 
(public) diplomats always held on to notions of German cultural superiority 
and generally preferred bilateral to multilateral relations. After all, one of the 
reasons they were eager to cooperate with organizations like the Carnegie En-
dowment was that these structures provided them with international networks 
without multilateral oversight and afforded them a much better opportunity to 
re-establish German influence than, say, the scientific “boycott organizations.” 
In addition, German caution with regard to the important United States was 
not necessarily representative of German foreign policy. Toward lesser pow-
ers, as Peter Grupp has shown, Germany tended to act much as it had before 
the war.21 Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that this Amerikapolitik 
lasted a comparatively short period of time. The policies of the Brüning cab-
inet after 1930, for example, already had more in common with the policies 
before 1914 and after 1933 than those of the mid-1920s. After 1930, the peaceful 
revisionists, especially the left-leaning ones, were increasingly marginalized as 
Weimar’s foreign policymakers abandoned persistent deference to American 
psychology for a quasi-Wilhelmine “free-hand” approach. German attention 
shifted increasingly toward southeastern Europe and Latin America, where 
moral conquests seemed more readily attainable.
21 Peter Grupp, Deutsche Außenpolitik im Schatten von Versailles: Zur Politik des Auswärtigen 
Amts vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs und der Novemberrevolution bis zum Inkrafttreten des Ver-
sailler Vertrags, 1918–1920 (Paderborn, 1988).
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Finally, even if I agree that toward a specific country – the United States – 
and for a very specific period of time – from 1923 to 1930 – German public 
diplomacy in the United States was indeed part of a “republican foreign pol-
icy,” there was still no “republican” public diplomacy, i. e., a systematic effort 
to promote a democratic Germany in the United States. Of course, some of 
Germany’s “peaceful revisionists” like Ernst Jäckh, Anton Erkelenz, Reinhold 
Schairer, and Ambassador Prittwitz did emphasize the deep historical roots 
of German democracy and sought to underline the values and ideals it shared 
with the United States. But their individual emphasis did not make a larger 
policy. Despite the fact that Germany’s democratic status was widely acknowl-
edged as a distinct asset in the United States, the Foreign Ministry’s records 
provide little indication of any systematic championing of a democratic Ger-
many.22 For example, Berlin’s criticism of German tourism promotion (Chap-
ter 6) revolved around the reluctance to promote a (high) cultural Germany, 
not the equally obvious reluctance to promote a democratic Germany. In the 
same vein, the Wilhelmstrasse rejected the Vereinigung Carl Schurz’s request 
to change its name to honor Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (a Prussian gen-
eral) rather than Carl Schurz (a 1848 revolutionary) on the political grounds 
that it was best to avoid any association with the German-American Steuben 
Society, not on the ideological grounds that Schurz might more appropriately 
represent the Weimar Republic. The absurdity of the situation was perhaps best 
recognized by U.S. Ambassador Schurman, who always wondered why Ger-
mans would keenly promote the role a relatively obscure historical figure like 
Steuben played in the American Revolution while making no serious effort 
to emphasize the role of Enlightenment thinkers like Immanuel Kant. Even 
though Germany had a notable tradition of democratic thought and action, 
the Foreign Ministry seems to have made no concerted attempt to capitalize 
on it. What is more, Weimar Germany failed to require even basic democratic 
convictions of those it sent abroad as “informal ambassadors.” Whereas Nazi 
Germany carefully screened its exchange students for their National Socialist 
beliefs, Weimar never even asked whether they had a basic commitment to 
democratic government. As a consequence, Germany sent National Socialist 
exchange students to the United States long before 1933.23
These realities reveal a deeper dilemma of German foreign policy after 
World War I: the commitment to revision usually trumped the commitment to 
democratic government. Especially when faced with the decision to promote 
either the republic or to make discrete revisionist gains, German elites almost 
invariably chose the latter. It was symptomatic that German exchange students, 
22 Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften, 86.
23 One example is Ulrich von Gienanth, who joined the NSDAP in 1930 and was sent abroad as 
an exchange student in 1931. After 1937 he served as the Ministry of Propaganda’s “propaganda 
attaché” at the German Embassy in Washington.
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before leaving for the United States were sworn in on a common revisionist 
agenda, not a common democratic one. This is not to repeat old claims that 
Weimar was a democracy (entirely) without democrats but to emphasize that 
allegiance to the Reich and the recovery of its former glory were usually vastly 
more important to German elites. Weimar governments, as scholars have 
shown, strongly encouraged revisionism in the hope that it would hold a di-
vided postwar German society together; in the end, the ever louder, ever more 
violent calls for revision only contributed to its downfall.24
That many Americans still came to see the Weimar Republic in a decidedly 
democratic light arguably owed more to American hopes and assumptions 
than to any large-scale German projection. After the mid-1920s, American in-
vestors, politicians, and journalists often desired to see the new-born republic 
in a certain way, reflecting their ambitions to boost German loans, to aid in its 
recovery, or simply to find their hopes in a peaceful and stable Europe fulfilled. 
Not least, such impressions of a democratic Germany revealed an American 
disposition to regard the transition from monarchy to republic as a progressive 
and irreversible act. Many Americans were eager to hear men like Prittwitz or 
Jäckh paint the picture of a “new Germany,” and American tourists were quick 
to confuse an “Americanized” Germany with a democratic one. Despite some 
more critical voices, many Americans did not – or did not want to – see that 
Germany’s embrace of American-style sports was no indicator of democratic 
conversion or that the German professors the Carnegie Endowment circulated 
in the United States – for all their excellent connections – were actually “out-
siders,” as Peter Gay called them, in the German system.25 Without reading 
history backwards – there was certainly nothing foreordained about Weimar’s 
collapse – a significant part of America’s enthusiasm for a democratic Germany 
rested on wishful thinking. In the end, Weimar shone much brighter abroad 
than it did at home.
24 Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage, 72.
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